JB - [2025] WASAT 42 | CaseChat AU

JURISDICTION     :   STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
ACT: GUARDIANSHIP AND ADMINISTRATION ACT 1990 (WA)
CITATION:   JB [2025] WASAT 42
MEMBER:   JUDGE F VERNON, DEPUTY PRESIDENT
MS N EAGLING, MEMBER
MS R BUNNEY, MEMBER

HEARD:   6 MAY 2025
DELIVERED          :   15 MAY 2025
FILE NO/S:   GAA 133 of 2025

JB
Represented Person
CB
Applicant

Catchwords:

Administration - Jurisdiction to make administration order for South Australian resident - Effect in Western Australia of orders of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal - Whether the represented person has capacity - Whether the represented person is in need of an administrator - Whether the applicant is a suitable person to be appointed as administrator for the represented person - Appointment of limited administrator

Legislation:

Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, s 118
Evidence Act 1995 (C'th), s 185
Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA), s 3, s 4(2), s 4(3), s 4(4), s 4(6), s 4(7), s 17A, s 17A(1), s 40, s 43, s 64, s 64(1), s 67(1), s 67(2), s 68(1)(a), s 68(1)(b), s 68(1)(c), s 68(1)(d), s 74(1), s 80, s 80(1), s 83D, s 83D(1), s 83D(1)(a), s 83D(2), s 83D(3), s 84(a), s 86, s 86(1)(a), s 86(1)(aa), s 86(1)(b), s 87(1), s 87(5), s 89(1)(b), s 89(2), s 115, s 115(2)
Guardianship and Administration Act 1993 (SA), s 35(2)(c), s 37(1), s 37(1)(b), s 37(1)(d), s 57(1)(b), s 64(b), s 64(c)
Guardianship and Administration Regulations 2005 (WA), reg 3, reg 4
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 5
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 27(1)

Result:

CB appointed administrator of JB's estate in Western Australia

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Represented Person	:	In Person (By videolink)
Applicant	:	In Person (By videolink)

Solicitors:

Represented Person	:	N/A
Applicant	:	N/A

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

G v G (1986) 64 ALR 273; (1985) 10 Fam LR 718
GS v MS [2019] WASC 255
JCB [2025] WASAT 1
Re DEF and the Protected Estates Act 1983 [2005] NSWSC 534
SAL and JGL [2016] WASAT 63

REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:

Summary

On 2 January 2025, a single Member of this Tribunal made orders under s 64(1) of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) (GA Act):
(a)declaring that JB was unable by reason of a mental disability to make reasonable decisions about a part of her estate and was in need of an administrator; and
(b)appointing the Public Trustee as JB's limited administrator of the funds the Public Trustee held on trust for JB and funds that were expected to be received in respect of a criminal injuries compensation claim.
CB is JB's daughter and has sought review, under s 17A(1) of the GA Act, of the Member's decision.
Whilst JB now lives in South Australia, she continues to have an estate in Western Australia, being an amount of money held on trust for JB in the Public Trustee's common account.
CB accepts that JB needs an administrator. However, CB says that she should be appointed administrator of JB's estate in Western Australia, consistent with an order made by the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (SACAT) on 14 June 2024. CB says that she is suitable to be appointed JB's administrator as she is a member of JB's close family, being her eldest daughter, has significant involvement in JB's life, and has her best interests at heart.
We are satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that JB has a mental illness, namely paranoid schizophrenia, which causes her to be unable to make reasonable decisions in relation to her estate, in particular, about complex financial matters including how to manage the significant sum of money currently held by the Public Trustee. We have decided, on that basis, that JB is in need of an administrator.
We have also decided that we are not bound by the SACAT order and may make an order appointing an administrator for JB's estate in Western Australia.
However, we have decided that we are satisfied on the balance of probabilities that CB:
(a)will act in JB's best interests; and
(b)is otherwise suitable to act as administrator of JB's estate in Western Australia.
Accordingly, we have decided to appoint CB as the administrator of JB's estate in Western Australia. Our reasons are set out below.

Principles governing the proceedings

We are required to consider this matter afresh, on all the evidence before us, including the evidence that was before the Member.[1]
[1] State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act), s 27(1).
Our principal concern is to act in JB's best interests.[2]
[2] Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) (GA Act), s 4(2).
We must presume, amongst other things, that JB is capable of making reasonable judgments about her financial affairs until we are satisfied on the evidence that JB is not capable of doing that.[3]
[3] Section 4(3) of the GA Act.
We must not make an order appointing an administrator if JB's needs could be met by other means less restrictive of her freedom of decision and action.[4]
[4] Section 4(4) of the GA Act.
Any order appointing an administrator should be in the least restrictive terms that are possible in the circumstances.[5]
[5] Section 4(6) of the GA Act.
We must, as far as possible, try to ascertain JB's views and wishes.[6]
[6] Section 4(7) of the GA Act.

Issues

The issues for us to determine are:

(a)what power does this Tribunal have to make an administration order under s 64(1) of the GA Act, in circumstances where JB lives in South Australia and the SACAT has appointed CB as administrator of the money held by the Public Trustee in Western Australia;
(b)if this Tribunal has power to make an administration order, should such an order be made over JB's property in Western Australia; and
(c)if the answer to issue (b) is 'yes', who should be appointed as JB's administrator?

Waiver of service

Section 89(1)(b) of the GA Act provides that the Tribunal's executive officer must cause notice of a review to be given to the represented person, in this case JB. That notice must include the material and information specified in s 89(2) of the GA Act. Under s 115(2) of the GA Act, when a notice is given to a represented person, it must be explained to that person. Under s 67(2) of the GA Act, the requirement for notice may be dispensed with if the represented person is not resident or domiciled in Western Australia.
In this case, because JB lives in South Australia, CB, as the applicant, was asked to give JB notice of the application. JB briefly attended the hearing on 6 May 2025 by telephone from CB's home, also in South Australia, where she forcefully expressed her unhappiness with the Tribunal process and the Public Trustee's administration of her estate. JB also attended on an earlier occasion by video link, when the hearing was adjourned for reasons which are not currently relevant. JB appeared to understand the purpose of the proceedings on each occasion.
However, as it is not possible to be certain that all the requirements of s 89(2) and s 115(2) of the GA Act have been met, and where there is no apparent disadvantage to JB given her objection to the order appointing the Public Trustee as administrator, we will order that the requirement for notice of the application be dispensed with, pursuant to s 67(2) of the GA Act.

Findings of Fact

The facts set out in [20] to [28] below are not controversial and we make findings in accordance with those facts.

JB is currently 56 years old. She lives in South Australia, as does her daughter, CB, who is 35 years old. JB has a son who lives in Western Australia. Sadly, another daughter, KB, died in April 2023.
JB suffers from chronic paranoid schizophrenia and has done so for 20 years; the condition having been first diagnosed in 2005. JB's symptoms deteriorate when she does not take her prescribed medication, or when she uses illicit substances.
Since her diagnosis, JB has been involuntarily admitted to hospital because of her mental health condition on seven occasions, in 2005, 2012, 2020 (two occasions), 2021, 2022, and 2025, for periods of around two weeks to around six weeks. Most recently, JB was admitted to hospital in South Australia, on 28 February 2025, suffering drug induced psychosis and was discharged on 12 March 2025.
In September 2020, when JB was living in Western Australia, the Tribunal appointed the Public Trustee as JB's plenary administrator and the Public Advocate as JB's limited guardian. Those orders continued, with variation to the guardianship powers, until 2 January 2025, when the Member revoked the guardianship order because JB no longer lived in Western Australia and made the limited administration orders referred to at [1] above.
The criminal injuries compensation claim referred to in those orders concerns a claim made by the Public Trustee, on JB's behalf, for reimbursement of $5,909 that JB incurred for the funeral of her late daughter, KB. On 22 November 2024, the Office of Criminal Injuries Compensation paid the Public Trustee $3,180.10 in relation to this claim and disallowed the balance of the claim.[7]
[7] Public Trustee's report dated 1 April 2025.
Accordingly, the only asset JB has in Western Australia is the amount of money held in the Public Trustee's common account on her behalf. At the hearing on 6 May 2025, the trust manager employed by the Public Trustee, said that the amount held on JB's behalf as at that date was $94,308.67. This amount comprises the criminal injuries compensation payment referred to above, and the balance of a separate compensation payment to JB received on 3 October 2022.
In late 2022, JB moved to Adelaide to be with her daughter, CB. There was uncertainty for some time whether JB would remain in Adelaide. However, in around early 2024, the Public Advocate applied to the SACAT for guardianship and administration orders.
In a decision dated 14 June 2024, the SACAT:
(a)noted the evidence of a neuropsychological report, dated 9 May 2024, which concluded that JB could not make decisions in respect to complex financial, legal and personal affairs, but could make every day decisions concerning her accommodation and what she wants to do with her money;
(b)found that it was not satisfied that a guardianship order should be made given the adequacy of existing informal arrangements, and dismissed the application for a guardianship order;
(c)found that JB had a mental incapacity and that a limited administration order should be made;
(d)appointed CB limited administrator of JB's estate, with powers limited to:
(i)the management of JB's application with the Office of Criminal Injuries Compensation in Western Australia on behalf of JB; and
(ii)the assets of JB currently managed by the Public Trustee in Western Australia;
(e)made orders that CB provide certain statements of account to the South Australian Public Trustee; and
(f)ordered that the orders continue to have effect until further order of SACAT, and recommended review of the order on or before Friday, 13 June 2025,
(SACAT Orders).
JB and CB continue to live in South Australia. JB lives in a rented unit, which she moved into in about October 2024. The expense of furnishing that unit was paid from the funds held by the Public Trustee. This expenditure accounts for most of the reduction in the amount held by the Public Trustee from the amount noted in the SACAT Orders of approximately $109,000.

What power does the Tribunal have to make an order?

The Tribunal may make administration orders under s 64(1) of the GA Act. By s 67(1) of the GA Act, an order under s 64(1) may be made in respect of a person who is not resident or domiciled in Western Australia, limited to a person's estate in this State. There is no dispute that JB has an estate in Western Australia, being the amount held by the Public Trustee in its common account. On the evidence of the trust manager given at the hearing before the Member, which we accept, this account is in Western Australia.[8]
[8] Transcript of hearing on 17 September 2024 at page 11.
By s 83D(3) of the GA Act, an order made under the laws of another State has the same force and effect as an administration order made under the GA Act, where an interstate arrangement under s 83D(1) has been entered into between the relevant ministers in Western Australia and that other State for the recognition of such orders. There is such an interstate arrangement between Western Australia and South Australia.[9]
[9] Notice of an arrangement under s 83D of the GA Act on 27 February 1998 between the Attorney General of Western Australia and the Minister for Human Services for South Australia (Notice) was published in the Government Gazette on 21 April 1998 as required by s 83D(2) of the GA Act.
However, s 83D(3) provides that the relevant order in force under the laws of the other State has force 'while the person to whom it relates is in this State', that is while the represented person is in Western Australia. This is consistent with the interstate arrangement being in respect of 'adult persons who enter Western Australia'.[10]
[10] Notice published in the Government Gazette on 21 April 1998 and s 83D(1)(a) of the GA Act.
JB has not entered Western Australia since the SACAT Orders were made. Accordingly, s 83D(3) does not operate to give the SACAT Orders the force of an order made under s 64 of the GA Act.[11]
[11] SAL and JGL [2016] WASAT 63 at [13].
The Member considered whether the Tribunal was required to give 'full faith and credit' to the SACAT Orders pursuant to s 118 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (Constitution) and s 185 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).[12] This turns on whether the SACAT proceedings were 'judicial proceedings'.[13]
[12] See JCB [2025] WASAT 1.
[13] Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, s 118.
In GS v MS,[14] Quinlan CJ held that s 40, s 43 and s 64 of the GA Act do not confer judicial power on the Tribunal and that the nature of the powers to appoint guardians and administrators are properly to be regarded as essentially administrative powers.[15] This authority is binding on the Tribunal. Whilst it concerns the GA Act and not the Guardianship and Administration Act 1993 (SA) (South Australian Act), in our view, there is nothing in his Honour's reasoning or the South Australian Act that would suggest a different conclusion should be reached in relation to the SACAT proceedings. Accordingly, in our view, neither s 118 of the Constitution or s 185 the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) have any application in this case.
[14] GS v MS [2019] WASC 255.
[15] GS v MS [2019] WASC 255 at [103] and [104].
In any event, even if that conclusion is not correct, the effect of these provisions is that an order of another State's court is to be treated by us as having the same effect as that order would be afforded in the State where the order was made.[16] Administration orders made by the SACAT under the South Australian Act may be revisited on the application of, amongst others, the Public Advocate in South Australia, or the administrator of the represented person's estate,[17] which reflects the position under the GA Act.[18] Any administration orders made by the SACAT under the South Australian Act may also be the subject of internal review,[19] as may orders made by the Tribunal under the GA Act.[20] Orders in both jurisdictions are subject to mandatory periodic review.[21]
[16] Re DEFand the Protected Estates Act 1983 [2005] NSWSC 534 at [58].
[17] Section 37(1)(b) and (d) of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1993 (SA) (South Australian Act). Certain other potential applicants, referred to in s 37(1) may not be made without satisfying the Tribunal that there has been a change in circumstances.
[18] Section 86(1)(a), s 86(1)(aa) and s 86(1)(b) of the GA Act. Other potential applicants require leave under s 87(1), to be given if the Tribunal is satisfied there is a change of circumstances or some other reason for review under s 87(5).
[19] Section 64(b) of the South Australian Act provides for internal review by applicants, represented persons, the Public Advocate, and others with permission of the SACAT under s 64(c).
[20] Section 17A of the GA Act provides for internal review of Tribunal decisions at the request of persons aggrieved by the decision.
[21] Section 57(1)(b) of the South Australian Act provides for periodic review at intervals of three years. Section 84(a) of the GA Act provides for periodic review of orders at intervals of five years.
In this respect, such orders are analogous to the child custody orders considered in McLelland J in G v G,[22] which are always open for reconsideration. In that case, his Honour held that the constitutional and statutory provisions required the Supreme Court of New South Wales to treat a Queensland Supreme Court order as 'having the same degree of finality and conclusiveness (but not more) as that order would have in Queensland'.[23]
[22] G v G (1986) 64 ALR 273; (1985) 10 Fam LR 718.
[23] G v G (1986) 64 ALR 273; (1985) 10 Fam LR 718 at 276.
In our view, there is no prohibition on this Tribunal considering whether, on the evidence now before us, an administrator for JB's Western Australian estate could or should be appointed, as s 67(1) of the GA Act expressly authorises.
Accordingly, we find that we have power to make an administration order in this case, subject to our being satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the requirements of s 64(1) of the GA Act are met. The issue to be determined is whether we are satisfied of those requirements.

Should an administration order be made?

Before appointing an administrator, we must be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities that:
(a)JB suffers from a mental disability; and
(b)by reason of that mental disability, JB is unable to make reasonable judgments in respect of matters relating to all or any part of her estate; and
(c)JB is in need of an administrator of her estate.[24]
[24] Section 64(1) of the GA Act.
If we are so satisfied, we must then consider who should be appointed the administrator and what powers the administrator should have.
A person's 'estate' means all their financial affairs, and covers all their assets, both real and personal property, and their liabilities.[25]

JB's views and wishes

[25] SAL and JGL [2016] WASAT 63 [22] (Parry J, Dr B De Villiers & Ms D Quinlan); see also Interpretation Act 1984 (WA) s 5, definition of 'estate' and see also the long title to the GA Act, which refers to the administrator providing assistance in the management of a person's financial affairs.

As we have said, JB briefly attended the hearing on 6 May 2025 by telephone, and had appeared on an earlier occasion before that, where the hearing was adjourned.
As we understood it, prior to 6 May 2025, JB's position was that she was capable of managing her own finances and the administration order should be set aside. During that part of the hearing that JB attended, she was clearly very angry and spoke to the Tribunal in highly abusive terms. However, CB spoke to JB and was able to calm her down sufficiently for JB to speak to us about her wishes. JB said that she wanted to buy a home and a car and she wanted a power of attorney for her daughter. As CB is JB's only living daughter, we infer JB was referring to CB.
As we have also said, it was clear from what JB said that she was extremely unhappy with the Public Trustee administering the money held in the common account on her behalf.
We conclude from this that it is JB's wish to have control over her money and that she does not believe that she needs an administrator but that, if an administrator must be appointed, JB wants that person to be CB.

Medical evidence

At law a mental disability includes a psychiatric condition.[26]
[26] Section 3 of the GA Act, definition of 'mental disability'.

In a report dated 1 April 2025, AB, a psychiatry registrar with the health service which had treated JB in South Australia, said that JB has schizophrenia which is a fluctuating condition. This is consistent with the other evidence before us. AB said that they were unsure about JB's ability to undertake simple financial matters or to make complex financial decisions or to manage legal matters, as a functional assessment had not been undertaken.
In a report dated 30 August 2024, a neuropsychologist, KL, said she had examined JB on one occasion, in April 2024, for two hours. KL said that, in her opinion, JB was capable of simple decision-making in relation to her finances. However, KL said that JB presented with a degree of executive dysfunction, poor insight, impulsivity and facile reasoning from which KL concluded that JB was not capable of complex financial decision-making. KL also concluded that for the same reasons she would have concerns about JB's ability to make decisions about legal matters that are inherently complex and required considered and informed thought. KL said in her report that she considered this to be a static disability.
In a neuropsychological assessment report dated 9 May 2024, which was also before the SACAT, KL said:
From a purely cognitive point of view the central features in [JB's] profile, even when she is stable, include executive dysfunction and poor attentional control which are consistent with longstanding psychiatric illness and likely have the strongest impacts on her functional abilities. Fortunately other aspects of her profile are within expectation and importantly, she was able to learn and remember information adequately and was able to converse appropriately.
The presenting cognitive disturbances in [JB's] case, coupled with her poor insight into her own difficulties and mental wellbeing, do raise concerns for her ability to make reasonable and informed decisions regarding her health, safety and welfare, and to manage her finances. I am concerned that she is at risk of impulsivity and losing track of information particularly if it is long and complex. I believe that she retains the capacity to make simple decisions such as where she would like to live and what she would like to do with money (i.e., buy a house), however she will likely require help for more complex decisions and to work out the logistics of any plans. On observing the relationship with [JB] and [CB], which impressed as volatile at best and considering that [CB] has her own psychosocial challenges, perhaps it's best to not involve [CB] in [JB's] affairs.
On balance, I do not believe that [JB] has the capacity to make complex financial, legal and personal decisions that are informed, considered, and meet her best interests. I also note that her condition does fluctuate (based on previous medical reports), that she has little insight into her mental health condition, and that there is a chance she will become unwell in the future.
Having stated the above, I do believe that [JB] should be afforded the opportunity to consult in her expenditure and that efforts should be made to ameliorate her discontent with the present situation….[27]
[27] Report dated 9 May 2024, pages 4 and 5.
KL's conclusions find support in the contents of a functional care needs assessment undertaken on 15 March 2023. In that report, an occupational therapist, SK, said that JB achieved a score of 22 out of a total of 30 in a Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) which indicated a mild cognitive impairment. SK said that the score on the MoCA for visuospatial and executive function indicated a lack of flexibility in thought process and reduced focus through tasks and that JB had difficulty initiating, planning and sequencing tasks.[28] With respect to JB's need for assistance in 'money management', SK assessed that need as total. SK said that, in the past, JB had demonstrated poor planning and management of her funds, leading to significant debt and being taken advantage of by others. SK said that this was unlikely to change due to the nature of JB's condition, her reduced insight into her capacity and poor planning and decisionmaking skills.[29]
[28] Report dated 1 May 2023, page 7.
[29] Report dated 1 May 2023, page 14.
In addition, JB's support coordinator, MA, said in his report dated 31 January 2025 that he has known JB since late September 2024 and that he had observed JB's inability to make prudent financial decisions and that she often liked to spend money impulsively.[30] He considered that JB was unable to make independent simple and complex financial decisions or plan for the future and that her capability was severely compromised by her mental health conditions.[31] AM said that JB had poor insight into those conditions.[32]
[30] Service Provider report of AM dated 31 January 2025, page 3.
[31] Service Provider report of AM dated 31 January 2025, page 3.
[32] Service Provider report of AM dated 31 January 2025, page 4.
As we have said, the medical evidence before us is to the effect that JB has recently spent further time in hospital because of a psychotic episode apparently brought on by drug use. On the basis of KL's evidence, this latest episode is likely to have aggravated the difficulties identified in KL's report.
In addition, the reports before us are consistent in expressing concern about JB's vulnerability to financial exploitation due to her tendency to put the interests of others ahead of her own. The discharge summary prepared, following the recent hospital admission mentioned above, records that CB told the treating team that JB was vulnerable to exploitation by people that know when she is paid and who come to take her out to buy drugs for them.[33] CB, during the hearing before us, spoke of occasions where CB has had to intervene on her mother's behalf to prevent JB giving money to others who have sought it from her, and, in one case, to recover an expensive household item from a person who had borrowed it from JB and then failed to return it.
[33] Discharge summary dated 12 March 2025 from South Australian hospital, page 5.
We accept the evidence referred to in [47] to [53] above and make findings accordingly.

Does JB suffer from a mental disability?

We are satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, on the evidence we have referred to, that JB currently suffers from a mental disability, that is paranoid schizophrenia.

Is JB unable to make reasonable judgments because of the mental disability?

We are satisfied on the balance of probabilities, on the evidence we have referred to, in particular the evidence of KL, that whilst JB's mental health condition may fluctuate, her normal level of function as a result of the mental disability referred to in [55] above, is such that she cannot make reasonable complex financial decisions in her own best interests because of her executive dysfunction, impulsivity, poor attention control and inability to keep track of information. We are satisfied that this prevents JB from being able to make reasonable decisions with respect to larger sums of money, and certainly with respect to the amount currently held by the Public Trustee. We are satisfied her mental disability prevents her from making reasonable decisions about how to invest that money, or to consider and prioritise longer term financial objectives, or to assess the financial implications of items of expenditure, other than small purchases of a routine nature.
We also find on the evidence we have referred to, that JB is vulnerable, because of her mental disability, to financial abuse by others who may seek to take advantage of her.
It seems likely, on the evidence before us, that JB lacks capacity to make reasonable decisions of a simple financial nature, such as making a budget and paying routine bills. However, it is not necessary for us to make that finding, given the issue before us is whether JB can make reasonable decisions in relation to that part of her estate currently held by the Public Trustee.

Is JB in need of an administrator of her estate?

We are satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, on the findings we have made, and given the substantial sum involved, that JB requires an administrator to deal with the $94,308.67 currently held by the Public Trustee.

What functions should the administrator have?

We consider that the administrator should have all the powers of a plenary administrator in relation to that portion of JB's estate.

Who should be appointed as administrator?

We now turn to our conclusion about who should be appointed as JB's administrator.
CB has consented to act as JB's administrator. CB is over 18 years of age. Accordingly, CB is eligible to be appointed as JB's administrator, subject to our being satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that CB will act in JB's best interests and is otherwise suitable to act as administrator.[34]
[34] Sections 68(1)(a)-(d) of the GA Act.
Concerns had been raised at the hearing before the Member, by JB's trust manager at the Public Trustee, about CB's suitability to be JB's administrator. The Public Trustee provided a summary of the communications by JB, CB and others to the Public Trustee, called a 'Timeline of Events and Concerns', with the Public Trustee's report of 15 March 2023. This is, relevantly, reproduced at [62] of the Member's published decision.[35] In addition, the trust manager gave evidence about her concerns at the hearing on 17 September 2024 before the Member.
[35] JCB [2025] WASAT 1 at [62].
It is to be noted that neither JB nor CB attended the hearing before the Member, and so the Member did not get the opportunity to question CB on these matters. The Member fixed a relatively short period for review, to 13 July 2025, being one month after the scheduled SACAT review period expired on 13 June 2025. One reason for this was to allow CB the opportunity to respond to the Public Trustee's concerns.[36]
[36] JCB [2025] WASAT 1 at [251] to [253].
In addition, JB's support coordinator, AM, said in his report dated 31 January 2025 that he has known JB for four months and observed that JB's relationship with CB was unpredictable and would fluctuate. AM said that, when they disagree, it is often about money and that CB tends to depend on JB for financial support.[37] AM gave no details, in the report, of any instance in which such alleged dependence was observed.
[37] Service Provider report of AM dated 31 January 2025, page 2.
We raised the allegations with CB. She vehemently denied that she had attempted to obtain any benefit for herself from JB's money from the Public Trustee, or that she had attempted to have JB's pension paid into an account CB controlled. CB said that JB did not pay anything for her, and that she supported herself on Centrelink payments and a small carer's allowance for JB. She said that JB had not bought her, or her family, anything and that CB had paid for everything in her home. CB said that she had previously been employed and was intending to look for further employment in the future. It appeared from her evidence that CB had disagreed with JB about money, but that this concerned JB wishing to give other people money that they had asked her for. CB gave evidence that she 'shut down' the requests from others for JB to provide them with her money.
In relation to the allegations that JB had attempted to have the Public Trustee buy CB a car, CB said that her mother had asked the Public Trustee for a car, but that CB told her not to ask the Public Trustee for 'ridiculous things'. She said, currently, she does not hold a licence to drive, and accordingly, even if JB asked her to buy a car, she would not do so. We note that there was evidence before the Member that JB was disqualified from driving.
CB said of her relationship with her mother that she was the only one JB listened to and could get through to her. CB said they had a good bond and that CB knew JB very well. She said that she really does care for her mother. She said that she would do what she needed to do to protect her mother. However, CB accepted that JB needed someone to manage the money and said that she knew how to say 'no' to JB.
CB recognised that JB may be angry with her if CB was the administrator of JB's estate and did not spend it on what JB wanted. She said, in effect, that she felt that her acting as the administrator for her mother was the right thing to do, while recognising that task would be difficult. She said, in effect, that if managing the funds became too difficult, she would relinquish responsibility to the Public Trustee in South Australia.
CB said that one point of conflict in her relationship with JB was the involvement of the Public Trustee, and, in effect, JB seemed to hold CB responsible for the Public Trustee continuing to act as administrator.
CB said that the Public Trustee was too far away, in Western Australia, and that CB was the person looking after JB on a regular basis. CB said that JB does not like living on her own and had some trouble with her neighbours, which reflects other information before us. CB says that JB spends about three days a week at the home where CB lives with her children.
When asked what she would do with the money if she had control over it, CB said that she would probably lock the money up into a 12 month fixed account, to see how JB goes in that time. She said that JB needed counselling and to get her head right before any money was spent, although there were items, such as dentistry and health insurance, that JB needed now. CB said that she had a plan to seek financial advice if she needed help in determining what to do with the money in the future.
CB spoke of the obligations that she has, under the SACAT Orders, to file accounts, and appeared to understand those obligations.
We found CB to be a convincing witness. CB's responses to questions were frank. Her interactions with her mother that we heard during the hearing were calm and firm, and she was able to successfully calm JB down from a heightened state sufficiently that JB consented to speak to us. We accept CB's evidence that she cares for JB and knows how to deal with her, and that JB listens to her. More importantly, we accept CB's evidence that she would be able to say 'no' to her mother, and that she would do so when making decisions about expenditure from JB's estate if CB did not consider the expenditure was in JB's best interests. It was apparent that CB would make such decisions in consultation with JB, as is appropriate.
The concern raised by the Public Trustee at the hearing before the Member in September 2024 was, essentially, that CB may use JB's money for CB's own benefit if she was given control of the money currently held by the Public Trustee.
The evidence to which the Public Trustee referred was relatively dated, referring to late 2022. There was also no evidence of anyone with direct knowledge of the specific incidents referred to, the evidence being second or third hand. Other than the claims about the attempt to obtain money to buy a car, the amounts referred to by the Public Trustee involved two separate occasions and appear to be minor, although no specific amounts were identified. In addition, the evidence was that the requests for money to buy a car for CB were made by JB, not CB. As we have said, AM's report gave no details of any instance to support his opinion that CB looked to JB for financial support.
As we have said, we found CB a convincing witness. We largely accept her evidence and as a result, are satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that CB was not involved in JB's request that the Public Trustee provide money for a car for CB. Whether or not, in 2022, CB submitted accounts to the Public Trustee for reimbursement of JB's expenses that included two items of small value that appear to be for children rather than JB, we are satisfied that CB understands her obligations, if she is appointed administrator, to ensure that JB's money is spent for JB's benefit, and to meet her needs, and for no other person. Indeed, CB appeared to us to have a sensible attitude about what to do with the money.
The evidence before us, including JB's demeanour during the hearing, raises a concern that appointing CB as JB's administrator will damage JB's relationship with CB. That relationship appears to be the most significant and supportive in JB's life. However, we are satisfied that CB is aware of that risk and is likely to be able to manage it, and that, if she cannot, CB will take steps to be relieved as administrator.
We are also satisfied that JB is very strongly against the Public Trustee being her administrator. It is apparently causing JB significant distress to have what she perceives to be a government entity having control over her in this way. Given what we know about JB's history, that is understandable. We are also satisfied that, if JB cannot have control of her money herself, her wish is for CB to be appointed as administrator.
CB frankly admitted to a minor record as a juvenile, which in our view does not disqualify her from appointment as an administrator. Neither, in our view, does her receipt of a modest carer's allowance create a conflict which would prevent her appointment.
We are satisfied, on CB's evidence, that CB understands her obligations if appointed as an administrator, and that she can meet those obligations.
CB has been appointed administrator of JB's estate by the SACAT as we have said. The SACAT decision does not state its reasons for appointing CB, or expressly state that CB was suitable for appointment. However, we note that the legislation required the SACAT to be satisfied that CB was suitable to act as administrator.[38] Whilst we do not consider we are bound by the SACAT Orders, we consider that appointment provides some support for a finding that CB is a suitable person to be appointed, albeit limited in the absence of reasons.

Conclusion on suitability

[38] Section 35(2)(c) of the South Australian Act.

Ultimately, for the reasons set out above, we are satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that CB will act in JB's best interests and that she is a suitable person to act as JB's administrator.
Accordingly, we are satisfied that CB should be appointed as administrator of JB's estate in Western Australia.

Period of the order

The only power we have, under s 67(1) of the GA Act, is to make an order under s 64(1) of the GA Act, which, in turn, empowers us to appoint an administrator of JB's estate in Western Australia.

We are empowered under s 74(1) of the GA Act to make directions concerning property, on the application of an administrator. In this case, the Public Trustee's position was that it should continue to be appointed as administrator, and it has not asked us for a direction to pay the money held by it for JB to CB pursuant to the SACAT Orders.
Our appointment of CB as administrator will result in some duplication with the SACAT Orders, in that CB will have administrative obligations under s 80 of the GA Act and reg 3 and reg 4 of the Guardianship and Administration Regulations 2005 (WA), which are similar to the obligations imposed on CB under the SACAT Orders. We do not have power to exempt CB from those requirements, although the Public Trustee may do so.[39] It may be that the Public Trustee would grant an exemption, given the duplication with the SACAT Orders.
[39] Section 80(1) of the GA Act.
In any event, we will make an order that the administration order be reviewed in five years. If any issues arise in the meantime in relation to the matters referred to in [87], it will be possible for CB to make an application to review the administration order under s 86 of the GA Act. If, at that stage, JB continues to live in South Australia and the money currently held on trust for JB, which comprises all of JB's estate in Western Australia, has been paid to an account in South Australia, this Tribunal will have no further power to make orders in relation to JB under s 64(1) of the GA Act, and the administration order would, necessarily, be revoked.

Orders

We make the following declarations and orders:
1.The requirement for service of the notice on the represented person, [JB], is dispensed with pursuant to s 67(2) of the Guardianship and Administration Act1990 (WA).

Administration
2.The represented person, [JB], is declared to be:
(a)unable, by reason of a mental disability, to make reasonable judgments in respect of matters relating to part of her estate; and
(b)in need of an administrator of her estate.

3.The administration order made on 2 January 2025 is revoked.
4.[CB] of [address supplied] is appointed limited administrator with all the powers and duties conferred by the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) on a plenary administrator in respect of the funds held by the Public Trustee in trust for the represented person being $94,308.67 as at 6 May 2025.
5.The administration order is to be reviewed by 15 May 2030.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
FB
Associate to the Deputy President Judge Vernon
15 MAY 2025