Jason Deeney Christopher Hughes Richard Park Denis Seiffert v Patrick Projects Pty Ltd
[2018] FWCFB 86
•18 JANUARY 2018
| [2018] FWCFB 86 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.604—Appeal of decision
Jason Deeney
Christopher Hughes
Richard Park
Denis Seiffert
v
Patrick Projects Pty Ltd
(C2017/6399)
DEPUTY PRESIDENT GOOLEY | MELBOURNE, 18 JANUARY 2018 |
Appeal against decision [2017] FWC 5613 of Deputy President Bull at Perth on 30 October 2017 in matter number U2014/982, U2014/983, U2014/1008 and U2014/1059.
[1] Mr Jason Deeney, Mr Christopher Hughes, Mr Richard Park and Mr Denis Seiffert allege the termination of their employment by Patrick Projects Pty Ltd was unfair.
[2] The applications were listed for hearing on 23 October 2017 and on that occasion the Appellants made an application that Deputy President Bull should refrain from hearing the applications based on a reasonable apprehension of bias. The Deputy President advised the parties at the conclusion of the hearing that he would not recuse himself and on 30 October 2017 he published his reasons. 1 The Appellants have appealed that decision.
Procedural matters
[3] The Full Bench determined to list this matter at the same time as the appeal 2 filed by the Appellants in relation to the decision3 of Deputy President Bull to reject an application to revoke permission for Patrick Projects to be represented by a lawyer. Directions were issued for the filing of material in relation to this appeal. The Appellants sought a variation of the directions and an adjournment of the both appeals. That application was rejected by the Full Bench though the directions were varied to provide the Appellants with additional time to file material. The Appellants also made an application to the President for the issuing of directions under s.582 of the Act. No directions were issued by the President to the Full Bench.
[4] The Full Bench declined to adjourn the proceedings because it considered that the matters should not be further delayed and we did not consider that the Appellants would be prejudiced by the short timetable. The matter was listed only for permission to appeal. The Appellants had filed detailed submissions in support of the appeal and permission to appeal with the notice of appeal. Some of that material overlapped matters relied upon by the Appellants in the first appeal and we considered that it was appropriate to deal with the matters at the same time albeit in separate hearings.
[5] We granted permission for Patrick Projects to be represented by a lawyer in this appeal and published a separate decision setting out our reasons. 4
Permission to appeal
[6] An appeal under s.604 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the FW Act) is an appeal by way of rehearing and the Commission’s powers on appeal are only exercisable if there is error on the part of the primary decision maker. 5 There is no right to appeal and an appeal may only be made with the permission of the Commission.
[7] This appeal is one to which s.400 of the FW Act applies. Section 400 provides:
(1) Despite subsection 604(2), the FWC must not grant permission to appeal from a decision made by the FWC under this Part unless the FWC considers that it is in the public interest to do so.
(2) Despite subsection 604(1), an appeal from a decision made by the FWC in relation to a matter arising under this Part can only, to the extent that it is an appeal on a question of fact, be made on the ground that the decision involved a significant error of fact.
[8] In Coal & Allied Mining Services Pty Ltd v Lawler and others, the Federal Court characterised the test under s.400 as ‘stringent’. 6
[9] The task of assessing whether the public interest test is met is a discretionary one involving a broad value judgment. 7 In GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd v Makin a Full Bench of the Commission identified some of the considerations that may attract the public interest:
“... the public interest might be attracted where a matter raises issues of importance and general application, or where there is a diversity of decisions at first instance so that guidance from an appellate court is required, or where the decision at first instance manifests an injustice, or the result is counter intuitive, or that the legal principles applied appear disharmonious when compared with other recent decisions dealing with similar matters.” 8
[10] Alternately, other grounds on which permission to appeal may be granted include the decision being attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration and that substantial injustice may result if permission is refused. 9
[11] It is not clear if s.400 applies to a decision of a member to refuse to recuse him or herself. However we will take the approach that s.400(1) applies to this appeal but also take the step of setting out the conclusion we would reach if s.400(1) does not apply.
[12] It will rarely be appropriate to grant permission to appeal unless an arguable case of appealable error is demonstrated. This is so because an appeal cannot succeed in the absence of appealable error. 10 However, the fact that a member of the Commission at first instance made an error is not necessarily a sufficient basis for the grant of permission to appeal.11
[13] The appeal here is brought against an interlocutory decision. Courts and tribunals have generally discouraged appeals against interlocutory decisions, and it will not commonly be the case that permission would be granted to appeal against an interlocutory decision under s.604 of the FW Act, whether or not s.400(1) applies. 12
[14] We also note the decision of the Full Bench that a decision of a member not to recuse him or herself from determining a matter was discretionary in nature and hence the principles in House v the King apply. 13
The decision at first instance
[15] These applications have a long history. The employees were dismissed in 2014. The applications had been referred to the Deputy President after the resignation of Senior Deputy President Drake. The Deputy President on 26 July 2017 sent an email to the Appellants asking if they intended proceeding with the applications. 14 On 7 August 2017 the Appellants advised the Deputy President that they wished to proceed.15 The matter was listed for telephone directions on 21 August 2017 and on 18 August 2017 the Deputy President asked the Appellants to provide their written authority that Mr Strauss was authorised to act for them.16 A telephone directions conference was held on 31 August 2017 and the representative of Patrick Projects proposed that the applications be dealt with on the papers.17 The Appellants had earlier foreshadowed their objection to Patrick Projects being represented by a lawyer. After the directions conference directions were issued and the parties filed material in support of and in opposition to the application by the Appellants that the permission granted to Patrick Projects to be represented be revoked. That matter was dealt with on the papers and a decision issued.18
[16] The Appellants relied on these events to support their application that the Deputy President recuse himself from hearing the matter on the grounds of a reasonable apprehension of bias.
[17] The Appellants alleged that the email of the 26 July 2017 indicated the Deputy President had already formed a view about the matter. 19 They further alleged that by seeking authorisation in relation to their representative and by not requiring Patrick Projects to do the same, the Deputy President did not hold Patrick Projects to the same standard that he held the Appellants.20 They further alleged that by permitting Patrick Projects to raise, at the directions hearing, the issue of whether the matter should be heard on the papers and asking for their views, the Deputy President looked like he was going to follow Patrick Projects’ path and was avoiding a hearing.21 Further, the Appellants relied on the decision of the Deputy President in relation to the revocation of permission to appear as being evidence of his bias.22
[18] The Deputy President identified the principles to be applied when determining whether to stand aside from hearing the matter. 23
[19] The Deputy President noted the long history of the matter and noted that it was incumbent on the Commission to ascertain if the applicants wished to continue with the matter. 24 He then explained the circumstances that led him to seek the written authorisation from the applicants that Mr Strauss was their representative. He noted that there was no written record of any such authorisation.25 He held that nothing in this conduct could cause a reasonable apprehension of bias to arise in the mind of a fair minded lay observer.26
[20] He further rejected the submission that the fact that Patrick Projects’ representatives suggested that the matter be determined on the papers could lead to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The suggestion was not adopted and the matter was listed for hearing. 27
[21] The Deputy President acknowledged that the applicants were appealing his decision not to revoke permission for Patrick Projects to be represented by lawyers. He noted that dissatisfaction, without more, is not sufficient to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias. 28
[22] The Deputy President noted that he had expressed no views about the merits of the application. He held that there were no statements made or actions taken by him that would suggest any sense of prejudgement or predisposition. He therefore rejected the application.
Permission to appeal
[23] Before dealing with the grounds relied upon by the Appellants for permission to appeal we note, that to the extent that the Appellants in this appeal criticise the decision of the Deputy President to not revoke permission for Patrick Projects to be represented by a lawyer, that decision was the subject to an earlier appeal and decision. We note that the Appellants’ grounds of appeal in this matter seek to re-agitate the matters dealt with in the other appeal. We do not consider this to be appropriate. The decision under appeal here is the decision of the Deputy President to not recuse himself from further hearing of the matter.
Ground 1. 29
[24] The Appellants submitted that it was in the public interest to grant permission to appeal because the Full Bench has previously granted permission to appeal in a different earlier proceeding. 30 The Appellants then referred to the earlier decision of the Deputy President in which he noted the complexity of the applications before him. It is not clear how the Appellants suggest that either of these decisions is relevant to the decision under appeal. It is difficult to see how the mere fact that an earlier Full Bench dealing with an appeal in relation to permission for Patrick Projects to be represented by a lawyer is in any way relevant to the matter before this Full Bench. That issue was addressed in our earlier appeal decision. Permission to appeal that decision was refused. We were not taken to any decisions where permission to appeal had been granted in cases involving applications for recusal and in any event each case is to be determined on its own facts.
Ground 2. 31
[25] The Appellants submitted that there was a diversity of decisions at first instance and relied upon an earlier decision of the Full Bench. 32 The Appellants submitted that the decision of the Deputy President to grant permission for Patrick Projects to be represented by a lawyer was a significant error of fact and is evidence of bias. The decision of the Deputy President to refuse to revoke permission for Patrick Projects to be represented by a lawyer was itself subject to appeal. The Full Bench determined not to grant permission to appeal.33 We addressed the decision relied upon by the Appellants at [43] of that appeal decision. As we did not find the Deputy President’s earlier decision was disharmonious with other decisions, we are not satisfied that there is an arguable case that the decision of the Deputy President itself is evidence that would cause a fair minded lay observer to reasonably apprehend that the Deputy President might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the proceedings. We were not taken to any other cases where members had refused to recuse themselves to support the proposition that the Deputy President’s decision that is before us is disharmonious with other decisions.
Ground 3. 34
[26] The Appellants submitted that the issue is of importance and general application. Here the Appellants focused predominately on the decision of the Deputy President not to revoke permission to Patrick Projects to be represented by a lawyer. The Appellants submitted that this evidenced that the Deputy President had a predetermined view to grant permission. That submission misrepresents the matters to be determined by the Deputy President who as we noted in our early decision was not deciding whether to grant permission but whether to revoke permission. Again this issue was addressed in the earlier appeal. We are not satisfied that the Appellants have established that there is an arguable case that the matter currently before us is of importance and general application. The law in relation to bias is well established and is determined by the circumstances of each particular case.
Ground 4. 35
[27] The Appellants submitted that the decision at first instance manifests an injustice. Again the submissions address this in the context of the decision to not revoke permission for Patrick Projects to be represented. That decision is not the subject of this appeal. To the extent the Appellants rely on their dissatisfaction with that decision, to argue that there is a public interest in this appeal, it must be rejected. The appeal against that decision was dismissed.
[28] The Appellants submitted that the Deputy President referred to legal cases in his decision and submitted that he referred to no cases that supported their submissions. They submitted that it was unfair to expect them to understand or respond to the legal arguments in relation to the cases cited and this denied them a fair hearing.
[29] The legal cases referred to neither supported nor denied the Appellants’ submissions. The Deputy President set out in some detail the authorities relevant to his decision. There is no arguable case of bias in doing so.
[30] It was submitted that the Appellants have no ability to counter these legal references and were denied a fair hearing. The Appellants were represented by Mr Strauss before the Deputy President. He has represented the Appellants in these matters and related matters. In making their application that the Deputy President recuse himself, it was incumbent on the Appellants to set out the basis on which they submitted that the Deputy President’s conduct could cause a fair minded lay observer to reasonably apprehend that the Deputy President might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the proceedings. This required them to give consideration to the law and the facts. That they did not understand the case law does not mean that there is an arguable case that the decision manifests an injustice.
Ground 5. 36
[31] The Appellants submitted that the result is counter intuitive. Again this submission addresses the decision of the Deputy President not to revoke permission for Patrick Projects to be represented. This ground was relied upon in the earlier appeal and rejected. The Appellants do not make any submission as to how this supports their submission that the Deputy President should recuse himself.
Ground 6. 37
[32] The Appellants submitted that the legal principles applied appear disharmonious when compared with other recent decisions dealing with similar matters. Again this submission addresses the decision of the Deputy President not to revoke permission for Patrick Projects to be represented. This ground was relied upon in the early appeal and rejected.
[33] It then submitted that “a combination of actual bias and a strong apprehension of bias in the Commission is of sufficient public interest for the Full Bench to review the decision.” It is not clear from this submission if the Appellants are referring to the decision of the Deputy President to not revoke permission for Patrick Projects to be represented. If this is the submission, then this was dealt with in our earlier appeal decision. If it is a reference to the decision of the Deputy President not to recuse himself, we are not satisfied that there is an arguable case that the legal principles applied in the decision of the Deputy President not to recuse himself are disharmonious when compared with other recent decisions dealing with similar matters.
Ground 7. 38
[34] The Appellants submitted that the decision failed to consider s.381 (objects of Part 3-2); s.397 (matters involving contested facts); s.398 (conferences); s.399 (hearings); s.578 (matters the FWC must take into account in performing functions etc.); s.590 (powers of the FWC to inform itself); s.591 (FWC not bound by the rules of evidence); the Fair Hearings Practice Note and failed to rigorously apply the criteria in s.596 (representation by lawyers and paid agents.)
[35] Again this submission addresses the decision of the Deputy President not to revoke permission for Patrick Projects to be represented. This ground was relied upon in the earlier appeal and rejected, though we note the Appellants have added additional sections of the Act other than those relied upon in the earlier appeal which we address below.
[36] The Appellants submitted that Deputy President Bull attempted to breach s.397 in proposing that the matter be determined on the papers. We address that submission at [49].
[37] The Appellants submitted that in conducting the telephone hearing the Deputy President failed to have regard to the views of the parties in accordance with s.398 and s.399. Even if we accepted that the Deputy President did not have regard to the views of the parties as to whether the telephone mention should be conducted by way of hearing or conference, the Appellants have not established an arguable case that this conduct would cause a fair minded lay observer to reasonably apprehend that the Deputy President might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the proceedings. The Appellants have not established an arguable case that if he had not had regard to the views of the parties then any different outcome would have occurred namely that directions would have been issued for the future conduct of the matter.
[38] The Appellants submitted that the Deputy President did not have regard to the Fair Hearing Practice Note. The Fair Hearing Practice Note is a guide to parties and sets out in plain English the Commission’s and the parties’ obligations. However, as it makes clear, the practice note is not a code. The obligations set out in the practice note derive from the Act and the common law and do not impose a separate set of requirements. In any event we are not satisfied that the Appellants have established an arguable case that the Deputy President did not, in dealing with the application to recuse himself, apply the principles set on the practice note. The parties were provided with an opportunity to put their case and the mere fact that the Deputy President interrupted the Appellants does not establish an arguable case that they were denied a fair hearing.
Ground 8. 39
[39] It is not clear what this submission is addressing. The Appellants complain generally about the Commission and the conduct of this matter over a significant period of time. It is a complaint about the Commission allowing the involvement of lawyers which it is said disadvantages non-legally trained participants. Whatever the Appellants’ views about this, it does not support a submission that it is in the public interest to give permission to appeal. We are not in this decision considering the issue of whether permission to be represented by lawyers should be granted.
[40] The Appellants submitted that the granting of permission for Patrick Projects to be represented was evidence of bias. To the extent that they rely on this to support this appeal, the mere fact that a party disagrees with a decision, even strongly, does not mean that the decision maker is biased or would cause a fair minded lay observer to reasonably apprehend that the Deputy President might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the proceedings. We are not satisfied that this submission supports the granting of permission to appeal.
Ground 9. 40
[41] The Appellants submitted that members of the public should feel confident in having matters heard by the Commission without:
(1) having to go up against international law firms;
(2) having to understand legal arguments and precedents;
(3) having to defend themselves against motivated lawyers;
(4) having to feel threatened by the Commission itself;
(5) feeling they will not get an equal hearing.
[42] To the extent that this ground addresses the decision of the Deputy President to not revoke permission for Patrick Projects to be represented, we have addressed that in our earlier appeal decision. To the extent that the Appellants rely on this submission in this appeal, we note that the first three points raised do not address the issue of bias. In relation to the allegation of being threatened by the Commission, no examples of any threats to the Appellants were given. Further we are not satisfied that there is an arguable case that the decision of the Deputy President not to recuse himself could cause members of the public to lose confidence in the Commission.
Ground 10. 41
[43] The Appellants submitted that the decision to grant permission calls into question the ethics of the Commission and its members. To the extent that this ground addresses the decision of the Deputy President to not revoke permission for Patrick Projects to be represented we have addressed that in our earlier decision. To the extent it is relied upon in this appeal the Appellants have not made out an arguable case that the decision of the Deputy President not to recuse himself calls into question his ethics or other members of the Commission’s ethics or the ethics of the Commission itself.
Grounds of appeal
[44] In relation to the conduct relied upon to support the contention that Deputy President Bull should recuse himself, the Appellants have not made out an arguable case of error on the part of the Deputy President.
[45] In relation to the complaint about the email of 26 July 2017, the Appellants have not made out an arguable case that this email implied that the applications were without merit. The Deputy President noted the history of the matter and asked the Appellants if they wished to continue. 42 The Appellants complained that Patrick Projects was not asked if they intended to continue to defend the matter. However that is unsurprising. Only the Appellants could determine if the matter would proceed. Even had Patrick Projects decided not to defend the matter the Appellants would still be required to establish to the Commission’s satisfaction that the terminations were unfair. We are not satisfied that the Appellants have made out an arguable case that this conduct would cause a fair minded lay observer to reasonably apprehend that the Deputy President might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the proceedings.
[46] In relation to the complaint that the Appellants were asked to provide written notice that Mr Strauss 43 was authorised to represent them, we note that when the matters were originally lodged Mr Strauss was one of the applicants. By the time the matters came before the Deputy President, Mr Strauss’ application had been heard and determined. It is therefore not surprising the Deputy President sought confirmation that the remaining four applicants still wished to be represented by Mr Strauss. This was not an issue about whether Mr Strauss required permission to represent the four remaining applicants rather whether they authorised his representation. The Appellants submitted that the Commission did not have the power to seek this information from them. We do not agree. Section 590 of the FW Act provides the Commission with such a power. It is entirely appropriate for Commission members to ensure that a person purporting to represent a party before the Commission is properly authorised. The Appellants complain that Patrick Projects was not asked to confirm its representation. However a lawyer who ceases to represent a party is required by Rule 11.3 of the Fair Work Commission Rules 2013 to lodge a notice that they cease to act. In the absence of such a form, there was no need for the Deputy President to make a similar inquiry of Patrick Projects. We are not satisfied that there is an arguable case that this request would cause a fair minded lay observer to reasonably apprehend that the Deputy President might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the proceedings.
[47] It was submitted that the failure of the Deputy President to not require Patrick Projects to make an application under s.596(2) was evidence of bias. We have dealt with this matter in our earlier decision. We are not satisfied that there is an arguable case that the approach taken by the Deputy President would cause a fair minded lay observer to reasonably apprehend that the Deputy President might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the proceedings.
[48] The Appellants complained that they were only given a short period of time to provide the authorisation. The Appellants further complained that the Deputy President did not reply to their complaint other than to extend the time for the authorisation to be lodged. It was submitted that by doing so he was bullying, ignorant and biased. We are not satisfied that there is an arguable case that the failure to respond to the email in detail would cause a fair minded lay observer to reasonably apprehend that the Deputy President might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the proceedings. The Deputy President was not required to enter into discussions with parties about his reasons in relation to this procedural decision. In any event he granted the Appellants further time to lodge the authorisations and they did lodge them. We are not satisfied that the Appellants have made out an arguable case that this conduct would cause a fair minded lay observer to reasonably apprehend that the Deputy President might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the proceedings.
[49] The Appellants complained the Patrick Projects’ lawyers proposed at the telephone mention on 18 August 2017 that the applications be determined on the papers. 44 The Appellants complained that they were asked to respond. We note that the matter was subsequently listed for a hearing and as such the proposal made by Patrick Projects was not acceded to. A decision whether to determine a matter on the papers is a procedural matter. While we accept that the Appellants did not have any notice of this proposal, we are not satisfied that the Appellants have established an arguable case that by merely hearing the proposal and asking the Appellants their views would cause a fair minded lay observer to reasonably apprehend that the Deputy President might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the proceedings.
[50] The Appellants further complain about the conduct of the Deputy President at the hearing where the Appellants applied for the Deputy President to recuse himself. 45 It was alleged that the Deputy President refused “to calmly and quietly listen to the grounds and interrupted and did not allow any reference to his earlier decision to refuse to revoke permission for Patrick Projects to be represented by a lawyer.”
[51] The Appellants did not, in their appeal book, provide a copy of the transcript of the proceeding before the Deputy President. We have had the opportunity to listen to the audio of the hearing. It is clear from that audio that the Deputy President did not allow the Appellants to make submissions as to why his decision to revoke permission for Patrick Projects to be represented by a lawyer was wrong as this was a matter the Appellants could take up in their appeal. The Deputy President addressed this issue in his decision. 46 We are not satisfied that the Appellants have made out an arguable case that this conduct would cause a fair minded lay observer to reasonably apprehend that the Deputy President might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the proceedings.
[52] We are therefore not satisfied that the Appellants have established an arguable case that the conduct of the Deputy President either collectively or individually would cause a fair minded lay observer to reasonably apprehend that the Deputy President might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the proceedings.
Conclusion
[53] We are not persuaded that any of the grounds relied upon by the Appellants has established either in their own right, or when considered in combination, that permission to appeal should be granted. We have also considered whether the appeal raises other factors beyond those stated above that could be said to enliven the public interest and have concluded that there are not any. We are not satisfied that the Appellants have established that the decision involved a significant error of fact. However even if s.400(1) does not apply to this appeal, we would still refuse permission to appeal for the reasons we have stated as no public interest or other grounds have been made out which would justify the grant of permission to appeal.
[54] It follows that it is not in the public interest to grant permission to appeal. Permission is denied and the appeal is dismissed. An order 47 to that effect will issue with this decision.
DEPUTY PRESIDENT
Appearances:
R. Park for the Appellants.
M. Stutley and J. Doecke for the Respondent.
Hearing details:
2017.
Melbourne and Perth, by video link:
November 29.
1 Deeney and ors v Patrick Projects Pty Ltd[2017] FWC 5613
2 C2017/6204
3 Deeney and ors v Patrick Projects Pty Ltd[2017] FWC 5429
4 [2017] FWCFB 6449
5 This is so because on appeal the Commission has power to receive further evidence, pursuant to s607(2); see Coal and Allied v AIRC (2000) 203 CLR 194 at [17] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Hayne JJ
6 (2011) 192 FCR 78 at [43] per Buchanan J (with whose judgment Marshall and Cowdroy JJ agreed)
7 O’Sullivan v Farrer (1989) 168 CLR 210 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson,Toohey and Gaudron JJ; applied in Hogan v Hinch (2011) 85 ALJR 398 at [69] per Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ; Coal & Allied Mining Services Pty Ltd v Lawler and others (2011) 192 FCR 78 at [44] -[46]
8 [2010] FWAFB 5343, 197 IR 266 at [27]
9 Esso Australia Pty Ltd v AMWU; CEPU; AWU[2015] FWCFB 210,
10 Wan v AIRC (2001) 116 FCR 481 at [30]
11 GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd v Makin[2010] FWAFB 5343 at [26]-[27], 197 IR 266; Lawrence v Coal & Allied Mining Services Pty Ltd t/as Mt Thorley Operations/Warkworth[2010] FWAFB 10089 at [28], 202 IR 388, affirmed on judicial review in Coal & Allied Mining Services Pty Ltd v Lawler (2011) 192 FCR 78; NSW Bar Association v Brett McAuliffe; Commonwealth of Australia represented by the Australian Taxation Office [2014] FWCFB 1663 at [28]
12 Hutton v Sykes Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FWCFB 3384 at [3] and the decisions cited there also see Heap, in the matter of an Application for Writs of Prohibition, Certiorari and Mandamus against the Australian Industrial Relations Commission [2003] FCAFC 36 at [34]
13 Geoffery Hunter v Anthony Costello Automotive[2017] FWCFB 5839
14 [2017] FWC 5613 at [3]
15 Ibid at [4]
16 Ibid at [6]
17 Ibid at [8]
18 [2017] FWC 5429
19 [2017] FWC 5613 at [4]
20 Ibid at [7]
21 Ibid at [8]
22 Ibid at [9]
23 Ibid at [16]-[23]
24 Ibid at [24]-[25]
25 Ibid at [26]
26 Ibid at [27]
27 Ibid at [28]
28 Ibid at [29]
29 AB page 34
30 [2015] FWCFB 2679
31 AB page 34
32 [2015] FWCFB 2679
33 [2017] FWCFB 6515
34 AB page 35
35 AB pages 35-37
36 AB pages 37-38
37 AB page 37
38 AB page 39
39 AB pages 39-40
40 AB page 41
41 AB page 41
42 AB pages 4-6, paragraphs [22]-[36]
43 AB pages 7-13, paragraphs [37]-[70]
44 AB pages 15-16, paragraphs [73]-[82]
45 AB page 18, paragraphs [90]-[96]
46 [2017] FWC 5613 at [29]
47 PR599283
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
<PR599282>
2
15
0