JJB & ERB
[2006] WASAT 110
•5 MAY 2006
JJB & ERB [2006] WASAT 110
| STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL | Citation No: | [2006] WASAT 110 | |
| GUARDIANSHIP AND ADMINISTRATION ACT 1990 (WA) | |||
| Case No: | GAA:2236/2005 | 9 FEBRUARY 2006 | |
| Coram: | MS F CHILD (MEMBER) | 5/05/06 | |
| 18 | Judgment Part: | 1 of 1 | |
| Result: | Applicant appointed limited guardian and plenary administrator Enduring power of attorney revoked | ||
| B | |||
| PDF Version |
| Parties: | JJB ERB |
Catchwords: | Guardianship and administration – Need for orders – Section 119 not operative for consent to treatment where spouse incapable – Enduring Powers of Attorney – Obligations on donees of enduring power of attorney appointed jointly and severally – Wishes of donors – Existing enduring powers of attorney not operating to protect the interests of the donors – Need for an administration order – Enduring power of attorney revoked |
Legislation: | Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA), s 4, s 4(1), s 4(2), s 43, s 43(1)(b), s 43(1)(c), s 44(2), s 44(5), s 64, s 107, s 107(1), s 109, s 119, s 119(3) State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 78 |
Case References: | Nil Nil |
JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL STREAM : HUMAN RIGHTS ACT : GUARDIANSHIP AND ADMINISTRATION ACT 1990 (WA) CITATION : JJB & ERB [2006] WASAT 110 MEMBER : MS F CHILD (MEMBER) HEARD : 9 FEBRUARY 2006 DELIVERED : 5 MAY 2006 FILE NO/S : GAA 2236 of 2005
- GAA 2238 of 2005
- ERB
Represented Persons
Catchwords:
Guardianship and administration – Need for orders – Section 119 not operative for consent to treatment where spouse incapable – Enduring Powers of Attorney – Obligations on donees of enduring power of attorney appointed jointly and severally – Wishes of donors – Existing enduring powers of attorney not operating to protect the interests of the donors – Need for an administration order – Enduring power of attorney revoked
Legislation:
Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA), s 4, s 4(1), s 4(2), s 43, s 43(1)(b), s 43(1)(c), s 44(2), s 44(5), s 64, s 107, s 107(1), s 109, s 119, s 119(3)
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 78
(Page 2)
Result:
Applicant appointed limited guardian and plenary administrator
Enduring power of attorney revoked
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Represented Persons : N/A
Solicitors:
Represented Persons : N/A
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Nil
Case(s) also cited:
Nil
(Page 3)
Summary of the Tribunal's decision
1 The granddaughter of an elderly married couple applied for orders from the State Administrative Tribunal under the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) (GA Act).
2 Both members of the elderly couple, who were residents of a nursing home, were diagnosed as suffering from dementia and were unable to make decisions about their financial affairs or consent to medical treatment.
3 The couple had appointed their son and their daughter-in-law, jointly and severally, under enduring powers of attorney signed in 2001. There was evidence before the Tribunal that the donees of the enduring powers of attorney had transferred $250 000 to themselves and had mortgaged the previously unencumbered property of the couple prior to its sale.
4 It was apparent from the medical evidence before the Tribunal, that the elderly man was hospitalised at the time, suffering dementia and not capable of making a gift of his property. There was also doubt whether his wife was capable at the time of the transfer of the funds, because of the medical and other evidence of the circumstances existing at the time.
5 Following the death of the son, the granddaughter applied to the Tribunal and was appointed administrator and guardian for her grandparents. The Tribunal found that there was a need for formal orders for both guardianship and administration for both members of the elderly couple. There was a need for a guardian as each was incapable of giving consent to treatment of the other. The Tribunal found there was a need for administrators to be appointed for the management of their estates, even though there were existing powers of attorney in favour of their daughter-in-law, which as joint and several appointments continued after the death of the son.
6 The enduring powers of attorney were revoked by the Tribunal as it was clear on the evidence before the Tribunal that the joint donees had not discharged their obligations under the GA Act, to maintain records of all transactions and to protect the interests of the elderly couple. The Tribunal determined that it was inappropriate that their daughter-in-law continue to play a role in relation to the management of their estates.
(Page 4)
7 The granddaughter was appointed administrator to manage and protect her grandparent's estates, and to attempt to recover funds inappropriately disbursed by the donees. She was appointed limited guardian of each to consent to medical treatment.
Applications
8 The written reasons for decision in these matters are provided at the request of the applicant under s 78 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA).
9 These reasons relate to applications before the Tribunal for the appointment of a guardian and an administrator for both JJB and ERB, an elderly married couple who both have a diagnosis of dementia and who at the time of the hearing, were resident in an aged care facility.
10 The applications are made by their granddaughter (the applicant) pursuant to s 43 and s 64 of the Guardianship and Administration Act1990 (WA) (GA Act).
11 The applications were heard together. Neither JJB nor ERB attended the hearing as the medical evidence provided stated that it would be detrimental to their health for them to attend as they both have severe dementia and agitation, and could make no contribution to the hearing.
12 The applicant attended as did her father, GA, (the son-in-law of JJB and ERB), HS, the brother of ERB, and SB, the daughter-in-law of JJB and ERB and the donee of their enduring powers of attorney (the donee). The donee was represented at the hearing by Mr B Wotherspoon (counsel).
13 To protect the privacy of the JJB and ERB, names of all parties will be anonymised in these reasons, consistent with the practice of the Tribunal in proceedings brought under the GA Act.
Legislation
14 Before a guardian can be appointed under s 43 of the GA Act, the Tribunal must be satisfied that one or all of the matters set out in subsection 43(1)(b) apply to that person. That provision states that the Tribunal must be satisfied that the person who is the subject of an application is:
"(i) incapable of looking after his own health and safety;
(Page 5)
- (ii) unable to make reasonable judgments in respect of matters relating to his person; or
(iii) in need of oversight, care or control in the interests of his own health and safety or for the protection of others …"
15 Even where the Tribunal is satisfied in relation to any of the above elements, it must also be satisfied that the person is in need of a guardian (s 43(1)(c)).
16 Before an administrator may be appointed under s 64, the Tribunal must be satisfied that the person is unable, by reason of mental disability, to make reasonable judgments in respect of matters relating to all or any part of his estate; and is in need of an administrator of his estate.
17 Section 43 and s 64 of the GA Act, for the appointment of a guardian and administrator respectively, are expressly subject to s 4 of the GA Act, which provides:
"(1) In dealing with the proceedings commenced under this Act the State Administrative Tribunal shall observe the principles set out in subsection (2).
(2) (a) The primary concern of the Tribunal shall be the best interests of any represented person, or of a person in respect of whom an application is made.
(b) Every person shall be presumed to be capable of —
(i) looking after his own health and safety;
(ii) making reasonable judgments in respect of matters relating to his person;
(iii) managing his own affairs; and
(iv) making reasonable judgments in respect of matters relating to his estate,
until the contrary is proved to the satisfaction of the State Administrative Tribunal.
(c) A guardianship or administration order shall not be made if the needs of the person in respect of
- whom an application for such an order is made could, in the opinion of the State Administrative Tribunal, be met by other means less restrictive of the person's freedom of decision and action.
- (d) A plenary guardian shall not be appointed under section 43(1) if the appointment of a limited guardian under that section would be sufficient, in the opinion of the State Administrative Tribunal, to meet the needs of the person in respect of whom the application is made.
(e) An order appointing a limited guardian or an administrator for a person shall be in terms that, in the opinion of the State Administrative Tribunal, impose the least restrictions possible in the circumstances on the person's freedom of decision and action.
(f) In considering any matter relating to a represented person or a person in respect of whom an application is made the State Administrative Tribunal shall, as far as possible, seek to ascertain the views and wishes of the person concerned as expressed, in whatever manner, at the time, or as gathered from the person's previous actions."
18 Section 44(2) of the GA Act provides guidance as to the question of suitability for appointment of a person as guardian, including the desirability of preserving existing relationships, the compatibility of the proposed appointee with any appointed administrator, the wishes of the represented person and whether the proposed appointee will be able to perform the functions vested in him or her.
19 There may be no need for the appointment of a guardian to consent to medical treatment for a person who is incapable of giving consent, if there is someone in the life of the incapable patient who can give consent recognised under s 119(3) of the GA Act. If there is such a person, he or she may give consent to medical treatment on behalf of the incapable person without the need for a formal order.
20 Section 119 provides:
(Page 7)
- "(1) If in the opinion of a practitioner a person presented to him for treatment ¾
(a) is in need of urgent treatment;
(b) is incapable of consenting to the proposed treatment; and
(c) is at the time of presentation a person for whom a guardian could be appointed under this Act,
the practitioner may provide the treatment if the person referred to in subsection (3) consents to it.
(1a) A practitioner may provide treatment under subsection (1) without the consent of the person referred to in subsection (3) if in the opinion of the practitioner it is not practicable to obtain that consent.
(2) If in the opinion of a practitioner a person presented to him for treatment ¾
(a) is in need of treatment that is not urgent treatment;
(b) is incapable of consenting to the proposed treatment; and
(c) is at the time of presentation a person for whom a guardian could be appointed under this Act,
the practitioner may provide the treatment if the person referred to in subsection (3) consents to it.
(3) For the purposes of subsections (1) and (2), the person who may consent to treatment is the first in order of priority of the following persons ¾
(a) a guardian of the person needing the treatment;
(b) the spouse or de facto partner of the person needing the treatment;
(c) a person who, on a regular basis, provides or arranges for domestic services and support to the
- person needing the treatment but does not receive remuneration for doing so;
- (d) a person who is the nearest relative (other than the spouse or de facto partner) of the person needing the treatment and who maintains a close personal relationship with the person needing the treatment;
(e) any other person who maintains a close personal relationship with the person needing treatment; or
(f) a person prescribed in the regulations.
- (3a) For the purposes of subsection (3) a person is to be regarded as maintaining a close personal relationship with the person needing the treatment if the relationship is maintained through frequent personal contact and a personal interest in the welfare of the person needing the treatment.
(4) In this section ¾
'practitioner' in relation to medical treatment means a medical practitioner within the meaning of the Medical Act 1894, and in relation to dental treatment means a dentist registered under the Dental Act 1939; and
'urgent treatment' means treatment that in the opinion of the practitioner concerned is urgently needed ¾
(a) to save the life of the person needing the treatment;
(b) to prevent serious damage to the health of the person needing the treatment; or
(c) to prevent the person needing the treatment from suffering or continuing to suffer significant pain or distress."
(Page 9)
- executed by a proposed represented person can operate as a less restrictive alternative to the making of an administration order for that person.
22 Specifically s 107 provides:
"(1) The donee of an enduring power of attorney ¾
(a) shall exercise his powers as attorney with reasonable diligence to protect the interests of the donor and, if he fails to do so, he is liable to the donor for any loss occasioned by the failure;
(b) shall keep and preserve accurate records and accounts of all dealings and transactions made under the power;
(c) subject to section 109(2), may not renounce a power during any period of legal incapacity of the donor; and
(d) shall, if the donee becomes bankrupt, report that bankruptcy to the State Administrative Tribunal.
Penalty applicable to paragraph (b): $2 000."
Previous application for intervention by the donees of the enduring powers of attorney
23 The Tribunal absorbed the jurisdiction and functions of the former Guardianship and Administration Board (the Board) in January 2005. The files previously held by the Board are now in the possession of the Tribunal.
24 On the material before the Tribunal, it seems that JJB and ERB both executed enduring powers of attorneys on 12 September 2001. The son of the couple (now deceased) and their daughter-in-law were appointed jointly and severally as donees. The enduring powers of attorney were in the form to come into force from the date of execution.
25 On 1 May 2003, the son of JJB and ERB applied to the Board under s 109 of the GA Act for orders varying the power and seeking direction in respect of the enduring power of attorney executed by JJB.
(Page 10)
26 The application form submitted to the Board by the son states that the reason for the application was the "wish to borrow money on my parents [sic] behalf to maintain their home".
27 In response to a question in the application form regarding informing the donors of the application, the applicant son responded "[n]o … They have lost the capacity to understand". In a letter dated 30 April 2003, the applicant son states "[m]y [m]other has severe dementia and my father has severe Alzheimers [sic]".
28 The letter proposes that $30 000 be borrowed on behalf of JJB and ERB to effect repairs on their property. Later, in a letter dated 11 June 2003 to the Board, the applicant son refers to his application and states that his parents "have both deteriorated rapidly". It refers to an admission of his father to hospital after a period of wandering and a police search, and states:
"Both he and my Mother have no recollection of this. My Mothers [sic] loss of reality and her fear of being put into a nursing home is affecting her judgment in not accepting the severity of danger to father."
29 The file also contains medical and allied health reports regarding both JJB and ERB.
30 A letter from the donee, dated 8 July 2003, states in part "I fully support the application made by my husband …"
31 The letter notes concern about "a fast deterioration in their condition. [JJB] is now unable to make any decisions for himself and … [ERB] is struggling also with this responsibility".
32 The documents from the file including the application, file notes, correspondence and a report of a social worker from the Department of Rehabilitation and Aged Care were tabled at the hearing of the current applications. The relevance of the material from this earlier application before the former Board will be discussed later in these reasons.
Capacity
33 In respect of the issue of the current capacity of JJB and ERB, there is no conflict among those at the hearing that both are incapable of making decisions in relation to their persons or in relation to their estates.
(Page 11)
34 Reports were provided to the Tribunal by Dr MJ, who notes that he has known JJB and ERB for two years, and both are suffering from dementia and are incapable of managing their affairs both in relation to their personal living situation, health care and financial decision-making.
35 In respect of JJB, Dr JM described a diagnosis of "probable Alzheimer's dementia".
36 A report from the director of nursing of the aged care facility in which JJB lives states that he had been admitted there from Selby Lodge, a psycho-geriatric facility.
37 In respect of ERB, Dr MJ states that the diagnosis is "[d]ementia – query – Alzheimer's" and "there's been a gradual decline". The director of nursing notes, "[c]ognitive decline, anxiety, Alzheimer's disease, admitted from Selby Lodge, resident unable to converse sensibly".
38 Medical reports on the file of the former Board relate primarily to JJB but also refer to ERB.
39 Other medical evidence was provided by the applicant in the course of the hearing, including discharge summaries from Selby Lodge dated April 2004, for both JJB and ERB.
40 Based on all the medical evidence, I find that both JJB and ERB are persons for whom administration and guardianship orders can be made.
Need for a guardianship order
41 The applicant states that there is a need for the appointment of a guardian for the purposes of giving consent to medical treatment of both JJB and ERB.
42 Although the applicant describes the couple as being in reasonably good health, other than their cognitive impairments, she considers that there is a need for certainty about future decisions regarding medical treatment. She states that she is a registered nurse and has the necessary experience to make medical decisions for her grandparents. She states she has regular contact with the staff of the aged care facility where they live.
43 The donee does not support the appointment of a guardian for JJB or ERB, as she considers that there is no need for the appointments. It is submitted that prior to his death, the son gave consent to medical treatment and the health care of his parents, and this informal decision-making should continue and that should future health issues arise
(Page 12)
- for JJB or ERB, any decisions can be made informally by their relatives, including the donee and the applicant.
44 Counsel argued that if informal decision-making could not occur, then s 119 of the GA Act provides a mechanism by which consent to treatment could be obtained if necessary. The operation of s 119 was said to provide a less restrictive alternative to the appointment of a guardian.
45 Having considered the position of JJB and ERB, and all of the evidence, I consider that even if it was a lawful less restrictive alternative to the proposed guardianship orders, the proposed informal arrangement of joint decision-making by family members is unlikely to operate effectively because of the apparent breakdown in the relationships between the donee and the other members of the family present at the hearing.
46 In respect of the submission by counsel regarding the operation of s 119 of the GA Act, I consider that s 119 cannot operate in the situation of either member of this couple.
47 As set out above, the GA Act provides in s 119(3) the persons who may give consent for a patient who requires treatment but cannot consent to it.
48 The section provides that the person who may consent is the first in order of priority of those in the list. The first in the order of priority in the list is a guardian. The second is the spouse of the person needing treatment.
49 Both JJB and ERB have a spouse but that spouse, because of his or her own disability, is unable to give consent to treatment on behalf of the other. Although the spouse is the first in order of priority of persons under s 119(3), each is unable to perform that role. Because of the language of the section, it is not possible to go beyond the first in the order of persons in the list as it applies in a particular case.
50 As there is no person able to give lawful consent to medical treatment for JJB and ERB under s 119 of the GA, there is, in the statutory sense of s 43(1)(c) a need for a guardian for each of them.
51 While the donee did not consider that there was a need for an order if an appointment was to be made, she proposed a joint appointment of herself with the applicant. The applicant did not support a joint appointment.
(Page 13)
52 Because of the manifest deterioration in the relationship between the donee and the applicant, a joint appointment was considered inappropriate and not in the best interests of JJB and ERB.
53 In relation to the suitability of the applicant for appointment the donee described the applicant during the hearing as a "wonderful person" who had been an "excellent granddaughter" to JJB and ERB, and that she supported her making decisions for them (transcript page 17).
54 The appointment of the applicant as guardian to give consent to medical treatment of JJB and ERB was supported by the other family members present.
Need for an administration order
55 The applicant states that following the death of the son of JJB and ERB in November 2005, family members had become concerned about how the affairs of JJB and ERB were managed.
56 The applicant states that information about the finances had not been forthcoming from the donee immediately following the son's death, and what was known by family members from the donee about transactions undertaken by the son had concerned her and prompted her application for appointment as administrator for the estates of JJB and ERB.
57 In response to the application, the donee's submission is that while it is accepted that both JJB and ERB are suffering from dementia and are incapable of making reasonable decisions in respect of their estates, there is no need for the appointment of administrators as both JJB and ERB executed enduring powers of attorney in 2001, in which they both appointed their son and daughter-in-law, the donee, as joint and several attorneys.
58 The submission is that the enduring powers of attorney express the intentions of JJB and ERB for the management of their estates while they were both capable of expressing that wish, and provide a less restrictive alternative which meet the needs of JJB and ERB for management of their financial affairs and as such, the Tribunal may not appoint administrators for them.
59 The donee did not accept that she had failed to provide information about the management of the estates and stated that the sudden death of the son of JJB and ERB, her husband, and the impact this had had on her
(Page 14)
- and her children, had not been acknowledged by the other family members.
60 Copies of the enduring powers of attorney executed by JJB and ERB are before the Tribunal.
61 Both the applicant and HS suggested in the course of the hearing that the signature on the enduring power of attorney was not that of JJB.
62 It is not necessary to deal with this issue for the purpose of these reasons, as both enduring powers of attorney were revoked for other reasons. The hearing proceeded on the basis that the Tribunal accepted the enduring powers of attorney of JJB and ERB as validly executed and witnessed instruments by which each appointed the donee and her late husband as joint and several attorneys.
63 It is accepted that the authority of the donee is not "invalidated" by the death of the other donee.
64 The further submission at the hearing by the applicant, is that the donees have not acted appropriately under the enduring powers of attorney by making a gift of $250 000 of the funds of JJB and ERB to themselves, and by mortgaging their property prior to its sale. She also raises the possibility that the donees of the enduring powers of attorney have not accurately stated the asset position of JJB and ERB in declarations made by them to Centrelink and for assessment of the nursing home fees, and as such, the donees may have breached obligations and have incurred liabilities for the estates of JJB and ERB for overpayments of pension and underassessment of nursing home fees.
65 The applicant states the donees borrowed money secured by mortgage on the property of JJB and ERB in October 2003, at a time when they were in Selby Lodge, a psycho-geriatric facility, and not expected to return to their home to live. Documents submitted at the hearing by the applicant included "[d]ischarge letters" for both JJB and ERB from Selby Lodge with admission dates for each as 5 September 2003 and discharge dates of 14 April 2004. The applicant states, and the reports of the director of nursing confirm, that both JJB and ERB were admitted to the nursing home where they now reside from Selby Lodge.
66 A settlement statement, dated 7 May 2004, for the settlement of the sale of the property of JJB and ERB was provided to the hearing by the
(Page 15)
- donee. It refers to the sale price $550 000 and the discharge of mortgage to the Challenge Bank in the amount of $100 229.38.
67 The donee confirmed the mortgage and states that the loan was obtained so that her husband could "… renovate their house so that he could keep them cared for in there and then that changed because of their decline and then it was going to be our house ..." (transcript page 30).
68 When asked what the loan monies had been used for, the donee states that she didn't know, but later said that some of the money had been used for renovations of the property (transcript page 31). The applicant challenges this saying that she didn't see any evidence of any improvements made to the house. The written submission for the donee does not refer to the mortgage or the disbursement of loan monies.
69 The lack of certainty and clarity in the evidence of the donee regarding the disbursement of the loan monies suggests that the funds were not applied to repair or renovation of the property of JJB and ERB, and I accept the evidence of the applicant in this regard.
70 In relation to the $250 000 said to be gifted by JJB and ERB to the donee and her late husband, the written submission made on behalf of the donee states:
"The house was sold so that [JJB] could receive appropriate care in a nursing home. He was suffering from dementia at this time. [ERB] also moved into the home at this time so that she could be with [JJB], but we are instructed that ERB was capable of looking after herself and making her own decisions. Around this time, [ERB] had said to [the son] that he could have 250,000 of the proceeds from the sale. Our client recalls [ERB] saying to [the son] on numerous occasions in 2004 that he could have 250,000 because [JJB] and her no longer needed it and because it would be better that he had the money now which he was to receive under [JJB] and [ERB]'s wills rather than leave it sitting in the bank. We are instructed that [ERB] had capacity to gift the money at that time. In response to his mother's comments and with her authorisation, [the son] transferred $250,000 of the sale proceeds to himself."
71 The donee's evidence in the hearing is that $250 000 was transferred into a bank account in her name alone as her husband did not have a bank account. From there it was transferred into the mortgage account in both their names.
(Page 16)
72 The $250 000 "gifted" was part of the proceeds of sale of the jointly owned property of JJB and ERB. The written submission does not refer to or address the question of the capacity of JJB to make the gift of the jointly owned funds and all the medical and other evidence including that of the donee herself appears to support the view that he was not capable at the time the funds were transferred.
73 The applicant considers that ERB also would not have been capable of making this gift at the time of the transfer of the funds. The contemporaneous medical evidence provided by the applicant and the material available from the former Board's file tends to support the view of the applicant.
74 It was submitted for the donee that the financial affairs of JJB and ERB were managed entirely by the son during his lifetime. It was said that the donee never used the power of attorney in any way to deal with the financial affairs of JJB or ERB. It was said, that as she never used the power, she herself had never kept records and she had no knowledge of the financial affairs.
75 She states she "had nothing to do with the bank accounts" (transcript page 39). It was submitted by counsel that she had relied on her husband to manage the estates as she "trusted him" (transcript page 5). Later, when questioned about the disbursement of loan funds obtained, she stated that "I was never allowed to know" (transcript page 31). The donee persisted in her statements in the hearing that she had not been involved in any of the financial dealings but this is inconsistent with the other evidence both in relation to the receipt of funds and in relation to resident's agreements apparently signed by her. Whatever the true position, she accepted the role of donee and the obligations under s 107 of the GAA Act arise from her acceptance of that role. It was conceded by counsel that the obligations arise for both donees (transcript page 28).
76 The submission of the donee that she continues in her role as donee to provide for the future management of the financial affairs of JJB and ERB cannot be sustained. On the one hand she states she should continue as she was appointed by JJB and ERB, on the other she states that she never acted in the role of attorney and appears to accept no responsibility for the management of the affairs of JJB and ERB during the period the enduring powers of attorney have been in effect. From her evidence, it appears she is not familiar with the day to day financial arrangements involved in the management of their estates.
(Page 17)
77 Having considered all of the evidence submitted, including the donee's own evidence regarding the past management of the estate under the stewardship of the donee and her late husband, I consider there is a need for administration orders to be made for both JJB and ERB.
78 I accept that the enduring powers of attorney reflected the wishes of JJB and ERB regarding the future management of their affairs when they appointed the donee and her late husband jointly and severally as donees. In doing so, JJB and ERB placed great trust in their son and the donee to manage their affairs diligently and to protect their interests. It is clear from the evidence that their estates have been diminished significantly during the period of the stewardship of the donees.
79 It is in the best interests of JJB and ERB that an administrator be appointed for each of them and while this may not be consistent with the wishes expressed at the time of execution of their enduring powers of attorney, the Tribunal is bound to make orders in the best interests of the donors consistent with their protection from financial abuse.
80 The applicant submits, and I accept, that she should be appointed administrator for both JJB and ERB to preserve what is left in the estates and to attempt to recover funds inappropriately dispersed by the donees.
81 She is appointed limited guardian to consent to treatment of both JJB and ERB.
Orders
82 The Tribunal makes the following orders:
1. KLW be appointed plenary administrator of the estate of JJB and ERB with all the powers and duties conferred by the Act.
2. The enduring power of attorney dated 12 September 2001, by which JJB and ERB appointed DJB and SMB to be his attorneys, be revoked.
3. This order is to be reviewed by 9 February 2011.
(Page 18)
- I certify that this and the preceding [82] paragraphs comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
___________________________________
MS F CHILD, MEMBER
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