Jeavons v Chapman (No 2)

Jeavons v Chapman (No 2) involved an application by Mr and Mrs Jeavons for a protection order over the estate of Mrs Chapman, an elderly woman suffering from mental impairment. The applicants sought to be appointed as managers of the estate and to be allowed to pursue a testamentary causes proceeding in that capacity. The dispute arose from the substantial assets of Mrs Chapman, estimated to be between $8,000,000 and $10,000,000, and the lack of clear testamentary intentions on her part. The legal issues centred around the interpretation of sections 7 and 13(2) of the Aged and Infirm Persons’ Property Act 1940 (SA) and whether the court had the discretion to authorise the applicants to pursue a statutory will application under section 7 of the Wills Act 1936 (SA). Additionally, the court needed to determine whether it should grant an indemnity to the applicants for costs incurred in the testamentary causes proceeding.

The court examined the statutory provisions and their intent, finding that the Aged and Infirm Persons’ Property Act was remedial and intended to protect the estate of incapacitated persons. The court found that section 13(2) of the Act indeed allowed the court to grant managers wide powers concerning the protected estate. However, the court held that the specific power to pursue a statutory will application under the Wills Act was not encompassed within the general powers granted by section 13(2). The court also concluded that, even if the power existed, the merits of the case did not support granting such authority to the applicants at that stage of the proceedings. Finally, the court determined that making an indemnity order would be premature and undesirable given the uncertain outcome of the application.

The court declined to grant Mr and Mrs Jeavons permission to proceed with the testamentary causes proceeding as managers of the protected estate. It also dismissed their application for indemnification from the estate for costs that might be incurred in the testamentary causes proceeding. The court found that such decisions should be made at a later stage, once the merits of the testamentary causes proceeding were clearer.