Jeffrey Lyndon Piefke v Rio Tinto - [2022] FWCFB 97

[2022] FWCFB 97

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009

s.604—Appeal of decision

Jeffrey Lyndon Piefke
v

Rio Tinto

(C2022/2126)

VICE PRESIDENT HATCHER
DEPUTY PRESIDENT YOUNG
COMMISSIONER LEE

SYDNEY, 14 JUNE 2022

Appeal against decision [2022] FWC 669 of Commissioner Williams at Perth on 28 March 2022 in matter number U2022/255

Introduction

Mr Jeffrey Lyndon Piefke has applied, pursuant to s 604 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (FW Act), for permission to appeal a decision made by Commissioner Williams on 28 March 2022[1] to dismiss Mr Piefke’s application for an unfair dismissal remedy against “Rio Tinto”. The Commissioner dismissed the application pursuant to s 587 of the FW Act.

Directions were made for the filing of written submissions by Mr Piefke in relation to his application for permission to appeal. However, Mr Piefke failed to file any submissions in accordance with the directions, despite being prompted to do so on a number of occasions. Mr Piefke did, however, send a significant number of emails to the Commission which did not shed any light on the grounds of appeal. Prior to the hearing, Mr Piefke sought an adjournment on the basis of alleged work commitments. The request for adjournment was denied. On the day of the hearing, Mr Piefke appeared and further pressed for an adjournment of the proceedings on the grounds that, allegedly, he shortly had to go to sea to run a tug.[2] Mr Piefke did however make some submissions in relation to his appeal during the hearing.

The decision

The decision of the Commissioner is brief. A summary of the decision of the Commissioner as is relevant to this appeal is as follows:

· The employer named in Mr Piefke’s application is Rio Tinto.[3]

Mr Piefke states that he began working for the employer in March 2005 and was notified of his dismissal on 22 December 2021 and his dismissal took effect that day.[4]

Rio Tinto Aluminium Limited (Rio Tinto Aluminium) lodged an objection to the application asserting that Mr Piefke began working for it in June 2005 and that he resigned effective 31 January 2019 in accordance with the terms of a Deed of Settlement and Release between him and Rio Tinto Aluminium.[5]

In light of the objection by the named employer, directions were issued to Mr Piefke to file a witness statement and supporting documentary evidence “which proves as your application states that you were employed by Rio Tinto immediately before 22 December 2021 and that you were dismissed by Rio Tinto on that date.”[6]

Mr Piefke replied to the directions by sending a significant number of emails which the Commissioner characterised as “historical emails between Mr Piefke and a number of other persons or organisations which he has forwarded to the Commission without meaningful explanation.”[7]

The emails themselves do not demonstrate at all that Mr Piefke was employed by Rio Tinto immediately before 22 December 2021 and/or that he was dismissed by Rio Tinto on that date.[8]

No explanation of those…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Jeffrey Lyndon Piefke v Rio Tinto and more:

Read every judgment in full
Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
Download judgments as PDF or Word

Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details

Case: [2022] FWCFB 97
Decision Date: 14 JUNE 2022

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Jeffrey Lyndon Piefke, the applicant, sought an unfair dismissal remedy against Rio Tinto, the respondent, in the Fair Work Commission. Piefke’s application was dismissed by Commissioner Williams on 28 March 2022. Piefke sought leave to appeal the decision of Commissioner Williams. The appeal was heard by Vice President Hatcher, Deputy President Young and Commissioner Lee in Sydney on 14 June 2022. The central issue for the appeal was whether it was in the public interest to grant leave to appeal the dismissal of Piefke’s unfair dismissal application. Piefke did not file written submissions as required, nor did he provide any evidence to support his claims. He did, however, make oral submissions at the hearing.

The Court found that Piefke had no reasonable prospect of success on appeal. Piefke had not provided any evidence to support his claims and, in fact, had confirmed that Rio Tinto was not his employer at the time of the alleged dismissal. Piefke had also conceded that the Commissioner was correct in finding that there was no evidence of employment or dismissal by Rio Tinto. The Court found that the appeal was plainly without merit and that it would not be in the public interest to grant leave to appeal. The Court found that Piefke was using the proceedings as a vehicle to pursue various historic grievances against Rio Tinto, which did not relate to the decision under appeal. The Court concluded that permission to appeal should be refused.

The Court dismissed the appeal and refused leave to appeal the decision of the Commissioner. The Court found that it was not in the public interest to grant leave to appeal and that the appeal was plainly without merit. The Court found that Piefke had no reasonable prospect of success on appeal and that the Commissioner was correct in dismissing his unfair dismissal application. The Court noted that Piefke had confirmed that Rio Tinto was not his employer at the time of the alleged dismissal and that there was no evidence of employment or dismissal by Rio Tinto. The Court found that the appeal was an attempt by Piefke to pursue various historic grievances against Rio Tinto, which did not relate to the decision under appeal.

Orders