JINSON & FLETCHER

[2016] FamCA 140

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

JINSON & FLETCHER [2016] FamCA 140

FAMILY LAW – ORDERS BY CONSENT – all outstanding applications adjourned

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

British American Tobacco Australia Services Limited v Laurie [2011] HCA 2

APPLICANT: Ms Jinson

RESPONDENT: Mr Fletcher

FILE NUMBER: MLC 3123 of 2014

DATE DELIVERED: 9 March 2016

PLACE DELIVERED: Melbourne

PLACE HEARD: Melbourne (in chambers)

JUDGMENT OF: Cronin J

HEARING DATE: 9 March 2016

EMAILED CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED FROM

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT:	O’Hanlon Foster Lawyers
SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT:	Goldhirsch & Shnider

Orders

Upon reading the correspondence of each of the solicitors for the parties

IT IS ORDERED BY CONSENT:

1. That the interlocutory hearing listed for 1 April 2016 is vacated.

2. That all outstanding applications are adjourned to a date to be fixed and referred to the case management judge for further determination.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Jinson & Fletcher has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE

FILE NUMBER: MLC 3123  of 2014

Ms Jinson

Applicant

And

Mr Fletcher

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. In this property application, there is a dispute about the ownership and control of property in the form of a foundation conducted outside of Australia. The proceedings have been before the Court since 2014 and in that time, 14 hearings have been held. The final hearing had been allocated for three days commencing on 7 October 2015, relisted to commence on 8 October 2015 and then adjourned to commence as a two day hearing on 18 January 2016.  It had to be adjourned for various reasons all associated with the parties.

2. At the most recent hearing, the parties sought an interlocutory hearing focusing on discovery be appointed prior to the final trial being listed again.

3. In the course of discussion, it became apparent that there is a prospect (and it can be no higher than that) that the interlocutory determination might give rise to findings which, if critical of a party, would give rise to a British American Tobacco Australia Services Limited v Laurie [2011] HCA 2 type of problem.

4. As a consequence, the date for the interlocutory hearing was fixed before me and a timetable was set. It was therefore anticipated that after that hearing, the matter would be set down for trial, and, if necessary, before another judge.

5. By email letter dated 8 March, the solicitors for the wife, and with the apparent agreement of the solicitors for the husband, sought to vacate the interlocutory hearing because both parties had recently undergone medical procedures. In respect of the timetable, the solicitor said:

6. We have already (as a result of the medical procedures) had slippage in the deadlines.

7. The letter went on to say that the allocated hearing date would be a waste of the Court’s time. Senior counsel engaged for the parties had provided some dates in the second half of May where it would suit for the matter to be listed.

8. In setting the timetable, the parties were informed of the resource shortage of the Court. The proposed dates are outside of my personal capacity and I suspect, the Court generally. Accordingly, the only solution is to vacate the allocated date and refer the matter to the Case Management Judge for further determination. I shall order accordingly.

I certify that the preceding Eight (8) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Cronin delivered on 9 March 2016.

Associate: 

Date:  9 March 2016