FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| JEONG & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION | [2005] FMCA 804 |
| MIGRATION – MRT decision – on‑shore spouse visa application – not made within 28 days of expiry of last substantive visa – “compelling reasons” for waiving time requirement – no error found. |
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s.39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s.483A, Pt 8
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg.1.15A(1)(b), 1.15A(2A)(b), Sch.2 cl.820.211, 820.211(2), 820.211(2)(a), 820.211(2)(d), 820.211(2)(d)(ii), Sch.3 criteria 3001, 3001(1)
Babicci v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 77
Boscolo v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1999) 90 FCR 531
McNamara v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1096
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Dunne [1999] FCA 204
Paduano v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs & Anor [2005] FCA 211
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2002) 211 CLR 476
| First Applicant: | KI JA JEONG |
| Second Applicant: | BAN SEOK KIM |
| Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS |
| File Number: | SYG 2892 of 2004 |
| Judgment of: | Smith FM |
| Hearing date: | 26 May 2005 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 26 May 2005 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicants: | First applicant in person |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Ms S McNaughton |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Blake Dawson Waldron |
ORDERS
Application dismissed.
First applicant to pay the respondent’s costs in the sum of $5000.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 2892 of 2004
| KI JA JEONG & BAN SEOK KIM |
Applicants
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(revised from transcript)
This is an application under s.483A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Migration Act”) which challenges a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) handed down on 3 September 2004. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate which found that the applicants were not entitled to the grant of partner (temporary) (class UK) visas nor partner (residence) (class BS) visas.
Eligibility for these visas was based upon the circumstances of the first‑named applicant, Mrs Jeong, and her marriage to an Australian citizen. The second‑named applicant is her son, who is a minor and whose eligibility depends upon his mother’s satisfaction of the substantive criteria. Entitlement to the second, permanent residence, visa was dependent upon prior satisfaction of the temporary class UK visa, and it was the criteria for that visa which both the delegate and the Tribunal found not to be satisfied. From hereon I shall refer to Mrs Jeong as “the applicant” in the case, and shall address the Tribunal’s reasoning in relation to the temporary visa.
Before I refer to the applicant’s circumstances, I note that the Court’s jurisdiction under s.483A is “the same jurisdiction as the Federal Court in relation to a matter arising under this Act”. In a matter such as the present, that jurisdiction is under s.39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) but subject to limitations under Part 8 of the Migration…
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- Case
- [2005] FMCA 804
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court centred on whether the Tribunal's decision was vitiated by jurisdictional error, as the court's jurisdiction under s.483A of the Migration Act was limited to reviewing for such errors. The court could not substitute its judgment for that of the Tribunal regarding the substantive merits of the visa application. Instead, the court's role was to ensure the Tribunal had correctly applied the migration laws. The court acknowledged that it lacked the authority to bypass the migration laws or to evaluate their compliance with general human rights principles.
In examining the Tribunal's decision, the court found that the Tribunal had accurately summarised the applicant's circumstances, including her entry into Australia on a visitor visa, subsequent tourist visas, and the cessation of her last substantive visa. The court noted the details of the compliance officers' search and the subsequent interaction with the applicant, as well as the statutory declarations and documentary evidence provided by both the applicant and the nominator regarding their relationship. The Tribunal's consideration of the applicant's financial and health circumstances, including the nominator's medical condition, were also reviewed. The court concluded that the Tribunal's decision was based on a valid application of the migration laws and found no jurisdictional error.
Ultimately, the court dismissed the application and ordered that the first applicant pay the respondent's costs in the sum of $5000. The court's decision underscored the limited scope of judicial review in migration cases, focusing solely on the procedural correctness of the Tribunal's decision rather than the merits of the visa application itself.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
Application dismissed.
2.
First applicant to pay the respondent’s costs in the sum of $5000.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
This is an application under s.483A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Migration Act”) which challenges a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) handed down on 3 September 2004. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate which found that the applicants were not entitled to the grant of partner (temporary) (class UK) visas nor partner (residence) (class BS) visas. Eligibility for these visas was based upon the circumstances of the first‑named applicant, Mrs Jeong, and her marriage to an Australian citizen. The second‑named applicant is her son, who is a minor and whose eligibility depends upon his mother’s satisfaction of the substantive criteria. Entitlement to the second, permanent residence, visa was dependent upon prior satisfaction of the temporary class UK visa, and it was the criteria for that visa which both the delegate and the Tribunal found not to be satisfied. From hereon I shall refer to Mrs Jeong as “the applicant” in the case, and shall address the Tribunal’s reasoning in relation to the temporary visa. Before I refer to the applicant’s circumstances, I note that the Court’s jurisdiction under s.483A is “the same jurisdiction as the Federal Court in relation to a matter arising under this Act”. In a matter such as the present, that jurisdiction is under s.39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) but subject to limitations under Part 8 of the Migration Act. As interpreted in Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2002) 211 CLR 476, the limitations have the effect that the Court cannot set aside the Tribunal’s decision and send the matter back unless it is satisfied that the Tribunal’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error. The Court does not itself have power to decide whether the applicant meets the criteria for the visa under application. I emphasise, in light of submissions that were made to me by the applicant, that the Court does not have a general power to dispense with the effects of the migration laws, nor to assess the conformity of those laws to general principles of human rights. In short, the function of the Court is to consider whether the Tribunal has validly applied Australia’s migration laws when arriving at its decision. The circumstances of the applicant prior to her application for her spouse visa were summarised by the Tribunal in its decision. In my view, this was an accurate description of the evidence before the Tribunal: 14.The visa applicant entered Australia on a Subclass 976 Electronic Travel Authority (Visitor) visa on 7 July 2000. She was granted a Subclass 686 Tourist (Long Stay) visa on 8 March 2001 and a further Subclass 686 visa on 8 March 2001. This last Subclass 686 visa ceased on 18 June 2001. The application which is the subject of this review was made on 18 July 2002. Since then the visa applicant has held a Bridging C visa. The visa applicant’s son’s last substantive visa, a Subclass 976 visa, ceased on 7 October 2000. He was granted a Bridging E visa on 18 July 2002 on the basis of the application for a visa which is the subject of this review. 15.Departmental records indicate that on 24 September 2001, compliance officers had executed a search warrant at a Bankstown unit. The visa applicant’s son, 19 year old ‘adopted daughter’ and another Korean male were present. The visa applicant’s daughter advised that the male was the visa applicant’s ‘boyfriend’ and the father of the visa applicant’s son. The male departed Australia on 13 November 2001. The visa applicant’s daughter provided the family’s passports to the officers, including the visa applicant’s passport. The officers explained through an interpreter that the whole family were to attend the Department the next morning to collect their passports and discuss their immigration status and possibly apply for a Bridging E visa. The visa applicant did not do this. 16.The visa applicant was nominated in connection with the visa application by Mr Woo Soon Kang (the nominator), an Australian citizen, who was born in Korea on 16 April 1940. He acquired Australian Citizenship on 14 February 1986. 17.In a statutory declaration dated 30 July 2002, the visa applicant states that she was first introduced to the nominator by one of his church members at the Hurstville Catholic Club in April 2002. Since then they met almost every day and got to know each other. On 10 April 2002, he proposed marriage. She accepted his proposal as she felt deep sympathy and love for him. The nominator had been suffering from serious health problems and she was willing to provide care to him after she married him. They had arranged a wedding for October 2002. She was living at the same address as the nominator. She relies on his pension money and money her brother sends her from Korea. The visa applicant also provided documentary evidence to demonstrate that her relationship with the nominator was genuine. 18.In his statutory declaration of 30 July 2002, the nominator repeated this information. He added that he had been looking for a female person who was fit and able to provide care to him as he had been suffering from serious health problems. He found love and confidence in the visa applicant because she was truly sympathetic to his health condition and was willing to care for him after their marriage. 19.The visa applicant and the nominator married on 6 November 2002 in Sydney. A copy of the marriage certificate is on file. 20.The visa applicant was previously married to a Mr Jung Rok Kim. There is conflicting information as to when the visa applicant divorced her first husband. The Family Register for the visa applicant and her family dated 9 December 2002, states that Mr Kim divorced the visa applicant on 19 November 2002. The visa applicant claimed in a statement that she filed a divorce application in the Family Court of Korea and the court affirmed it on 18 October 2002. An amended translated family register provided to the Tribunal states that the visa applicant’s divorce was confirmed at the Seoul Family Court on 18 October 2002. On a notice of intended marriage dated 10 September 2002, the visa applicant states that she was divorced on 2 April 1997. 21.The nominator was previously married from 26 June 1967 until his divorce on 27 June 2000. The nominator has four children from that marriage and all are residing in Australia. The nominator then sponsored a Ms Sang Hak Lee as his spouse in an application lodged on 18 July 2000. The sponsorship was withdrawn on 20 March 2001 and the application was refused on 20 March 2001. The nominator divorced Ms Lee on 12 October 2001. 22.On 16 September 2002, the Department wrote to the visa applicant advising her of the requirement to provide compelling reasons for not applying schedule 3 criteria as her partner visa application was not lodged within 28 days of her substantive visa ceasing. In her response, the visa applicant claimed that she arrived in Australia on a 3 month tourist visa and she was able to extend her visa twice on 12 October 2000 and 8 March 2000 (sic: 2001). She could not extend her visa after 5 July 2002 due to difficult financial circumstances. She is a pastor and established a church in Korea in 1995. Her former husband embezelled church money. She was often physically and verbally attacked by him and had to visit hospital 3 times due to these domestic incidents. She decided to come to Australia to escape him. When she first met her husband, he was in bad health and could not walk 100 metres due to the side effects of a kidney transplant. He asked her to marry him and take care of his health. He is scheduled to have operations for glaucoma and cataract caused by diabetes. 23.The visa applicant provided a letter from Dr Ke‑Hwan Kim, general practitioner, dated 6 December 2002 in relation to the nominator’s condition. Dr Kim states that the nominator had a kidney transplant operation in 2000. He has peripheral vascular disease which caused leg pain with walking. He has glaucoma with poor eyesight in the left eye and reduced vision in the right eye. He is under the care of a renal physician, a vascular surgeon and an eye specialist.