JEEVES & JEEVES
[2010] FamCAFC 243
•8 October 2010
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| JEEVES & JEEVES | [2010] FamCAFC 243 |
| FAMILY LAW - APPEAL – APPLICATION FOR REINSTATEMENT OF APPEAL – where an application by the wife seeking to consolidate two appeals filed by her was not accepted for filing – where the first appeal was subsequently deemed abandoned after the wife failed to file the appeal books – where the wife has been represented at all times during the proceedings – where aspects of the first appeal, if successful, flow into the second appeal – where there is a significant prejudice to the wife in dismissing the reinstatement application – where the respondent is already required to prepare for and respond to the second appeal – where there are real issues to be raised on appeal – appeal reinstated. FAMILY LAW - APPEAL – APPLICATION IN AN APPEAL – appeals consolidated. FAMILY LAW - APPEAL – COSTS – application by the respondent for costs – where there are circumstances justifying an order for costs due to the wife’s failure to comply with orders. |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 94(2D)(c) Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) rr 22.21, 22.44 & former r 22.57 |
| Bane & Hacker [2009] FamCAFC 110 Batey-Elton & Elton [2009] FamCAFC 101 Bemert & Swallow [2010] FamCAFC 100 Chranley & Smart [2010] FamCAFC 139 Gallo v Dawson (1990) 93 ALR 479 Rand & Rand [2009] FamCAFC 88 |
| APPLICANT: | Ms Jeeves |
| RESPONDENT: | Mr Jeeves |
| FILE NUMBER: | MLF | 10167 | of | 2000 |
| APPEAL NUMBER: | SA | 25 | of | 2010 |
| SA | 47 | of | 2010 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 8 October 2010 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Melbourne |
| PLACE HEARD: | Melbourne |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Strickland J |
| HEARING DATE: | 8 October 2010 |
| LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: | Family Court of Australia |
| LOWER COURT JUDGMENT DATE: | 8 April 2010 |
| LOWER COURT MNC: | [2010] FamCA 258 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: | Ms Molyneux SC with Mr Combes |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: | Mr Middlemis |
| COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Mr Sweeney with Ms Rea |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Taussig Cherrie Fildes |
Orders
Appeal number SA 25 of 2010 be reinstated.
Appeal number SA 25 of 2010 be heard at the same time as the Application for Leave to Appeal in the event that leave is granted.
Appeal number SA 25 of 2010 be consolidated with Appeal number SA 47 of 2010 and that the appeals be heard together.
The time for the appellant to file and serve the appeal books in Appeal number SA 25 of 2010 be extended to close of business on 11 October 2010.
The wife pay the husband’s costs of and incidental to the Application in an Appeal filed on 3 September 2010 as agreed and in default of agreement as assessed.
That the Application in an Appeal filed on 3 September 2010 be dismissed.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Jeeves & Jeeves is approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| IN THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
Appeal Number: SA 25 of 2010
SA 47 of 2010
File Number: MLF 10167 of 2000
| Ms Jeeves |
Applicant
And
| Mr Jeeves |
Respondent
EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
The application before me today is an Application in an Appeal filed by the wife on 3 September 2010. In that application the wife seeks that appeal number SA 25 of 2010 be reinstated and, secondly, that that appeal be consolidated with appeal number SA 47 of 2010 and the appeals be heard together.
The argument has proceeded today in relation to the first order sought. I will come to the second order sought once I deal with the issue of reinstatement.
The application is supported by an affidavit filed by the wife’s solicitor, Mr Middlemis on 3 September 2010. The application is opposed by the husband.
Background
On 8 April 2010 the trial judge delivered an evidentiary ruling in the trial of the wife’s application under s 79A and s 90K of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
On 16 April 2010 the wife appealed the ruling of 8 April 2010 by Notice of Appeal No. SA 25 of 2010 (“the first appeal”).
On 14 May 2010 the wife filed a draft index to the appeal books.
On 31 May 2010 the wife (by her solicitor) appeared at the directions hearing before the Appeals Registrar.
On 18 June 2010 the trial judge delivered his substantive judgment.
On 23 June 2010 the Appeals Registrar made orders in the first appeal that the appeal books be filed by 30 July 2010.
On 16 July 2010 the wife appealed the judgment and orders dated 18 June 2010 by Notice of Appeal No. SA 47 of 2010 (“the second appeal”).
On 16 July 2010 the wife forwarded to the Appeals Registrar an Application in an Appeal in the first appeal in which the wife sought, inter alia, an order that the first appeal be consolidated with the second appeal and that these be heard at the same time. The application was not accepted because it was not supported by an affidavit.
On 9 August 2010 the first appeal was deemed abandoned.
On 12 August 2010 the wife’s solicitor sent (be email) a letter to the Appeals Registrar. That letter reads:
I was under the mistaken belief that my client’s appeal filed 16 April 2010 (SA25 of 2010) was going to be rolled into her second appeal filed 16 July 2010 (SA47 of 2010)
I note that I attempted to file an Application in a Case to seek that result but such Application in a Case was rejected because it did not have a supporting Affidavit.
I also wrote to the husband’s solicitors on 19 July 2010 seeking their consent to having the two appeals consolidated but they have not responded.
My client is still proceeding with the appeal filed 16 July 2010 (SA47 of 2010) and her draft index is due to be filed by 4.30pm tomorrow (Friday 13 August 2010). That will be done
My client would still like to proceed with her first appeal bearing the number SA25 of 2010 but if it has been struck out then I guess that is the end of the matter and my client will seek to address the issues surrounding the first appeal under some of the headings of her second appeal bearing file number SA47 of 2010.
The Summary of Argument has been completed for the first appeal and could be filed if able to be reinstated and consolidated.
On 3 September 2010 the wife filed her further Application in an Appeal in the first appeal.
Relevant legislation
Section 94(2D) of the Family Law Act provides that certain applications of a procedural nature may be heard and determined by a judge of the appeal division. Included are applications:
(c)to reinstate an appeal under subsection (1) or (1AA) that, because of the standard Rules of Court, was taken to have been abandoned;
Pursuant to r 22.44 of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth):
A party may apply to have an appeal taken to be abandoned under this Chapter reinstated.
In this case, the appeal was deemed to be abandoned under to r 22.21, as a result of the non-compliance by the appellant with the requirement of filing appeal books by 30 July 2010.
As I have said in other judgments I have delivered in matters of this nature, r 22.44 replaced r 22.57 and, whilst sub-r (2) of r 22.57 set out a list of non-exhaustive factors the Court could have regard to in determining an application for the reinstatement of an appeal, the current r 22.44 does not contain any such guidance, providing only that a party may apply to have an appeal reinstated.
It is useful, in my view, to set out the factors contained in sub-r (2) of the former r 22.57:
22.57 Application for reinstatement of appeal
(1)A party may apply to have an appeal abandoned under subrule 22.56 (1) reinstated.
(2)In determining an application under subrule (1), the court may consider, among other things, the following:
(a)the main purpose of these Rules (see rule 1.04);
(b)the administration of justice;
(c)whether the application has been made promptly;
(d)whether the non‑compliance was intentional;
(e)whether there is a good reason for the non‑compliance;
(f)the extent to which the party has otherwise complied, in the case, with orders and legislative provisions;
(g)whether the non‑compliance was caused by the party or the party’s lawyer;
(h)the effect of non‑compliance on each other party;
(i)the effect that reinstating the appeal would have on each other party and on parties to other cases in the court;
(j)an order for costs, including costs on an indemnity basis;
(k)whether a party should be prevented from taking any further steps in the appeal until the costs are paid.
Logically, and the authorities support this, the sorts of matters identified in that sub-rule are the sorts of matters which are relevant and would and should be considered by the Court in dealing with any reinstatement application. Ultimately though, it is still a matter of discretion, and I refer to what Boland J said in Bane & Hacker [2009] FamCAFC 110 at paragraph 25.
Principles to be applied
In relation to the authorities, the most relevant authority is the High Court decision of Gallo v Dawson (1990) 93 ALR 479 and, particularly, the judgment of McHugh J at p 480. His Honour said this:
The grant of an extension of time under this rule is not automatic. The object of the rule is to ensure that those Rules which fix times for doing acts do not become instruments of injustice. The discretion to extend time is given for the sole purpose of enabling the Court or Justice to do justice between the parties: see Hughes v. National Trustees Executors and Agency Co. of Australasia Ltd. (1978) VR 257, at p 262. This means that the discretion can only be exercised in favour of an applicant upon proof that strict compliance with the rules will work an injustice upon the applicant. In order to determine whether the rules will work an injustice, it is necessary to have regard to the history of the proceedings, the conduct of the parties, the nature of the litigation, and the consequences for the parties of the grant or refusal of the application for extension of time: see Avery v. No.2 Public Service Appeal Board (1973) 2 NZLR 86, at p 92; Jess v. Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187, at pp 194-195. When the application is for an extension of time in which to file an appeal, it is always necessary to consider the prospects of the applicant succeeding in the appeal: see Burns v. Grigg (1967) VR 871, at p 872; Hughes, at pp 263-264; Mitchelson v. Mitchelson (1979) 24 ALR 522, at p 524. It is also necessary to bear in mind in such an application that, upon the expiry of the time for appealing, the respondent has "a vested right to retain the judgment" unless the application is granted: Vilenius v. Heinegar (1962) 36 ALJR 200, at p 201. It follows that, before the applicant can succeed in this application, there must be material upon which I can be satisfied that to refuse the application would constitute an injustice.
As is obvious from that quote, the Court in Gallo v Dawson, was dealing with an extension of time to appeal but it has been held in this Court on a number of occasions that the principles there set out equally apply to an application to reinstate an appeal and I refer to Rand & Rand [2009] FamCAFC 88, Batey-Elton & Elton [2009] FamCAFC 101 and most recently Bemert & Swallow [2010] FamCAFC 100.
Mr Sweeney has also referred me to an earlier decision of mine, namely Chranley & Smart [2010] FamCAFC 139, and it is useful to quote from paragraph 26 of my reasons for judgment delivered in that case, in reference to what McHugh J said in Gallo v Dawson. I said this:
Now what McHugh J highlighted was that this is, of course, an exercise of discretion and that discretion can only be exercised in favour of an applicant upon proof that strict compliance with the rules will work an injustice upon the applicant. And in order to determine whether the rules work an injustice it is necessary to have regard to the history of the proceedings, the conduct of the parties, the nature of the litigation, and the consequences for the parties of the grant or refusal of the application. His Honour went on and said, “it is always necessary to consider the prospects of the applicant succeeding in the appeal.” It is also necessary to bear in mind what his Honour termed, “‘the vested right [of the respondent] to retain the judgment’ unless the application is granted.”
The fundamental issue is whether the reinstatement of the appeal is necessary to enable the Court to do justice between the parties. In looking at that issue, there are a number of factors that have to be taken into account and they are as set out, for example, by McHugh J in Gallo v Dawson, to which I have already referred. In addition, of course, and some of these overlap with what his Honour said in Gallo v Dawson, it seems to me that the factors set out in sub-r (2) of the former r 22.57 are also factors which are relevant to determining where the justice of the case lies. In that regard, I highlight the factor of whether there is a good reason for the non-compliance.
Discussion
As I referred to earlier, there was an affidavit filed in support of the application and, in that affidavit, the most recent history of the matter is outlined. What Mr Middlemis deposes to is that, of course, there were two appeals filed. He sought the consent of the other side to consolidate the two appeals. He says no response was received to that request and, as a consequence, he says he filed an application in which an order was sought consolidating the appeals. That was the application filed on 16 July 2010.
What Mr Middlemis further says, and this is in paragraph 12 of his affidavit, is that he proceeded in the mistaken belief that, in the circumstances, an application seeking an order for the consolidation of the two appeals was sufficient for the making of the orders sought and did not require a supporting affidavit. He then deposes that the application was rejected by the Appeals Registrar because the application was not supported by an affidavit.
Mr Sweeney makes the relevant point that nowhere in that affidavit does Mr Middlemis provide an explanation, or a reason, for non-compliance with the order for the filing of appeal books in this appeal. In the written submissions of the applicant though, Ms Molyneux suggests that it can be implied from the affidavit that Mr Middlemis did not realise that, if the appeal books were not filed by the due date, the appeal would be taken to be abandoned. Thus, in effect, Ms Molyneux is asking me to make that implication from the affidavit of Mr Middlemis. Mr Sweeney has made forceful submissions in opposition to that. I will come back to that issue.
Turning to the history of the proceedings, I do not want to dwell too much on that. Mr Sweeney has outlined that history in his submissions to me, and he has made the obvious point that the proceedings are of long standing, having been commenced, effectively, in 2001, although, of course, there was a significant gap between 2003 and 2006, before the proceedings which led to the current orders being made. He also highlights that the proceedings were conducted over 18 hearing days, in relation to the single issue of s 79A. There were a number of comments made by the trial judge as to the conduct of the parties and, in particular, of the wife, in relation to that hearing. Indeed, ultimately, an indemnity costs order was made.
The salient point that Mr Sweeney also makes, in referring to the history of the proceedings, is that the wife was represented, at all times, by senior and junior counsel and by an accredited family law solicitor and, therefore, it can be assumed that the relevant time limits for the filing of documents and, in this case, for the lodging of appeal books were well known and the consequences of failure to file within the time allowed were well known by the wife, via her legal representatives.
In terms of the nature of the litigation, there is not much to say about that. As I said, the most recent proceedings involved a s 79A application. The earlier proceedings, commencing in 2001, involved financial issues, namely property settlement and spousal maintenance. In my view, there is nothing that turns upon the nature of the litigation in deciding whether the appeal should be reinstated or not.
Next, I come to the consequences for the parties of the grant or refusal of the application and this is sometimes referred to as the prejudice that the parties might suffer, depending upon the result. This issue has taken up a good deal of the hearing time today.
In terms of the consequences and/or prejudice to the wife if the application is refused, she, of course, will not be able to pursue the appeal. If that was my decision, there is no appeal from it, save and except via a special leave application to the High Court and that would, in normal circumstances, and, indeed, in most circumstances, be fraught with difficulties, and it is not necessarily a viable option.
Equally, and this is a significant issue in this case, as I referred to earlier, there is what I have called the second appeal, namely, the wife’s appeal against the final orders made by the trial judge. What has been put to me today in submissions, and it is apparent to me, is that if the first appeal is successful, aspects of that flow into the second appeal, given the grounds of appeal. Thus that is a significant prejudice, in my view, to the wife in dismissing the reinstatement application.
With the husband, the consequences for him will be that he will lose the fruits of his Honour’s judgment and although that is simply said, it is a significant issue and is highlighted, of course, in the reasons of McHugh J in Gallo v Dawson and is something that is to be found in most of, if not all of, the authorities in this Court on this topic of reinstatement.
However, that said, Ms Molyneux has submitted, and I accept this, that the prejudice in that regard to the husband is somewhat ameliorated – that is my word – by the fact of there being a second appeal. In other words, if there was just the one appeal and the issue was reinstatement of that or not, if the application was successful then, of course, the consequences to the husband would be he would have to deal with that appeal. He would have to instruct solicitors and presumably then counsel, to respond. However, as the matters stand, he has to do that anyway. Not, obviously, directly in relation to the issues raised in the first appeal but there is a second appeal and that is proceeding and the husband is well and truly caught up in that exercise in any event. Thus I accept the submission, to repeat, that that circumstance somewhat ameliorates the prejudice, and the consequences, to the husband of allowing this application.
Next, I turn to the prospects of the applicant succeeding in the appeal. The grounds of appeal are set out, obviously, in the Notice of Appeal that was filed on 16 April 2010. I note, at this stage that leave to appeal is necessary and that is, in fact, what is sought in the Notice of Appeal. But, of course, as is appropriate, the Notice of Appeal just does not deal with the leave to appeal. It goes on and identifies the grounds of appeal, which will be promoted in the event that leave is granted.
Leave to Appeal:
Errors of principleFirst Ruling
1. The Learned Trial Judge proceeded on the basis that the evidence admitted with the consents of the respondent and the admissions by the respondent may, later and after the conclusion of the evidence in trial, be withdrawn by the respondent without application by the respondent to do so and without leave of the Court.
2. The Learned Trial Judge erred in determining the matter in favour of the respondent in the absence of any material upon which the Learned Trial Judge could be satisfied or reasonably satisfied that there was a proper basis upon which the respondent could withdraw the consents and withdraw from reception the evidence.
3. The Learned Trial Judge erred in that he failed to take into account the prejudice suffered by the applicant, and that the applicant had conducted her case on the basis of the consents and the admissions, and to permit the respondent to withdraw the consents and admissions worked an injustice to the applicant.
4. The Learned Trial Judge erred in that he failed to accord to the applicant procedural fairness and natural justice.
5. The Learned Trial Judge erred in that he proceeded on the basis that, after the evidence had been admitted by consent and without objection, the onus lay on the applicant to justify its continued reception into evidence.
Substantial Injustice
6. As a consequence of the respondent’s submissions, the applicant did not call her witness Mr [W] of the CBA and conducted her case on the basis of the consent and admission of the evidence.
Second Ruling
7. The Learned Trial Judge erred in that he failed to accord the applicant procedural fairness and natural justice.
8. The Learned Trial Judge erred in that he failed to take into account the prejudice suffered by the applicant, and that she had conducted her case on the basis that the documents listed in paragraph F of her Outline of Case dated 18 June 2009 had been received into evidence and, to rule after the conclusion of the evidence in the trial that some of the those documents were inadmissible worked an injustice on the applicant.
Substantial injustice
9. The applicant relied on all the affidavits of her valuer, [Mr L] (listed in paragraph F of her Outline of Case filed 18 June 2009) as evidence of the fact that a valuation of the business by [Mr L] with an end date of 20 May 2011 was the direct result of the false representations made to [Mr L] by the respondent on 5 February 2002 that:
(a)the business operated pursuant to a lease;
(b)the lease ended in 2010; and
(c)his insistence there was no extension to the lease beyond 2010.
(page 8 of the affidavit of [Mr L] filed 4 April 2002).
10. The later affidavits of [Mr L] evidence his continual reliance upon those representations (false) made by the respondent to him on 5 February 2002 and are evidence of the fact that at no time did the respondent withdraw those representations prior to the making of orders on 11 December 2003.
11. The affidavits of [Mr L] are evidence of the fact that the valuation with an end date of 30 May 2011 operated to the financial advantage of the respondent when compared to the (true) terminal valuation of [the E site] and go to the loss suffered by the applicant as a result of the existence of the valuation with an end date of 30 May 2011.
12. The affidavits of [Mr L] go to the credit of the respondent.
13. Accordingly, to rule the affidavits of [Mr L] other than the affidavit affirmed 14 August 2009 as inadmissible causes a substantial injustice to the applicant.
Proposed Grounds of Appeal:
1. The Learned Trial Judge acted on a wrong principle.
2. The Learned Trial Judge erred in law.
3. The Learned Trial Judge proceeded on the basis that the evidence admitted with the consent of the respondent and the admissions by the respondent may, later and after the conclusion of the trial, be withdrawn by the respondent without application by the respondent to do so and without leave of the Court.
4. The Learned Trial Judge erred in determining the matter in favour of the respondent in the absence of any material upon which the Learned Trial Judge could be satisfied or reasonably satisfied that there was a proper basis upon which the respondent could withdraw the consents and withdraw from reception the evidence.
5. The Learned Trial Judge erred in that he failed to take into account the prejudice suffered by the appellant, and that the appellant had conducted her case on the basis of the consents and the admissions, and to permit the respondent to withdraw the consents and admissions worked an injustice to the applicant.
6. The Learned Trial Judge erred in that he proceeded on the basis that, after the evidence had been admitted by consent and without objection, the onus lay of the appellant to justify its continued reception into evidence.
7. The Learned Trial Judge proceeded on the basis that the evidence of the appellant, which included the material recorded at paragraph F of her Outline of Case dated 18 June 2009, could later and after the conclusion of the evidence in the trial, be ruled inadmissible without notice by the Court to the appellant that it would do so of its own motion.
8. The Learned Trial Judge erred in that he failed to take into account the prejudice suffered by the appellant that, having conducted her case on the basis that the documents listed in paragraph F of her Outline of Case dated 18 June 2009 had been received into evidence, it would work an injustice on the appellant to rule, after the conclusion of the evidence in the trial, that some of those documents were inadmissible.
9. The Learned Trial Judge erred in that he failed to accord the applicant procedural fairness and natural justice,
10. The Learned Trial Judge failed to take into account relevant matters.
11. In the proper exercise of his discretion the Learned Trial Judge should not have excluded the evidence now excluded by his Ruling delivered 8 April 2010.
Coincidentally, the bases of the leave application – and this is often the case – are, if not the same, in a substantial way they are the same as the grounds of appeal ultimately sought to be pursued.
The issues to be raised on appeal have been the subject of much discussion and taken up much of the hearing time. Obviously I am not sitting today as the Full Court hearing the appeal but I still need to consider the likelihood of success. I am obliged to do that in exercising my discretion today, but of course, I observe that I am limited in how far I can go in that regard, in that I only have limited documentation before me.
I have been greatly assisted though by Mr Sweeney taking me to parts of the transcript before the learned trial judge and, in short, Mr Sweeney’s submission is that the chances of success of the appeal are quite low or limited.
I listened carefully to what Mr Sweeney said about that and I have taken the opportunity to sit back and look at the transcript and take on board the submissions that both counsel have helpfully made on this topic and, as I commented during the hearing, the more that is looked at, the more it became obvious to me that it is not a matter that I can be in any way definitive about today.
What I can say is that, prima facie, there appears to be arguable grounds of appeal. There are arguments both ways and, as I say, the depth and breadth of the arguments that have been put before me today just highlight the fact that there are, in my view, real issues to be raised on appeal.
Thus where then does the justice of the case lie, taking into account all of those factors?
I am concerned, greatly, by the absence, in the affidavit in support of the application of a reason, or an explanation, for non-compliance. Mr Sweeney has also urged me not to make any implication from the affidavit and, particularly, the implication that Ms Molyneux has urged that I make. However it seems to me that I am able to make such an implication from the affidavit and that implication being that the solicitor, Mr Middlemis, did not realise that if the appeal books were not filed by the due date, the appeal would be taken to be abandoned. I hasten to add, though, that this should be seen in the context of what was happening at the time and by that I mean, there were two appeals proceeding, and there was an application to consolidate, which was the primary application, if you like, that Mr Middlemis was concerned with. It seems to me that that was the cause of Mr Middlemis’ failure to appreciate that the appeal would be abandoned if he did not file the appeal books in time.
The other matter that sways me in this case is the balancing of the prejudice to the respective parties. I am not going to repeat what I have said about that but, in my view, that – and my remarks in relation to the prospects of success of the appeal, namely, that, at least, prima facie, I can see that there are real issues to be raised on appeal, are the principal factors which lead me to find that it is in the interests of justice, in this case, for the application to be granted.
Costs
I have delivered my reasons for judgment in relation to the Application in an Appeal and I have indicated the orders that I propose to make on that application. I now have before me an application for costs on behalf of the husband.
Initially, Mr Sweeney sought that the question of costs be reserved. My position, though, is I should deal with this now, having heard the application. I have therefore received submissions from both counsel in relation to it. Ms Molyneux opposes any order for costs.
Mr Sweeney primarily puts to me in support of the application that his client is only in court today because of the default of the wife. Ms Molyneux puts to me that I should take into account the fact that her solicitor wrote to the other side, seeking their consent to consolidate the appeals and there was no response.
In my view, there are circumstances here that justify an order for costs. The only reason this application had to brought, in my view, was because of the failure by the wife to comply with the orders made by Registrar Marrone on 23 June 2010 for the filing of appeal books. I fail to see what the relevance is to that of correspondence passing from one solicitor to another, seeking consent to consolidation. That is not what this was about. Although, in my reasons for judgment, I have indicated that I accept the submission of Ms Molyneux as to any implication I can make from the affidavit of the solicitor, that is as far as it goes.
Thus, as I say, in my view there are circumstances here that justify an order for costs and it is, purely and simply, because of the default of the applicant wife.
I certify that the preceding forty-nine (49) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Strickland delivered on 8 October 2010.
Associate:
Date: 3 December 2010
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