John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Gacic

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales concerning a defamation action brought by Aleksandra Gacic, Ljiljana Gacic, and Branislav Ciric (the respondents) against John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd and Mr Matthew Evans (the appellants). The respondents alleged that a publication by the appellants had caused damage to their business reputation and led to a loss of profits. The core of the dispute involved the interpretation and application of statutory provisions governing appeals from jury findings in defamation cases, specifically sections 7A of the *Defamation Act 1974* (NSW) and 108(3) of the *Supreme Court Act 1970* (NSW).

The legal issues before the High Court included whether section 108(3) of the *Supreme Court Act* conferred a power on the Court of Appeal to direct a verdict for a plaintiff on specific issues where the jury's findings were found to be unreasonable as a matter of law. The Court also had to determine the role of the jury in defamation proceedings, particularly when a jury found that imputations were conveyed but were not defamatory, and whether the Court of Appeal was obliged to order a new trial in such circumstances. The proper interpretation of the word "may" within section 108(3) and its implications for the Court of Appeal's duty to exercise its power when an entitlement to a verdict is established were also central to the determination.

A majority of the High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Court of Appeal. The majority held that the Court of Appeal had erred in its approach to the statutory powers of appeal. They concluded that section 108(3) of the *Supreme Court Act* did confer a power to direct verdicts where issues were established as a matter of law, and that this power should have been exercised in favour of the respondents on certain imputations. The Court ordered that verdicts be entered for the respondents on specific imputations, finding them to be defamatory, while a verdict was entered for the appellants on another imputation. The remaining issues were remitted for a new jury determination.