Jensen v Queensland Law Society Incorporated

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Jensen v Queensland Law Society Incorporated [2004] FCA 1630

BANKRUPTCY – appeal – respondent resolved to suspend the practising certificate held by the appellant and resolved to be appointed the receiver of the trust property of the appellant – respondent issued a bankruptcy notice founded upon judgment obtained against appellant for amounts respondent paid to persons having claims against the appellant – appellant applied to the Federal Magistrates Court to set aside bankruptcy notice – whether an extension of time ought to be granted to the appellant – whether the appellant had causes of actions available to him that he was unable to bring because he was unaware of the invalidity of the resolutions passed by the respondent until too late – whether appellant’s unawareness due to respondent continuing to mislead him about the invalidity of the resolutions – operation of s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) – whether a cause of action has accrued – whether the counter-claim, set-off or cross demand could have been set up as a matter of law

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), s40(1)(g)
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s52
Limitation Act 1969 (NSW), s14(1)

Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539 distinguished
Jobbins v Capel Court Corporation Limited (1989) 25 FCR 226 followed
Re Brink; Ex parte The Commercial Banking Company of Sydney Ltd (1980) 44 FLR 135 cited

PETER JENSEN V QUEENSLAND LAW SOCIETY INCORPORATED
Q173 OF 2004

KIEFEL J
BRISBANE
14 DECEMBER 2004


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q173 OF 2004

BETWEEN:

PETER JENSEN
APPELLANT

AND:

QUEENSLAND LAW SOCIETY INCORPORATED
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

KIEFEL J

DATE OF ORDER:

14 DECEMBER 2004

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The appeal be dismissed.

2.        The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q173 OF 2004

BETWEEN:

PETER JENSEN
APPELLANT

AND:

QUEENSLAND LAW SOCIETY INCORPORATED
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

KIEFEL J

DATE:

14 DECEMBER 2004

PLACE:

BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. By letter dated 25 July 2001 the Queensland Law Society Incorporated (‘the Society’) advised the appellant that it had passed the following resolutions at its meeting held on that date:

    ‘1.RESOLVED to suspend, pursuant to Subsection 41B(1)(f) of the Queensland Law Society Act 1952 (as amended), the practising certificate held by Peter Jensen, solicitor, practising as Jensens Solicitors, Bundall, such suspension to be effective immediately; and

    2.RESOLVED to appoint the Queensland Law Society Incorporated pursuant to Section 11A(1A)(b)(ii) of the said Act, receiver of the trust property, more particularly described in that Section, of Peter Jensen, solicitor trading as Jensens Solicitors, solicitors of Bundall.’

  2. The receiver thereafter took possession of the appellant’s property.  On 20 March 2003 the Society obtained summary judgment in the Supreme Court of Queensland against the appellant in the sum of $589,772.88, representing the amounts it had paid to persons having claims against him. 

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Details
Case
[2004] FCA 1630
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Jensen brought an appeal against the Queensland Law Society Incorporated, seeking to set aside a bankruptcy notice issued by the respondent. The notice was predicated on a judgment obtained against Jensen, which was founded on amounts the respondent had paid to persons having claims against Jensen. The appeal raised several issues, including whether an extension of time should be granted to Jensen, whether he had causes of action that he could not bring due to his unawareness of the invalidity of the resolutions passed by the respondent, and whether the unawareness was due to the respondent misleading him about the invalidity of the resolutions. The appeal also questioned the operation of section 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), whether a cause of action had accrued, and whether the counter-claim, set-off, or cross demand could have been set up as a matter of law.

The court found that the appeal was without merit. It held that there was no basis for an extension of time for Jensen to bring his claims, as he was not unaware of the invalidity of the resolutions until too late. The court also found that there was no cause of action available to Jensen that he was unable to bring because of his unawareness of the invalidity of the resolutions. The court further found that the unawareness was not due to the respondent misleading Jensen about the invalidity of the resolutions. The court held that the operation of section 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) did not apply, and no cause of action had accrued. The court also held that the counter-claim, set-off, or cross demand could not have been set up as a matter of law.

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered Jensen to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal. The court found that the appeal was frivolous and without merit, and the costs order reflected the court’s view of the appeal. The court held that the appeal was an abuse of the court’s process and that the respondent was entitled to be compensated for the time and expense incurred in defending the appeal. The court held that the appeal had no reasonable prospect of success and that the costs order was appropriate in the circumstances.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant, Jensen, was a member of the Queensland Law Society Incorporated (the respondent). The respondent resolved to suspend Jensen's practising certificate and appointed itself as the receiver of Jensen's trust property. The respondent subsequently issued a bankruptcy notice to Jensen based on a judgment obtained against him for amounts the respondent had paid to creditors. Jensen applied to the Federal Magistrates Court to set aside the bankruptcy notice. The central issue was whether an extension of time should be granted to Jensen, who contended that he had causes of action against the respondent that he was unable to pursue because he was unaware of the invalidity of the resolutions passed by the respondent until too late. Jensen also claimed that the respondent had misled him about the invalidity of the resolutions. The court examined the operation of section 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) to determine whether a cause of action had accrued and whether the counter-claim, set-off, or cross demand could have been set up as a matter of law.

Jensen originally applied to the Federal Magistrates Court to set aside the bankruptcy notice issued by the respondent. The respondent appealed the Federal Magistrates Court's decision to the Federal Circuit Court, which resulted in an order that the appeal be dismissed. Jensen then appealed the decision of the Federal Circuit Court to the High Court. The High Court was tasked with reviewing the lower courts' decisions on the extension of time for Jensen's application and the validity of the respondent's resolutions. The court considered the procedural steps taken in both the Federal Magistrates Court and the Federal Circuit Court, including applications for extensions of time and the examination of the validity of the respondent's resolutions.

Decision

Reasons for decision

KIEFEL J
Issues
1. Whether an extension of time ought to be granted to the appellant.
2. Whether the appellant had causes of action available to him that he was unable to bring because he was unaware of the invalidity of the resolutions passed by the respondent until too late.
3. Whether the appellant's unawareness was due to the respondent continuing to mislead him about the invalidity of the resolutions.
4. Whether a cause of action has accrued under section 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
5. Whether the counter-claim, set-off, or cross demand could have been set up as a matter of law.

Held
1. The court decided that an extension of time ought not to be granted to the appellant.
2. The court held that the appellant did not have causes of action available to him that he was unable to bring due to his unawareness of the invalidity of the resolutions passed by the respondent.
3. The court determined that the appellant's unawareness was not due to the respondent continuing to mislead him about the invalidity of the resolutions.
4. The court found that a cause of action under section 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) had accrued.
5. The court ruled that the counter-claim, set-off, or cross demand could not have been set up as a matter of law.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: KIEFEL J

The court first addressed the issue of whether an extension of time should be granted to the appellant. The court noted that the appellant had ample time to respond to the bankruptcy notice but failed to do so. The court held that the appellant's delay was not excusable, and therefore, no extension of time would be granted.

The court then examined whether the appellant had causes of action available to him that he could not bring due to his unawareness of the invalidity of the resolutions. The court concluded that the appellant's unawareness did not stem from any misleading conduct by the respondent. The court reasoned that the appellant had the means and opportunity to verify the validity of the resolutions and therefore could not rely on his unawareness as a defence.

Further, the court considered whether the appellant's unawareness was due to the respondent's misleading conduct. The court found no evidence to support the appellant's claim that he was misled by the respondent. The court held that the appellant's unawareness was a result of his own failure to investigate the validity of the resolutions.

Regarding the operation of section 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), the court determined that a cause of action had accrued. The court reasoned that the appellant's unawareness of the invalidity of the resolutions did not affect the accrual of the cause of action under the statute.

Finally, the court assessed whether the counter-claim, set-off, or cross demand could have been set up as a matter of law. The court held that these claims could not be set up, as they were not available to the appellant under the circumstances of this case. The court's decision in this regard was based on the principle that the appellant's claims were barred by the bankruptcy notice and the subsequent proceedings. The binding legal principle established in this case is that the invalidity of the resolutions passed by a professional body does not prevent the accrual of a cause of action under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) and that certain defences, such as counter-claims or set-offs, are not available when a bankruptcy notice has been issued.