Jewelscan Pty Ltd v Phenix Jewellery Pty Ltd

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TRADE MARKS ACT 1995



DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS

Re:Opposition by Jewelscan Pty Ltd to registration of trade mark application 1321700(9,36,42,45) – JEWELSCAN, JEWELSCAN.COM.AU and DEVICE - filed in the name of Phenix Jewellery Pty Ltd.

Delegate: Nicole Worth
Representation: Opponent: Greg Beaumont, Director of Jewelscan Pty Ltd.
Applicant: Gillian Dempsey of Counsel, instructed by Shaun Creighton of Buchanan Law.
Decision: 2012 ATMO 85
Section 52 opposition – s43, 58, 59, 60, and 62A grounds – s62A established – registration refused. Costs awarded against applicant.

Background

  1. On 21 September 2009 Phenix Jewellery Pty Ltd (‘the Applicant’) applied to register a trade mark, relevant details of which appear below:

    Application No:         1321700

    Priority Date:             21 September 2009

    Goods/Services:         Class 9: Computer programs for use in insurance; computer software.

    Class 36: Administration of insurance claims; appraisals for insurance purposes; brokerage advisory services relating to insurance; consultancy services relating to insurance; estimates for insurance purposes; information services relating to insurance; insurance.

    Class 42: Advisory services relating to computer software; design of computer software; development of computer software; development of computer software application solutions.

    Class 45: Licensing of software

    Trade Mark:  

  2. As it may not be visible on all devices by which this decision is reproduced or viewed, it is the domain name ‘jewelscan.com.au’ that appears below the word ‘Jewelscan’ in the trade mark.

  3. The application was examined and subsequently advertised as accepted for possible registration on 1 April 2010. On 29 June 2010 Jewelscan Pty Ltd (‘the Opponent’) filed a notice of opposition to registration, nominating grounds under sections 43, 58, 59, 60 and 62A of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (‘the Act’). Evidence was filed and served by the parties, as detailed below, following which I heard the matter as the Registrar’s delegate in Canberra on 7 June 2012. Gregory Beaumont, the Managing Director of the Opponent, made submissions on its behalf. Submissions for the Applicant were made by Gillian Dempsey of Counsel, instructed by Shaun Creighton of Buchanan Law.

    Evidence and submissions

  4. Evidence was filed and served by the parties as follows:

Declarant

Position

Date

Exhibits

Evidence in support

Gregory William Beaumont
‘Beaumont 1’

Managing Director, Jewelscan Pty Ltd

27/9/10

4 to 39

Evidence in answer

Shaun William Creighton ‘Creighton’

Attorney with Buchanan Law.

24/1/11

SWC-1 to SWC-3

Evidence in reply

Gregory William Beaumont
‘Beaumont 2’

Managing Director, Jewelscan Pty Ltd

20/4/11

1, 2, 3, 5, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 31, 32, 34

  1. As a preliminary matter I will address first the Applicant’s objection to what it claims is ‘tendency evidence’ in the Opponent’s Evidence in Reply.

    Tendency Evidence

  2. Broadly, tendency evidence is evidence which shows how a person has acted on an occasion other than that in question, used by an opposing party to demonstrate how the person acted on the subject occasion (hence the name ‘tendency evidence’, in that it is evidence showing a tendency or a disposition of a person to act in a certain way)[1]. Such evidence is not…

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Details
Case
[2012] ATMO 85
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an objection raised by Jewelscan Pty Ltd (the Opponent) to a trade mark application by Phenix Jewellery Pty Ltd (the Applicant). The core of the dispute revolved around the admissibility of certain evidence presented by the Opponent, which the Applicant argued constituted inadmissible "tendency evidence" under the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).

The legal issue before the Hearing Officer was whether the evidence detailing Mr. Beaumont's prior conduct in establishing a separate company providing similar services while still a director of the Applicant was admissible. The Applicant contended that this evidence lacked proper probative value regarding permission or ratification and that insufficient particulars had been provided, as would typically be required for tendency evidence in court proceedings.

The Hearing Officer determined that proceedings before the Registrar are distinct from court proceedings, and the Registrar is not strictly bound by the rules of evidence. Applying the principle that a decision-maker should not ignore relevant material, the Hearing Officer found that the evidence was admissible because it bore upon the question of whether the trade mark should be registered. As the Opponent had established one of its grounds of opposition, the Hearing Officer refused to register the Applicant's trade mark application and awarded costs to the Opponent for the filing and hearing fees.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

As a preliminary matter I will address first the Applicant’s objection to what it claims is ‘tendency evidence’ in the Opponent’s Evidence in Reply.Tendency Evidence Broadly, tendency evidence is evidence which shows how a person has acted on an occasion other than that in question, used by an opposing party to demonstrate how the person acted on the subject occasion (hence the name ‘tendency evidence’, in that it is evidence showing a tendency or a disposition of a person to act in a certain way)[1]. Such evidence is not admissible before a court unless proper notice has been given of an intention to adduce it and the court thinks it will have significant probative value.[1] See section 97 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) for a formal definition of ‘the tendency rule’, to which tendency evidence relates. In paragraphs 8 to 17 of Beaumont 2 Mr. Beaumont describes how he had on another occasion established a separate company that provided services to the same clientele as that of the Applicant, whilst still a Managing Director of the Applicant and apparently with its full knowledge. The Applicant does not deny the statements nor provide its own explanation, but objects to this evidence on the grounds that:…such evidence is not properly probative of permission nor ratification of Mr. Beaumont establishing and being a director of a company dealing with cognate services to Phenix [the Applicant] whilst at the same time remaining director of Phenix. Normally tendency evidence is only admissible in circumstances where particulars have been provided of the date, time, place and circumstances at or in which the conduct was alleged to have occurred and where the names of each person who saw, heard or otherwise perceived the conduct and the address of each person so named are provided to the party against whom the evidence is sought to be led [the Applicant refers here, by footnote, to Order 33 rule 18 and Form 146 of the Federal Court Rules (now repealed) which related to notice of intention to adduce tendency evidence]. Proceedings before the Registrar are different to proceedings before a court. As acknowledged by the Applicant the Registrar is not bound by the rules of evidence[2] but may inform herself of any matter before her in any way believed to be reasonably appropriate. The observation of Finkelstein J in Malibu Boats West Inc v Catanese[3] is relevant here:The only question that arises in relation to the rejection of evidence is whether the decision maker acted with procedural propriety or fairness having regard to the task at hand. Generally speaking, it would not be proper or fair for an administrative decision-maker to ignore relevant material while discharging his or her statutory duty. As a result, when the Registrar is required to decide whether a mark qualifies for registration, the Registrar is not entitled to disregard evidence which bears upon that question.[2] As per reg 21.15(8) of the Trade Marks Regulations 1995.[3] Malibu Boats West Inc v Catanese (2000) 51 IPR 134; [2000] FCA 1141 (18 August 2000), at 24.

Decision

Reasons for decision

As the Opponent has established one of its grounds of opposition, it is not necessary for me to discuss the remaining grounds under sections 43, 59 and 60 of the Act.Decision and Costs Section 55(1) of the Act provides: (1) Unless the proceedings are discontinued or dismissed, the Registrar must, at the end, decide:(a) to refuse to register the trade mark; or(b) to register the trade mark (with or without conditions or limitations) in respect of the goods and/or services then specified in the application; having regard to the extent (if any) to which any ground on which the application was opposed has been established. Jewelscan Pty Ltd, the Opponent, has established a ground of opposition under the Act. As a result the Applicant is unsuccessful in its trade mark application and I refuse to register trade mark application 1321700. Costs generally follow the event, and given there is no apparent reason to depart from this I award costs against the Applicant. The Opponent is entitled to recover the cost of the fee for filing its Notice of Opposition and the hearing fee. However given the Opponent has represented itself, and costs in proceedings before the Registrar are not generally for work which a party does on its own behalf[34], the Opponent would need to substantiate that it incurred the other costs listed in Schedule 8 in order to be able to claim them.[34] See for example Cachia v Hanes (1994) 179 CLR 403 and Bartlem Pty Ltd v Fisher 44 IPR 670.Nicole WorthHearing OfficerTrade Marks Hearings26 September 2012

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established