Jerrold & Bettie
[2024] FedCFamC1F 252
•18 April 2024
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Jerrold & Bettie [2024] FedCFamC1F 252
File number(s): BRC 1047 of 2024 Judgment of: JARRETT J Date of judgment: 18 April 2024 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – ADOPTION – Whether leave to commence adoption proceedings is in the best interests of the child – Leave granted under s 60G of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) to commence proceedings Legislation: Adoption Act 2009 (Qld) ss 92, 92(1)(d)
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 4(1), 60CC, 60F(4)(a), 60G(1), 60HA(3)(a), 61E, 65J.
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 21 Date of last submission/s: 18 April 2024 Date of hearing: 18 April 2024 Place: Brisbane Solicitors for the Applicant: Determined on the papers ORDERS
BRC 1047 of 2024 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MR JERROLD
Applicant
AND: MS BETTIE
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JARRETT J
DATE OF ORDER:
18 APRIL 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicant and the respondent each have leave for proceedings to be commenced for the adoption of X born 2008 by Mr Jerrold.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JARRETT J:
X was born in 2008 in City B. Her biological father is Mr C. Mr C died as a consequence of an illness in 2013 in City D, State E, United States of America.
X’s mother, Ms Bettie, and Mr C were once married to each other, but by the time of X’s birth, they had separated and divorced. According to the evidence before me, X never spent any time with Mr C before his death.
Ms Bettie and the applicant, Mr Jerrold, commenced a relationship and married in Country F in 2009. They remain, as they describe it, “happily married”.
By this application, both Mr Jerrold and despite her being named as a respondent to the proceeding, Ms Bettie seek leave for proceedings to be commenced for X’s adoption by Mr Jerrold pursuant to s 60G(1) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
The present application is necessary because s 92 of the Adoption Act 2009 (Qld) provides that a person may apply to the Chief Executive to arrange an adoption by that person of a stated child only if a number of matters are satisfied. Included within the mandated requirements, in particular at s 92(1)(d), is a requirement that a person applying to adopt a child has been granted leave under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) to apply for adoption proceedings.
An application for leave to commence adoption proceedings may only be made by a prescribed adopting parent. The phrase prescribed adopting parent is defined in s 4(1) of the Act relevantly as being the spouse of, or a person in a de facto relationship with, a parent of the child the subject of the application. It also includes a parent of the child and either his or her spouse, or a person in a de facto relationship with that parent.
There is no issue that Mr Jerrold and Ms Bettie are both, whether considered separately or together, within the definition of prescribed adopting parent for the purposes of the present application.
In considering whether or not to grant leave pursuant to s 60G of the Act, the Court must consider whether granting leave would be in the child’s best interests, having regard to the effect of ss 60F(4)(a), 60HA(3)(a), 61E, and 65J of the Act where those sections might apply in any particular case.
Section 60F(4) has no application in the present case. Neither does s 60HA(3)(a). Section 61E provides for any adoption to bring a person’s parental responsibility for the child to an end except in certain circumstances. Given that Mr C is deceased, it is of no particular interest here. Section 65J provides for any adoption to bring extant parenting orders to an end. There are presently no extant parenting orders although there is an agreement between Mr C and Ms Bettie entered into in 2009 relating to the change of X’s surname from C to Bettie. Again, by reason of Mr C’s death, this is of no moment.
The application is to be determined by reference to a consideration of what is in X’s best interests having regard to the matters raised for consideration by s 60CC of the Act and which are relevant in the context of the present case.
The evidence shows that X has only known Mr Jerrold as her father. Mr Jerrold and Ms Bettie have raised X as their own child. They swear that X lives in a safe and loving environment where she is free from physical and psychological harm or risk.
Mr Jerrold and Ms Bettie have another child together, G. X and G are said to have a very close relationship, spend a lot of time together and have their own bedrooms next to each other.
X is doing very well at H School. She has a good circle of friends.
The parties submit that if the application is granted, at an “everyday” level, nothing will change for X. She will remain in her usual safe and familiar environment. There is no reason revealed in the evidence to expect that anything about Mr Jerrold’s role in X’s life is likely to change.
The parties further submit that an adoption will put X on an equal footing as her sister G, “with both [Mr Jerrold] and [Ms Bettie] as formal parents”. They suggest that this should remove any “psychological concerns [X] may feel from being different from [G]”, something about which there is no evidence but which I infer is probably the case.
The importance of bonds between siblings is difficult to overstate and I consider it plainly in X’s best interests to give she and G the opportunity to tighten those bonds. The formal recognition of Mr Jerrold’s role in X’s life provides such an opportunity.
Mr Jerrold is a Country J national and the parties point out that adopting X would permit her to apply for Country J citizenship. Currently, G holds Country J citizenship. Both girls speak the language of Country J and X has close relationships with her grandparents in Country J.
Further, having regard to the evidence about the nature of this family and their relationships, I am satisfied and I find that it is in X’s best interests for Mr Jerrold to be equipped with parental responsibility for X, if she is ever in a position where important decisions need to be made rapidly and Ms Bettie is not available to make them.
I have turned my mind to whether there are any reasons it is not in X’s best interests for Mr Jerrold to have leave to seek to adopt her. I am unable to detect any such reasons in the evidence. There is no evidence of domestic or family violence in the household. There is no evidence of a history of violence or criminality.
I am satisfied, and I find, that it is in X’s best interests for there to be a grant of leave to the applicant and the respondent to commence proceedings for the adoption of X by Mr Jerrold.
There will be orders accordingly.
I certify that the preceding twenty-one (21) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Jarrett. Associate:
Dated: 18 April 2024
0
0
2