Jenkin,Trevor Robert & Ors trading as Calomba Transport v Muir, Steven Paul
[1982] FCA 110
•4 Jun 1982
‘ I N THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ) NORTHERN TERRITORY DISTRICT ) N.T. No. G . 2 7 of 1 9 8 1 REGISTRY ) )
GENERAL D I V I S I O N )
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN
TERRITORY OF-A~RALIA
BETWEEN :
TREVOR OBERT J E N K I N , I R A
JOHN JENKIN and DORRIS
MURIEL JENKIN t r a d i n g as
C a l o m b a Transport A p p e l l a n t s
(Defendan t s )
and
STEVEN PAUL MUIR R e s p o n d e n t (Plaintiff)
CORAM: Northrop, T o o h e y and McGregor JJ. NORTHROP J . ,
TOOHEY J. and REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 4 J U N E 1 9 8 2 . McGREGOR J.
T h e appe ! l l a n t s appeal from a j u d g m e n ,t of the Supreme
C o u r t of t h e Northern T e r r i t o r y of A u s t r a l i a g iven on 16 O c t o b e r
1 9 8 1 and whlch awarded t o t h e respondent $ 1 5 1 , 1 7 7 . 1 7 damages agalnst t h e appel lan ts w i t h costs t o be taxed. T h e learned t r i a l Judge
calculated the a m o u n t of those d a m a g e s as f o l l o w s :
“ G e n e r a l d a m a g e s f o r i m p a l r m e n t of w o r k i n g capacity
(1) d u r i n g t o t a l lncapac i ty 9 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
( 2 ) from 1 O c t o b e r 1 9 7 9 t o date 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
( 3 ) for t h e f u t u r e 9 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
f i l l o w m c e f o r f u t u r e s u r q e r y 3 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
General damages fo r p a i n and
s u f f e r i n g and lo s s of amenities 3 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
. . 2 . .
"Special damages 4 , 1 7 7 . 1 7 $ 1 5 1 , 1 7 7 . 1 7 "
The appeal 1s l i m l t e d t o t h e quantum of damages.
Durlng the course of submlsslons senior counsel for the
a p p e l l a n t s l imited h i s s u b m l s s l o n t o t h e items included under
the heading "General damages for impalrment of worklng capaci ty" .
The f m d i n g s of f a c t made by t h e t r i a l Judge were
not cha l lenged . On 22 February 1 9 7 9 t he r e sponden t su f f e red
l n ] u r l e s l n a road acc lden t i n c l r cums tances In wh ich the
a p p e l l a n t s a d m i t t e d l l a b i l i t y . The respondent i s now 34 y e a r s
of age and al though born in England, has l ived In Austral ia s lnce November 1 9 7 4 . H i s work h i s t o r y i s set o u t i n t h e r e a s o n s f o r judgment of t h e t r l a l Judge. In 1 9 7 7 he galned a r i g g e r ' s l icence and towards the end of 1 9 7 7 he decided t o work on h l s own account as a r igg lng con t r ac to r i n Darwln . He 1s a person
of resource and energy and the t r ia l Judge accepted h ls ev idence .
By February 1 9 7 9 h i s b u s i n e s s was becoming e s t a b l i s h e d a n d h l s
f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n was Improving. He d i d a l o t of t h e p h y s i c a l
work h i m s e l f w h l c h r e q u l r e d c o n s i d e r a b l e a g i l l t y , t o l e r a n c e t o
hard work a n d t h e a b l l l t y t o work long hours. The l e a r n e d t r i a l
Judge said:
" I t 1s n o t p o s s l b l e upon t h e e v ~ d e n c e t o a s s e s s
t h e p l a j n t l f f ' s a v e r a g e income from 111s b u s m e s s
a t t h e tlme o f h l s acc iden t no r can the g ross o r
n e t Income he would have der lved dur lng the
pe r lod of t o t a l l n c a p a c l t y ( L 2 February 1 9 7 9 t o
1 October 1 9 7 9 ) be c a l c u l a t e d . "
The d e t a i l s o€ t he In ju ry su f fe red - by t h e respondent
need not be set ou t . I t i s s u f f l c i e n t t o s a y t h a t he was t o t a l l y . . 3 . .
l n c a p a c l t a t c d f o r the elght rrcnths from 2 2 February 1 9 7 9 t o
1 October 1 9 7 9 . T h e r e a f t e r t h e learned t r i a l Judge found:
"Were he employed a s a r l g g e r c a r r y l n g o u t
I
normal dut ies , I f i n d t h a t he would be unable
t o r e t a l n s u c h employment. On t h e l a b o u r
market he would have no prospects of ob ta in ing
work a s a r l g g e r . H e i s f i t f o r some bench
work but It is c l ea r wha teve r t a sk h e under takes
wh ich p l aces s t r a ln on h i s l e f t k n e e , h e w i l l
s u f f e r f o r it a t t h e end of the day. He has
t h u s l o s t t h e c a p a c i t y t o work as a g e n e r a l r l g g e r , a s k i l l and t rade he developed through
h l s own m i t i a t l v e and hard work." When the respondent commenced h i s own buslness he
engaged m wire s p l i c i n g as an a n c l l l a r y a c t l v l t y t o e a r n income.
When he was a b l e t o r e t u r n t o work a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t h e c o n c e n t r a t e d
f o r some time on wire s p l i c i n g and he employed a p e r s o n t o a s s i s t
him I n t h a t work since, because of h i s i n j u r i e s , h e was unable
t o do It a l l h i m s e l f . I n i t i a l l y h e p a i d t h a t employee about $300.00 p e r week, and t h e r e a f t e r on an Income-sharing arrangement
which t h e l ea rned t r ia l Judge sa id he could not fu l ly unders tand .
T h e respondent i s t h e s o l e p r o p r i e t o r of h i s b u s m e s s a n d t h e
t r i a l Judge said:
"I h a v e n o r e l i a b l e o r d e t a i l e d e v i d e n c e of t h e
accounts of the bus iness for the year ended
30 June 1 9 8 1 . The cop ie s o f p rev lous r e tu rns
( t a x a t l o n r e t u r n s ) , t h e g r o u p c e r t i f i c a t e a n d
a s ses smen t s a re of l i m i t e d v a l u e e s p e c i a l l y
a s it i s c l e a r t h a t f o r some y e a r s t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s
t a x r e t u r n s were not subml t ted ."
H l s Honour then contlnued:
"As f a r as I can ~ u d g e t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s b u s i n e s s
i s progress ing ... He is d ivers i fy ing , working
on s t ruc tu ra l e r ec t ion , p l ayground equ lpmen t
( rope l adders and n e t s ) and wire s p l i c l n g . I
a c c e p t t h e f a c t t h a t h i s i n a b i l i t y t o work
a s a r l g g e r n e c e s s i t a t e s t h e employment of
s u b s t i t u t e l a b o u r b u t I am unable to approach
. . d . .
the matter on the basls of the detailed
calculations urged by the plalntiff's
counsel In his submlsslons. The fact ofthe matter is that the data 1s insufficient."
Hls Honour then made comments relating to the fact that the
lnabillty of the respondent to do much of thework hlmself would
be productive of a continuing loss, but as tlme passed his
responslbillties as a contractor, planner, employer of labour and
purchaser of materlals would have made inroads into the time he could spend on actlve rigging work. He also found:
"...that success depends upon the efficiency
of labour In this type of busmess and there
is no substltute for a man working for himself. I accept the plaintiff's evldence that when one employs a rigger (a hlgh risk occupatlon) the costs of compulsory insurance
add materlally to overall costs. A worklng proprletor can make his personal insurance arrangements more cheaply."
His Honour then concluded that the assessment of general damages for impalrment of earning capacity must be a matter of judgment. He continued:
"To strike a weekly loss figure, or to
attempt to asses6 the loss to date based
on evidence of past payments to riggers and the like 1s unreliable as the consequential 'advantages' to the plaintlff
- and there must be some - cannot be assessed."
During the period of total incapaclty the trial Judge
assessed the respondent's net average loss at the rate of $325 per week and after allowing for the contingencies of the industry
he allowed the sum of $ 9 , 0 0 0 . Although not conceding this item, senior counsel for the appellants did not seriously challenge that amount. In all the clrcumstances that aeount is reasonable.
. . 5 . .
r
- 5 - b
H i s Honour then cont inued:
"For impairment of working capacity and
consequen t i a l loss of earnings from
1 October 1 9 7 9 u n t l l t h e p r e s e n t time
- s l i g h t l y I n e x c e s s o f two y e a r s
I a l low $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 ...
A s t o t h e f u t u r e I t ake t he v i ew on
t h e p r o b a b l l l t i e s t h a t h e d e v e l o p m e n t
o f o s t e o a r t h r i t i s will s h o r t e n t h e
p l a l n t i f f ' s working l i f e by a few yea r s .
Discomfort may be c h e c k e d o r a l l e v i a t e d
by the su rqe ry M r . F ry advises bu t
o s t e o a r t h r l t l s w i l l p rog res s . I t 1s
u n l l k e l y I f i n d t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f
w i l l u n d e r g o a r t h r o p l a s t v o r a r t h r o -
d e s l s . The p l a i n t i f f h a s l o s t t h e
f l e x i b i l i t y h i s p h y s i c a l f i t n e s s and
i n i t i a t l v e s combined t o o f f e r b e € o r e h i s
acc iden t . I a s s e s s t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s
g e n e r a l damages fo r fu tu re economic
l o s s i n t h e sum of $ 9 5 , 0 0 0 . I make
an allowance of $ 3 , 0 0 0 f o r what I f i n d t o
be the p robab le c o s t s and l o s s a s s o c i a t e d
w l t h a l l e v l a t l n g surgery ." S e n i o r c o u n s e l f o r t h e a p p e l l a n t s s u b m i t t e d t h a t
t h e r e was no ev idence to suppor t the items of l o s s a s s e s s e d a t
$ 1 0 , 0 0 0 and $ 9 5 , 0 0 0 r e s p e c t i v e l y .
The ludgment under appeal was g i v e n b e f o r e t h e High
Court publ ished i t s reasons in Todorovic v . Waller ( 1 9 8 1 ) 56
A . L . J . R . 5 9 . Wl thout making re ference to the d i scuss ions
a p p e a r i n g t h e r e i n r e l a t i n g t o t h e method of c a l c u l a t i n g damages
i n c a s e s i n whlch a p l a l n t l f f , by r e a s o n o f h i s i n ~ u r i e s , h a s
s u f f e r e d a loss o r I m p a i r m e n t o f h l s c a p a c i t y t o e a r n wages I n
t h e f u t u r e it i s s a l u t a r y t o r e f e r t o what was s a i d by Glbbs C . J .
and Wllson J. a t pp.61-62:
"Cer ta ln fundamenta l p r lnc lp les are so well
e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t it 1s unnecessary to c i t e
a u t h o r i t i e s i n s u p p o r t of them. I n t h e
f i r s t p l a c e , a p l a l n t i f f who has been injured
by the negl igence of the defendant should be
. . 6 . .
"awarded such a sum of money a s w l l l , a s
n e a r l y as p o s s i b l e , p u t him I n t h e same
p o s i t l o n as i f he had not sus ta ined the
i n ~ u r i e s . S e c o n d l y , damages f o r one cause of ac t ion m u s t be recovered once and forever,
and ( in the absence of any s ta tu tory exception)
must be awarded as a lump sum; t h e c o u r t
cannot order a d e f e n d a n t t o make p e r l o d l c payments t o t h e p l a l n t i f f . T h i r d l y , t h e
cour t has no conce rn wl th the manner i n which t h e p l a i n t i f f u s e s t h e sum awarded t o him;
t h e p l a i n t i f f i s f r e e t o d o w h a t h e l l k e s w l t h
It. Four th ly , the burden l les on t h e p l a l n t l f f
t o p r o v e t h e l n j u r y o r loss f o r which he seeks damages.
Although the a m of t h e cour t in awardlng
damages 1s t o make good t o t h e p l a l n t l f f , so
f a r as money can do , t he loss which he has
s u f f e r e d , It is obv ious tha t It is imposslble
t o a s s e s s damages f o r p a l n a n d s u f f e r i n g and
loss of amenlt ies of l i f e by any process of
a r l t h m e t i c a l c a l c u l a t i o n . It may be less
obvlous, but i s no less c e r t a i n , t h a t t h e
assessment of damages for future pecuniary loss
r e s u l t l n g f rom personal in jur ies can never be
a mere matter of mathematics. It 1s t r u e t h a t
a s t h e assessment of damages has become more s o p h i s t i c a t e d , c a l c u l a t i o n s a r e made i n an attempt
t o a c h i e v e g r e a t e r p r e c i s i o n . Such c a l c u l a t i o n s
a f a l se appea rance of accuracy.
may sometlmes give
Some of t h e f l g u r e s on which they are based are
t h e r e s u l t of e s t l m a t e o r s p e c u l a t l o n . I n t h e
case of loss of earn ing capac i ty It is necessary
t o compare what t h e p l a i n t i f f m i g h t h a v e e a r n e d i f
he had no t su f f e red the in lu ry wi th wha t he i s
l i k e l y t o e a r n i n h i s i n l u r e d c o n d l t i o n . I n many
cases t h l s means t h a t t h e c o u r t h a s t o e n g a g e i n
' a d o u b l e e x e r c l s e I n t h e a r t of prophesylng ' :
Paul v. Rendell (19811, 55 A.L.J.R. 3 7 1 , - a t ~ p . 3 7 2 .
Of course In some cases o f s e r l o u s i n j u r y - - it w l l l be p o s s i b l e t o s a y t h a t t h e p l a l n t l f f i s probably
capab le o f ea rn ing no th ing In t he fu tu re . However,
I n no case can the re be any s o l i d b a s i s on whlch
to de te rmme what t h e p l a i n t l f f would have earned
If h e had not r e c e i v e d t h e i n ~ u r l e s i n r e spec t o f
which he sues . A c t u a r i a l t a b l e s w i l l show t h e average number of years which w l l l b e l i v e d a f t e r
a c e r t a l n a g e by t h o s e a l l v e a t t h a t a g e , b u t w i l l
n o t show t h a t It i s p r o b a b l e t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f ,
even i f i n good h e a l t h , would have conformed t o t h e average. No evidence can poss ib ly ind ica te whether J
t h e p l a l n t l f f , had he not been inlured, would have ' \ I I t
remained i n good hea l th , and cont lnued to be employed a t any p a r t i c u l a r r a t e o f e a r n l n g s . F o r these r easons , damages fo r manc ia l loss l i k e l y t
r e s u l t t o f rom personal ln jury ' can on ly an be ;
" ' e s t i m a t e , o f t e n a very rough estimate, of
t h e p r e s e n t v a l u e o f h i s prospective loss ' : Br l ty sh Transpor t Commission b. Gourley,
T 1 9 5 6 ) A.C. 1 8 5 , a t p .212, per L o r d Reld.
Ultimately, the process must a lways be one o f judgment ra ther than ca lcu la t lon ."
In t he p re sen t ca se s en io r counse l fo r t h e a p p e l l a n t s
s u b m i t t e d t h a t t h e r e was no evidence t o suppor t t he cha l l enged
heads of loss. He r e l i e d s t r o n g l y on the v lews expressed by
the Cour t of Appeal i n Ashc ro f t v . Cur t in ( 1 9 7 1 ) 1 W.L.R. 1 7 3 1 .
In adopt ing a ph rase appea r lng In tha t r epor t , counse l con tended t h a t on a cons ide ra t ion o f t he r easons fo r j udgmen t of t h e t r i a l
Judge, the amountsof $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 and $ 9 5 , 0 0 0 had been "plucked out
of t h e a i r " a n d , a s I n Ashorof t v . Cur t in the appea l should be
allowed and a t t h e most very moderate sums should be s u b s t l t u t e d
t h e r e f o r , p a r t i c u l a r l y s l n c e t h e e v i d e n c e d l s c l o s e d t h a t t h e
r e sponden t ' s bus lness was i n c r e a s i n g I ts p r o f l t a b i l l t y y e a r
by year .
Counse l for the respondent re fer red t o a s p e c t s of
t h e evidence not contained m t h e reasons for judgment of the
tr ial Judge. In substance the business being conducted by t h e
respondent was t h a t of h i r ing h lmsel f out a s a n lndependent
c o n t r a c t o r r i g g e r a n d where necessary employmg o ther people to
do t h e work wlth hlm. He had h i s r l g g e r ' s l i c e n c e a n d I f work r equ i r ed more labour than he could himself supply he engaged
o t h e r p e r s o n s t o a s s l s t h im. Those persons dld not need t o have a r i g g e r ' s l l c e n c e p r o v l d e d t h e respondent was p resen t
a t t h e s i t e whzle t h e r l g g l n g work was being performed. A t t h e
. I
tlme of the hear ing the respondent was I n f a c t employing f o u r ' , . : Y L
men, none of whom had a r i g g e r ' s l i c e n c e . If he had been able
t o do the work of a r q g e r he would not have needed t o employ
t h e f o u r t h man but would have done t h a t work h imsel f . L i k e w l s e ,
s imilar consideral lonsappl ied concernlng the wire s p l i c l n g , b u t
t h l s a s p e c t o f h i s b u s i n e s s was d e c l i n l n g . I n t h e f l n a n c i a l
year 1978-79 the respondent was u n a b l e t o work for four months .
I n t h e f l n a n c i a l y e a r 1379-80 he was a b l e t o work f o r e l g h t months
only commencing 1 October 1 9 7 9 . During those elght months he paid approximately $ 7 , 5 0 0 t o men t o do work tha t no rma l ly h e
would have done hlmself. I n t h e financial year 1 9 8 0 - 8 1 he pald men
approxlmately $ 1 1 , 6 0 0 f o r work that normally he would have done
h i m s e l f . F o r t h e s i x weeks 1 J u l y 1 9 8 1 t o mid-August ( t h e d a t e of t h e hear ing) he pa id men approximately $ 1 , 6 0 0 f o r work t h a t
normally he would have done himself. A t t h e time of t h e h e a r i n g
t h e r a t e o f pay f o r a r i g g e r was $6 .00 per hour for casua l work ,
bu t the respondent was paying $ 8 . 0 0 per hour.
On these f lgu res , t he r e sponden t pa id wages of
approxlmately $ 2 0 , 7 0 0 d u r i n g t h e p e r l o d 1 October 1 9 7 9 t o t h e
d a t e o f h e a r l n g t o g e t work done that normally he would have
done h lmsel f bu t t ecause o f h i s in jur ies w a s incapable of doing.
I t is t r u e t h a t d u r l n g t h a t p e r l o d t h e n e t p r o f i t s o f h l s b u s m e s s
were inc reas ing bu t t ha t does no t nega te the lo s s su f fe red by hlm
r e s u l t l n g f r o m h i s i n c a p a c l t y t o p e r f o r m t h e work h imsel f . Likewlsc '
it is t r u e t h a t he was f r e e t o p e r f o r m o t h e r a c t i v i t i e s c o n n e c t e d
w i t h h i s b u s i n e s s b u t n e v e r t h e l e s s h a d t o b e on s i t e while
r i g g i n g work was bemg done. I n a l l t h e c i rcumstances the
determinat ion of $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 a s damages f o r t h e p e r i o d c a n n o t be
s a i d t o be excesslve.
Llkewise with respect to the damages for future
economlc loss. It 1s unusual for riggers to work as riggers after reachlng flfty years of age. The respondent was conducting
an expandmg buslness. To some extent the wire splicing work was decreasing but the rigglng work was expandmg. He would in the
future be required to employ a man to do rigging work which
normally he would have done himself. On the assumption that he
paid that man at the rate of $6.00 per hour on the average of forty
hours a week for forty weeks of the year, wages would amount to
$9,600 per annum. This ignores the requirement of any overtime
work and the additlonal costs associated with the employment of
other people. That estimate is conslstent with what had occurred during the period 1 October 1 9 7 9 to the date of hearing.
During the appeal the Court admitted as evldence an
actuarial calculatlon based on a male born on 30 November 1 9 4 7 ,
the date of birth of the respondent, an interest rate of 3 % per anntlM
and mortality tables. On that calculatlon the present value of
an annuity of $1.00 per week commencing on 28 May 1 9 8 2 and ceasing on the male attaining the age of slxty-five years or prior death is $985. That sum 1s over-generous in that It extends to age
sixty-flve. But in any event, having regard to the princlples
stated in Todorovic and maklng allowances for discounts It cannot
be sald that In all the clrcumstances the allowance of $95 ,000
for damages for the future was excessive. Llkewise, the lncreaslng
profltabllity of the respondent’s business does not detract from
the loss suffered by him resulting from his incapacity to perform
i
the work of a rlgger, especially If at some future datc he is
obliged to seek work as an employee. Ultimately, the process of 4
determining.the quantum of damages is one of judgment, not of ‘i
The learne d trial Judge did not have the benefit of
the opinlons expressed in Todorovic. H l s statement of reasons
supportlng his determination of the challenged damages may have
been meagre. Nevertheless, on further analysis and In the light of Todorovic the Court is not satlsfled that the damages awarded were excessive. Accordlngly, the appeal is dlsmissed with costs
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