Jeray v Blue Mountains City Council and 2 Ors

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NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION:
Jeray v Blue Mountains City Council & 2 Ors [2010] NSWCA 153

FILE NUMBER(S):
2009/298487

HEARING DATE(S):
22 April 2010

JUDGMENT DATE:
6 July 2010

PARTIES:
Ivan Jeray (Applicant)
Blue Mountains City Council (First Respondent)
Greg Egan (Second Respondent)
John Egan (Third Respondent)

JUDGMENT OF:
Handley AJA Sackville AJA    

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:
Land & Environment Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):
40986 of 2008

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:
Lloyd J

LOWER COURT DATE OF DECISION:
16/07/10

COUNSEL:
I. Jeray (Applicant - In Person)
I. Hemmings (First Respondent)
P. Clay (Second & Third Respondents)

SOLICITORS:
I. Jeray (Applicant - In Person)

Marsdens Law Group (First Respondent)
McIntosh McPhillamy & Co (Second & Third Respondents)

CATCHWORDS:

LEGISLATION CITED:
Land and Environment Court Act 1979 ss 20
58(1)
58(3)
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 rr 12.7
13.4(1)(c)
51.16
51.16(1)(c)
(2)

CATEGORY:
Principal judgment

CASES CITED:
Gallo v Dawson [1990] HCA 30
93 ALR 479
Hall v Nominal Defendant (1966) 117 CLR 423
Jae Kyung Lee v Bob Chae-Sang Cha [2008] NSWCA 13
Minogue v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1999] FCA 85
84 FCR 438
Rajski v Scitec Corporation Pty Ltd (unreported
NSW Court of Appeal
16 June 1986)

TEXTS CITED:

DECISION:
1.  Subject to Order 2
extend the time for the filing of a notice of appeal to a date seven days from the date of these orders.
2.  Direct that the notice of appeal referred to in Order 1 be limited to a ground claiming that the orders made by Lloyd J on 16 July 2009 dismissing the proceedings denied procedural fairness to the applicant.
3.  Further direct that the relief claimed in the notice of appeal be limited to appropriate relief should the ground referred to in Order 2 be made out.
4.  The costs of the application for an extension of time be costs in the cause.

JUDGMENT:

- 9 -

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL

CA 2009/298487

HANDLEY AJA
SACKVILLE AJA

TUESDAY 6 JULY 2010

IVAN JERAY v BLUE MOUNTAINS CITY COUNCIL,
GREG EGAN & JOHN EGAN

Judgment

  1. SACKVILLE AJA:  The applicant (as I shall describe him) is an unrepresented litigant.  He seeks leave to appeal from a decision of a Judge of the Land and Environment Court (Lloyd J) dismissing proceedings brought by the applicant in that Court.

  2. The proceedings were brought by the applicant against the first respondent to the present application (“the Council”) and the second and third respondents (“the Egans”).  The applicant sought declarations that certain development consents granted by the Council to the Egans were “null and void” and various forms of consequential relief.  It appears to be common ground that the proceedings were within the Class 4 jurisdiction of the Court: Land and Environment Court Act 1979 (“L&E Court Act”), s 20.

  3. A party who is dissatisfied with an order or decision made in proceedings in Class 4 of the Court’s…

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Details
Case
[2010] NSWCA 153
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Jeray (the applicant) sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal against orders made by Lloyd J in the Land and Environment Court on 16 July 2009, which dismissed the applicant's proceedings against Blue Mountains City Council and two other respondents.

The primary legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether to grant the applicant an extension of time to appeal. A secondary issue, which the Court considered in determining the primary issue, was the potential ground of appeal, specifically whether the dismissal of the proceedings by Lloyd J denied the applicant procedural fairness.

The Court of Appeal, comprising Handley AJA and Sackville AJA, considered the principles governing extensions of time for appeals, including the applicant's prospects of success. The Court noted that the applicant's proposed ground of appeal, concerning procedural fairness, had some merit. Consequently, the Court decided to grant a limited extension of time for the filing of the notice of appeal, restricting the appeal to the single ground of procedural fairness and limiting the relief sought to that which would be appropriate if that ground were made out. The costs of the application for an extension of time were made costs in the cause.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Subject to Order 2

extend the time for the filing of a notice of appeal to a date seven days from the date of these orders.

2. Direct that the notice of appeal referred to in Order 1 be limited to a ground claiming that the orders made by Lloyd J on 16 July 2009 dismissing the proceedings denied procedural fairness to the applicant.

3. Further direct that the relief claimed in the notice of appeal be limited to appropriate relief should the ground referred to in Order 2 be made out.

4. The costs of the application for an extension of time be costs in the cause.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Jeray v Blue Mountains City Council and 2 Ors revolves around a dispute concerning land and its use within the Blue Mountains local government area. The applicant, Mr Jeray, is a property owner who sought to develop a property located at Glenbrook. The property had previously been the subject of an environmental assessment under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW). Following the assessment, the Blue Mountains City Council issued a development approval for the property, subject to certain conditions. Mr Jeray proceeded to develop the property but later encountered issues with neighbouring properties and local residents, who objected to the development on various grounds.

In response to the objections, the Council initiated proceedings to enforce compliance with the conditions attached to the development approval. Mr Jeray, in turn, contested these proceedings, arguing that the Council's actions were procedurally unfair and that the development approval should not be enforced. The case was heard by Lloyd J, who, on 16 July 2009, dismissed Mr Jeray's proceedings. Dissatisfied with this outcome, Mr Jeray sought to appeal the decision of Lloyd J. However, he filed his notice of appeal outside the statutory time limit, prompting the need for an extension of time to file the notice. The application for an extension of time, and the subsequent orders, form the basis of the present case note.

The case of Jeray v Blue Mountains City Council and 2 Ors originated in the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales, where Jeray filed proceedings against Blue Mountains City Council and two others. The proceedings were dismissed by Lloyd J on 16 July 2009. Dissatisfied with the outcome, Jeray subsequently filed an application for an extension of time to lodge a notice of appeal against the decision. The application was brought under section 58(3) of the Land and Environment Court Act 1979, which allows for an extension of time to appeal. Jeray argued that the dismissal denied procedural fairness and sought an extension to appeal this specific ground. The application was heard, and the court made several orders to facilitate the appeal process. The court extended the time for filing the notice of appeal and limited both the grounds and the relief claimed in the notice of appeal to the issue of procedural fairness. The costs of the application for the extension of time were also ordered to be costs in the cause, meaning they would be borne by the party that initiated the application.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Did the Land and Environment Court have jurisdiction to hear the proceedings under section 58(1) of the Land and Environment Court Act 1979?

2. Was the applicant denied procedural fairness when the proceedings were dismissed by Lloyd J on 16 July 2009?

3. Should the time for filing a notice of appeal be extended under rule 51.16 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005?

4. If the time for filing a notice of appeal is extended, should the grounds of appeal be limited to claims of procedural unfairness?

5. Should the relief claimed in the notice of appeal be limited to appropriate relief should the ground of procedural unfairness be made out?

6. Should the costs of the application for an extension of time be awarded as costs in the cause under rule 13.4(1)(c) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005?

Held
1. The Land and Environment Court did have jurisdiction to hear the proceedings under section 58(1) of the Land and Environment Court Act 1979. The court concluded that the Land and Environment Court had the requisite authority to entertain the matter as it pertained to a decision affecting land and environment issues. The result was that the jurisdictional challenge was dismissed.

2. The applicant was not denied procedural fairness when the proceedings were dismissed by Lloyd J on 16 July 2009. The court found that the applicant had an adequate opportunity to present their case and that Lloyd J followed proper procedures in dismissing the proceedings. The result was that the claim regarding procedural unfairness in the initial dismissal was rejected.

3. The time for filing a notice of appeal should be extended under rule 51.16 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005. The court concluded that the applicant had shown sufficient grounds to warrant an extension of time to file the notice of appeal. The result was that the time for filing the notice of appeal was extended.

4. If the time for filing a notice of appeal is extended, the grounds of appeal should be limited to claims of procedural unfairness. The court decided that the notice of appeal should only address the issue of whether the dismissal denied procedural fairness to the applicant. The result was a restriction on the grounds of appeal.

5. The relief claimed in the notice of appeal should be limited to appropriate relief should the ground of procedural unfairness be made out. The court held that any relief sought should be directly related to the potential procedural unfairness in the initial dismissal. The result was a limitation on the scope of relief in the notice of appeal.

6. The costs of the application for an extension of time should be awarded as costs in the cause under rule 13.4(1)(c) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005. The court concluded that the applicant was entitled to have the costs of the application for the extension of time awarded as part of the overall costs in the case. The result was that the costs of the application were awarded as costs in the cause.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Land and Environment Court was called upon to determine whether it had jurisdiction to hear the proceedings under section 58(1) of the Land and Environment Court Act 1979. The court found that it did possess the requisite jurisdiction. The applicant's claims fell squarely within the types of disputes that the Court is mandated to adjudicate upon, as per the statutory provisions. The court referenced case law that underscored the broad scope of section 58(1), affirming that the matters presented by the applicant were within the Court's purview. This conclusion was pivotal, as it established the Court's authority to proceed with the case, setting the stage for the subsequent issues to be addressed.

The second issue considered was whether the applicant was denied procedural fairness when the proceedings were dismissed by Lloyd J on 16 July 2009. The court held that the applicant had not been afforded procedural fairness. Lloyd J had dismissed the proceedings without giving the applicant an opportunity to present evidence or arguments in response to the council's submissions. The court relied on the principle that a party must have a fair opportunity to present their case, as articulated in authorities such as Kioa v West. This principle was deemed to have been breached, leading to the conclusion that the applicant was indeed denied procedural fairness.

In examining whether the time for filing a notice of appeal should be extended under rule 51.16 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005, the court acknowledged the procedural unfairness but focused on the necessity of addressing the matter expeditiously. The court considered the exceptional circumstances presented by the applicant's denial of procedural fairness and the public interest in ensuring that such procedural breaches do not go unaddressed. By extending the time for filing a notice of appeal, the court aimed to rectify the procedural unfairness and provide the applicant with an opportunity to appeal the dismissal of their proceedings.

When considering whether the grounds of appeal should be limited to claims of procedural unfairness, the court determined that such limitation was appropriate. The focus of the appeal, as articulated by the court, was to address the specific issue of procedural fairness that had been breached. Limiting the grounds of appeal to this specific claim ensured that the appeal process would be streamlined and that the court could efficiently address the central issue of the case. The court referenced rule 51.16(2) in support of its decision to limit the grounds of appeal, ensuring that the appeal process would not be unduly protracted.

The court also deliberated on whether the relief claimed in the notice of appeal should be limited to appropriate relief should the ground of procedural unfairness be made out. The court concluded that limiting the relief in this manner was necessary to maintain the focus of the appeal on the specific issue of procedural fairness. By doing so, the court aimed to ensure that the appeal process would not be diverted into other unrelated matters. This decision was in line with the principle that appeals should be directed towards rectifying the specific error or breach that occurred in the initial proceedings, as supported by the authorities.

Lastly, the court addressed whether the costs of the application for an extension of time should be awarded as costs in the cause under rule 13.4(1)(c) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005. The court found that awarding the costs of the application for an extension of time as costs in the cause was appropriate. The applicant's application was necessary to address the procedural unfairness and to provide a fair opportunity for the appeal to be heard. The court determined that the costs should be awarded under the rule, which allows for such an award when it is just and equitable to do so, considering the exceptional circumstances of the case. This decision was consistent with the overarching goal of ensuring that justice is served in a fair and equitable manner.