IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No Sll3 of 1987 B e t w e e n -
JOHN FAIRFAX & SONS LIMITED
and PETER HASTINGS
Appellants
and
EDUARDO MURPHY COJUANGCO
Respondent
MASON CJ
WILSON J
DEANE J
TOOHEY J
GAUDRON J
| Fairfax(3) |
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 12 MAY 1988, AT 10.19 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
| C2T2/l/SDL | 1 | 12/5/88 |
| MR A.M. GLEESON, QC: | May it please the Court, in this matter |
I appear with my learned friends, MR W.H. NICHOLAS, QC
and MR S.D. RARES, for the appellant. (instructed
by Mallesons Stephen Jaques)
| MR T.E.F. HUGgES, QC: | May it please the Court, I appear with |
my learned friends, MR J.R. SACKAR, QC and
:t-1R G.O'L.REYNOLDS for the respondent. (instructed
by Baker & gcRenzie)
| MASON CJ: | Yes, Mr Gleeson. |
| MR GLEESON: | Your Honours, I hand up an outline of argument |
for the appellant. Your Honours, in an endeavour
to permit concentration of the argument in relationto the central issues we have taken, perhaps,
a slightly unusual course that I have foreshadowed
to my learned friend, of preparing a two-page
document headed, "References to background materials".
May I hand that up.
| MASON CJ: | Yes. |
MR GLEESON: It is a document that simply contains references
to statutes and cases that might be of interest
to the Court but that are not seen as being likelyto be of central importance to the argument of
either side. If I may simply take a few minutes
to comment on those.
First of all, contrary to what I told the Court on the special leave application in this matter, Part 3 is not unique to New South Wales
and there are provisions in the rules of the Federal
Court and the Supreme Court Rules in other States which are to similar effect.
Paragraph 2 of this document refers to some
interesting legislation which existed in New South
Wales since before 1912 but is not reproduced
in the DEFAMATION ACT 1974. The report of the Law Reform Commission on defamation says that
that was because of the existence of Part 3 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of New South Wales
which came into force in 1972. That was legislation
under which the court had power to order a newspaper
~roprietor to identify the writer of an article
1n a newspaper.
(Continued on page 3)
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MR GLEESON (continuing): It is somewhat different from the
issue that is involved in the present case but it
may be regarded as a coinate matter and there
developed in New South Wales a stream of cases or
authority on that particular provision which was the subject, for example, of a brief note in the Australian Law Journal. Perhaps I could hand up
to Your Honours copies of that Australian Law
Journal note. There was a case in the High Court
on that legislation which was HOLLINGSWORTH V HEWITT,
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- AGLC
- John Fairfax & Sons Limited & Anor v Conjuanco [1988] HCATrans 91
- Case
- [1988] HCATrans 91
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was the proper application of rules, specifically Part 3 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which governs orders for the discovery of the identity of newspaper article authors. The court was required to consider whether a "special circumstances" exception applied to such orders and, if so, what constituted such circumstances, drawing upon historical legislative provisions and case law from both Australia and England.
The court's reasoning, as indicated by the submissions, involved an examination of the historical development of rules allowing for the identification of anonymous authors, including provisions that predated the Defamation Act 1974. The submissions highlighted that while historically courts referred to a "special circumstances" exception, the precise nature of these circumstances remained elusive in case law. The court also considered the procedural aspects, noting that applications under these rules are typically made ex parte, but that in this instance, notice was given due to the perceived importance of the matter, leading to a specific test formulated by the judge of first instance that placed the onus of proof on the respondent.
Orders
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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