Jeffrey Nelson v Commissioner of Taxation

[2015] HCASL 58

JEFFREY NELSON

v

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION

[2015] HCASL 58
B1/2015

1. The applicant claimed deductions for primary production business expenses incurred in the 2004 to 2009 years of income.  The applicant did not derive income from primary production during this period.  The respondent disallowed the deductions.  The Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("the Tribunal") affirmed the respondent's determination, holding that the applicant's activities for which the deductions were claimed were not incurred in "carrying on a business" within the meaning of s 8-1(1)(b) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). 

2. An appeal to the Federal Court of Australia (Collier J) was dismissed.  The applicant appealed from that dismissal to the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia (Greenwood, Rares and Davies JJ).  The Full Court agreed with Collier J that there was no legal error in the Tribunal's decision[1].  Moreover, the Full Court considered that the grounds of appeal before Collier J when critically examined did not raise appealable questions of law[2].  The Full Court declined to address two points that were not raised before Collier J:  the first relied on Tweddle v Federal Commissioner of Taxation[3] and the second asserted that the applicant had been denied a reasonable opportunity to present his case before the Tribunal contrary to s 39(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). The Full Court considered that each of these points was misconceived[4]. 

   [1]Nelson v Commissioner of Taxation [2014] FCAFC 163 at [10].

   [2]Nelson v Commissioner of Taxation [2014] FCAFC 163 at [19], [20], [22] citing s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth).

   [3](1942) 180 CLR 1; [1942] HCA 40.

   [4]Nelson v Commissioner of Taxation [2014] FCAFC 163 at [21], [27]-[31], [36].

3. The applicant applies for special leave to appeal from the orders of the Full Court. The applicant does not have legal representation and his application falls to be determined under r 41.10 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth).

4. The discursive draft grounds of appeal and written case do not identify a question of law suitable for the grant of special leave to appeal nor are the interests of the administration of justice engaged by the application. 

5. The application is dismissed.

6. Pursuant to r 41.10.5, we direct the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order dismissing the application.

V.M. Bell
6 May 2015 S.J. Gageler