Jim Awad and TNT Australia Pty Ltd

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[2014] AATA 331  

Division GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

File Number(s)

2013/0430

Re

Jim Awad

APPLICANT

And

TNT Australia Pty Ltd

RESPONDENT

Decision

Tribunal

Senior Member J Toohey
Dr Bill Isles, Member

Date 28 May 2014
Place Sydney

The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and substitutes for it the decision that the respondent is liable under s 14 of the Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 to compensate Mr Awad for the injury he suffered as a result of the incident on 10 August 2012.

........................................

Senior Member J Toohey

CATCHWORDS – COMPENSATION – psychological condition – diagnosis – whether state of affairs actually occurred – whether employment contributed to a significant degree – decision under review set aside

Legislation

Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 ss 4, 5A(1), 5B(1), 5B(3), 14, 16, 19

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 s 37

Cases

Comcare v Mooi (1996) 69 FCR 439

Wiegand v Comcare (2002) 72 ALD 795

REASONS FOR DECISION

Senior Member J Toohey
Dr Bill Isles, Member

BACKGROUND

  1. Mr Jim Awad has been employed by the respondent since 1995.  On 28 August 2012, he claimed compensation under the Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (the Act) for “depression, anxiety state” which he said resulted from an incident at work on 10 August 2012. 

  2. It is common ground that an incident occurred on 10 August 2012 involving Mr Awad and his branch manager, Mr Scott Sullivan.  It is also common ground that there had been some tension between the two men leading up to the incident, but the respondent disputes Mr Awad’s version of events and denies that his employment contributed to a significant degree to his condition. 

  3. We have to determine whether the respondent is liable under s 14 of the Act to compensate Mr Awad for his condition. 

  4. Separately from the determination that it was not liable under s 14 to compensate Mr Awad, the respondent determined it was not liable to compensate him under ss 16 or 19 for medical expenses or incapacity.  That determination is not the subject of these proceedings.

    SUMMARY OF DECISION

  5. There is no question that Mr Awad’s presentation, and features of his illness, are highly unusual.  His treating psychiatrist, and three consulting psychiatrists who saw him for assessment, agree on that point.  They agree that his condition is complex and that he shows features of abnormal illness behaviour.  That said, none thought he was fabricating his illness and all agreed that the incident on 10 August 2012, CCTV footage of which is in evidence, could produce a psychiatric response in a person.  

  6. It is not for us to determine whether Mr Sullivan acted unreasonably or unfairly during the incident on 10 August 2012 or to arbitrate as to who was in the right or wrong.  For the reasons set out below, we are satisfied that Mr Awad suffered an injury as a result of that incident for which the respondent is liable to compensate him.  We are satisfied that the incident created…

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Details
Case
[2014] AATA 331
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Jim Awad commenced proceedings against TNT Australia Pty Ltd in the Federal Circuit Court, challenging the respondent's decision to not compensate him for an injury he sustained at work. Mr Awad contended that he suffered a psychiatric injury due to an incident with his supervisor, Scott Sullivan, on 10 August 2012. The court was required to determine whether Mr Awad's employment contributed to a significant degree to his psychiatric condition, entitling him to compensation. The primary issue was whether the incident with Mr Sullivan created a perception in Mr Awad's mind that contributed to a significant degree to his psychiatric injury.

The court examined the evidence provided, including statements from Mr Awad, his treating psychiatrist, Dr David Grace, and three consulting psychiatrists. The court acknowledged the complexity of Mr Awad's condition, noting features of abnormal illness behaviour. However, the court accepted that the incident with Mr Sullivan could have produced a psychiatric response in a person. The court held that it was not necessary for the court to determine the reasonableness of Mr Awad's perception of the incident, only that the perception existed and contributed to his condition. The court found that the respondent's decision not to compensate Mr Awad was incorrect and ordered that Mr Awad was to be compensated for his injury.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Significant degree means a degree that is substantially more than material: s 5B(3). THE EVIDENCE Mr Awad has provided a written statement of evidence dated 3 October 2013. He did not give oral evidence. In a written report dated 15 February 2014, his treating psychiatrist, Dr David Grace, stated that Mr Awad was unable to endure giving oral evidence because of his psychological condition. Dr Grace confirmed his opinion in oral evidence. We accept his advice. It makes our task more difficult but we are satisfied we have sufficient evidence before us and that the weight of the evidence favours Mr Awad. Mr Awad’s wife, Marguerite Awad, gave written and oral evidence. Dr Grace provided written reports and gave oral evidence. Psychiatrists, Dr John Champion, Dr Graham George and Dr Michael Robertson, provided written reports and gave oral evidence concurrently. Also before the Tribunal were documents (T-documents) provided by the respondent under s 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act1975 and CCTV footage of the incident on 10 August 2012 which was made available to the doctors who gave evidence before the Tribunal and to Mr Sullivan. Written statements of Mr Sullivan and others who witnessed the incident are in the T-documents, and Mr Sullivan gave oral evidence. Mr Awad’s written statement As Mr Awad did not give oral evidence, relevant parts of his written statement are reproduced here in full; other parts are summarised as follows: …..8. Some days prior to 10 August 2012, I was approached by various PM shift workers who felt the monthly meetings were not being held with them and when they were, were often scheduled during their tea break. As a TWU delegate, I resolved to raise the issue with Scott Sullivan, Branch Manager. 9. On about 9 August 2012, I spoke with [a supervisor named Michael]… as I understood a meeting was scheduled to take place for the PM shift on the following day and I wished to discuss any issues he may have so I could discuss these with the TWU members ahead of the meeting. Michael advised me he had several concerns, including employees arriving late for work or walking off the dock, as well as people not smoking in the designated smoking areas.10. On 10 August 2012, I had a conversation with a fellow TWU delegate, John Cocoris. I do not recall our exact conversation as we discussed various things regarding including the upcoming meeting. I also advised John that a supervisor had warned me “someone was smoking on the dock” or words to that effect. John questioned me about who that supervisor was and I declined to tell him as I did not wish to betray confidences.11. At about 5:00PM on 10 August 2012, a Wellbeing Barbeque was [held in the dock] … to award employees for their work and celebrate years of service.12. I saw that Scott was working near the barbeque and I went over him to discuss the concerns the PM shift workers were having. Scott was not interested in discussing the issue as he was too busy with the barbeque and brushed me off.13. A short time later, I was entering the lunch room to take my break but was called back by Scott who was speaking with John. Both Scott and John appeared to be quite agitated and Scott asked John to repeat what he had just said. John then said, words to the effect of, “You told me Scott was watching me through the cameras trying to catch me smoking on the dock”. I was shocked and said to John words to the effect of, “no, that’s a lie, I said someone from management told me they have seen people smoke on the dock”. John then turned to me and called me a “fucking liar” or words to that effect. I became highly embarrassed by being sworn at. John and Scott kept talking and when I tried to explain myself, Scott turned to me and told me to “fuck off” and he “did not want to talk to me”, or words to that effect. I do not recall what else was said during this time although Scott was very aggressive to me and kept pointing his fingers at me when he was yelling at me. I believe I may have asked Scott to move this away from staff but Scott kept berating me. I was extremely upset and embarrassed by Scott’s behaviour particularly as he was my manager and had raised his voice and swore at me in front of many of my colleagues. I felt as if I had become frozen or numb and I also felt a tightness in my throat which caused me to be unable to get any words out to defend myself.14. I returned to the lunchroom and sat down. I believe I became quite teary in the lunchroom and I was still suffering from shock of what had just occurred. I felt overwhelmed and unable to talk. I was not thinking straight and couldn’t focus. I do not recall much after the incident. I believe I may have returned back to some of my duties but I do not recall completing any work.15. Over the next few days I still felt like I was in a daze. I could not stop thinking about the incident with Scott. I was still embarrassed after being belittled in front of my colleagues and although I did not wish to discuss it with others, I decided I needed to clear the air with Scott.16. On Monday, 13 August 2012, I approached Peter Roderick, a fellow driver and TWU delegate. I explained to Peter that I had a blow up with Scott on Friday and I wanted to fix the issue. Together we approached Scott in his office. Scott was still very terse with me and at one stage he said that I had gone “gaga on Friday”, or words to that effect. I do not recall the majority of the conversation although it was only short before Scott told me he had had “enough of” me, or words to that effect.17. Although I continued to work for the next few days or so, I felt completely lost. I was having difficulty concentrating both at home and at work and I kept fixating on being embarrassed in front of my colleagues. I was finding it difficult to sleep at night and just generally did not feel like myself.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Separately from the determination that it was not liable under s 14 to compensate Mr Awad, the respondent determined it was not liable to compensate him under ss 16 or 19 for medical expenses or incapacity. That determination is not the subject of these proceedings.SUMMARY OF DECISION There is no question that Mr Awad’s presentation, and features of his illness, are highly unusual. His treating psychiatrist, and three consulting psychiatrists who saw him for assessment, agree on that point. They agree that his condition is complex and that he shows features of abnormal illness behaviour. That said, none thought he was fabricating his illness and all agreed that the incident on 10 August 2012, CCTV footage of which is in evidence, could produce a psychiatric response in a person. It is not for us to determine whether Mr Sullivan acted unreasonably or unfairly during the incident on 10 August 2012 or to arbitrate as to who was in the right or wrong. For the reasons set out below, we are satisfied that Mr Awad suffered an injury as a result of that incident for which the respondent is liable to compensate him. We are satisfied that the incident created a perception on Mr Awad’s part such that it contributed to a significant degree to a psychiatric reaction and led to him being incapacitated for employment. We are not required in these proceedings to determine how long that incapacity lasted.RELEVANT LEGISLATION The respondent will be liable to compensate Mr Awad if he suffered an injury that resulted in death, incapacity for work, or impairment: s 14. By s 5A(1), injury means: (a)a disease suffered by an employee; or (b)an injury (other than a disease) suffered by an employee, that is a physical or mental injury arising out of, or in the course of, the employee's employment; or(c)an aggravation of a physical or mental injury (other than a disease) suffered by an employee (whether or not that injury arose out of, or in the course of, the employee's employment), that is an aggravation that arose out of, or in the course of, that employment. By s 5B(1), disease means: (a) an ailment suffered by an employee; or (b) an aggravation of such an ailment; (c)that was contributed to, to a significant degree, by the employee's employment by the Commonwealth or a licensee. Ailment means any physical or mental ailment, disorder, defect or morbid condition whether of sudden onset or gradual development: s 4. It is not in dispute, if the Tribunal finds Mr Awad suffers from a psychological condition, that it is an ailment. Significant degree means a degree that is substantially more than material: s 5B(3). THE EVIDENCE Mr Awad has provided a written statement of evidence dated 3 October 2013. He did not give oral evidence. In a written report dated 15 February 2014, his treating psychiatrist, Dr David Grace, stated that Mr Awad was unable to endure giving oral evidence because of his psychological condition. Dr Grace confirmed his opinion in oral evidence. We accept his advice. It makes our task more difficult but we are satisfied we have sufficient evidence before us and that the weight of the evidence favours Mr Awad.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As we understand their evidence, none of the doctors suggest that Mr Awad is concocting his symptoms; rather, that a pattern of entrenched “abnormal illness behaviour” has developed which, in Dr Champion’s view, will resolve once the present litigation is finalised. All think his condition likely to be complicated by factors including his medication, personality and psycho-social factors. CONSIDERATION We have to decide whether Mr Awad suffered an injury in the nature of an ailment to which his employment contributed to a significant degree. We are not required in these proceedings to determine the extent of any incapacity he has suffered. An ailment may be found to exist, notwithstanding it cannot be identified with the label of a recognised medical condition, if it is a condition “outside the boundaries of normal mental functioning and behaviour”: Comcare v Mooi (1996) 69 FCR 439 at 444. The doctors have offered varying diagnoses of Mr Awad’s condition, from Dr Grace’s initial diagnosis of Adjustment Disorder with Depressed and Anxious mood to Dr George’s and Dr Robertson’s diagnosis of persistent depressive disorder, and Dr Robertson's of chronic major depressive disorder. All agree that there are features of abnormal illness behaviour in his presentation, although only Dr Champion confined his diagnosis to this condition (without saying abnormal illness behaviour is a diagnosable condition). The doctors agree that Mr Awad’s present condition is highly unusual and his response apparently out of all proportion to the incident observed on the DVD. The progression of his condition defies their experience of responses to stressful events and they cannot adequately explain it. They agree that a diagnosis could only be made with any confidence if Mr Awad were to be hospitalised, taken off all his medications, and looking at “all his biological functions” one at a time. Despite their differences, the doctors were all of the view that what was observed on the DVD had the potential to lead to a psychiatric response in the nature of an adjustment disorder. In Wiegandv Comcare (2002) 72 ALD 795, von Doussa J said that, in determining whether an incident or state of affairs contributed to an ailment to the required degree:… there is no requirement at law that the interpretation placed on the incident or state of affairs by the employee, or the employee’s perception of it, is one which passes some qualitative test based on an objective measure of reasonableness. If the incident or state of affairs actually occurred, and created a perception in the mind of the employee (whether reasonable or unreasonable in the thinking of others) and the perception contributed in a material degree to an aggravation of the employee’s ailment, the requirements of the definition of disease are fulfilled. The respondent contends that the state of affairs claimed by Mr Awad did not exist, in particular, that the version of events he gave to Dr Grace, and on which Dr Grace’s opinion was formed, did not exist. Further, that the DVD does not support his version. The respondent submits we should prefer Mr Sullivan’s version of events and that, absent the state of affairs claimed by Mr Awad, his claim must fail.