JLM & Anor v Millar & Ors; PTC v Millar

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry

Melbourne No M57 of 1992

B e t w e e n -

JLM & ANOR

Applicants

and

MICHAEL MILLAR, JOHN PATTERSON

& JOHN MYERS

Respondents

Office of the Registry

Melbourne No M58 of 1992

B e t w e e n -

PTC

Applicant

and

MICHAEL MILLAR, JOHN PATTERSON

JLM 1 13/11/92

& JOHN MYERS

Respondents

Applications for special leave

to appeal

MASON CJ
BRENNAN J
McHUGH J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 13 NOVEMBER 1992, AT 10.08 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR R. MERKEL, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my

learned friend, MR J.B.R. BEACH, on behalf of the

applicants. (instructed by the Director of Legal

Aid Commission (Victoria))

MR F.X COSTIGAN, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my

learned friend, MR I.R.L. FRECKELTON, for the

respondents. (instructed by the Victorian

Government Solicitor)

MASON CJ:  Mr Merkel, before you proceed, I should say that

the Deputy Registrar of the Court has received

letters from the Registrar of the Childrens Court

advising that Mr Myers, the third-named respondent,

does not wish to be represented at the hearing of

these matters and will abide by any order of the

Court.

MR MERKEL: If the Court pleases. In our submission, the

matters raised by the present application cover

three basic issues on which special leave is

sought. The first relates to what, in our

submission, will be a great injustice to the 81

children and the 16 families if the proceedings

proceed as presently formulated to a joint hearing

of all 81 protection applications together.

second concerns the principles to be applied by a The

court when joinder is sought of different cases

because of some commonality of interest or of

subject-matter. And we say that principle is one
of general application. The third issue relates to

the power of the Childrens Court to hear separate protection applications jointly in the absence of the consent of the parties. If I could deal with

our submissions in respect of each of those matters

in the order that I have indicated to Your Honours.

BRENNAN J: It must be difficult to do so, though, is it

not, because you really have to start with the

section 82 problem, do you not?

JLM 2 13/11/92
MASON CJ:  The jurisdiction point, the power point.
MR MERKEL:  Yes, Your Honours. The first two points assume

power, and the third -

MASON CJ:  Is it not logical to deal with the power point

first?

MR MERKEL:  Yes, Your Honours, if I can do that first. In

our submission, the Full Court correctly accepted

that there were no statutory provisions or rules of

court which permitted the joinder of separate

applications but Their Honours - and this was dealt

with in His Honour Mr Justice Brooking's judgment -

found that the power to order joinder of

proceedings arose as part of…

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Details
Case
[1992] HCATrans 334
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants, JLM and another, and PTC sought special leave to appeal from a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria. The dispute concerned the power of the Childrens Court to jointly hear separate protection applications without the consent of the parties. The applicants argued that a joint hearing of 81 protection applications involving 16 families would cause great injustice.

The High Court was required to determine three main issues: whether a joint hearing of all 81 protection applications would result in a great injustice; the principles governing the joinder of different cases due to commonality of interest or subject matter; and crucially, the power of the Childrens Court to hear separate protection applications jointly in the absence of party consent. The applicants initially sought to address the injustice and joinder principles, but the Court directed them to first address the jurisdictional point regarding the Childrens Court's power.

The applicants submitted that there were no statutory provisions or court rules permitting the joinder of separate applications. They contended that while the Full Court found such power arose from the inherent power of a court to regulate its procedures, this was distinct from the power to join different proceedings. They relied on historical precedent, including *Cameron v McBain* and *Crane v Director of Public Prosecutions*, to argue that courts historically lacked the power to order joinder of separate actions or indictments without party consent, suggesting that any such power must be explicitly conferred by statute.

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