Jingyi & Chao (No 2)
[2022] FedCFamC2F 1836
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Jingyi & Chao (No 2) [2022] FedCFamC2F 1836
File number(s): SYC 3653 of 2021 Judgment of: JUDGE MORLEY Date of judgment: 15 December 2022 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – property – interim injunctive orders – where the Applicant Wife seeks to amend an injunctive order in order to sell real property in NSW and thereafter purchase real property in Queensland – Court vacates the previous injunctive order – where upon completion of the purchase of Queensland property, the Wife is restrained from dealing with her interest in the Queensland property and ensuring at all times that her equity therein shall be no less than $668,250 – where the Applicant Wife shall make weekly disclosures regarding each loan account secured by mortgage on Queensland property to the Respondents – where the matter is transferred to Division 1 of the Court.
FAMILY LAW – parenting – interim parenting orders – where the child spends alternate weekday and overnight time with his Mother – where it is in the child’s best interest to spend weekday and overnight weekend time with his Mother on alternate weekends – where it is in the child’s best interest to spend five consecutive nights with the Mother during school holidays.
Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 60B, 60CA, 60CC, 65, 65DAA. Cases cited: Melville & Melville (No 3) (2020) 61 Fam LR 280
Newett & Newett (2020) FamCAFC 76
Division: Division 2 Family Law Number of paragraphs: 33 Date of hearing: 15 December 2022 Place: Parramatta Counsel for the Applicant Mr Lloyd SC Solicitor for the Applicant: JC Legal Practice Counsel for the Respondents: Mr Condon SC and Mr Southwood Solicitor for the Respondents: Juris Cor Legal ORDERS
SYC 3653 of 2021 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: MS JINGYI
Applicant
AND: MR CHAO
First Respondent
MR B CHAO
Second Respondent
MR TIAN (and another named in the Schedule)
Third Respondent
order made by:
JUDGE MORLEY
DATE OF ORDER:
15 DECEMBER 2022
THE COURT NOTES THAT:
A.Pursuant to Court Orders made on 20 April 2022, upon the completion of the purchase of D Street, Suburb E NSW, the First Applicant be restrained from dealing with, assigning, and transferring or further encumbering her interest in the Suburb E Property ensuring at all times that her equity therein shall not be less than $668,250.00.
B.JC Legal Practice is presently administrating a controlled money account with the sum of $105,062.00 under the joint name of the Applicant and First Respondent.
C.The First Applicant has entered into a contract for the purchase of property located at F Street, Suburb G, QLD at a price around $2.4 million in mid-2022.
D.The Suburb E Property has been listed for auction on 26 November 2022.
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Discharge order 3 of the consent orders dealing with the Suburb E property made on 20 April 2022.
PENDING FURTHER ORDER, THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS THAT:
2.Upon completion of the sale of the Suburb E property, the Applicant shall do all acts, things and sign all necessary documents to cause the sale proceeds of the Suburb E property of no less than $668,250 to be paid into the JC Legal Practice's trust account and such funds can only be utilised thereafter for purchase of Applicant's equity in the Queensland property.
3.The Applicant Wife shall provide to the Respondents, the settlement adjustment sheet, documents and records relating to the sale of the Suburb E property and the purchase of the Queensland property within three (3) business days after the settlements are completed.
4.Upon completion of the purchase of Queensland property, the Applicant Wife is restrained from dealing with, assigning, transferring, further encumbering or otherwise so dealing with her interest in the Queensland property, ensuring at all times that her equity therein shall be not less than $668,250.
5.The Applicant Wife shall provide to Respondents on a weekly basis a statement in relation to each loan account secured by mortgage on the Queensland property.
6.The Applicant Wife shall give the Respondents notice in writing within 24 hours of any default by her in relation to any required payment or payments on all and any loan accounts secured by mortgage on any of the following real properties: D Street, Suburb E NSW, H Street, Suburb J Queensland, K Street, Suburb G Queensland, L Street, Suburb N NSW and F Street, Suburb G Queensland.
7.That the First Respondent Husband file and serve an Amended Financial Statement by no later than 4:00PM on 20 January 2023.
8.That in the event that the Applicant Mother intends to spend time with X born 2019 ("the child"), as provided in order 6 of the orders made on 24 December 2021, the Applicant Mother must give the Respondent Father five (5) clear days' notice in writing of her intention to spend that time with the child.
9.The Applicant Mother spend time with the child each alternate weekend from the end of preschool/daycare or school or 4:00PM on Friday until 4:00PM on the following Sunday, commencing on the 13 January 2023.
10.That the mother spend time with the child during each school holiday period and including the school holiday periods prior to the child commencing school attendance for a period of five (5) consecutive nights at times to be agreed been the parents in writing.
11.The mother communicate with the child via video call through a medium agreed between Applicant Mother and the Respondent Father each alternate Friday on which the Applicant Mother is not otherwise spending time with the child at some time between 7:00PM and 7:30PM.
12.Each of the Applicant Mother and Respondent Father are restrained from making comments derogatory of the other parent, any member of the other parent's family, or any member of the other parent's household, in the presence or within the hearing of the child.
13.Each of the Applicant Mother and Respondent Father are restrained from allowing the child to remain in the presence of or within the hearing of any other person who is making comments derogatory of the other parent, any member of the other parent's family, or any member of the other parent's household.
14.The costs of each party today are reserved.
15.The proceedings are transferred to Division 1 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia on a date and at a time to be advised by the National Assessment Team, on the basis that:
(a)The case involves international issues
(b)The case involves numerous parties
(c)The likely length of the case exceed four days hearing time
(d)The respective workload of each Division suggests that transferring this matter is appropriate
16.That the Mother’s time with the child under order 6 of the orders made on 24 December 2021 is suspended until and including 11 January 2023.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE MORLEY:
These are the Reasons for Judgment that were delivered ex tempore on 15 December 2022. They have been settled herein in written form. Grammatical errors and accidental errors in reference have been amended for ease of comprehension. Legal citations have been included in full and incorporated into these Reasons.
These are Reasons for Judgment in relation to an interim matter relating to both financial and parenting issues before the Court today and in relation to the parenting issues they are short form reasons as allowed by section 69ZL of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (‘the Act).
The matter before the Court is an Amended Application in a Proceeding filed by the Applicant Wife on 13 December 2022 in relation to which she relies upon her affidavit sworn or affirmed on 18 November 2022 and a Financial Statement by herself completed and filed on 13 December 2022. Tendered to the Court today was a tender bundle on behalf of the Wife. An objection was raised on the basis of relevance on behalf of the Husband by Mr Condon of Senior Counsel and that tender was not pressed. That matter is not considered in these Reasons.
There was no Response to the Application in a Proceeding filed, and I will come back to that in a second. At the interim hearing, the Applicant Wife was represented by Mr Lloyd of Senior Counsel and the Respondent Husband and the other Respondents in the matter, the Second Respondent being the father of the Husband, the Fourth Respondent being the mother of the Husband, the Third Respondent being a private corporation, C Pty Ltd, represented by Mr Condon of Senior Counsel with Mr D. Southwood of Counsel before the Court. The parenting aspect of the matter related to the parties’ only child, X, born 2019. X is nearly four years of age at the present time. He lives with his father and spends time with his mother pursuant to current interim orders.
The matter was before me on 24 November 2022 at which time I made orders that the matter was stood over to today for consideration in person. I directed that the Respondents file any Response to Application in a Proceeding and supporting affidavit material by no later than 4pm on 9 December 2022 and I reserved the costs of the Respondents in relation to the matter before the Court on 24 November to today. The First Respondent Husband filed an affidavit in the matter that was sworn or affirmed by him on 14 December 2022, noted by the Court’s computer system, at 6.52 pm as the time of filing but I have learnt that that is not an accurate indication of when the document was submitted to the Court for filing in all cases. But, in any case, that document was filed yesterday, served yesterday after the time directed in the orders. No Response, as I say, has been filed for any of the Respondents and, in a technical sense, the Amended Application in a Proceeding comes before the Court on an undefended basis in not being opposed by any countervailing application. That would always entitle a Respondent to make submissions, in any case, but would not entitle a Respondent as of right to present evidence before the Court.
Nevertheless, first of all, because this matter related to parenting issues and it is always proper that the Court have as much information as can be obtained to assist the Court to make orders proper with the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration, I considered the affidavit of the Father/Husband in this matter, though cautioning to say in the time available to me I did not read every word of the extensive annexures to that affidavit, but I did peruse through those annexures so that I could pick out any matters that I considered had particular relevance to what was before the Court. Today, submissions were made on behalf of the parties by their Senior Counsel and I will deal first with the financial issues.
PROPERTY
The orders sought by the Applicant Wife set out in her Amended Application in a Proceeding, starting with some notations to make explicable the wording of the orders, seek to amend certain of the orders that were made on 20 April 2022. On that day, two sets of orders were made, one set dealing with properties then owned by and to be purchased by the Wife in relation to the Suburb O and the Suburb E properties, and securing a sum of $668,250 from the danger of being disbursed, so as to keep safe assets relevant to any order adjusting property between the parties in these proceedings under the Act. The application sought to, in effect, vary orders but, in a proper sense, if orders are made, because of the different properties being dealt with, it would be by way of making fresh orders.
In very simple terms what has happened is that despite existing orders, the Wife has entered into a contract to sell a property at D Street, Suburb E and I think such was done without giving the required notice but she has also entered into a contract to purchase a property at F Street, Suburb G, Queensland and, as was explored on 24 November before the Court with the Wife, if she continued and performed under those contracts was putting herself in some danger of contempt. She has not done so and the orders she seeks are so as to alter the securing of the said sum of $668,250 by attaching it to the Queensland property after a purchase, and in the interim between the sale of the Suburb E property and the purchase of the Queensland property to have those monies held safe in the trust account of her solicitors.
The Wife presents the evidence that the detail of the sale of the Suburb E property will provide at least a sum within her power and control of $668,250 enabling her to comply with an order requiring her to deposit that sum with JC Legal Practice in a trust account to be held pending its use in the purchase of the Queensland property. The evidence of the Wife also asserts that the contract price as shown in annexure D to her affidavit for the Queensland property is $2,375,000. She gives evidence that she has provided $60,000 by way of deposit. She gives evidence that she intends to obtain finance by way of a loan account to be secured by a mortgage on the property in a sum of $1,662,500. In simple maths, that would leave her an equity of $712,500. The Wife in her affidavit in paragraph 20 deposes to that mathematics. On the basis of that evidence, I can find that there will be the necessary sum of $668,250 within the Wife’s power and control from completion of the sale of the Suburb E property, that such sum would be deposited with JC Legal Practice pending its use in a purchase of the Queensland property.
In relation to the Queensland property purchase, as the word encompasses quite a number of possible expenditures including expenditure that, to put it in a very simple way, is ‘evaporated money’ such as the payment of stamp duty, legal costs and so forth (evaporated does not mean improper, it simply means that it does not add to the purchaser’s equity in the property in any way or represent it). During submissions it was put by Mr Condon on behalf of the Respondents that any order addressing the use of the funds in relation to the purchase of the Queensland property should be confined to that amount of $668,250 being applied to the purchase of the Applicant’s equity in that property and not to other purchases associated with spending money on purchase. I find that there is, of course, good sense in that submission and that, in the event that orders are made as sought by the Wife, they should be in terms of the application of those funds only to the purchase of equity.
It is then, of course, sought that an order be made mirroring the order that started all of this chain of affairs when the sale of the Suburb O property was contemplated and to go in to the Suburb E property that the sum of $668,250 be secured in terms of the Wife’s equity in the Queensland property so that that sum is safe and secure pending the Court’s adjudication of any alteration of property interests between the parties. On the Wife’s mathematics that I have already gone through, there will be adequate equity in the property. I have no countervailing evidence because I have no countervailing application from the Husband. An argument is also put in submissions by Mr Condon cogently that it is possible, and Mr Condon puts it really on the basis of there is a demonstrable danger based upon the Wife’s financial position as indicated in her Financial Statement, that there can be defaults not only in relation to the finance secured by a mortgage on the Queensland property to be purchased, but also on other properties held by the Wife such that her position may deteriorate to the point where the sum sought to be kept safe is no longer kept safe due to the contractual rights of mortgage holders.
That is, as I say, a valid concern and it is a valid concern in terms of the operations the Wife seeks to undertake and the valid concerns of the Respondents to keep safe a certain sum and therefore any orders that are made, if made in terms of what the Wife seeks, should also include provision that the Respondents are kept appraised, at least on a weekly basis given the sums involved, of the amounts outstanding on a weekly basis on all and any loan accounts secured on the Queensland property and that, further than that, given the terms of the Wife’s Financial Statement and the arguments put for the Respondents, that the Wife should notify the Respondents within a suitably urgent time of any default in any of the required payments on any of the loan accounts secured on any of the named real properties that the Wife lists as property owned by her in items 35 and 36 of her Financial Statement from 13 December. I find that that is also a valid safeguard in terms of orders.
An oral application was made on behalf of the Respondents by Mr Condon that the Court extend injunctive relief to cover all of the property, certainly of the Wife, in the matter, but I find that such oral application is not accepted; it is made without sufficient notice to the other party. It is not in a proper form by way of an application before the Court in the form of an Application or Response. In that regard, I refer to what was said by Tree J, sitting as a Full Court, in Newett & Newett (2020) FamCAFC 76 and by Kent J in Melville & Melville (No 3) (2020) 61 Fam LR 280. In that last case, his Honour was making the point that an email to Chambers is not an Application; an Application is per the Rules. In the matter of Newett and Newett, Tree J was even more specific in relation to the Court acting upon application properly before the Court and not otherwise. But, as I said, even in an undefended matter, it is proper and, in fact, it is required that any submissions made on behalf of the party without an Application before the Court must be taken and considered and they have been.
Accordingly, I find it is appropriate to make orders with the intent as sought by the Wife but with the variations I referred to in the course of this short judgment so as to properly safeguard the position of the Respondents and I will make those orders at the end of these Reasons. It is appropriate that a direction be made in relation to the financial side of things that the First Respondent Husband file and serve an updated Financial Statement, his last such document being from August 2021, and it is appropriate, given the nature of this matter, that that be updated.
PARENTING
Turning to the parenting side of things, and as I have said, these are 69ZL short form Reasons. The current interim parenting orders made on 24 December 2021 by Senior Judicial Registrar provide for the child to live with the Father and spend time with the Mother for a period of three months, eight hours per week each Wednesday from 10am to 6pm, and at the end of that three-month period each alternate Wednesday from 10am to 6pm and on the other alternate Wednesday from 10am Wednesday until 6pm on the following day, which is Thursday.
I refer to the documents before the Court in the matter but I also have the assistance of a Child Impact Report dated 7 November 2022 prepared by Court Child Expert Ms M. I was directed to certain parts of that report by both Senior Counsel in the matter, Mr Condon stressing the report spoke of the necessity for X to have more frequent time with his mother and I was referred to the document by Mr Lloyd for the Mother in relation to it being beneficial for X if the Mother could have some participation in his weekly routine, for example, school pick up and drop off, extracurricular activities and so forth and being involved in the evening routine. Relevantly, in paragraph 22 Ms M writes:
It is positive that both parents agree that [X] should continue to live with [Mr Chao] and remain in his primary care. It seems that [X] would benefit from spending time that is more frequent with his mother given that they were observed to share a positive relationship. At [X’s] age, time should be more frequent rather than long blocks of time. It may be beneficial for [X] to spend weekend time with [Ms Jingyi], for example, each alternate weekend to allow for more quality time between [X] and his mother.
The application of the Mother before the Court is for the parenting orders to now encompass each alternate weekend from after school or 4pm on Friday until 4pm on Sunday. At X’s age, he is not attending formal school but the intent is that if he is attending preschool or day care then from the end of preschool or day care or 4pm on the Friday until the following Sunday. It is put by Mr Condon in submissions on behalf of the Father that the period should not be as sought by the Mother, that is the whole weekend, but should be added to the existing orders as time between about 4pm on Friday and 4pm on Saturday, one overnight, rather than taking the leap to two overnights. The order sought by the Mother is not specific as to whether or not order 6 of the orders made on 24 December 2021 are varied by being vacated and the new order made or this order being a variation by being an addition to it. Anyway, they are the competing applications of the parties.
The Mother also seeks that she have a 15 minute video call with the child every Wednesday and Friday from 7pm to 9pm. As I said, X is three years and 10 months old. Keeping a child on the phone for 15 minutes, the Court’s experiences teaches, is sometimes a difficult task and certainly going to 9pm at night would seem to be rather late for a child of that age. Every Wednesday and Friday would seem not to fit hand in glove with the proposition that there be Wednesday time under the existing orders, Wednesday to Thursday time under the existing orders and alternate Friday. But certainly some communication between X and his mother during any seven-day period of time between a Wednesday and a Wednesday when it is the non-time with alternate weekend would seem to make sense.
The Mother also seeks a period of seven days during school holiday periods with the child. That is a significant step up in consecutive time between mother and child since the parties separated, which is variously contended to have occurred in either 2019 or 2020, not taking into account any time living under the same-roof. The Mother also seeks and the Father does not cavil with the usual non-derogation order and during submissions, I voiced to the parties a non-derogation order in the usual terms in which I consider when making such orders.
I will try and speed it up for this reason, that in any parenting matter the Court is required to follow the legislative pathway and cannot put it aside for any purpose.
The legislative pathway found in the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), of course, requires the Court to pay attention to the objects and the principles that underlie the objects of the parenting section of the Act, Part VII of the Act and section 60B and to always keep in mind section 60CA which provides that in making any particular parenting order, interim or final, the Court must always regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration. It is not the only consideration, as Kirby J said in the High Court on at least two occasions. There are many other considerations, not least the parents and extended family, but it must always be the paramount consideration. Section 65D of the Act provides that when the Court is considering any parenting order, interim or final, the Court must apply a presumption that it is in a child’s best interest that the parents have equal shared parental responsibility for the child. To my recollection, there is no parental responsibility order in force but, under the terms of the legislation, it is an appealable error for the Court to simply cast section 65D aside and not to consider that presumption. I will not go into the details of the presumption in these-short form Reasons for Judgment; they are in the section.
When the Court is considering what is in a child’s best interests, the Court must consider the primary initial considerations in section 60CC of the Act. I will get to those in a minute. If an order is made that the parents have equal shared parental responsibility for the child, then the Court must consider the matters set out in section 65DAA of the Act which deal with the child spending equal time with each of the parents and, if that is not to be the case, consider the child spending substantial and significant time with each of the parents. The section provides a three‑step process: is it in the child’s best interests, is it reasonable and practicable - and the matters to be considered there are set out in subsection 5 - and if the answer to both is yes, the Court must consider making an order of that nature. I will not go any further with that.
The primary considerations in section 60CC are the benefit of the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of the child’s parents and any need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm, from being subjected to or exposed to abuse, neglect or family violence. Subsection (2A) mandates the Court must give greater weight to the second consideration, being the need to protect the child, over the benefit of the child having a meaningful relationship with both parents. The second primary consideration traditionally brings up a consideration of any risk elements in the matter, though the word risk or unacceptable risk is not found in the terms of that section; it is found in another section where the Court is mandated not to make orders that risk exposing a party or a child to unacceptable risk of family violence but it is posited that as the primary considerations are where the Court considers risk the sum of the additional considerations figure into that concept as well. Happily, this is not a case where risk is posited, therefore the Court does not need to do the weighing exercise.
The main primary consideration is the benefit to X of having a meaningful relationship with both parents. Under the current parenting regime put in place nearly a year ago now, the time between X and his mother is a long way away from what is described as substantial and significant in section 65DAA(3) and, to my mind, is only a period of time that may allow X to maintain his meaningful relationship with his mother but certainly not to develop that meaningful relationship with his mother. I find that it is in X’s best interest that the Court consider, and if all the other additional considerations do not find against, make orders that provide to X to have an increased amount of time with his mother.
In that regard, I keep in mind the passage I read out from the Child Impact Report but, whilst emphasis is placed on the phrasing of “spending time that is more frequent with his mother rather than long blocks”, it also refers to X spending weekend time with his mother. With X having been spending time since about March of this year with his mother each alternate week from Wednesday 10am until 6pm the next day, and on the other alternate Wednesday from 10am to 6pm on the Wednesday itself, I find that the addition of time where X may spend two extra nights in a row with his mother is not a “long block of time” as referred to in paragraph 22 but is an appropriate addition of time to enable X to maintain and develop his meaningful relationship with his mother.
Going quickly through the additional considerations, at X’s age any views expressed by X would not carry any weight with the Court and the Court does not have evidence of views, in any case. In terms of the nature of the relationship of the child with each of his parents, I have the guidance provided by Ms M and her observations in the Child Impact Report and that speaks to an existing and developed relationship between X and each of his parents which speaks to X’s comfort in the care of each of his parents as observed and I find that there is an established relationship between X and each of his parents. The current state of X’s attachment, if one refers to attachment theory, cannot be known on the available evidence but certainly the period of hiatus and then the limited amount of time that X has had with his mother must have had some effect on that which an increase in time may assist in overcoming.
I do not find sufficient relevance for these purposes in the additional considerations going to the extent to which the parents have taken or failed to take opportunity to participate in long‑term decisions, spend time with or communicate with the child or maintain the child, the likely effect of any change in X’s circumstances including separation from the other parent. The change in his circumstances proposed is an increase in the amount of time he spends with his mother by adding Friday to Sunday each alternate weekend and the Mother seeks to add seven-day blocks in each of the school holidays.
Taking the first proposal, the alternate weekend time, that change in circumstance would be of X’s benefit in allowing him to develop his meaningful relationship with his mother and she with him and it would not act, in my view, to any detriment in relation to his meaningful relationship with his father, his father still having the care of X for the greater bulk of the time. I do not have evidence that would lead me to find that the practical difficulty and expense of the child spending time with and communicating with his parents would bear on these matters.
A relevant consideration there is, as raised by Mr Condon in submissions, the changeover point for X. At the moment, both parties are residing in the Greater Sydney area. There is an inference that it may be open to the Mother to relocate herself to reside in Queensland once the purchase of the Queensland property has been completed but the Court is not presented with any direct evidence of the Mother’s intentions or any evidence that goes to identifying the Mother’s intentions in that regard. I consider that the appropriate order in relation to changeovers is that the parties conduct changeovers at a place as agreed between them from time to time and, failing agreement, that the Mother collect the child from either school or preschool or day care as appropriate or, if that is not the circumstance, the changeover occur by the Mother collecting the child at the start of her time from the Father’s residence and the Father collecting the child at the end of the Mother’s time from her residence.
The reason for having it that way around is that it is known to the Court as the argument break – if the Mother is late picking him up, she has lost time but she cannot blame the Father; if the Father is late collecting him at the end, the Mother has had extra time but he cannot blame the Mother.
The capacity of each of the parents has not been called into question before me in the evidence in this interim consideration. X’s maturity, sex, lifestyle and background, including lifestyle, culture and traditions, is an important consideration in every matter and X has exposure to his traditional culture, lifestyle and background in the company of each of his parents to his great advantage.
The attitude of the child and responsibilities of parenthood is not something that I find bears upon consideration of an expansion of the Mother’s time as proposed by her.
I find that it is appropriate to make an order as sought by the Mother expanding the time she has from what is provided in the orders made on 24 December last year to include each alternate weekend from the end of day care, preschool, school, or 4pm if none of those apply on Friday until 4pm on Sunday. In relation to school holidays, I agree with the submission put forward that going to a seven-day block straight away at this stage might be a step too far. I consider that an order proper in X’s best interests is that, pending further order, he spend time with the Mother for five nights during each school holiday period at times to be agreed between the parties.
I certify that the preceding thirty-three (33) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Morley. Associate:
Dated: 23 February 2023
SCHEDULE OF PARTIES
SYC 3653 of 2021 Respondents
Fourth Respondent:
C PTY LTD
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