Jess & Jess (No 2)
[2021] FedCFamC1A 49
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1) APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Jess & Jess (No 2) [2021] FedCFamC1A 49
Appeal from: Jess & Jess and Ors [2018] FamCA 1179
Jess (Declaration and Recusal) [2019] FamCA 841
Appeal number(s): SOA 74 of 2019 File number(s): MLF 3444 of 2006 Judgment of: ALSTERGREN CJ & STRICKLAND J Date of judgment: 5 November 2021 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – COSTS – Applicants/appellants wholly unsuccessful in the appeal against a declaratory order but successful in the appeal against a refusal to recuse – Recusal appeal succeeded on a question of law – Applicants’/appellants’ applications for costs dismissed – Overall costs apportioned at 90 per cent to the appeal against the declaratory order – No exceptional circumstances justifying a departure from the ordinary rule of calculating costs on a party/party basis – Costs sought by the first respondent reasonable and fixed in the amount sought – Costs ordered in the sum sought by the first respondent against the applicants/appellants in relation to the declaratory appeal – Third respondents’ participation in the declaratory appeal was largely unnecessary – Third respondents’ application for costs dismissed – Cost certificates ordered for each party in relation to the recusal appeal.
Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 28(4)(a), 117
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) s 17(2)(b)
Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) ss 6, 9
Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) rr 19.18, 19.34
Federal Circuit and Family court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) r 12.17
Cases cited: Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (No 2) (1995) 135 ALR 160; [1995] FCA 350
Colgate-Palmolive Co and Anor v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225; [1993] FCA 801
Jess & Jess [2021] FamCAFC 159
Kohan & Kohan (1993) FLC 92-340; [1992] FamCA 116
Limousin v Limousin (Costs) (2007) 38 Fam LR 478; [2007] FamCA 1178
Munday v Bowman (1997) FLC 92-784; 22 Fam LR 321
NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank Ltd (No 2) [2001] 109 FCR 77; [2001] FCA 480
Prantage & Prantage (2013) FLC 93-544; [2013] FamCAFC 105
Number of paragraphs: 50 Date of last submission/s: 23 September 2021 Date of hearing: In Chambers on the Papers Place: Melbourne Counsel for the Applicants/Appellants: Mr Waller QC with Mr Mereine Solicitor for the Applicants/Appellants: HWL Ebsworth Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr Dickson QC with Ms Johnston Solicitor for the First Respondent: Kenna Teasdale Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Not participating Counsel for the Third Respondents: Mr Austin QC with Ms Papaleo Solicitor for the Third Respondents: Lander & Rogers ORDERS
SOA 74 of 2019
MLF 3444 of 2006FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DIVISION 1 APPELLATE JURISDICTIONBETWEEN: MR JESS JNR & ORS
Applicants/Appellants
AND: MS JESS
First RespondentMR J IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE LEGAL PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE LATE MR JESS SNR
Second Respondent
MR K & MR L AS TRUSTEES OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF MR JESS SNR (DECEASED)
Third Respondents
ORDER MADE BY:
ALSTERGREN CJ & STRICKLAND J
DATE OF ORDER:
5 NOVEMBER 2021
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicants/appellants pay the costs of the first respondent fixed in the sum of $163,242.42.
2.The applications for costs made by the applicants/appellants be dismissed.
3.The application for costs made by the third respondents be dismissed.
4.The Court grants to the applicants/appellants a costs certificate pursuant to s 9 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) being a certificate that, in the opinion of the Court, it would be appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment under that Act to the applicants/appellants in respect of the costs incurred by the applicants/appellants in relation to the application for leave to appeal and the appeal from the refusal by the primary judge to recuse herself.
5.The Court grants to the first respondent a costs certificate pursuant to the provisions of s 6 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) being a certificate that, in the opinion of the Court, it would be appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment under that Act to the first respondent in respect of the costs incurred by the first respondent in relation to the application for leave to appeal and the appeal from the refusal by the primary judge to recuse herself.
6.The Court grants to the third respondents a costs certificate pursuant to the provisions of s 6 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) being a certificate that, in the opinion of the Court, it would be appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment under that Act to the third respondents in respect of the costs incurred by the third respondents in relation to the application for leave to appeal and the appeal from the refusal by the primary judge to recuse herself.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Jess & Jess has been approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ALSTERGREN CJ & STRICKLAND J
INTRODUCTION
On 25 August 2021, this Court delivered reasons for judgment and made orders in relation to a Notice of Appeal filed on 13 December 2019 (Jess & Jess [2021] FamCAFC 159).
The orders the subject of the appeal were first, Order 2 of the orders made on 15 November 2019, namely a declaration that the Deed of Declaration of Trust was not executed on the date it bears (“declaratory order”), and secondly, Order 4 whereby the primary judge dismissed an application seeking that her Honour recuse herself from further involvement in determining the proceedings (“the recusal”).
This Court found that leave to appeal was required to appeal both orders, and on 25 August 2021, ordered that the application for leave to appeal the declaratory order be dismissed, the application for leave to appeal the recusal be granted and the appeal be allowed, the primary judge be disqualified from any further hearing of the proceedings, and the balance of the proceedings be determined by a judge other than the primary judge.
In addition, orders were made providing a regime for the filing of submissions as to costs as follows:
(4)Any party seeking an order for costs in respect of the appeal shall file and serve within fourteen (14) days a written submission of no more than five (5) pages identifying the order sought and the reasons relied upon for that order.
(5)Any party against whom an order for costs is sought shall file and serve within fourteen (14) days of service upon that party of written submissions pursuant to Order 4, a written submission of no more than five (5) pages in response.
On 7 September 2021, the first respondent filed written submissions seeking the following orders:
5 …
a. the Appellants pay 90% of the costs incurred by the First Respondent in relation to the appeal, on an indemnity basis and fixed in the sum of $238,335.57, payable within 28 days; or
b. in the alternative to (a), the Appellants pay 90% of the costs incurred by the First Respondent in relation to the appeal, on a party/party basis and fixed in the sum of $163,242.42, payable within 28 days; and
c. in addition to (a) or (b), the First Respondent be granted a costs certificate pursuant to the provisions of section 6 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth), being a certificate that, in the opinion of the Court, it would be appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment under that Act to the First Respondent in respect of 10% of the costs incurred by her in relation to the appeal.
On 8 September 2021, the applicants/appellants filed written submissions seeking the following orders:
3.1The Applicants/Appellants pay 70% of the First Respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application for leave to appeal from Order 2, such costs to be taxed on a party/party basis unless otherwise agreed.
3.2The Third Respondent pay the Applicants’/Appellants’ costs of and incidental to the application for leave to appeal, and the appeal from, Order 4, including the Notice of Contention dated 2 January 2020, such costs to be taxed on a party/party basis unless otherwise agreed.
4.If the Court makes no order for costs in favour of the Applicants/Appellants then they seek cost certificates in relation to their application for leave to appeal, and the appeal from, Order 4.
On 8 September 2021, the third respondents filed written submissions seeking the following orders:
(a)the Appellants pay 90% of the costs incurred by the Third Respondents in relation to the appeal, on an indemnity basis and fixed in the sum of $400,583.70, payable within 28 days; or
(b)in the alternative to (a), the Appellants pay 90% of the costs incurred by the Third Respondents in relation to the appeal, on a party/party basis and fixed in the sum of $289,377.80, payable within 28 days; and
(c)in addition to (a) or (b), the Third Respondents be granted a costs certificate pursuant to section 6 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth), being a certificate that, in the opinion of the Court, it would be appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment under that Act to the Third Respondents in respect of 10% of the costs incurred by them in relation to the appeal.
Justice Kent was a member of the bench who heard and determined the appeal. However, his Honour resigned from the Court with effect from 29 August 2021. The parties have consented to the remaining judges dealing with the question of costs, which is a course permitted by s 28(4)(a) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) and s 17(2)(b) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth).
THE LEGISLATION
The respective applications of the parties are governed by s 117 of the Act which relevantly provides as follows:
(1)Subject to subsection (2), subsections 45A(6) and 70NFB(1) and sections 117AA and 117AC, each party to proceedings under this Act shall bear his or her own costs.
(2)If, in proceedings under this Act, the court is of opinion that there are circumstances that justify it in doing so, the court may, subject to subsections (2A), (4), (4A), (5) and (6) and the applicable Rules of Court, make such order as to costs and security for costs, whether by way of interlocutory order or otherwise, as the court considers just.
(2A)In considering what order (if any) should be made under subsection (2), the court shall have regard to:
(a) the financial circumstances of each of the parties to the proceedings;
(b)whether any party to the proceedings is in receipt of assistance by way of legal aid and, if so, the terms of the grant of that assistance to that party;
(c)the conduct of the parties to the proceedings in relation to the proceedings including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the conduct of the parties in relation to pleadings, particulars, discovery, inspection, directions to answer questions, admissions of facts, production of documents and similar matters;
(d)whether the proceedings were necessitated by the failure of a party to the proceedings to comply with previous orders of the court;
(e)whether any party to the proceedings has been wholly unsuccessful in the proceedings;
(f)whether either party to the proceedings has made an offer in writing to the other party to the proceedings to settle the proceedings and the terms of any such offer; and
(g) such other matters as the court considers relevant.
…
THE ORDERS SOUGHT BY THE FIRST RESPONDENT
The basis of orders 5a and b sought by the first respondent is that the costs of the appeal should be apportioned as to 90 per cent in relation to the declaratory order and 10 per cent in relation to the recusal.
Pausing there, we accept that the overwhelming focus of the appeal was on the declaratory order, and that is demonstrated by comparing the complexity of the issues, the grounds of appeal, the extent of the written submissions filed, and the time taken in oral submissions, and we agree with the apportionment of costs proposed by the first respondent.
The applicants/appellants concede that they ought to pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application for leave to appeal, and the appeal from the declaratory order, on a party/party basis, but submit that those costs should be reduced by 30 per cent to reflect the outcome of the recusal appeal.
The first respondents oppose any order for costs being made against them in respect of the recusal appeal, and it is appropriate that we address that issue at this stage.
In relation to the first respondent, the applicants’/appellants’ submission is that because the application for leave to appeal and the appeal were “wholly successful”, citing s 117(2A)(e) of the Act, that is a circumstance which justifies this Court departing from the general principle in s 117(1) that each party bear their own costs.
However, s 117(2A)(e) does not say what the applicants/appellants suggest it does. As can be seen, the relevant factor is whether any party to the proceedings has been “wholly unsuccessful”. Applying the correct terminology, the first respondent has been wholly unsuccessful in relation to the recusal appeal, but that appeal succeeded on a question of law, and specifically an error by the primary judge in the application of legal principle (see [394] – [395]). Further, it is not suggested that the primary judge was led into error by the first respondent, and thus the costs of the appeal should not be visited upon her. The proposition that costs follow the event does not apply, given the terms of s 117 of the Act.
That is the basis of the opposition by the first respondent to the application for costs made by the applicants/appellants, and it is the basis on which we propose to proceed.
It is also necessary to have regard to the financial circumstances of the parties in considering an application for costs (s 117(2A)(a)). However, the financial circumstances of the parties here are such that they can have no relevance to whether or not an order for costs is made. Thus there is no need to address those circumstances, and none of the parties suggest otherwise.
The conduct of the parties to the proceedings is also relevant in considering an order for costs (s 117(2A)(c)and (g)). In that regard we agree with the first respondent’s submission that, “[t]he appellants adopted a scattergun approach to this appeal, pursuing all 25 grounds of appeal in relation to the Declaratory Order even where many of those grounds overlapped, amounted to mere repetition of the arguments advanced below, had no prospect of success and all were ultimately unsuccessful” (paragraph 12 of the first respondent’s submissions in relation to costs filed 7 September 2021).
Plainly then there are circumstances that justify an order for costs being made against the applicants/appellants in favour of the first respondent, and she should have 90 per cent of her costs, representing the costs relating to the application for leave and the appeal against the declaratory order, without any reduction for the outcome of the recusal appeal.
The next question in relation to those costs is on what basis they should be calculated, namely on the usual basis of party/party, or on the exceptional basis of indemnity.
There is no doubt that this Court is able to order indemnity costs, and there is also no doubt about the principles that apply. In summary, the court ought not usually make an order for costs to be calculated otherwise than on a party/party basis, but where there are exceptional circumstances that warrant departure from the ordinary rule, then indemnity costs can be awarded (e.g. see Limousin v Limousin (Costs) (2007) 38 Fam LR 478, Prantage & Prantage (2013) FLC 93-544 and Kohan & Kohan (1993) FLC 92-340).
Examples of such circumstances can be drawn from the oft-quoted decision of Sheppard J in Colgate-Palmolive Co and Anor v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225, and are as follows (taken from Munday v Bowman (1997) FLC 92-784 at 84,660):
(a)Where it appears that an action has been commenced or continued in circumstances where a party properly advised should have known that he had no chance of success. In such cases the action must be presumed to have been commenced or continued for some ulterior motive or because of some wilful disregard of the known facts.
(b)Making allegations of fraud, knowing them to be false, and the making of irrelevant allegations of fraud.
(c)Evidence of particular misconduct causing loss of time to the court and to other parties.
(d)The making of allegations which ought never to have been made or the undue prolongation of a case by groundless contentions.
(e) An imprudent refusal of an offer to compromise.
(Citations omitted)
The exceptional circumstances relied on by the first respondent here are as follows:
(a)The applicants/appellants perpetrated a fraud on the first respondent, and the resources applied by them in this litigation they have as a result of that fraud.
(b)The nature of the appeal, with the appeal book comprising over 7,300 pages, each summary of argument being in excess of 70 pages, and the appeal hearing lasting for three days. Further, the applicants/appellants pursuing 25 grounds of appeal, all of which were ultimately found to be without any merit.
As to the issue of fraud the applicants/appellants submitted correctly that what is relevant is “the conduct of the party in the litigation, not the conduct of the party in the antecedent facts” (see paragraphs 14 and 15 of the applicants’/appellants’ reply submissions filed on 23 September 2021 citing Lindgren J in NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank Ltd (No 2) [2001] 109 FCR 77 at [56]).
Thus, that cannot provide the necessary exceptional circumstance.
As to the nature of the appeal, that plainly arises from the fact that the trial ran for 87 days, resulting in 298 pages of reasons delivered by the primary judge in respect of the declaratory order. Those facts shaped the nature of the appeal, and it cannot be said that the length of the appeal book, the length of the summaries of argument, and the duration of the hearing demonstrates exceptional circumstances.
Finally, lack of success does not per se provide a basis for indemnity costs to be ordered.
Accordingly, there is no circumstance here which would warrant departing from the ordinary rule of calculating costs on a party/party basis. We will return to the amount sought on that basis shortly.
THE ORDERS SOUGHT BY THE THIRD RESPONDENTS
It is relevant to point out that the third respondents were the trustees of the bankrupt estate of the husband, and thus they had to have regard to the interests of the husband’s creditors.
The issue squarely raised for consideration here though, is whether there should be a costs order at all in favour of the third respondents in relation to the application for leave to appeal and the appeal from the declaratory order.
The applicants/appellants submit that there should be no order because it was unnecessary for the third respondents to take part in that application and appeal. That is because although they were named as a party to the primary proceedings, they elected not to participate in those proceedings, yet they chose to participate in the application and the appeal by filing lengthy written submissions and making oral submissions. Further, it is emphasised that those written submissions were very much a repeat of the written submissions of the first respondent, whose position in the application and the appeal the third respondents supported. And finally, as was the case, the oral submissions of the third respondents delivered on the third day of the hearing were primarily focussed on the recusal appeal and the Notice of Contention they filed in relation to that application and appeal.
In response, the third respondents submit that it was appropriate for them to participate in the application and the appeal against the declaratory order. They say that they were a “proper party to the proceedings below” and they were “properly interested in both the primary proceedings and this appeal”. As a consequence, they had an “obligation” to defend the orders of the primary judge, and they made a responsible decision “to preserve the resources of the bankrupt estate in relation to the primary proceeding” (see paragraphs 5 and 6 of the third respondents’ reply submissions filed 22 September 2021).
However, we do not see that that answers why the third respondents participated in the application and the appeal to the extent that they did. To satisfy the “obligation” that they assert they had, and to act responsibly, they need not have filed the written submissions that they did. Given that they were a repetition of the written submissions of the first respondent, all the third respondents needed to do was adopt those submissions, and that would have amply satisfied their “obligation” to the bankrupt estate and the creditors, and avoided the incurring of significant legal expenses. Plainly, they also did not need to have their Queen’s Counsel and his junior sit through the oral argument in relation to the application and the appeal against the declaratory order, because as was conceded by them in their reply submissions, their oral submissions principally concerned the recusal appeal.
It is telling that in their written submissions in support of their application for costs, it is unequivocally stated that “their interest in resisting this appeal was legally indistinguishable from that of the first respondent” (paragraph 4 of the third respondents’ submissions filed on 8 September 2021).
Granted, the third respondents in their reply submissions correctly point out that by this Court’s conclusion at [91]–[93], the third respondents submissions as to an analysis not offered by the first respondent was accepted. However, that one instance pales into insignificance when compared with the extent of, and the breadth of, the case mounted by the first respondent, and repeated by the third respondents. It cannot provide a justification for the third respondents filing their lengthy written submissions.
Thus, in the exercise of our discretion we propose to dismiss the third respondents’ application for costs in relation to the application for leave to appeal and the appeal against the declaratory order.
THE ORDERS SOUGHT BY THE APPLICANTS/APPELLANTS
As referred to above, the applicants/appellants in effect seek orders for costs against both the first respondent and the third respondents in relation to the successful recusal appeal.
However, as we have explained, there is no basis for such an order being made against the first respondent, and the same reasoning applies in relation to the third respondents. Thus, there will be no order for costs against either the first respondent or the third respondents, and the application for costs will be dismissed.
In that event though, as referred to above, the applicants/appellants seek a costs certificate, and the first respondent and the third respondents join in that application.
Costs certificates can be issued to the parties pursuant to the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) where the appeal succeeds on a question of law, and there is no order for costs. That is the case here, and we are prepared to make the orders sought in the exercise of our discretion.
We note that both the first respondent and the third respondents sought that their costs certificates authorise a payment in respect of 10 per cent of the costs incurred by each of them in relation to the appeal, and we make the following comment about that claim. Although we accept that the costs incurred in relation to the recusal appeal were 10 per cent of the overall appeal, there is a maximum of only $4,000 that is payable pursuant to a costs certificate, and it is not possible for a costs certificate to issue specifically for 10 per cent of the overall costs of the appeal.
THE QUANTUM OF COSTS
We have found that the applicants/appellants should pay 90 per cent of the costs of the first respondent calculated on a party/party basis.
The amount calculated on that basis is $163,242.42, and the first respondent seeks that their costs be fixed in that sum. The applicants/appellants submit though that the size of the amount sought “justifies a proper assessment being undertaken having regard to the assessment principles in r 19.34 of the [former] Family Law Rules (paragraph 18 of the applicants’/appellants’ reply submissions filed 23 September 2021).
For some time now this Court has adopted the principle that wherever practicable the costs payable should be fixed. That process is supported by r 12.17 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (formerly r 19.18 of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)) which provides that this Court may order costs payable in a specific amount.
The obvious purpose of such rules is to “avoid the expense, delay and aggravation involved in protracted litigation arising out of taxation” (Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (No 2) (1995) 135 ALR 160 at 162).
The applicants/appellants attempted to suggest that that principle should not apply where the amount of the costs sought is large. However, it seems to us that the larger the amount the more opportunities there are for dispute and arguments to arise in a taxation, unnecessarily prolonging the finalisation of the matter.
Here, no specific challenge is made by the applicants/appellants to any of the costs sought by the first respondent, and we consider those costs to not only be justified, but to be reasonable. Indeed, given the size of the costs sought by the applicants/appellants in the event that an order for costs was made in their favour, it does not behove them to complain about the comparatively modest costs sought by the first respondent.
Thus, there will be an order that the applicants/appellants pay the first respondent’s costs in relation to the application for leave to appeal and the appeal against the declaratory order fixed in the sum of $163,242.42.
CONCLUSION
As just referred to, there will be an order for costs in favour of the first respondent. There will also be no order for costs in favour of either the applicants/appellants or the third respondents, and their respective applications will be dismissed.
Finally, each party will have a costs certificate in relation to their respective costs incurred in the application for leave to appeal and the appeal against the order dismissing the application for the primary judge to recuse herself.
I certify that the preceding fifty (50) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Chief Justice Alstergren & Justice Strickland. Associate:
Dated: 5 November 2021
SCHEDULE OF PARTIES
SOA 74 of 2019
MLF 3444 of 2006Appellants
Third Appellant:
GGG PTY LTD (ACN …)
Fourth Appellant:
EEE PTY LTD (ACN …)
Fifth Appellant:
HHH PTY LTD (ACN …)
Sixth Appellant:
X CORPORATION PTY LTD (ACN …)
Seventh Appellant:
X-1 PROPERTIES PTY LTD (ACN …)
Eighth Appellant:
SSS PTY LTD (ACN …) AS TRUSTEE OF THE TTT INVESTMENT TRUST
Ninth Appellant:
VVV PTY LTD (ACN …)
Tenth Appellant:
MS C JESS
Respondents
Fourth Respondent:
PPP INVESTMENTS PTY LTD (ACN …)
Fifth Respondent:
AAA PTY LTD (ACN …) AS TRUSTEE OF THE BBB TRUST
Sixth Respondent:
CCC PTY LTD (ACN …) AS TRUSTEE OF THE DDD UNIT TRUST
Seventh Respondent:
JJJ PTY LTD (ACN …)
Eighth Respondent:
LLL PTY LTD (ACN …)
Ninth Respondent:
MMM PTY LTD (ACN …)
Tenth Respondent:
X HOLDINGS PTY LTD (ACN …)
Eleventh Respondent:
X INTERNATIONAL PTY LTD (ACN …)
Twelfth Respondent:
X PROPERTIES PTY LTD (ACN …)
Thirteenth Respondent:
X-1 PTY LTD (ACN …)
Fourteenth Respondent:
X PTY LTD (ACN …) AS TRUSTEE OF THE Y UNIT TRUST
Fifteenth Respondent:
NNN PTY LTD (ACN …)
Sixteenth Respondent:
OOO PTY LTD (ACN …)
Seventeenth Respondent:
QQQ PTY LTD (ACN …) AS TRUSTEE OF THE RRR FAMILY TRUST
Eighteenth Respondent:
Y (NZ) LIMITED (NO. …)
Nineteenth Respondent:
Y (WA) PTY LTD (ACN …)
Twentieth Respondent:
Y INTERNATIONAL PTY LTD (ACN …)
Twenty first Respondent:
X-2 PTY LTD (ACN …)
2
4
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