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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M57 of 1992 B e t w e e n -
JLM & ANOR
Applicants
and
MICHAEL MILLAR, JOHN PATTERSON
& JOHN MYERS
Respondents
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M58 of 1992 B e t w e e n -
PTC
Applicant
and
MICHAEL MILLAR, JOHN PATTERSON
| JLM | 1 | 13/11/92 |
& JOHN MYERS
Respondents
Applications for special leave
to appeal
MASON CJ
BRENNAN J
McHUGH J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 13 NOVEMBER 1992, AT 10.08 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR R. MERKEL, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my
learned friend, MR J.B.R. BEACH, on behalf of the
applicants. (instructed by the Director of Legal
Aid Commission (Victoria))
MR F.X COSTIGAN, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my
learned friend, MR I.R.L. FRECKELTON, for the
respondents. (instructed by the Victorian
Government Solicitor)
| MASON CJ: | Mr Merkel, before you proceed, I should say that |
the Deputy Registrar of the Court has received
letters from the Registrar of the Childrens Court
advising that Mr Myers, the third-named respondent,
does not wish to be represented at the hearing of
these matters and will abide by any order of the
Court.
MR MERKEL: If the Court pleases. In our submission, the
matters raised by the present application cover
three basic issues on which special leave is
sought. The first relates to what, in our submission, will be a great injustice to the 81
children and the 16 families if the proceedings
proceed as presently formulated to a joint hearing
of all 81 protection applications together.
second concerns the principles to be applied by a The court when joinder is sought of different cases
because of some commonality of interest or of
subject-matter. And we say that principle is one of general application. The third issue relates to the power of the Childrens Court to hear separate protection applications jointly in the absence of the consent of the parties. If I could deal with
our submissions in respect of each of those matters
in the order that I have indicated to Your Honours.
BRENNAN J: It must be difficult to do so, though, is it
not, because you really have to start with the
section 82 problem, do you not?
| JLM | 2 | 13/11/92 |
| MASON CJ: | The jurisdiction point, the power point. |
| MR MERKEL: | Yes, Your Honours. | The first two points assume |
power, and the third -
| MASON CJ: | Is it not logical to deal with the power point |
first?
| MR MERKEL: | Yes, Your Honours, if I can do that first. | In |
our submission, the Full Court correctly accepted
that there were no statutory provisions or rules of
court which permitted the joinder of separate
applications but Their Honours - and this was dealt
with in His Honour Mr Justice Brooking's judgment -
found that the power to order joinder of
proceedings arose as part of…
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- Case
- [1992] HCATrans 334
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine three main issues: whether a joint hearing of all 81 protection applications would result in a great injustice; the principles governing the joinder of different cases due to commonality of interest or subject matter; and crucially, the power of the Childrens Court to hear separate protection applications jointly in the absence of party consent. The applicants initially sought to address the injustice and joinder principles, but the Court directed them to first address the jurisdictional point regarding the Childrens Court's power.
The applicants submitted that there were no statutory provisions or court rules permitting the joinder of separate applications. They contended that while the Full Court found such power arose from the inherent power of a court to regulate its procedures, this was distinct from the power to join different proceedings. They relied on historical precedent, including *Cameron v McBain* and *Crane v Director of Public Prosecutions*, to argue that courts historically lacked the power to order joinder of separate actions or indictments without party consent, suggesting that any such power must be explicitly conferred by statute.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi