Jepson & Jepson (No 5)
[2024] FedCFamC1F 51
•9 February 2024
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Jepson & Jepson (No 5) [2024] FedCFamC1F 51
File number: SYC 2100 of 2016 Judgment of: MCCLELLAND DCJ Date of judgment: 9 February 2024 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – Where the applicant husband seeks a partial property distribution – Where the Court is not satisfied that such an order is appropriate in the circumstances of the case – Application dismissed – Costs reserved to final hearing. Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 79, 80 Cases cited: Jepson & Jepson [2017] FamCA 1013
Jepson & Jepson [2022] FedCFamC1F 45
Jepson & Jepson (No 2) [2022] FedCFamC1F 913
Jepson & Jepson (No 4) [2023] FedCFamC1F 937
Kowaliw and Kowaliw (1981) FLC 91-092
Ruslan & Ruslan [2024] FedCFamC1F 50
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 45 Date of hearing: 20 December 2023 Place: Sydney Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr White, Powe & White Family Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr Watkins Second Respondent: Litigant in person ORDERS
SYC 2100 of 2016 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MR JEPSON
Applicant
AND: MS JEPSON
First Respondent
MS B JEPSON
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
MCCLELLAND DCJ
DATE OF ORDER:
9 FEBRUARY 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The husband’s Application in a Proceeding filed 8 November 2023 is dismissed.
2.Costs of the husband’s Application in a Proceeding filed 8 November 2023 be reserved for determination at the final hearing.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Jepson & Jepson has been approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MCCLELLAND DCJ:
INTRODUCTION
This matter concerns an Application in a Proceeding filed by the applicant husband, Mr Jepson, (“the husband”) on 8 November 2023. The husband’s application seeks, firstly, a partial property settlement in the amount of $320,000 and secondly, for the wife to pay the husband’s costs of the application on an indemnity basis. The parties have incurred substantial legal cost in conducting the proceedings in this Court and the husband also has a need to fund private legal representation in criminal proceedings that currently remain on foot (husband’s affidavit filed 8 November 2023, paragraph 29).
For reasons which follow, I have dismissed the husband’s application.
This matter also concerned an Application in a Proceeding filed by the first respondent wife, Ms Jepson (“the wife”), on 8 December 2023. The wife’s application sought to discharge the third respondent, K Pty Ltd, from the proceedings and for the husband to pay the costs of the third respondent. At the interim hearing on 20 December 2023, the parties, by consent, agreed to remove K Pty Ltd from the proceedings. The husband was not required to pay the costs of the third respondent.
The wife’s Application in a Proceeding filed 8 December 2023 was finalised on 20 December 2023 and will not be dealt with further in this judgment.
BACKROUND
The background of this matter has been extensively canvassed in decisions of, firstly, Loughnan J in his judgment dated 14 November 2017; Jepson & Jepson [2017] FamCA 1013, and my earlier judgments dated 8 February 2022; Jepson & Jepson [2022] FedCFamC1F 45 and 22 November 2022; Jepson & Jepson (No 2) [2022] FedCFamC1F 913. In those circumstances, I provide the following brief outline of background facts and contentions insofar as they are relevant to the issues I am required to determine.
The husband and wife were married in 1998 and separated in November 2015. They have two children who are now adults.
As well as the husband’s involvement in this Court, the husband is also facing criminal charges relating to company finances. The wife is a crown witness in the proceedings.
This matter was provisionally listed for a five-day final hearing on 23 October 2023. At the commencement of the hearing, as a result of the late filing of an affidavit by the second respondent, Ms B Jepson, who is the husband’s mother, I adjourned the matter. The adjourned dates are listed in the first week of July 2024. Those dates were chosen in circumstances where there is a potential overlap with issues being considered in the husband’s criminal proceedings: Jepson & Jepson (No 4) [2023] FedCFamC1F 937 at [9].
Subsequent to the final hearing being adjourned, the husband indicated that he would make an application for an interim property adjustment order. This was reflected in the notation of the orders made by me on 23 October 2023.
The orders sought in the husband’s Application in a Proceeding filed 8 November 2023, are as follows:
1.All time limits be and are hereby abridged necessary to allow this Application in a Proceeding to be brought before and otherwise heard urgently before the Court.
2.By way of partial property settlement, the Applicant Husband shall receive the sum of $320,000.00.
3.Necessary to give effect to the aforesaid Order, the solicitor for the Husband shall serve upon [BB Lawyers] a copy of these Orders whereupon such Orders are sufficient authority for [Mr W] to direct the relevant sum to the solicitors for the Applicant Husband.
4.The Respondent Wife shall pay the costs of the Applicant Husband on an indemnity basis or otherwise she shall pay the costs of the Applicant Husband as determined by the Senior Judicial Registrar.
The second respondent filed a Response to an Application in a Proceeding on 18 December 2023, seeking that orders are made in accordance with the husband’s application.
The wife’s Response to an Application in a Proceeding filed 12 December 2023, opposes the husband’s application and seeks that the husband pays the wife’s costs.
It is important to note that a similar application for partial property distribution was made by the husband on 24 October 2022. The funds were sought in order to assist him meet legal costs associated with the criminal and family law proceedings. In his 2022 application, the husband sought a partial property distribution in the sum of $2,260,000. However, this was revised by counsel at the interim hearing where the husband only pressed the sum of $375,000 (Jepson & Jepson (No 2) [2022] FedCFamC1F 913 at [12]). He is now seeking the amount of $320,000 in order to meet legal fees that he has incurred, to date, in these proceedings as well as fees he expects to incur for the final hearing.
On 22 November 2022, I declined to make the orders sought by the husband for reasons which included my assessment that the legal costs incurred by both parties were grossly disproportionate to the issues that remained in dispute and, further, the husband failed to satisfy me that such an order was required to even up the parties comparative resources that were available to them to conduct the litigation: Jepson & Jepson (No 2) [2022] FedCFamC1F 913 at [22]. I was also not convinced that the parties had made a genuine attempt to resolve the matter without incurring further legal expenses.
MATERIALS RELIED UPON
The husband relies upon the following materials:
(1)Outline of Case Document (Interim Hearing) filed 19 December 2023;
(2)Application in a Proceeding filed 8 November 2023;
(3)Husband’s affidavit filed 8 November 2023; and
(4)Husband’s affidavit filed 19 December 2023.
The first respondent wife relies upon the following materials:
(1)Outline of Case Document (Interim Hearing) filed 15 December 2023;
(2)Response to Application in a Proceeding filed 12 December 2023;
(3)Wife’s affidavit filed 12 December 2023;
(4)Amended Response to Initiating Application (Family Law) filed 11 December 2023; and
(5)Tender bundle received 12 December 2023 (Exhibit “A”).
The second respondent relies upon the following materials:
(1)Response to Application in a Proceeding filed 18 December 2023; and
(2)Affidavit of Ms B Jepson filed 18 December 2023.
SUMMARY OF THE HUSBAND’S ARGUMENT
In support of his application, the husband filed an affidavit dated 8 November 2023. In that affidavit, it is contended that:
·The husband’s criminal proceedings cannot commence until he has enough money to fund private representation and avail himself of numerous legal commitments (paragraphs 29 and 44);
·The husband is “substantially prejudiced by there being no partial property settlement” as he may be required to become self-represented if he cannot pay his outstanding legal fees (paragraph 37);
·The wife’s aim is for the husband not to have money, so that he is forced to become self-represented (paragraph 38); and
·Since the post-separation period, the wife’s financial position contrasts drastically with the husband’s (paragraphs 42–43).
In relation to that last point about the parties’ financial positions, the husband’s Case Outline filed 19 December 2023 at paragraph 13, states:
a. The husband’s income is that of a Centrelink payment;
b. The husband is living rent free with his elderly mother;
c.The husband’s mother has met the day to day costs of the husband to the extent that it relates to the payment of household bills, food and petrol for the husband;
d.The husband’s mother has funded legal fees to a point for the husband and from the beginning of 2022, this support has ended;
e. The husband has unmet legal expenses;
f. The husband has accrued legal fees which are outstanding;
g.Absent access to assets forming part of the marriage, the husband will essentially be deprived of legal representation across the matters he has before the Court.
The husband contrasts this position with the wife, as follows:
a. The wife owns in her sole name [EE Street, Suburb FF]. The property was purchased for or about $1,900,000 and it has been valued at $1,725,000;
b. The source of funds that the wife used to purchase this property arose from negligent conduct on the part of [Y Company] throughout the course of the parties relationship;
c. The wife has, in effect, a $2,000,000 property to live in which she does absent any mortgage expense;
d. The wife is the beneficiary of an inheritance which is presently preserved, however it is generating returns. The wife has access to this capital asset to meet her expenses which she is doing;
e. The wife is working and has an income;
f. The wife has, in the post separation period, taken steps to sell matrimonial assets and she has retained those monies for her own use and benefit …
g. The wife has not sought an interim property order for the payment of her legal fees. The wife seemingly has chosen to be unrepresented.
(Husband’s Case Outline filed 19 December 2023, paragraph 14)
The husband submits that the wife’s affidavit is largely unresponsive in terms of addressing the parties’ contrasting financial positions (husband’s Case Outline filed 19 December 2023, paragraph 14).
SUMMARY OF THE WIFE’S ARGUMENT
The first respondent wife submits that funds should not be released to the husband because she will contend, at final hearing, that it is not just and equitable to make a property adjustment order. This is in circumstance where the wife asserts that, aside from monies held in a controlled monies account totalling approximately $1,556,041, the property pool consists of funds that have come into her possession in the period subsequent to the parties’ separation. Those post separation funds, the wife asserts, are made up of an insurance payout and inheritance she has received.
While acknowledging that the funds in the controlled monies account were obtained when the parties were in an intact relationship, the wife stated through her counsel, that at final hearing, she will contend that the funds held in the controlled monies account should remain in her possession in circumstances where they are the proceeds of sale of a property that was in her sole name and further, that the husband has engaged in reckless, negligent or wanton behaviour with the parties matrimonial assets (see principles as set out in Kowaliw and Kowaliw (1981) FLC 91-092 at 76,644).[1]
[1] Wife’s Case Outline filed 15 December 2023, paragraph 9.
As against those funds which the wife contends should remain in her possession, she notes that the husband will retain his interest in a substantial valuable collection which the husband contends is jointly owned by both himself and his mother, the second Respondent. The wife acknowledges that whether or not the husband and or his mother retain part or all of that collection will depend on the outcome of the criminal proceedings. That issue can’t, therefore, be determined at this point in time.
In essence, the wife seeks at final hearing, that the whole of the funds contained in the controlled monies account from the sale of the former matrimonial home, L Street, Suburb P NSW (“the Suburb P property”), be paid to herself because, according to the wife:
·The husband was dishonest in his business dealings and had debts to one bank in the amount of approximately $30 million and a debt of over $10 million with a second bank. It is contended that one of the banks “took action against [the husband] […]”;[2]
·The husband engaged in “cheque [fraud]”, which ultimately led to the collapse of the companies in 2013;[3]
·The husband was charged by police, with the criminal trial listed for several weeks commencing in early 2024.[4] There are also criminal proceedings in relation to other charges;[5] and
·There are a number of assets which the husband has not contributed to, including the wife’s inheritance in the amount of $1.2 million, and the unit she is currently living in, which was purchased for nearly $2 million by funds provided by her compensation payment.[6]
[2] Wife’s affidavit filed 12 December 2023, paragraph 3.
[3] Wife’s affidavit filed 12 December 2023, paragraph 4.
[4] Wife’s affidavit filed 12 December 2023, paragraph 5.
[5] Wife’s affidavit filed 12 December 2023, paragraphs 6–7.
[6] Wife’s affidavit filed 12 December 2023, paragraph 11.
The wife also contends that the husband has significant resources available to him “in the form of financial assistance from his mother”,[7] and also from unidentified friends who have been referred to in costs notices served by the husband. In that respect, for example, the wife refers to what she contends is an inconsistency between the husband claiming, in early 2022 that his mother had “nothing left” to lend him, and the husband’s costs notices which state that legal fees paid by the husband in the subsequent period have been paid by either his mother or the unidentified friends.[8]
[7] Wife’s Case Outline filed 15 December 2023, paragraphs 6 and 17.
[8] Wife’s Case Outline filed 15 December 2023, paragraph 12.
In response to the husband’s contention as set out in his Case Outline filed 19 December 2023, that the source of funds received from her insurance compensation payment was due to the “negligent conduct on the part of [Y Company] throughout the course of the parties relationship”,[9] the wife states that she received the funds “as compensation for the fraud [the husband] committed against [her]”.[10]
[9] Husband’s Case Outline filed 19 December 2023, paragraph 14(b).
[10] Wife’s affidavit filed 12 December 2023, paragraph 11(b).
Clearly, I am not able to adjudicate in respect to the parties’ respective contentions at this stage of the proceedings.
BALANCE SHEET
The husband’s affidavit included a balance sheet that had been prepared for the purpose of the final hearing set down to begin in October 2023 (Annexure “A” to the husband’s affidavit filed 8 November 2023). It is noted that the final balance sheet has not yet been agreed.[11]
[11] Wife’s affidavit filed 12 December 2023, paragraph 1.
During the hearing, I asked the parties to go through the balance sheet with me and identify each item that is agreed and relevant to the husband’s application.[12]
[12] Transcript 20 December 2023, p.6 lines 19–22.
For the purpose of the interim hearing only, the following items were agreed:
(a)Proceeds of sale from the Suburb P property: $1,556,041
(b)EE Street, Suburb FF Folio ID …/SP… (subject to an updated valuation)[13]: $1,725,000
(c)Furniture, furnishings, plant and equipment: $118,025
(d)Jewellery: $80,000
(e)Handbags: $12,000
(f)Motor Vehicle 3: $9,500
(g)Recreational vehicle: $1,500
(h)Entitlement to the Estate of Ms GG (wife’s inheritance): $650,060
(i)Entitlement to the Estate of Mr HH (wife’s inheritance): $606,099
(j)Motor Vehicle 4: $5,000
(k)Tools: $5,000
[13] Transcript 20 December 2023, p.7 lines 2–17.
Counsel for the wife conceded that, for the purposes of the final hearing, there would be at least $4.76 million worth of property in existence. I note that the value of the collection was excluded as the husband contends that it will be a matter that turns on findings at the final hearing.[14]
[14] Transcript 20 December 2023, p.11 lines 1–11.
The solicitor-advocate for the husband contended that the liabilities amounted broadly to $775,000,[15] and that the second respondent claims that she is owed $417,624,[16] leaving a net pool – at the high watermark of the wife’s case – of $3.58 million.[17]
[15] Transcript 20 December 2023, p.11 lines 19–23.
[16] Transcript 20 December 2023, p.12 lines 45–46.
[17] Transcript 20 December 2023, p.13 lines 15–17.
In essence, the husband contends that the partial property distribution he is seeking constitutes just 8.88 per cent of that agreed pool.[18] The husband contends that, particularly in light of significant funds advanced by the second respondent to the parties and or their corporate interests, during the course of the parties relationship, that it is inconceivable that he will not receive an adjustment of at least that sum, at final hearing.
[18] Transcript 20 December 2023, p.14 lines 7–10.
RELEVANT LEGAL PRINCIPLES
I set out the relevant principles that apply in considering whether to make an order for partial property distribution in Ruslan & Ruslan [2024] FedCFamC1F 50 at [29] as follows:
(1)The exercise of discretion: ss 79 and 80(1)(h) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) confer power on the Court to make orders for a partial distribution of property prior to the final hearing. That is:
(a)Section 79 confers a discrete power to make orders for property settlement and the Court may exercise that power through “a succession of orders until the power ... is exhausted” or until a final order dealing with all the known property of the parties is made: Strahan & Strahan (Interim Property Orders) (2011) FLC 93-466 (“Strahan”) at [110], quoting Gabel & Yardley (2008) FLC 93-386 at [57].
(b)Section 80 is not, in itself, a source of jurisdiction for such an order to be made. Rather, the section is an “enabling provision” that provides various ways in which the general power in s 79 of the Act may be exercised in individual cases: Davidson and Davidson (No 2) (1994) FLC 92-469 at 80,875 and Yunghanns & Yunghanns (1999) FLC 92-836 at [118]. This includes, by s 80(1)(h), the making of “a permanent order, an order pending the disposal of proceedings or an order for a fixed term or for a life or during joint lives or until further order”.
(2)There are three stages to the hearing of an application for interim property adjustment orders:
(i)The first two stages were described in Strahan at 85,645–85,646, with the first being a “procedural step” which requires an analysis of whether the circumstances of the case triggers the Court’s power to invoke s 80(1)(h) of the Act to make an order for partial property adjustment. At this stage, the “overarching consideration” is the interests of justice: Strahan at [132].
(ii)The second stage is the “substantive step”, where the provisions of s 79 must be considered and applied, but with limitations, given that it is not the final hearing.
(iii)The third stage, although not necessarily to be considered in this order, is to assess whether the applicant for relief has discharged the persuasive burden referred to in Medlow & Medlow (2016) FLC 93-692 (“Medlow”) at [86], of establishing that there are sufficient assets available to satisfy the order sought without prejudicing the other party (“the Medlow onus”). In that respect, the Full Court said:
The onus was clearly upon [the applicant for relief] to establish that there were sufficient assets available for the interim distribution and that the effect of any interim order was capable of being reversed as part of the final hearing or at least would not defeat [the respondent’s] property claim. The onus was not on the [respondent] to adduce such evidence.
(iv)Moreover, the evidence required to discharge the Medlow onus is such that the Court should be “comfortably satisfied” of the sufficiency of assets to ensure that the applicant would receive, at final hearing, no less than the amount sought by way of interim property distribution: Widmann & Widmann [2016] FamCA 1164 at [14] and see Hardwick & Hardwick (No 2) [2022] FedCFamC1A 216 at [72].
(3)Even if there is sufficiency of evidence to discharge the Medlow onus, that is not the end of the matter. An applicant seeking orders for partial property distribution is required to show more “than the mere fact that upon a final hearing the applicant would receive the property being sought (or an amount in excess of the funds being sought) from the other party”: Strahan at [139].
(4)The overriding consideration at all stages of the process is that the Court is satisfied that it is “just and equitable” to make the order in the circumstances: Stanford & Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108 at [35] (“Stanford”). The determination of that issue should not be approached on the basis of an assumption “that one or other party has the right to have the property of the parties divided between them”: Medlow at [72], quoting Stanford at [40]. This applies to an application for an order for a partial distribution of property in interim proceedings as much as it does to an application for the adjustment of property at the final hearing of the matter.
(5)In applying these considerations, the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction should be conducted with an appreciation that “as a generality, the interests of the parties and the Court are better served by there being one final hearing of s 79 proceedings”: Strahan at [177], quoting Harris and Harris (1993) FLC 92-378 at 79,929–79,930.
(6)Additionally, subsequent to the introduction of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) (“FCFCOA Act”) in September 2021, the Court, the parties and their legal advisers are required to have regard to the “overarching purpose” set out in s 67 of the FCFCOA Act, which includes the public interest of ensuring that disputes are resolved “as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible”. In respect to comparable provisions set out in ss 56 and 60 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), it has been determined that it will usually be the case those principles are best served by one rather than a multiplicity of hearings: Cook by her tutor Kristy Stewart v Riding for the Disabled Association (NSW) Raymond Terrace and Lower Hunter Centre [2023] NSWSC 1503 at [19].
(7)As a related issue, the manner in which the party seeking a partial property distribution has conducted the proceedings will also be relevant. Most relevantly, that includes the extent to which the party and or their legal advisers have complied with their obligations pursuant to ss 67 and 68 of the FCFCOA Act to promote the overarching purpose by keeping costs to a reasonable and proportionate amount. To do otherwise, simply provides additional resources to the party to engage in ongoing “lawfare” at a likely disproportionate cost to the parties and to taxpayers.
(8)The party seeking the relief carries the persuasive burden of satisfying the Court that the circumstances of the case are such that the Court should exercise its discretion in their favour. In that respect, as noted by Thackray J in Strahan at [223]:
… it is important to note that s 80(1) [or s 90SS(1)] is couched in the permissive. Hence, although the Court must give consideration to the matters set out in s 79(4) [or s 90SM] when hearing an application for an interim payment, it has no obligation to make an interim order. The Court “may” do so if it considers that it should in the exercise of its discretion.
(9)Circumstances in which the Court has made an order for partial property distribution include, but are not necessarily limited to, where one of the parties has a monopoly in terms of access to the finances and resources of the parties such that they have a significant advantage in the litigation and, conversely, the other party is significantly disadvantaged: see, eg, Strahan at [80] and Iphostrou & Iphostrou and Ors [2011] FamCA 20 at [60].
(10)It is unlikely that the Court would grant such relief in circumstances where to do so would “potentially defeat any party’s claim or legitimate expectations in a final hearing”: Aitken & Murphy (No 2) [2012] FamCA 239 at [158].
…
(12)Finally, among the matters that the Court may take into consideration in the exercise of its discretion is the proximity of the final hearing dates and the complexity of the issues involved in determining the likely ability of the Court to, if necessary, ‘claw back’ the funds released by way of interim property settlement: Pinta & Pinta [2022] FedCFamC2F 34 at [115].
CONSIDERATION
As noted in the authorities to which I have referred, the exercise of discretion to make an order for there to be a partial distribution of the parties’ property to one or both of the parties prior to final hearing, involves far more than simply determining whether there will be sufficient funds available to effectively “claw back” the amount so distributed.
It is not in dispute that during their intact relationship, the parties operated a number of successful businesses and accumulated significant wealth. It is also not in dispute that in doing so, they received considerable assistance from the second respondent. Ordinarily, it could be expected that the husband would be entitled to a significant adjustment in his favour as a result of not only his own contributions, but also those of the second respondent.
However, appearing in his capacity as an officer of the court, counsel for the wife has asserted that the wife has a viable argument that, as a result of the husband’s conduct, the Court will determine at final hearing that it would not be just and equitable to make an order for property settlement pursuant to s 79 of the Family LawAct1975 (Cth).
For me to make an order for partial property adjustment at this stage of the proceedings would deprive the wife of the opportunity to present that case. That is because there would have already been a distribution of funds to the husband in the sum of $340,000.
As I indicated to counsel for the wife during the course of the interim hearing, the argument the wife seeks to present to characterise the husband’s conduct as negligent, reckless and/or wanton is a case of considerable complexity. I am not, however, required to determine that the case which the wife intends to present is fanciful or without any real prospects of success at this stage of the proceedings.
As against the disadvantage that would be suffered by the wife, I must consider the husband’s contention that without the benefit of an order for partial property distribution, he will be unable to properly present his case at final hearing. In considering that issue, I have had regard to the fact that each party has had ample opportunity to engage in reasonable and sensible cost budgeting to ensure that funds they have expended on this litigation are reasonable and proportional in the context of the issues in dispute and that it is conducted within a realistic costs envelope.
In this matter, the parties have adopted a highly litigious approach at considerable cost to themselves and also to the public who ultimately meet the costs in respect to the resources that the Court is required to apply to adjudicate the multiplicity of issues agitated by the parties.
Additionally, I am not satisfied that there is an inequality in the respective resources available to the parties to conduct this litigation in circumstances where, until responding to this application, the wife has been self-represented for a substantial part of the proceedings and the husband has had the benefit of ongoing legal representation. The capacity of the husband to have funded that litigation, with respect, remains opaque in circumstances where other than his mother, he has failed to identify those persons who he has referred to in his cost notices as having provided funds to him to assist him to conduct the litigation to date.
Accordingly, for these reasons, I am not satisfied that it is appropriate for the Court to make an order for there to be a partial property distribution as sought by the husband and, as a result, his application is dismissed.
The parties have not had the opportunity of addressing the Court in respect to costs in light of this decision. Accordingly, I will reserve the question of costs of these interim proceedings as an issue that will be determined at the final hearing.
I certify that the preceding forty-five (45) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Deputy Chief Justice McClelland. Associate:
Dated: 9 February 2024
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