Jeremiah v Lawrie - [2016] NTCA 6

Jeremiah v Lawrie & Anor [2016] NTCA 06
PARTIES:JEREMIAH, Wade Lee

v
LAWRIE, Delia Phoebe
and
CAREY, Deputy Chief Magistrate

TITLE OF COURT:  COURT OF APPEAL OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
JURISDICTION:  CIVIL APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT EXERCISING TERRITORY JURISDICTION
FILE NO:AP 6 of 2016 (21615168)
DELIVERED:  2 NOVEMBER 2016
HEARING DATES:  7 & 8 JULY 2016
JUDGMENT OF:  KELLY, HILEY and REEVES JJ
APPEAL FROM:  MILDREN AJ
CATCHWORDS:

SEARCH WARRANT – Validity – requirement for warrant to identify the nature of things authorised to be seized – Police Administration Act 1979 (NT) s 117(5) – whether warrant complied with requirement in s 117(5)(b) to include a description of the nature of the things to be seized – warrant described things authorised to be seized by reference to offence – warrant described things authorised to be seized as “electronic records [of the kind set out] related to … an offence [under] s 118 of [the Criminal Code]” – warrant in such form must provide sufficient particulars of offence for it to be ascertainable whether a thing seized is authorised to be seized by the warrant – trial judge correct to find that without particulars of who is said to have committed the offence, and where and when, it would be impossible to ascertain what electronic records of the kind described complied with the description in the warrant – appeal dismissed
Criminal Code 1983 (NT) s 118
Police Administration Act 1979 (NT) s 117
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 10, s 70
Inquiries Act (NT)
Police Administration Act (NT) s 116, 117, 118A
Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) s 73
Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27; [2009] HCA 41; Different Solutions Pty Ltd v Commissioner, Australian Federal Police (No 2) (2008) 190 A Crim R 265; [2008] FCA 1686; Hart v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (2002) 124 FCR 384; [2002] FCAFC 392; Ousley v The Queen (1997) 192 CLR 69; Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355; [1998] HCA 28; State of New South Wales v Corbett (2007) 230 CLR 606; [2007] HCA 32; The Queen v Tillett; Ex parte Newton (1969) 14 FLR 101; Thiess v Collector of Customs (2014) 250 CLR 664; [2014] HCA 12, applied
Trimboli v Onley (No 3) (1981) 56 FLR 321; followed
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Cloran (1984) 4 FCR 151; Beneficial Finance Corporation v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (1991) 31 FCR 523; Harts Australia Ltd v Commissioner, Australian Federal Police (1997) 75 FCR 145; Lawrie v Carey DCM [2016] NTSC 23; Lawrie v Lawler [2016] NTCA 03; Parker v Churchill (1986) 9 FCR 334; Wright v Queensland Police Service (2002) 2 Qd R 667, referred to

REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Appellant:A Moses SC with K Anderson
First Respondent:  P Davis SC with A Scott
Second Respondent:  C Retallick
Solicitors:
Appellant:The Australian Government Solicitor
First Respondent:  Ward Keller
Second Respondent:  Solicitor for the Northern Territory
Judgment category classification:    B
Number of pages:  56

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWIN
Jeremiah v Lawrie & Anor [2016] NTCA 06
No. AP 6 of 2016 (21615168)
BETWEEN:

WADE LEE JEREMIAH

Appellant

AND:

DELIA PHOEBE LAWRIE

First Respondent

AND:

DEPUTY CHIEF MAGISTRATE CAREY

Second Respondent

CORAM: KELLY, HILEY and REEVES JJ
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered 2 November 2016)
KELLY J:

This is an appeal against a decision of Mildren AJ setting aside a warrant which authorised the entry and search of a government office in Darwin and the seizure of electronic records relating to email communications sent and received from Ms Lawrie (“the respondent”) and four other named people “between the period 18 December 2013 and 1 April 2015”.
I have had the considerable benefit of reading a draft of the judgment of Reeves J. The facts, relevant legislation, background and issues on the appeal are all set out in that decision. While I agree with (and adopt) the bulk of the reasoning in the decision of Reeves J, I am compelled to disagree with his Honour’s conclusion.
As Reeves J notes (at [65]), there is no challenge to the primary judge’s conclusion[1] that, despite there being a full stop after “1 April 2015”, the following sentence fragment:
being a thing related to or in connection with an offence against a law in force in the Northern Territory, namely an offence of making a false statement in statements required to be under oath or solemn declaration - Section 118 of the Criminal Code Act (Northern Territory).
was clearly intended to confine the “Electronic records” subject to the warrant to emails that fit that description.
I do not agree with the statement in [77] of the judgment of Reeves J that the determination of this appeal essentially involves an exercise in statutory construction. Rather, I agree with the proposition advanced by the respondent that this appeal does not simply turn on a construction of the statute, but, at least as crucially, on a construction of the warrant. The statute authorises the warrant, but the warrant authorises the search of the place named in the warrant and seizure of the things described in the warrant.[2]
The relevant parts of s 117 of the Police Administration Act (“PAA”) (the section which authorises the issue of warrants of the kind at issue) are as follows:
117 Search warrants
(2)Where an information on oath is laid before a justice of the peace alleging that there are reasonable grounds for believing that there is at a place anything relating to an offence, the justice of the peace may issue a search warrant authorising a member of the Police Force named in the warrant to enter and search the place and seize anything relating to an offence found in the course of the search at the place.
(3)A justice of the peace shall not issue a warrant under subsection (1) or (2) in relation to an information unless:
(a)the information sets out or has attached to it a written statement of the grounds upon which the issue of the warrant is sought;
(b)the informant or some other person has given to the justice of the peace, either orally or by affidavit, such further information, if any, as the justice of the peace requires concerning the grounds on which the issue of the warrant is being sought; and
(c)the justice of the peace is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for issuing the warrant.
(5)There shall be stated in the warrant issued under this section the following particulars:
(a)the purpose for which the search or entry is authorised;
(b)a description of the nature of the things authorised to be seized; and
(c)…
Subject to my general comments in relation to the form of the warrant below, I agree with Reeves J (at [89]) that in stating that it authorised the holder “to enter and search the place described above” the warrant complied with the prescription in s 117(5)(a) to state particulars of the purpose for which the search or entry was authorised. The issue for determination on this appeal is whether it complied with the requirements of s 117(5)(b).
Section 117(5)(b) requires the warrant to include a description of the nature of the things authorised to be seized. In my view, no question of construction of s 117(5)(b) arises. Its meaning is plain. Similarly, in my view, the object of the requirement to provide a description of the nature of the things authorised to be seized is obvious: what the warrant authorises to be seized must be objectively ascertainable. What is necessary for the determination of this appeal, is to construe the warrant to assess whether it complies with this requirement. In my view it does not.
The respondent submitted that, while a warrant may be valid if it does not identify the offence concerned, if it does identify the object of the search by reference to an offence, that offence must be properly defined. I agree. The nature of the things authorised to be seized must be plainly stated to enable a person reading the warrant to form a judgment about whether an item seized purportedly pursuant to the warrant falls within or outside the authority conferred by the warrant. There must be a standard by which the lawfulness of the conduct of the officer executing the warrant can be judged should that be challenged at a later date.
Punctuation and infelicities of expression aside, what this warrant authorises to be seized is: “Electronic records [of the kind set out] [which are] related to … an offence against a law in force in the Northern Territory, namely an offence of making a false statement in statements required to be under oath or solemn declaration - Section 118 of the Criminal Code Act (Northern Territory).” The question is whether this description adequately defines the class of documents authorised to be seized. In my view the question of whether the resulting description is adequate or inadequate does not depend upon the principles set out in the cases, but on a simple examination of the warrant.
At [97] Reeves J refers to a footnote in Ousley v The Queen[3] (“Ousley”) citing The Queen v Tillett; Ex parte Newton[4] (“Tillett”) for the proposition that a warrant need not specify particular things to be seized if the class of things is sufficiently identified by reference to an offence. That, to my mind does nothing more than emphasise the need for a warrant to sufficiently identify the class of things authorised to be seized – whether by reference to an offence or otherwise.
In Tillett, Fox J made some observations about the requirement for a description of the things that may be seized in connection with a warrant issued under the Crimes Act (Cth):[5]
In the present case, it is argued on behalf of the applicants that the warrant is also defective because (a) it does not sufficiently specify the documents or things to be seized, ... Submission (a) is not in my opinion a valid objection in so far as it involves that there must necessarily be something in the nature of an itemization or specific description of particular documents or things. The generality of the warrant will be sufficiently narrowed in the present case if the offence is specified. This doubtless leaves the constable with some degree of discretion, but clearly that was intended. The fact is that the ambit of the discretion is to some extent circumscribed, and there is some basis for keeping his activities within proper limits.
It can be accepted that, under PAA s 117 also, “list certainty” is not required. As the very purpose of a warrant is to search for things that may be related to, or provide evidence of, the commission of an offence, the applicant for a warrant will often not know precisely what he or she is looking for. If one accepts that a warrant may be so framed as to leave room for a discretion in the warrant holder as to what may be seized, there must (as Fox J impliedly acknowledged in the above passage from Tillett) be some criterion by which a judgment can be made as to whether the discretion miscarried, that is to say whether a reasonable warrant holder could possibly have formed the view that the warrant authorised the seizure of a particular item. In my view, s 117(5)(b) requires the warrant to specify the type of item to be seized with sufficient particularity to enable that to occur.
Although it is not strictly necessary for the purposes of this decision, it seems to me that whether a warrant provides for an area of discretion in the warrant holder as to what things may be seized will depend on the wording of the warrant. For example, if a warrant simply lists things or provides a concrete description of the things authorised to be seized, the authority conferred by the warrant will be limited to the things listed or things which objectively comply with the description. In such a case, what is required is “criterion certainty”: that is it must be able to be said, with certainty, that a given object falls within or outside the class described in the warrant. On the other hand, if the things authorised to be seized are described by reference to the authorised officer’s opinion or belief in the existence of a certain state of affairs or otherwise in partly subjective terms,[6] and a question arises as to whether particular items have been lawfully seized, the question to be determined will be whether an authorised officer could reasonably hold the relevant opinion or belief, or whether there are in fact sufficient grounds to induce the requisite belief or opinion in a reasonable person.[7] In such a case, at an anterior stage, where the question is the one here before the Court, namely whether the warrant complies with the requirement in s 117(5)(b) to provide a description of the nature of the things authorised to be seized, the question will be whether the warrant provides a sufficient description to enable an assessment to be made as to whether there are sufficient grounds to induce in a reasonable person the belief that the thing seized fell within the class so described.
As the applicant for this warrant chose to frame it in the terms he did – ie (essentially) such of c 12,000 emails as are “related to or in connection with an offence against a law in force in the Northern Territory, namely an offence of making a false statement in statements required to be under oath or solemn declaration – Section 118 of the Criminal Code Act” – then in order to satisfy that requirement in s 117(5)(b), the warrant must give sufficient particulars of the offence for it to be objectively ascertainable whether a particular email which has been seized does or does not fit that description.
In my view, the warrant under consideration on this appeal does not.[8] I agree with the conclusion of the learned trial judge[9] at [26].
Does mere reference to the name of the offence and the statutory provision meet the requirements that that warrant provided particulars of the purpose for which the search was authorised and the description of the nature of things authorized to be searched? In the peculiar circumstances of this case, in the absence of any ancillary information the institution to which the warrant was addressed would not be in any position to say with even the faintest degree of clarity what documents amongst the nearly 12,000 emails have or might have a possible connection to the offence without knowing who it was is alleged to have committed the offence and where, when and, given the generality of the kind of offence relied upon, in what circumstances this is said to have occurred. I am not saying that in other cases of a different nature the same conclusion would be reached. For example, if the offence charged was possession of an illegal drug, namely cannabis plant material, it may not be necessary to say anything more than that. However, in this case the offence alleged was of an entirely different character, and, like the offence of perjury considered by Holmes J in Wright, inherently vague. In my opinion the warrant did not meet the requirements of the Act and is therefore invalid. [emphasis added]
Without knowing, for example, who is alleged to have committed the offence and at least the context in which it has said to have been committed,[10] it would not be possible to say of any particular email whether or not it fell within the class described – namely emails “related to or in connection with an offence against a law in force in the Northern Territory, namely an offence of making a false statement in statements required to be under oath or solemn declaration – Section 118 of the Criminal Code Act (Northern Territory)”. I am unable to agree with the conclusion of Reeves J at [103] that, “[h]aving regard to the description of the things that were authorised to be searched and the description of the offence with which those things were connected, or to which they were related” the warrant served to achieve strict compliance with s 117(5)(b).
The appellant contended that the expression in [26] “the institution to which the warrant was addressed would not be in any position to say ... what documents … might have a possible connection to the offence” demonstrated error on the part of the trial judge. The appellant contended that the trial judge wrongly focused on the person affected by the warrant and that this was a result of his Honour applying what was said by Holmes J in Wright v Queensland Police Service,[11] a case involving quite different provisions in the Queensland legislation which required a warrant to provide “brief particulars of the offence”.[12] The appellant submitted that his Honour erred in relying upon the decision in Wright to conclude that the purpose of the Northern Territory Police Administration Act was the same as the purpose of the Queensland legislation there under consideration.
The appellant’s contention was based on what the trial judge said at [25] and [26] of the reasons for decision. His Honour quoted the following paragraphs from the judgment of Holmes J in Wright:[13]
It is clear that the purpose of stating the offence is to set some boundaries for the search itself. In Bradrose Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Police, ex parte Bradrose Pty Ltd the principle that the description of the offence should be such as to enable the persons affected “to know the exact object of the search” was adopted. That expression has been used with some regularity in the Federal Court in the context of search warrants issued under s 10 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). In more recent times, however, the question has been stated more broadly as to whether the warrant discloses the nature of the offence “so as to indicate the area of search”, although McHugh J in Oustley [sic] referred to the need for a warrant to be sufficiently precisely worded to enable a person affected “to know the object of the search”.
[32] Whether one takes a narrow or broad approach to that necessity, it seems clear that the insertion merely of the name of the offence and section could not meet it. Nor is it an answer to say that the second applicant at least would have known the details of the offence alleged, having been charged. The question of whether a warrant meets the requirements of the Act, must, in my view, be answered objectively by reference to its contents. A reader without ancillary information would not have known from its face by whom the offence was alleged to have been committed, let alone where and when. Having regard to the need for the person affected to be able to understand the bounds of the search to be conducted, and the Act’s stated purpose in s. 4(e) “to ensure fairness and to protect the rights of person whom police officers exercise powers under this Act” it is clear that the requirement for brief particulars cannot be met by a bald naming of the offence and relevant section.[14]
His Honour then said[15] immediately before the passage quoted at [18] above:
I accept the criticism made by Mr. Moses SC that Wright dealt with quite different legislation, particularly in that s 73 of the Queensland Act has no exact counterpart in s 117(5) of the Northern Territory Act, but nevertheless it seems to me that the purposes of both provisions are the same, notwithstanding that the Northern Territory Act does not have an expressed purpose such as was contained in s 4(e) of the Queensland Act. It may fairly be assumed that in drafting s 117, the Legislative Assembly had in mind the need for the balance which is referred to in cases such as the passage I have quoted previously from George v Rockett.[16]
I do not find it necessary to come to any conclusion as to whether his Honour erred in his reliance on Wright, or in finding that the purposes of the Queensland and Northern Territory provisions were the same. It seems to me that in the passage quoted above his Honour indicated that he was alive to the differences between the two Acts, but in any event, I do not think this issue is determinative of the appeal. Whether or not his Honour’s conclusion about the purpose of s 117(5)(b) was correct, in my view his Honour was correct in deciding that “in the peculiar circumstances of this case”, it would not be possible “to say with even the faintest degree of clarity what documents amongst the nearly 12,000 emails have or might have a possible connection to the offence” without knowing further details of the kind his Honour set out. For that reason the warrant did not “meet the requirements that that warrant provided particulars of the purpose for which the search was authorised and the description of the nature of things authorized to be seized”[17] – specifically the latter. I do not think that placing the emphasis on the person affected by the warrant as the one who needs to be in a position to say which documents might comply with the description affects the soundness of the conclusion. In my view, it would not be objectively possible to determine from the description in the warrant whether a particular document fell within the class specified and so whether it was authorised by the warrant to be seized.

Counsel for the appellant contended that the warrant did not need to describe the type of documents authorised to be seized with the particularity described above. He contended that the warrant did not stand alone, that before the warrant is issued the applicant must submit to the issuing justice an information containing the particulars specified in s 117(2) and (3)(a), and that the issuing justice must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for issuing the warrant. The contention was that, so long as these conditions were satisfied, there was no need for any specificity in the warrant as to the type of thing authorised to be seized, and that, often, it would be undesirable for the target of a police investigation to be given particulars of the things authorised to be seized as it might risk the integrity of an on-going investigation.
I do not accept that submission. First, it seems to me to be contrary to the plain words of s 117(5)(b). Second, it ignores the fact that, after a warrant has been executed, a court may be called upon to determine whether something seized purportedly under the authority of a warrant was lawfully seized, that is to say whether it fell within the authority set out in the warrant. It is essential to that task that the warrant contain a sufficient description of the things authorised to be seized to enable a judgment of the lawfulness of the seizure to be made. As Holland J said in Trimboli:
Considered at the time of seizure, the conditions essential to a lawful seizure under the present type of warrant are, I think, reasonably clear. So far as it may be founded on the warrant, the authority to seize is necessarily restricted to the things described in the warrant. As, by s 10 of the Act, the authority is given only to the officer named in the warrant, he must, even if he has exercised his right to have assistance, be the one to carry out any seizure. As he is authorised to seize only the things described, a decision by him that a thing seized is a thing described is a necessary act in the lawful execution of the power to seize. The officer’s authority does not entitle him to seize everything or anything he finds simply in the hope that it might turn out to be or to include something described by the warrant.[18]
For these reasons, in my view, the appeal should be dismissed.
Problems with the form of the warrant
I wish also to say something about the form of the warrant. The fact that the warrant was the subject of a successful application to the Supreme Court to set it aside, and the fact that it has come on appeal to this Court is attributable in large measure to manifest inadequacies in the drafting of it. Further, those inadequacies caused unnecessary time and expense during the course of the proceedings in raising issues that would not have been necessary had the document been properly punctuated.
The warrant is in the following terms:

Northern Territory of Australia

Police Administration Act, Section 117(2)

SEARCH WARRANT

TO SEARCH A PLACE

TO: Wade Lee Jeremiah, a member of the Police Force:-
WHEREAS I, Deputy Chief Magistrate Michael Carey, a Justice within the meaning of the Police Administration Act, pursuant to Section 117(2) of that Act, being satisfied by information on oath placed before me on the 27th day of January 2016, that there are reasonable grounds for believing that there is at a place described as:-
Department of Corporate and Information Services
Northern Territory Government
Level 3, Darwin Plaza
41 Smith Street Mall, Darwin
the following thing:
Electronic records kept and maintained by the Northern Territory Government (“NTG”), specifically relating to all email communications sent and received from the following persons:-
-Delia Phoebe Lawrie
-Michael Gleeson
-Cathryn Tilmouth
-Mandy (or Amanda) Taylor; and
-Charlie Phillips
between the period 18 December 2013 and 1 April 2015.
being a thing related to or in connection with an offence against a law in force in the Northern Territory, namely an offence of making a false statement in statements required to be under oath or solemn declaration - Section 118 of the Criminal Code Act (Northern Territory).
AUTHORISE YOU, with such assistance as you think necessary to enter and search the place described above, if necessary by force, and to seize the thing described above, that is found at the place.
This warrant is subject to the caveat that in the event that any person named in said warrant claims client legal privilege on behalf of Delia Lawrie in respect of any of the documents that are proposed to be seized pursuant to this warrant, then those documents the subject of that claim are to be sealed and delivered to the registry of the Court of Summary Jurisdiction, Nicholls Place Darwin and therein held until the question of client legal privilege has been determined by the Court.
This Warrant expires on the 8th day of February, 2016 unless sooner executed.

DATED THE 27TH DAY OF JANUARY 2016.
Signed ______(Michael Carey DCM)_____
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE

Excising presently unnecessary words, the operative words of the warrant are these:
WHEREAS I, Deputy Chief Magistrate Michael Carey … being satisfied by information on oath placed before me on the 27th day of January 2016, that there are reasonable grounds for believing that there is at a place described as Department of Corporate and Information Services etc the following thing: Electronic records [of the kind set out] between the period 18 December 2013 and 1 April 2015. being a thing related to or in connection with an offence ... AUTHORISE YOU, to enter and search the place described above and to seize the thing described above, that is found at the place.
The punctuation renders the warrant meaningless – or at the very best ambiguous. Why is there a capital letter in “Electronic”, a full stop after 1 April 2015, a full stop after “(Northern Territory)” and before “AUTHORISE YOU”? These are all part of the one sentence. For that matter, why are the words “the following thing” there at all? What follows is not “a thing” but a description of a number of things. Similarly inappropriately, the warrant authorises the seizure of “the thing” not “the things”.
In addition, the word “WHEREAS” at the beginning is at best redundant. A sentence in the following form makes sense:
“I, being satisfied [of the relevant matters] authorise you to enter and search [the nominated place] and to seize [the things described].”
This warrant appears to have been partially copied from a now largely archaic format in which the maker of the document set out preliminary matters in recitals preceded by the word “whereas” followed by an operative part. A warrant in this form would have a similar format to the following:
“WHEREAS I am satisfied [of the relevant matters] AND I THEREFORE AUTHORISE you to enter and search [the nominated place] and to seize [the things described].”
If this warrant is an attempt to duplicate that kind of format it does not succeed: here the recital has no verb and the operative part has no subject.[19] The simplest remedy would be to delete the word “WHEREAS”.
Finally, the limitation on the description of documents authorised to be seized by reference to the suspected offence reads:
being a thing related to or in connection with an offence against a law in force in the Northern Territory, namely an offence of making a false statement in statements required to be under oath or solemn declaration – Section 118 of the Criminal Code Act (Northern Territory).
There is no s 118 in the Criminal Code Act. The reference should be to the Criminal Code 1983 (NT) which is Schedule 1 to the Act.
All this is not mere pedantry. If the intention is that the warrant should recite that the statutory preconditions for its issue have been satisfied, it should do so, and it is of primary importance that the warrant sets out clearly and unambiguously what it is that the warrant authorises the holder to do. In this case, time and money was expended before the judge at first instance in an argument that the warrant did not purport to limit the range of documents authorised to be seized to those which might be connected or related to an offence, simply because of the mis-applied full stop after “1 April 2015”.
If the deficiencies in this warrant are the result of following an electronic form, that form needs to be amended. In any case, officers preparing a draft warrant should read the draft they have produced to ensure that it is intelligible, properly punctuated, and says what is intended to be said; and that it accurately and clearly sets out the things which it is intended that the warrant will authorise the officer to seize. If the electronic form is inadequate for the purpose, it would seem to me that the document should be redone manually if necessary to render it intelligible.
Problems with the execution of the warrant
I should also add that I agree with the comments made by Reeves J about the practical difficulties of executing this warrant in the absence of any provision in the PAA which would allow an executing officer who encounters a vast quantity of electronic data an adequate opportunity to search that data in order to identify what part of it relates to the offence (or otherwise falls within the description in the warrant) such that the officer can validly seize it.
There is simply no power in the PAA to remove electronic (or other) documents from the premises being searched so as to examine them elsewhere to see if they fall within the class of documents authorised to be seized by the warrant. The only authority for removal of the documents is the warrant, and the warrant only authorises seizure of documents which fall within the description set out in the warrant (in this case emails sent and received from the named people between the specified dates “related to or in connection with an offence against a law in force in the Northern Territory, namely an offence of making a false statement in statements required to be under oath or solemn declaration – Section 118 of the Criminal Code Act (Northern Territory)” (sic). Further, the only person authorised to seize such documents is the person to whom the warrant was issued so that person must form the relevant judgment.[20]
In Trimboli[21] there is a discussion of the English case of Inland Revenue Commissioners v Rossminster Ltd.[22] Rossminster concerned a power to search and seize conferred by statute rather than a warrant, but, as pointed out in Trimboli the principle is the same: the decision as to what fits the description in the warrant of what is authorised to be seized must be made before leaving the premises – there being no power to remove documents other than those which (in that case) fit the description in the statute, and (in this case) fit the description in the warrant.
Given those constraints, the authorised person in a warrant issued under PAA s 117 must ascertain while on the premises that any documents he wishes to seize fall within the description in the warrant. That being the case, it being agreed that there were around 12,000 emails in the electronic records in question, there seems to me to be no practical way in which this particular warrant could have been lawfully executed.
Finally, I agree with the comments of Hiley J at [60].
HILEY J:
I agree that the appeal should be dismissed. In particular I agree with the conclusions expressed by Kelly J as to the need for a warrant to sufficiently identify the nature of the things authorised to be seized so that a reasonable warrant holder can ascertain what things may be seized (at [7] - [8] and [12] - [14] above), the non-compliance of the subject warrant with this requirement (at [14] - [16]), the relevance of the interests of a person who may be affected by the warrant (at [17] - [20]) and the relevance of information known to the holder of the warrant but not apparent on the face of the warrant (at [21] - [22]). I add the following comments.
In the present matter the warrant purports to describe the nature of the things authorised to be seized by reference to an offence, namely “an offence of making a false statement in statements required to be under oath or solemn declaration – Section 118 of the Criminal Code Act (Northern Territory).” Accordingly, the main question in the present matter, and the focus of most of the submissions on appeal, is whether the offence is sufficiently described in the warrant to identify the area of the search.
The primary judge’s observation, at the end of [18] of his reasons for decision, that it is “necessary that the warrant should refer to a particular offence and authorize seizure by reference to that offence”, is uncontroversial for the purposes of this matter. That observation is consistent with views expressed in the authorities to which his Honour referred in footnote 5, Tillett and Corbett,[23] and in other authorities to which we were referred including BFC,[24] Parker v Churchill,[25] Wright, Ousley, Hart[26] and Different Solutions.[27]
At the hearing of the appeal both parties referred extensively to those and other authorities, none of which directly related to s 117 of the PAA or legislation elsewhere containing provisions such as s 117(5)(a) or s 117(5)(b). However they are useful in so far as they contain relevant principles including those concerning the kind of information that should be included in a warrant in order that the permitted scope of the search is identified.
Tillett, BFC and Parker involved the interpretation and application of s 10(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). This provision authorised the issue of a warrant following the issuing officer being satisfied that “there is reasonable ground for suspecting that there is” at the place to be searched “anything” relating to an offence. Many of the other authorities relate to similar provisions, but also involve additional provisions which expressly stipulate that the warrant must refer to a particular offence.[28]
In Different Solutions Graham J summarised those authorities and expressed a number of conclusions.
At [104] his Honour said:
To avoid invalidity, a search warrant must disclose the nature of the offence sufficiently to indicate the permissible area of search in relation to which s 3E of the Crimes Act is capable of operating, in otherwise intelligible terms (see generally per Jackson J in Parker v Churchill at 340; see also Burchett J in Beneficial Finance at 543; 21 and Harts at 152;183). [my emphasis]
At [106] his Honour referred to:
the necessity for search warrants … to define with reasonable particularity all relevant matters: the premises, the things liable to be seized and the offences which were committed or suspected to have been committed (per Lockhart J in Cloran[29] at 154). [my emphasis]
And at [111] - [112]:
[111] The statement of an offence in a search warrant need not be made with the precision required for an indictment. That would be impossible, and indeed to attempt it would be irrational, bearing in mind the stage of the investigation at which a search warrant may issue. The purpose of the statement of the offence in a search warrant is not to define issues for trial, but to set bounds to the area of search which the execution of the warrant will involve, as part of an investigation into a suspected crime. The appropriate contrast is not with the sort of error which might vitiate an indictment, but with the failure to focus of statutory suspicion and belief upon any particular crime, with the result of a condition of the issue of the warrants is not fulfilled (per Burchett J in Beneficial Finance at 533; 11 which was cited with approval by Heerey J in Chong v Schultz (2000) 112 A Crim R 59 at [7]).
[112] What the rule (sic) requires is identification (and so limitation) of an area of search by reference to a suspected offence, not the formulation of a pleading before the offence is capable of prosecution (per Burchett J in Beneficial Finance at 533-4; 11). [my emphasis]
Although Different Solutions was one of those cases which involved legislation that expressly required the issuing officer to state in the warrant “the offence to which the warrant relates”, the main authorities to which Graham J referred when expressing those opinions were Cloran, BFC and Parker, none of which involved legislation that expressly included such a requirement. His Honour also referred to Tillett in the course of reaching his conclusions.
I refer also to the summary by McHugh J in Ousley at p 107 quoted by Reeves J at [96], and in particular to some of the words which Reeves J highlighted in bold: “or is so vaguely worded that a person affected by it cannot know the object of the search”. At footnote 168 McHugh J cited a number of authorities including Tillett and Cloran and said that:
A warrant need not specify particular things to be seized, however, if the class of such things is sufficiently identified by reference to an offence.
As Kelly J points out (at [10]) this does nothing more than emphasise the need for a warrant to sufficiently identify the class of things authorised to be seized, whether by reference to an offence or otherwise. Where, as here, the nature of the things authorised to be seized is described by reference to a particular offence, it is useful to refer to the circumstances in Cloran (referred to by McHugh J in Ousley) and Parker, both cases where the description in a warrant was found to be inadequate.
In Cloran, search warrants issued under s 10(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) authorised the search for and seizure of documents in relation to a Four Corners program titled “Branded” that “will afford evidence as to the commission of offences against s 70 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).” In summary, s 70 made it an offence for a Commonwealth officer to publish or communicate any fact or document which came to his knowledge or possession, by virtue of his office, and which it was his duty not to disclose, unless otherwise authorised to do so. Lockhart J quashed the warrants. After referring to a number of decisions including Tillett, his Honour said that it was “impossible to know with any degree of particularity or precision what are the offences alleged to be committed against s 70.”[30] His Honour proceeded to express the view repeated by Graham J in Different Solutions at [106] and quoted in [44] above.
In Parker a number of warrants, issued in about 1985, identified four offences, one of which was described (in paragraph (d)) as being an offence against “section 231 of the Income Tax Assessment Act in that Ralph Edward Parker and Therese Isabel Carsen did at various times since 30 June 1978 until the present time evade payment of income tax.” The Full Court of the Federal Court comprising Bowen CJ, Lockhart and Jackson JJ, held that part of the warrants invalid. Jackson J described paragraph (d) of the warrants as:
… entirely bereft of any particularity. It simply alleges in the broadest terms that “at various times” over a period of more than six years Parker and Carsen had evaded payment of income tax and it is impossible in these circumstances, in my view, to regard par (d) as stating with sufficient particularity the offences …
I consider the warrant in the present matter is similarly wanting in particularity and thus fails to describe the nature of the things authorised to be seized.
Section 118 of the Criminal Code provides as follows:
Any person who, on any occasion on which a person making a statement touching any matter is required by law to make it on oath or under some sanction that may by law be substituted for an oath, or is required to verify it by solemn declaration, makes a statement touching such matter that, in any material particular, is to his knowledge false and verifies it on oath or under such other sanction or by solemn declaration, is guilty of an offence and is liable to imprisonment for 7 years.

Like the statutory provisions involved with the defective warrants in Cloran and Parker, and like the offence of perjury considered in Wright, s 118 is very broad and could potentially encompass a wide range of statements that could have been made, particularly by a public figure such as the respondent, over a period exceeding 15 months.
In my view the warrant did not sufficiently identify the class of the things that could be seized by merely referring to “an offence of making a false statement in statements required to be under oath or solemn declaration” and s 118 of the Criminal Code.
Rather than simply referring to:
Electronic records kept and maintained by the Northern Territory Government (“NTG”) specifically relating to all email communications sent and received from [the 5 named persons] between the period 18 December 2013 and 1 April 2015 being a thing related to or in connection with an offence against a law in force in the Northern Territory, namely an offence of making a false statement in statements required to be under oath or solemn declaration – section 118 of the Criminal Code Act (sic) (Northern Territory)
the warrant should have described the relevant offence with more particularity.
This could easily have been done. For example, the other two warrants that were subject of the litigation before the primary judge expressly referred to “representation, advice and assistance provided … to Ms Delia Phoebe Lawrie and Mr Gerald McCarthy or their representatives during the Inquiry into the Stella Maris – 2014” and to records relating to his/her “involvement in Supreme Court matter Lawrie v Lawler [2015] NTSC 19 … which commenced on the 30 July 2014” being a thing related to or in connection with an offence against … Section 118 …”.[31]
There cannot have been any operational reason why the warrant the subject of these proceedings could not at the least have identified the two persons of interest, Ms Delia Phoebe Lawrie and Mr Gerald McCarthy, and the context of the alleged offending, namely in relation to the Inquiry and the subsequent Supreme Court matter.
Other matters
I agree with Reeves J (at [84] - [85]) about the purpose of the search and seizure provisions in this part of the PAA being to enable the gathering of information to determine whether offences have been committed and to facilitate proof of them.
I also agree with Kelly J’s comments regarding the form of the warrant (at [24] - [31] and the comments by Kelly J (at [32] - [35]) and Reeves J (at [105] - [108]) regarding the need for legislation that will assist in cases involving large quantities of electronic data.
I add that I am concerned about the delay and cost associated with the bringing of this appeal. I do not understand why the appellant has not sought and obtained a fresh warrant which better describes the nature of the things to be seized. That would have enabled the appellant to proceed with this part of the investigation, and avoided the need for the parties and the public to incur the considerable cost associated with proceeding with this appeal.
REEVES J:
Introduction
Detective Acting Sergeant Jeremiah, the appellant (who I will refer to in these reasons as Detective Jeremiah), is a member of the Northern Territory Police Force. On 27 January 2016, he attended on the second respondent, then the Deputy Chief Magistrate of the Northern Territory, and successfully applied for the issue of three search warrants.
One of those warrants (the first warrant) authorised the entry and search of a government office in Darwin and the seizure of certain electronic records relating to email communications sent and received from Ms Lawrie, the first respondent, and four other people in that office. That warrant was executed on 28 January 2016 and resulted in the seizure of a large quantity of electronic data comprising approximately 12,000 emails. The other two warrants were addressed respectively to a barrister and a solicitor who had represented the first respondent during an Inquiry conducted under the provisions of the Inquiries Act (NT) by Mr John Lawler.
Ms Lawrie applied by originating motion to have the three warrants declared invalid. She claimed the first warrant was bad on its face and the second and third warrants did not authorise the seizure of privileged documents.[32] She was successful in relation to the first warrant, but not in relation to the other two. This appeal seeks to reverse Ms Lawrie’s success with respect to the first warrant.
The first warrant
The first warrant was in the following form.
Northern Territory of Australia
Police Administration Act, Section 117(2)
SEARCH WARRANT
TO SEARCH A PLACE
TO: Wade Lee Jeremiah, a member of the Police Force:-
WHEREAS I, Deputy Chief Magistrate Michael Carey, a Justice within the meaning of the Police Administration Act, pursuant to Section 117(2) of that Act, being satisfied by information on oath placed before me on the 27th day of January 2016, that there are reasonable grounds for believing that there is at a place described as:-
Department of Corporate and Information Services
Northern Territory Government
Level 3, Darwin Plaza
41 Smith Street Mall, Darwin
the following thing:
Electronic records kept and maintained by the Northern Territory Government (“NTG”), specifically relating to all email communications sent and received from the following persons:-
-Delia Phoebe Lawrie
-Michael Gleeson
-Cathryn Tilmouth
-Mandy (or Amanda) Taylor; and
-Charlie Phillips
between the period 18 December 2013 and 1 April 2015.
being a thing related to or in connection with an offence against a law in force in the Northern Territory, namely an offence of making a false statement in statements required to be under oath or solemn declaration - Section 118 of the Criminal Code Act (Northern Territory).
AUTHORISE YOU, with such assistance as you think necessary to enter and search the place described above, if necessary by force, and to seize the thing described above, that is found at the place.
This warrant is subject to the caveat that in the event that any person named in the said warrant claims legal privilege on behalf of Delia Lawrie in respect of any of the documents that are proposed to be seized pursuant to this warrant, then those documents the subject of that claim are to be sealed and delivered to the registry of the Court of Summary Jurisdiction, Nicholls Place Darwin and therein held until the question of client legal privilege has been determined by the Court.
This Warrant expires on the 8th day of February, 2016 unless sooner executed.
DATED THE 27TH DAY OF JANUARY 2016.
Signed ______(Michael Carey DCM)_____
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE
It is not in dispute that, despite there being a full stop after “1 April 2015”, the words contained in the following four lines were clearly intended to confine the “electronic records subject to the warrant” to emails of that description.[33]
Relevant background
The factual background to this appeal is succinctly recorded in the primary judge’s reasons as follows:
[3]On the 3^rd of August 2012 the then Minister of Lands and Planning made a decision pursuant to a Cabinet decision made on the 10^th of July 2012 to grant a Crown lease of a site located in Darwin to a Union. The decision was made without calling for expressions of interest or public tender.
[4]Ultimately, there was a change of government and the new government withdrew the offer for the grant of the lease.
[5]On the 5^th of December 2013, the Legislative Assembly of the Northern Territory decided that an enquiry into the decision to grant the lease was necessary as a consequence of which the Administrator appointed Mr. John Lawler as a Commissioner to conduct an Inquiry pursuant to s 4A of the Inquiries Act (NT). One of the purposes of the Inquiry was to review the antecedent issues leading to the former government’s decision to grant a Crown Lease to the Union and to assess the involvement of “relevant persons” in that decision, including the plaintiff who was then a Minister in the former government.
[6]On the 20^th of December 2013, the plaintiff engaged Ms. Spurr to represent her and the former Minister of Lands and Housing, Mr. Gerry McCarthy for the purposes of the Inquiry. The letter of engagement dated that day indicates the terms of the costs agreement between the parties which includes details of how the work and disbursements will be charged and paid for. It is asserted that the solicitor engaged the barrister to act as counsel on the same date on a pro bono basis.
[7]The Inquiry commenced on the 6^th of January 2014, during the course of which Mr. McCarthy and the plaintiff gave evidence. Mr. Wyvill SC was granted leave to represent them during the enquiry. Subsequently for various reasons which it is not necessary to go into at this stage, Ms. Spurr advised the Commissioner by letter dated 14 April 2014 that she and Mr. Wyvill SC “will no longer be representing Ms. Lawrie and Mr. McCarthy in this matter” because “our clients have exhausted their ability to access pro bono legal assistance.”
[8]The Inquiry concluded on the 26^th of May 2014 when the Commissioner’s Report was handed to the Administrator. That report contained a number of criticisms of the plaintiff’s conduct (the adverse findings).
[9]On the 30^th of July 2014 the plaintiff filed an Originating Motion in this Court in which the Commissioner was the defendant claiming that the adverse findings and associated recommendations damaged her reputation and seeking a declaration that, in reporting adversely to the plaintiff, the Commissioner had failed to observe the requirements of procedural fairness, and for an order in the nature of certiorari to quash the report. At this stage the plaintiff was represented by Ms. Spurr and Mr. Wyvill SC. Subsequently, in late 2014 Ms. Spurr and Mr. Wyvill SC filed affidavits in that action in which they asserted that they were not expecting to receive any adverse findings against the plaintiff. An affidavit by Ms. Lawrie to similar effect was also sworn or affirmed on the 14^th of November 2014. It is alleged that each of these deponents made false statements which they knew to be untrue. At some stage Mr. Wyvill SC withdrew from those proceedings and other legal representation was obtained before the matter went to hearing in late January 2015. I note that according to the reasons published by Southwood J, the affidavits of the plaintiff, Spurr and Wyvill were not read, they were not called to give evidence, and allegations set out in paragraphs 6-12 of the Statement of Facts and Issues referred to in his Honour’s Judgment at para [222], although filed in court, were abandoned.
[10]On the 1^st of April 2015, Southwood J delivered judgment. His Honour dismissed the application and made a number of findings which were relied upon by the second defendant in his sworn information in support of the warrants which were ultimately issued by the first defendant. It is not necessary to refer to them as no challenge is made along the lines that the material placed before the learned magistrate was insufficient to justify the issue of the warrants.
[11]On the 2^nd of April 2015, a letter was sent to Mr. Wyvill SC from Southwood J’s associate indicating that his Honour had determined that his conduct during the Inquiry and his representation of the plaintiff, including whether he had sworn a false affidavit, should be referred to the Law Society for investigation, and that the Law Society would be asked to consider whether there are any matters which should be referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions. On the 7^th of April 2015 a referral was made to the NT Police by the Attorney-General.[34]
Relevant legislation
The legislative provision at the centre of this appeal is s 117 of the PAA. This provision is one of many within Part VII of the PAA which is headed “Police powers”. It provides as follows:
117 Search warrants
(1)Where an information on oath is laid before a justice of the peace alleging that there are reasonable grounds for believing that anything connected with an offence may be concealed on the person of, in the clothing that is being worn by or in any property in the immediate control of, a person, the justice of the peace may issue a search warrant authorising a member of the Police Force named in the warrant to search the person of, the clothing that is being worn by or property in the immediate control of, the person and seize any such thing that he may find in the course of the search.
(2)Where an information on oath is laid before a justice of the peace alleging that there are reasonable grounds for believing that there is at a place anything relating to an offence, the justice of the peace may issue a search warrant authorising a member of the Police Force named in the warrant to enter and search the place and seize anything relating to an offence found in the course of the search at the place.
(3)A justice of the peace shall not issue a warrant under subsection (1) or (2) in relation to an information unless:
(a)the information sets out or has attached to it a written statement of the grounds upon which the issue of the warrant is sought;
(b)the informant or some other person has given to the justice of the peace, either orally or by affidavit, such further information, if any, as the justice of the peace requires concerning the grounds on which the issue of the warrant is being sought; and
(c)the justice of the peace is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for issuing the warrant.
(4)Where a justice of the peace issues a warrant under subsection (1) or (2) he shall record in writing the grounds upon which he relied to justify the issue of the warrant.
(5)There shall be stated in the warrant issued under this section the following particulars:
(a)the purpose for which the search or entry is authorised;
(b)a description of the nature of the things authorised to be seized; and
(c)the date, not being a date later than 14 days after the date of issue of the warrant, upon which the warrant ceases to have effect.
(6)A member may, at any time before a warrant issued under subsection (1) or (2) is executed, make application to a justice of the peace to withdraw the warrant.
Although s 117 is headed “Search warrants” and it is contained within Division 2, which is headed “Search and entry”, it, and various other provisions of Part VII, permit the seizure of things found in the course of a search.
For example s 118A provides that:
118A Seizure authorised under search warrant
A member of the Police Force who executes a warrant issued under section 117 or 118 may, in addition to seizing anything of a nature described in the warrant, seize any other thing:
(a)found in the course of executing the warrant; and
(b)that the member believes on reasonable grounds is connected with any offence.
The references to thing in the above provisions must be read in conjunction with s 116(1) which provides:
116 Interpretation
(1)For this Part:
(a)anything with respect to which an offence has been committed or is believed on reasonable grounds to have been committed;
(b)anything with respect to which there are reasonable grounds for believing that it will offer evidence of the commission of any such offence; or
(c)anything with respect to which there are reasonable grounds for believing that it is intended to be used for the purposes of committing any such offence,
shall be taken to be a thing connected with or relating to an offence, and includes anything that has been unlawfully obtained in connection with or relating to an offence.
Primary judge’s reasoning
Before the primary judge, Ms Lawrie advanced two contentions in her challenge to the first warrant. Each contention incorporated two bases. The first basis relied upon for the first contention related to the breadth of the warrant. The primary judge rejected that basis because he held that there was no challenge to the breadth of the warrant on the grounds that the information before the learned magistrate failed to establish a connection between the things referred to in the warrant and the offence, “extraordinary as that may appear to be at face value”.[35] The second basis for the first contention was that the warrant did not purport to limit the range of records to which it related to those that might be connected or related to any offence. The primary judge’s reasons for rejecting that basis have already been mentioned above.[36] None of these conclusions has been challenged in this appeal.
Ms Lawrie’s second contention was that the words in the first warrant were insufficient to define properly the scope of the warrant. In particular, she pointed to the fact that, although the alleged offence was referred to in the warrant, there was no indication as to who it was that was said to have made the false declaration, when it was said to have been made, the nature of it, that is what it related to, and in what context it was said to have been made.[37] The first basis put in support of this contention was rejected by the primary judge on essentially the same ground as he rejected the first basis in support of the first contention: that there was no challenge to the breadth of the warrant.[38] This conclusion is also not challenged in this appeal.
The second basis put in support of this second contention relied upon the decision of Holmes J (as she then was) in Wright a decision concerning s 73 of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld). The primary judge quoted from what Holmes J had said at [31] and [32] of that decision, and then expressed the following conclusions:[39]
I accept the criticism made by Mr. Moses SC that Wright dealt with quite different legislation, particularly in that s 73 of the Queensland Act has no exact counterpart in s 177(5) of the Northern Territory Act, but nevertheless it seems to me that the purposes of both provisions are the same, notwithstanding that the Northern Territory Act does not have an expressed purpose such as was contained in s 4(e) of the Queensland Act. It may fairly be assumed that in drafting s 177, the Legislative Assembly had in mind the need for the balance which is referred to in cases such as the passage I have quoted previously from George v Rockett. Does mere reference to the name of the offence and the statutory provision meet the requirements that that warrant provided particulars of the purpose for which the search was authorised and the description of the nature of things authorized to be searched? In the peculiar circumstances of this case, in the absence of any ancillary information the institution to which the warrant was addressed would not be in any position to say with even the faintest degree of clarity what documents amongst the nearly 12,000 emails have or might have a possible connection to the offence without knowing who it was is alleged to have committed the offence and where, when and, given the generality of the kind of offence relied upon, in what circumstances this is said to have occurred. I am not saying that in other cases of a different nature the same conclusion would be reached. For example, if the offence charged was possession of an illegal drug, namely cannabis plant material, it may not be necessary to say anything more than that. However, in this case the offence alleged was of an entirely different character, and, like the offence of perjury considered by Holmes J in Wright, inherently vague. In my opinion the warrant did not meet the requirements of the Act and is therefore invalid.
It is the conclusions reached in this paragraph that are at the heart of this appeal.
Contentions on the appeal
Detective Jeremiah submitted that the primary judge had erred in relying upon the decision in Wright to conclude that the purpose of the PAA was the same as the purpose of the Queensland legislation there under consideration. Rather, he submitted the primary judge should have determined the purpose of the PAA by reference to its provisions alone. Detective Jeremiah also submitted that the primary judge had erred in construing s 117(5) of the PAA. He submitted that the express requirements of that section were to state the purpose for which a search is authorised and to describe the things authorised to be seized. He submitted that the primary judge had erred in construing that section as requiring the warrant to state with clarity which of the things specified in it have, or might have, a possible connection with the offence. He submitted that the section does not require the offence to be so particularised. Since the warrant stated the relevant offence and corresponding legislative provision, he submitted it was valid on its face.

Ms Lawrie submitted that the primary judge was clearly aware of the differences between the PAA and the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) and had not erred by relying on the decision in Wright to conclude that the purposes of the two pieces of legislation was similar. Further, she submitted that a warrant issued under the PAA must comply with “the general law requirement that the object of the search must be identified on the face of the warrant”. She submitted that, while a warrant may be valid if it does not identify the offence concerned, if it does identify the object of the search by reference to an offence, that offence must be properly defined. She therefore submitted that the primary judge correctly found that the warrant was defective because it did not properly define the offence concerned. In particular, she submitted it did not identify the date and place of the alleged offence, the identity of the alleged offender and the circumstances in which the alleged offending had occurred.
Consideration
In my view, Detective Jeremiah’s contentions should be accepted and Ms Lawrie’s rejected. That is so because, in his conclusions at [26] of his reasons, I consider the primary judge erred in at least two respects. First, his Honour erred in equating the purpose of the PAA to that of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld). Secondly, and relatedly, his Honour erred by holding the warrant to be invalid because it did not define the offence concerned with sufficient clarity. My reasons for reaching these conclusions are as follows.
It is convenient to begin by stating what may be thought to be the obvious. The determination of this appeal essentially involves an exercise in statutory construction. In this context, Gummow J described the inquiry that has to be conducted in Ousley[40] in the following terms:
Lord Wilberforce pointed out in Inland Revenue Commissioners v Rossminster Ltd that any inquiry into the form of search warrants at common law is of limited assistance where the form of the warrants in question is prescribed by statute. The matter is one of statutory interpretation,²²¹ giving proper weight to the precept that a legislative intention to interfere with fundamental rights by the commission of what otherwise would be tortious or criminal acts “must be clearly manifested by unmistakable and unambiguous language”. [Footnotes omitted]
This statement was reinforced in footnote 221 (appearing near the middle of the quotation above), as follows:
²²¹ See Cooper v Booth (1785) 3 Esp 135 at 144 [170 ER 564 at 567] where Lord Mansfield described as depending entirely upon the statute under which the warrant in question had been granted, the issues arising on an action in trespass against those who had executed the warrant.
In the same matter, Gaudron J (dissenting, but not on this aspect) expressed similar views as follows:[41]
The warrants involved in this appeal derive their force entirely from statute. Necessarily, the question whether they are valid only if they recite the matters upon which their validity depends is a question of statutory construction. More precisely, it is a question whether an inference should be drawn that recital of those matters is or is not necessary, the Act making no provision one way or the other in that regard. And in ascertaining which of those two inferences should be drawn, it is appropriate to have regard not only to the provisions of the Act but to the position with respect to warrants under the general law and, also, the nature of the warrants for which the Act provides.
It is well-established that any exercise in statutory construction requires a consideration of the text, context and purpose of the statutory provision concerned: see Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority;[42] Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue;^[43] and Thiess v Collector of Customs.[44] With particular reference to the construction of statutes authorising the search of premises and the seizure of things found during such a search, in Hart v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police[45] the Full Court of the Federal Court said the exercise:
… begins with the ordinary meaning of the words considered according to their context and the legislative purpose. This reflects the primary object of all statutory construction which, according to Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 at 381 per McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ, is “to construe the relevant provision so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of all the provisions of the statute”. The importance of purpose and policy was emphasised in that case by reference to the observation of Dixon CJ in Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Agalianos (1955) 92 CLR 390 at 397: “the context, the general purpose and policy of a provision and its consistency and fairness are surer guides to its meaning than the logic with which it is constructed.”
The Full Court went on to make the following observations about the need to apply a “strict” construction to such statutes:[46]
Where “strict construction” is invoked it is necessary to keep in mind what that term means. In the context of penal statutes it was said, a long time ago, and yet consistently with contemporary doctrine (Scott v Cawsey (1907) 5 CLR 132 at 155 per Isaacs J), to reflect nothing more than a requirement that:
“a Court should be specially careful, in the view of the consequences on both sides, to ascertain and enforce the actual commands of the legislature, not weakening them in favour of private persons to the detriment of the public welfare, nor enlarging them as against the individuals towards whom they are directed.”
The invocation of “strict construction” in penal statutes was described by Gibbs J as “perhaps one of last resort”: Beckwith v The Queen (1976) 135 CLR 569 at 576. It should not distract from the primary object of statutory construction enunciated in Project Blue Sky. The search and seizure provisions of the Crimes Act are not punitive. They are not to be treated as penal provisions. It is more appropriate to see them as subject to the general principles that govern statutory interference with established common law rights and freedoms. [Citations omitted]
It then concluded as follows:[47]
Notwithstanding these general considerations, effect must be given to the importance attached by the legislature to the use of search warrants as an important and legitimate tool in the detection and prosecution of criminal offences. Where the language of the statute authorising their use offers choices between one construction requiring fine legal judgments in the issue and/or execution of warrants and another which is more likely to be consistent with operational realities then the latter construction is generally to be preferred. …
And further, after referring to and quoting from a number of authorities, it said:
… These remarks relate more to attacks upon the scope of warrants and action under them than to the construction of the statutes authorising the issue of such warrants. They nevertheless expose adequately the policy issues and legislative purposes which should inform construction. In particular, there is no requirement that the Court approach that task armed with a prima facie hostility to the invasion of privacy that is necessarily involved in the exercise of investigative powers. Privacy is but one of the interests to be taken into account in construing legislation authorising the exercise of such power.
With these observations in mind, I turn to the first of the two errors mentioned above.[48] In my respectful view, his Honour erred in concluding that the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) and the PAA had the same purpose as that stated in s 4(e) of the former Act: “to ensure fairness to, and protect the rights of, persons against whom police officers exercise powers under this Act”.[49] At a superficial level, the inclusion of the word “responsibilities” in the title to the Queensland Police Powers and Responsibilities Act may provide an indication as to why such a purpose is likely to be expressed in that Act. By comparison, the PAA is, by its terms, devoted solely to the establishment of the Northern Territory Police Force and related matters (Parts II to VIA and VIIA to X) and to defining the powers of that Police Force in the investigation of crime (Part VII). There is no express statement of purpose in the PAA similar to s 4(e). Nor is there any provision in Part VII, or elsewhere in the PAA, from which such a purpose could be inferred. Instead, Part VII contains a series of powers the exercise of which are all directed to the purpose of facilitating the investigation and prosecution of crime.
When regard is had to the structure and terms of the PAA, and particularly Part VII, I consider this is the purpose of the police powers provisions stated therein. That is their purpose is more akin to that outlined by the Full Court in the following observations in Hart:[50]
The purpose of search and seizure provisions is to provide for the gathering of information to determine whether offences have been committed and to facilitate proof of them: Rogers v Moore (1992) 39 FCR 201 at 217 per French J. Recognition of that purpose may yield a construction of the legislative words that is not necessarily narrowly defined. Remaining ambiguity or doubt whether of meaning or application will, in accordance with authority, be resolved in favour of the rights and freedoms of the subject.
It is therefore with respect to that purpose that the provisions of s 117 of the PAA must be construed, not by reference to the very different purpose identified by the primary judge.
This first error, in my respectful view, led to the second. It was to apply this incorrect purpose to the construction of s 117 PAA and thereby conclude that the warrant was invalid. The critical importance of purpose in determining invalidity was highlighted by the High Court in Project Blue Sky, in the following terms:[51]
An act done in breach of a condition regulating the exercise of a statutory power is not necessarily invalid and of no effect. Whether it is depends upon whether there can be discerned a legislative purpose to invalidate any act that fails to comply with the condition. The existence of the purpose is ascertained by reference to the language of the statute, its subject matter and objects, and the consequences for the parties of holding void every act done in breach of the condition.
Put differently, if the primary judge had construed the PAA by reference to its true purpose, as stated above, I do not consider one could “discern … a legislative purpose to invalidate” the warrant.[52]
To demonstrate this, it is necessary to turn to consider the text of s 117 of the PAA, particularly s 117(5). That section prescribes the “particulars” that shall be stated in a warrant. As can be seen above,[53] there are three such particulars. The third, the date upon which the warrant ceases to have effect, is not in issue in this appeal, so it is only necessary to consider the first two.
The first, s 117(5)(a), requires the warrant to state, by way of particulars, “the purpose for which the search or entry is authorised”. When this provision is read in the context of the first two subsections of s 117 (s 117(1) and (2)), which distinguish between a warrant issued for the purposes of searching a person (117(1)) and a warrant issued for the purposes of searching a place (117(2)), I consider it is to be construed to require the warrant to state which of these two purposes the warrant authorises. Applying that construction, it can be seen from the warrant above[54] that it stated that it authorised Detective Jeremiah “to enter and search the place described above”. That place is earlier described as the Department of Corporate and Information Services, Northern Territory Government, Level 3, Darwin Plaza, 41 Smith Street Mall, Darwin. In my view, the warrant therefore complied with the prescription in s 117(5)(a) to state particulars of the purpose for which the search or entry was authorised.
The second, s 117(5)(b) of the PAA, requires the warrant to state, by way of particulars, “a description of the nature of the things authorised to be seized” (emphasis added).
The words of this subsection must, of course, be read together as a whole. Nonetheless, it is instructive to consider some of the particular expressions that have been used within it. I will deal with them, in turn (as emphasised above). In this context, the ordinary meaning of the word “nature” is “the particular combination of qualities belonging to a person or thing by birth or constitution; native or inherent character”.[55] This word therefore requires the warrant to describe those features of the things which are authorised to be seized.
As is already noted above,[56] s 116(1) of the PAA provides an expansive meaning to the word “thing”. It applies not only to things connected with, or relating to, an offence that has been committed, but extends to things that are intended to be used for the purposes of committing an offence.
The word “seized” is not defined in the PAA. It was also not defined in the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), which was the legislation under consideration in Hart. The observations the Full Court made about its meaning in the context of a seizure under that legislation are therefore pertinent. They were:[57]
The content of the term “seizure” is to be understood in light of its purpose which is to enable use of the things seized in the investigation of a suspected offence and at any subsequent trial arising out of the investigation. Seizure under a search warrant therefore involves a taking of possession that is temporary and for a specific purpose. Anything seized must be returned if the reasons for the seizure no longer exist or if it is decided that it is not to be used in evidence (s 3ZV). That requirement does not apply to the case in which the thing is forfeited to the Commonwealth or is the subject of a dispute as to its ownership.
In connection with an earlier version of the search and seizure provisions of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), Fox J made the following observations about the relationship between the description of the things that may be seized and the connection with, or relation to, an offence:[58]
In the present case, it is argued on behalf of the applicants that the warrant is also defective because (a) it does not sufficiently specify the documents or things to be seized, ... Submission (a) is not in my opinion a valid objection in so far as it involves that there must necessarily be something in the nature of an itemization or specific description of particular documents or things. The generality of the warrant will be sufficiently narrowed in the present case if the offence is specified. This doubtless leaves the constable with some degree of discretion, but clearly that was intended. The fact is that the ambit of the discretion is to some extent circumscribed, and there is some basis for keeping his activities within proper limits.
It is important to note that in Tillett, Fox J had earlier held the warrant in question to be bad because it did not “refer to a particular offence and authorize seizure by reference to that offence”.[59] That is, the warrant did not state any offence at all.
These observations highlight the relationship that exists between the description of the thing, the description of the offence to which the thing is connected or related and the object of the search. In Ousley, McHugh J listed a series of grounds upon which a warrant had been held to be bad, as follows:[60]
Thus, subject to any statutory provision to the contrary, a warrant issued by a subordinate authority is bad unless it is apparent that it was issued by a person with jurisdiction to issue it or if it fails to record the ground or grounds upon which it was issued or is so vaguely worded that a person affected by it cannot know the object of the search or fails to show that an offence has been committed or is suspected of having been committed or fails to recite the information which was the basis of its issue or fails to state an essential basis of jurisdiction or fails to specify the person who is to execute the warrant or indicates that the issuing authority has not addressed the right question or, in the case of a search warrant, fails to specify precisely the place to be searched. [Footnotes omitted; emphasis added]
With respect to the third instance (emphasised above) dealing with the “object of the search”, the footnote[61] contained the following statement:
A warrant need not specify particular things to be seized, however, if the class of such things is sufficiently identified by reference to an offence: cf…Tillett…at 114.
In Different Solutions,[62] Graham J conducted a helpful review of the authorities relating to the sufficiency of the description in a search warrant of the object or area of the search it authorises. His Honour began by identifying the restrictive “exact object of the search” approach taken in Parker and similar authorities, including Tillett.[63] He then referred to the change of approach adopted in BFC and Harts Australia Ltd v Commissioner, Australian Federal Police[64] where “a broad practical approach” was preferred.[65] Thereafter, as well as identifying a number of errors or omissions that had not led to the invalidity of a warrant,[66] his Honour also discussed the balance that had to be struck between “the sanctity of a person’s domain and concomitantly an interference with his privacy”[67] and “the prevention, detection and punishment of crime”,[68] noting that it was the task of the Courts to “find a satisfactory and workable compromise of the conflicting public interests that are involved”.[69]
In her contentions in this appeal, Ms Lawrie has therefore correctly identified the need for a search warrant to state the object or area of the search. However, she has also claimed that, while the failure to include a reference to an offence will not cause such a warrant to be invalid, if an offence is inserted in it to attempt to state the object or area of the search, it will lead to invalidity if that offence is not sufficiently defined. I do not consider this latter contention accurately reflects the effect of the observations set out in the authorities cited above. The defect in it is that it fails to address the instance where both a thing or things and an offence or offences are stated in the warrant. In that case, I consider the two components will operate together to define the object or area of the search. Whether they do that so inadequately that it leads to the invalidity of the warrant will depend upon the considerations set out above.
In this case, the warrant did include both components. As can be seen above,[70] it described the “thing” and the offence in the following terms:
Electronic records kept and maintained by the Northern Territory Government (“NTG”), specifically relating to all email communications sent and received from the following persons:-
-Delia Phoebe Lawrie
-Michael Gleeson
-Cathryn Tilmouth
-Mandy (or Amanda) Taylor; and
-Charlie Phillips
between the period 18 December 2013 and 1 April 2015.
being a thing related to or in connection with an offence against a law in force in the Northern Territory, namely an offence of making a false statement in statements required to be under oath or solemn declaration - Section 118 of the Criminal Code Act (Northern Territory).
It is worth interposing that, while there is no express requirement in s 117(5) to state the particulars of the offence the subject of the investigations to which the search warrant relates, nonetheless, the primary judge found, by inference, that it was necessary for the warrant to “refer to a particular offence and authorize seizure by reference to that offence”.[71] This conclusion is not in issue in this appeal.

The question then is whether this description of the object or area of the search is so deficient that the primary judge was correct in holding that it was invalid. The most recent statement by the High Court on this issue is contained in Corbett. In that matter, Callinan and Crennan JJ described how the common law concerns to protect citizens against the vices of general warrants were to be accommodated in the following terms:
104Obviously each statutory requirement or condition needs to be construed on its own terms and by reference to the statute in which it is to be found. However, common requirements for “reasonable grounds for believing” (or suspecting) imposed on an applicant (as here under s 5(1)(b)), or upon an issuing justice (as in Rockett or Beneficial Finance) have a common derivation. The concern of the common law courts to avoid general warrants and to strictly confine any exception to the principle that a person's home was inviolable is the original source of common, although differently expressed, statutory requirements. These requirements have as their purpose the proper identification of the object of a search by reference to a particular offence. This in turn limits the scope of the search authorised by the search warrant. As stated in the judgment of this Court in Rockett:
“[T]he description of the object of the search is a reference point for delimiting the scope of the warrant … [T]he requirement of ‘reasonable grounds for believing’ … performs the important function of preventing the authority to search and seize which a warrant confers from being worded in unjustifiably wide terms.”
105Section 5(1)(b) should be construed by reference to the principle that the applicant is required to state reasonable grounds for believing in a particular offence so as to ensure that the issuing justice knows the specific object of the search warrant and accordingly limits its scope. Strict compliance, in the sense described in Rockett, is achieved when that purpose is fulfilled. To invalidate the warrant here because of the incorrect reference in the application would not serve that purpose. [Footnotes omitted]
These observations applied to the issue of the warrant in question, however I consider that they are equally applicable to the contents of the first warrant in this case. Having regard to the description of the things that were authorised to be searched and the description of the offence with which those things were connected, or to which they were related, I therefore consider this warrant served to achieve this strict compliance. Put differently, taking into account the authorities I have discussed above and the purpose of the police powers provisions of the PAA I have identified above of facilitating the investigation and prosecution of crime, I do not consider the description of the object of the search by reference to both the things in question and the offence was so deficient that it led to the invalidity of the first warrant.
For these reasons, I consider this appeal must be allowed and the orders of the primary judge set aside. This means that the things that were seized and returned to the Northern Territory Government Department of Corporate and Information Services should be returned to Detective Jeremiah.
However, it is appropriate to add these observations. While I consider the primary judge was in error in finding this warrant to be invalid, I do consider his Honour has identified a real issue with the execution of this warrant. In my view, the difficulty in this case does not arise from any lack of clarity in the description of the object of the search in the warrant, but rather lies with the lack of any provision in the PAA which allows an executing officer who encounters a vast quantity of electronic data an adequate opportunity to search that data in order to identify what parts of it relate to the offence such that he or she can validly seize it. This difficulty was adverted to in Hart where the Full Court discussed a similar issue, in relation to s 10 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) which, in its previous form, was similar, albeit more prescriptive, than s 117 of the PAA. The Court said:[72]
71Prior to the enactment of s 3K it was not possible under s 10 of the Crimes Act or the like provisions of other jurisdictions to remove things from the warrant premises with a view to deciding at a later time whether or not to seize them. This limitation flowed from the conditions by which the statute governed the execution of a warrant. It reflected the general principles enunciated by Lord Denning MR in Ghani v Jones [1970] 1 QB 693. His Lordship described it (at 706) as “settled law” that officers entering a house under a warrant or arresting a person with or without warrant for a serious offence were “entitled to take any goods which they [found] in his possession or in his house which they reasonably [believed] to be material evidence in relation to the crime for which he [was] arrested or for which they [entered]” (at 706). See also R v Inland Revenue Commissioners; Ex parte Rossminster Ltd at 960 per Eveleigh LJ and at 1013 per Lord Diplock.
72It was possible to remove a file, book, bundle or document which was believed on reasonable grounds to contain material of evidentiary value, provided that any necessary sorting process was carried out with reasonable expedition and that those documents not of evidential value returned reasonably promptly. It was not open to an executing officer to remove materials for later sorting without consideration of whether or not they might contain evidential material: Reynolds v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1985] QB 881 at 896 per Slade LJ; at 889 per Waller LJ; at 902-903 per Purchas LJ; Allitt v Sullivan [1988] VR 621 at 641 per Brooking J; Bartlett v Weir (1994) 72 A Crim R 511 at 523 per Beazley J.
The Commonwealth Legislature addressed this difficulty by establishing the Gibbs Committee and inserting ss 3L and 3K into Part IAA of the Crimes Act.[73] Those sections included provisions which allowed executing officers to take equipment to the search premises “reasonably necessary for the examination or processing of a thing found at the premises in order to determine whether it is a thing that may be seized under the warrant” (s 3K(1)); subject to various conditions, to move a thing found at the search premises “for examination or processing in order to determine whether it may be seized under a warrant” (s 3K(2)); to “operate electronic equipment at the warrant premises to access data … if he or she suspects on reasonable grounds that the data constitutes evidential material” (s 3L(1)); subject to various conditions, to “copy any or all of the data accessed by operating the electronic equipment to a disk, tape or other associated device brought to the premises” (s 3L(1A)); and to “seize the equipment and any disk, tape or other associated device” upon which an executing officer finds evidential material after operating the equipment (s 3L(2)). These provisions have been amended on occasions since as issues have been identified with respect to them.
There are no such provisions in the PAA. In their absence, it is not difficult to predict that an executing officer such as Detective Jeremiah who is confronted with a large quantity of electronic data when undertaking a search at premises will encounter problems forming the requisite belief on reasonable grounds at the premises in relation to the connection between that data and the offence to which the warrant relates such as to justify seizing all or a part of that data. Nonetheless, since I do not know the full circumstances of the seizure in this case and since this has not been raised as an issue in this appeal, it is not appropriate that I take this matter any further.
For these reasons, I consider the appropriate orders are:
(a)The appeal be allowed.
(b)The orders of the primary judge made on 29 April 2016 be set aside.
(c)Order that the documents seized under the first warrant should be returned to the appellant.
(d)Order that the first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
ORDER OF THE COURT:
The appeal is dismissed.

[1] Lawrie v Carey DCM & Anor [2016] NTSC 23 (“Lawrie”) at [22]

[2] Trimboli v Onley (No 3) (1981) 56 FLR 321 (“Trimboli”) at 327

[3] (1997) 192 CLR 69 at 118 (footnote 27)

[4] (1969) 14 FLR 101 at 114

[5] in the passage quoted by Reeves J at [94]

[6] for example as in Trimboli “passports and documents in support thereof” “as to which there are reasonable grounds for a belief that they will afford evidence of a crime”

[7] Ibid at p 335

[8] I have formed the view (expressed above) that the description attempted in the warrant is an objective one, of the first type considered above, so that the warrant must contain a sufficient description for it to be objectively ascertainable whether a particular email which has been seized does or does not fit that description; but even if the description attempted is one of the second type considered above, I do not think the description in this warrant is adequate. Without some further detail as to the offence referred to (for example who is suspected of having committed it and in connection with what) it would not be possible to make an assessment as to whether there were grounds for a reasonable belief that any particular document fell within the class specified.

[9] Lawrie

[10] The two warrants that were found to be valid by the learned trial judge included these details in the description of the documents authorised to be seized. The wording of these is set out in the judgment of Hiley J at [56]

[11] (2002) 2 Qd R 667 (“Wright”)

[12] Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) referred to in the judgment at [25]

[13] Lawrie at [25]

[14] These are the paragraphs as they appear in Lawrie not the original.

[15] Supra at [26]

[16] The reference is clearly intended to be s 117.

[17] The word used by the trial judge in [26] is “searched”, but in context it is clearly intended to be a reference to the requirement in s 117(5)(b) that the warrant provide a description of the nature of the things authorised to be seized.

[18] Trimboli at p 333

[19] The verb in the recital in the above example is “am” and the subject of the operative part is “I”.

[20] Trimboli at p 334

[21] at p 336

[22] [1980] AC 952 (“Rossminster”)

[23] State of New South Wales v Corbett (2007) 230 CLR 606; [2007] HCA 32 (“Corbett”)

[24] Beneficial Finance Corporation v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (1991) 31 FCR
523 (“BFC”)

[25] Parker v Churchill (1986) 9 FCR 334 (“Parker”)

[26] Hart v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (2002) 124 FCR 384; [2002] FCAFC 392
(“Hart”)

[27] Different Solutions Pty Ltd v Commissioner, Australian Federal Police (No 2) (2008) 190 A

Crim R 265; [2008] FCA 1686 (“Different Solutions”)

[28] Hart and Different Solutions involved s 3E(5)(a) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) which required the issuing officer to state in the warrant, inter alia, “the offence to which the warrant relates”. Wright concerned s 73 of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act (2000) Qld which required that the warrant provide “brief particulars of the offence”. Ousley concerned s 4A(4)(a) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) which required the warrant to specify, inter alia, “the offence in respect of which the warrant is granted”. Corbett involved a prescribed form of a search warrant which was to contain a “description of offence”.

[29] Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Cloran (1984) 4 FCR 151 (“Cloran”)

[30] Cloran at 154

[31] AB 56 and 59

[32] Lawrie v Carey DCM [2016] NTSC 23 (Lawrie), at [13] and [28] respectively

[33] There is no challenge to the primary judge’s conclusion to this effect at Lawrie [22]

[34] An appeal against Southwood J’s judgment of 1 April 2015 was dismissed by the Northern Territory Court of Appeal on 2 June 2016, Lawrie v Lawler [2016] NTCA 03.

[35] Lawrie at [21]

[36] See at [65] above

[37] Lawrie at [23]

[38] Lawrie at [24]

[39] Lawrie at [26]

[40] Ousley at 118

[41] Ousley at 88

[42] (1998) 194 CLR 355; [1998] HCA 28 (Project Blue Sky) at 381 per McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ

[43] (2009) 239 CLR 27; [2009] HCA 41 at [47] per Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ

[44] (2014) 250 CLR 664; [2014] HCA 12 at [22]–[23] per French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ

[45] Hart at [64]

[46] Hart at [67]

[47] Hart at [68]

[48] At [75]

[49] Lawrie at [25]

[50] At [65]

[51] Project Blue Sky at [91]

[52] Project Blue Sky at [91]

[53] At [67]

[54] At [64]

[55] Macquarie Dictionary, 4^th ed

[56] At [70]

[57] Hart at [82]

[58] Tillett at 114

[59] Tillett at 113

[60] Ousley at 107

[61] Fn 168

[62] Different Solutions at [98]–[118]

[63] Different Solutions at [99]

[64] (1997) 75 FCR 145 (“Harts”)

[65] Different Solutions at [100]

[66] Different Solutions at [102]–[104]

[67] Different Solutions at [106]

[68] Different Solutions at [107]

[69] Different Solutions at [107]

[70] At [64]

[71] Lawrie at [18]

[72] Hart at [71]–[72]

[73] Hart at [74]–[79]