Jarrad v Melbourne and Metropolitan Tramways Board

CATCIJWORDS

Industrial law - breach of award -

stand down'' of employees -

work available not given

to employees but kept for later

resumption of work

- not thereby unable to usefully employ" -

"usefully" not synonym for "gainfully"

- employer failing to

exercise sufficient diligence

In deciding to stand down

employees - penalty imposed - Conciliation and Arbitration

Act	1904 S . 119

Clifford Jarrad v. Melbourne and Metropolitan

Tramavs Boerd

Coram :	Keely J.
Place:	Melbourne
Date:	4 August 1978

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTR4LIA

) 1

INDUSTRIAL DIVISION

)	V. No. 16 of 1978

)

VICTORIA

DISTRICT

EGISTRY

IN THE MATTER o f the Conciliation and Arbltration Act 1904

CLIFFORD JARRAD

Claimant

- and -

MELBOURNE AND METROPOLITAN

TRAMWAYS BOA2D

espondent

JUDGE MAKING ORDER:

KEELY, J.

DATE OF ORDER:

4 August 1978

WHERE MADE:

Melbourne

ORDER OF THE COURT:

The Court determines that the respondent on or

about

4 October 1977 committed

a breach of the Vehlcle Industry

(Roping In No. 1) Award 1974 in that it failed to pay to

the persons whose names appear in the summons herein (as

amended) other than James John krphy the amount of wage

appropriate under the said Award to which the said persons

were entitled in respect

of 4 October 1977.

2. The Court imposes upon the respondent a penalty of Five

hundred dollars ($500.00) in respect of the said breach

of the Award.

3. The Court orders thaL the whole of the penalty be paid to

the Vehicle Builders Employees' Federation

f Australia.

- 2 -

4 . The Court orders that the respondent shall pay to each of

the employees referred to

in paragraph 1 hereof in respect

of whom the said breach has been found,

the amount of the

underpayment resulting from the

said breach of the Award.

Liberty to

apply.

r'KOM lKANSLRIr,I

ORAL

J U U G M t N ' I

,	IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA	)
) V. No. 16 of 1978
INDUSTRIAL DIVISION	)

IN THE MATTER of the Conciliatlon

and Arbitration Act

1904

B E T W E E N :

CLIFFORD JARRAD	Claimant
AND
THE MELBOURNE ASD NETR@POLITAN
TRAMWAYS BOARD	Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGXENT

4 AUGUST 1978

KEELY, J.

This is an application under s.119

of the Conciliztion

and Arbitration Act 1904, (the Act) for the imposition of

a penalty in respect

of an alleged breach of the Vehicle

Industry (Roping-In No. 1) Award 1974.

The breach alleged.

as amended without obJection at the hraring, is that of failing

to pay to certain members

of the Vehicle Builders Employees'

Federation of Australia (the FederaLion) wages

in respect of

the whole or any part

of 4 October 1977.

At the commencement of the hearing the summons

was

amended by consent to delete the name Max Flynn from the llst

of employees set out in the summons. The summons as amended

contained the names

of 14 employees of whom one was a crmc

driver, another was a crane driver who also

had other duties

and the remaining 12 were employed as tram truck assemblers.

- 2 -

Counsel for the claimant and the respondent

commendably reached agreement

on certain facts and

so shortened

the length of the hearing.

Those agreed facts, as amended

during the hearing

are as follows:

I t (l) That the V.B.E.F. is

an organisation wlthin the

meaning of Section 119 of	the Concillation and
Arbitratlon Act.

(2) That tYLs Melbourne and MetroDolitan

Trmwavs Board

(M.M.T.B.) is a body corporare capable of sulng and being sued by virtue of Sectior; 4(?) of the Melbourne and Metropolitan Tramways Act 1956 (Vic.) No. 6311.

That on 3rd and 4th October, 1977 the persons named in the summons out cf which these proceedings arise (the relevant employees)

were employed by the

P1.M.T.B. pursuant to an

award of the Australian Conclliation end

Arbitratlon Commission entitled

The Vehlcle

Industry (Roping-In No. 1) Award 1974 (No. 3995)

as varied.

That on 3rd October. 1977 thc F.I.M.T.R. Kotified

each and every

one of the relevant

evploS-ecs that,

as from 4.15 p.m. on 3rd Octsber, 1 9 7 7 , he would

be stood down. That the eLfect of such notice

was the:

each of ths relevant cmplcyees

has

notified that wazes would be deducted

durm;:

the period of the stand dobn 2nd tb.at stand down

was for an indefinite perlod.

That ncne of the relevant c ; ? p l o y e ~ ~ h a s been paid wages by the N.M.T.B. in res?cLL o i 4th October, 1977.

The restrictions on the use of power supplied

by the State Electricity

Commission of Victoria

were as advertised in the Melbourne daily press on Tuesday 27th September, 1977, and continued in force without alteration until Saturday 8th October, 1977 and were applicable to the M.M.T.B.

In respect of the use of such power for

commercial and industrial purposes the

N.M.T.B.

had no exemption from the restrlctlons. In

respect of the

use for tractlon the

M.M.T.B. was

permitted to, and did, use

half of its normal

consumption to provide essential publ~c

transport.

All the restrictions were lifted effectively

irom midnight on 26th October, 1977.

- 3 -

( 7 )

That Clifford Jarrad is

an officer of the

V.B.E.F.

who is authorised under the rules of

the V.B.E.F. to sue on behalf of the

V.B.E.F.

(8)

That as at 3rd and 4th October, 1977 each and

every one of the relevant employees was

member of the V.B.E.F."

The Vehicle Industry (Roping-In No. 1) Award 1974,

provided, in respect

o f the members named in the

summons,

that "the conditions of employment shall be those prescribed

for the Melbourne and Metropolitan Tramways Board by Part XXXV

of the Metal Trades Award	1952 as varied from time	to time"
(the award).

It was common ground that

at all material times there

were two clauses of the award which might be relevant to

the stand down.

Clause 1A(e)

of Part X x ) N provides:

I t Standing d o m of Employees.

(e)

Notwithstanding anything elsewhere contained

in this clause the employer shall

have the

right to deduct payment for any day the employee

cannot be usefully employed because of any

strlke or through any breakdown in machinery

or any stoppage

of work by any cause for which

the employer cannot reasonably

be hsld

responsible.

Clause 29(l)(a)

provides:

I 1 Emergency

Provisions.

(1)

Notwithstanding anything elsewhere contained

in this part of the

Appendis the following

provision shall apply in the State of Victoria

in the case of an employer who is subjected to

restriction or rationlng in the use of electric

energy and/or coal gas and/or the cmetgency

disconnection thereof in accordance with orders

or regulations approved by

t k appropriate lawful

authority.

- 4 -

(a)

If by reason of such restriction

or rationing

or emergency disconnection

he is unable usefully

to employ an employee for the whole or part of any day o r shift, he may deduct from the wages of that employee payment for any part of

the day or shift sucn employee cannot be

usefully employed .

. .

There is then a proviso which is not presently material.

Counsel €or the claimant and the respondent

bo h contended

that clause 29(l)(a)

overrides clause 1A(e) of Part XXXV of

the award insofar

as there is any inconsistency between the

two provisions.

However, Mr Alan Stockdale of counsel, 01-1

behalf of the respondent, submitted that clause 29(l)(a)

should be construed narrowly and that,

so construed, the

clause did not apply

to the standing

d o m of employees which

occurred on 4 October 1977	, which, in his submission, came
within clause lA(e).

The notice to the emp

loyees of the respondent's decislon

1 1

to stand d o m employees was headed Power Restrictions" ,lnd

I 1

expressly stated that the stand down

!<as because of the

prolonged power strike by SEC workers and consequent restrictions placed upon the use of electric power".

I accept the argument of

Mr Don Ryan of counsel on behalf

of the claimant, that ther,e

was no mtervening cause betxeen

the electricity restrlctions and the respondent's decision

to stand down the employees. The mere fact that the stand dobm

did not occur until some

days after the commenccment of thc

electricity restrictions does

not in any way prevent the stand

down from being, in the words of clause 29(l)(a),

by reason

. .

4 - 5 -

of ... restriction ... in the use of electric energy".

Accordingly in my

view clause 29(l)(a)

is the approprlate

clause to consider, being the clause directed specifically to the case of an employer who contends that on a particular

day certain employees could

not be usefully employed

reason of restrictions upon the use of electric energy. Perhaps in this case, the result would bs the sams if clause 1A(e) 1,xre

applied instead of clause

29(l)(a).

I turn now to consider whether on the evidence the

respondent was "unable

usefully to employ" on 4 October 1977

the employees named in the summons. W. J. Allenby, an orgaplser of the Federation, gave evidence that on the morning of Tuesdzy, 4 October 1977 at the Preston Workshops of the respondent he

saw members of the Federation who had been stood 0L-n perfor-

work. He stated that on that morning J. W. Barrett, the foreqan

of the truck shop, told him that he dld not deny that there

iizc

work available to be done by the employees concerned but

thc

work they were doing

was work that (the respondent was) goln;

to give them when they

came back t o work after the power

restrictions had been lifted".

Mr Allenby also gave evidence that

on the same day

J. D.

Scholtz, the assistant manager of the Preston Workshop said

1 1

to him similar statemezts which meant the same thing".

Mescrc Barrett and Scholtz

both gave evidence on behalf of

- b -

the respondent. The former said that he did not remember

making such a statement and the latter said that he could not

recall saying it but neither denied having made such a statement.

I accept the evidence of Mr Allenby that the statements were made

and in my view they correctly expressed the views held by Messrs Scholtz and Barrett on 4 October 1977. Further, t o the

extent to which the evidence	of Messrs Scholtz and Barrett in
this hearing is inconsistent	with those statements I accept

the statements made

on 4 October 1977 rather than their evldence

given some 10 months later.

In this connection two other passages in the evidence

Mr Scholtz are illuminating.

Ln one he said "the usual

practice (at the workshops) has always been that they have

at least a day's work available

f o r when they return" (i.e.

work after the stand

down period).

The other passage in h 1 5

evidence was in response

to a question as to what was his

view now, i.e. "looking back at the incident with hindslght".

His answer made it clear that his view is	now different. He
said:

"Looking back, I would say yes, if the same

situation arose again, I would say that would

be a view I would hold that if the work was

there it should be done. This is my own

personal opinion; it should be done and ther

the people could be brought back after the

rest of the shops resumed

when supplies of

I ,

materials and parts were available.

- / -

In view of the foregoing evidence, I do not consider It

is necessary to deal in detail

with the evldence as to the

work available to be done, nor with the evidence of the kork

performed on 4 October 1977 by employees who had

been notitied

by the respondent that they had been stood down.

However, I

shall refer briefly to

Mr Barrett's evidence on the subject

of the availability of work and its usefulnes:

Mr Aarrett gave evidence that the work

of fitting brake

gear to truck frames

was performed on 4 October 1977 by one

team of two men

who had not been stood down. He stated there

was enough of that work available to have enabled him to employ

another team of two tram truck assemblers	on that work all
day on 4 October.

Mr Barrett gave a considerable amount

o f evidence as to

certain work called "running

bolts down" whlch was in fact

performed - contrary to the stand down order given by the respondent - by several of the employeLs named in the summons.

In this operation bolts which

have been previously used but

which are in reasonable condition are put in a vice

and have

any imperfections removed by

a die. This work - which Nr Barrett

described as part of the normal work of the assemblers

- 1s

apparently done from time

to time because, as he sald, it is

II cheaper to use the run down bolts rather than

use new

ones".

In my vlew it is vork which is useful in the respondent's

I t

business even if the supply is already adequate".

It would

* . .

- 8 -

be different if there were such an over-supply that problems

of storage made the work of increasing the supply	no longer
useful. However, Mr Barrett described the supply	of the "run

down bolts" after the work of running the bolts

down had been

performed on 4 October 1977 (by those employees who had bccn

told that they

were stood down f o r the day) simply

II adequate"

although the question asked by

Mr Stockdale was whether

thc

1 1

supply was adequate, excessive or not enough". On all cf the evidence I consider that the supply of bolts already

so treated was not adequate immediately before those	employee-s
perfomed the work on 4 October 1 9 7 7 .

Mr Barrett also stated that there were

at the workshops

enough previously used bolts requiring the performance

of the

work of "Iuming the bolts down" to occupy all of the tran truck

assemblers in the pcrformancr of thet work on 4 October ia':

although there would not have been enough dies for

all of t?.?

employees to have performed that work on that day. Hoicevec,

the unavailability of sufficient dies does not advance the

respondent's case significantly because the work of runnln,

down bolts wjth the available dles was	not all allocated by
'the respondent to specific employees.	I shall refcr to thc

fact that unallocated work is work

whlch is available to

a l l employees who have been stood dow1 when dealing with thc-

Carpcnters apd Jnincrs Case laLer.

- 9 -

Mr Barrett gave

fu r the r

idence

u se fu l ' '

work

that

was

a v a i l a b l e

t o be performed

and

was

i n f a c t p e r f o r m e d

employees who had

been

stood

down - on 4 October 1 9 7 7 .

Such

work inc luded two employees named Pepe at-d Woodianisky

1 1 f i n i s h i n g

number

one

t ruck";

two

other

employees named

Sappuppo

and

Kariouz

"finishing

a number

15 truck".

a l s o

r e f e r r e d t o t h e

work

4 October 1977

two

employees

nn red

Hollingworth and Diana performing "truck

work" which "could

have

been

any

the normal work of an assembler'

and

which

"would

b e u s e f u l

work".

Further evidence

was g iven by Mr

B a r r e t t

t o b r e z k i n g

down

b rake

gea

i n to

s ing le

componen t s .

d e s c r i b e d

t h i s

work

which

was

done by one Bisogono

(who was

n o t named

i n

t h e summons b u t who

was

s tood down) as u s e f u l .

Two

o t h e r

employees

named

S e l l a n t i a n d L a s k a r a s

a l s o s t o o d d o m b u t

n o t named

i n

t h e

summons - were

bu i ld ing

brake

gear .

This

work was descr ibed by

B a r r e t t as

b e i ~ g u s e f u l i n t h e

long

term,	by wh ich he sa id	tha	t	he	wean	t	t ha t	t he ex i s t ln ;	s tock -
1 1

p i l e was

enough f o r

p o s s i b l y

q u l t e

few

weeks'

work".

Oth;.r

work

which

Barrett desc r ibed as u s e f u l as soon as t h e

r e s t r i c t i o n s were

l i f t e d was

t h a t of

two

employees named

Hebbard

and

James

- who a r e named in t h e summons.

They b o t h

gave evidence

on 4 October 1977

they

were

assembling

brake

gea r

to bcgies and

a c c e p t

t h a t e v l d e n c e i n s t e a d

of Mr

Bar re t t ' s ev idence tha t

t hey were bo th d i sman t l ing t rucks .

- 10 -

I have reached the conclusion

on all the evidence that

the respondent was

unable to usefully employ James John Murphy

I&,o

was employed solely as a crane driver although he

had previously

been employed as a tram truck assembler. As to Ales S,ne?ic

whose dutles included but

were not limited to crane driving,

I consider that on the evidence there was work

upon whlch he could

be usefully employed including some of the work he In facL performed on 4 October 1977 when he attended the workshop

despite the notification that

he had been stood dov-n.

Each of the remaining 1 2 employees named in

the sum'rops

was a tram truck assembler at all material tines and

the

evidence in my view clearly establishes that there

>:as work

available, the performance of which

was within the tcms of

the contracts of employment of those eirp1c:;~es and !;hich X ~ S

work which would be

of use and of valuc trJ

the respsrdenL c - ~ t h e r

on the resumption of normal operations

upcn the 1;ftinS of

the power restrictions or

lcithin one monLh approuivately

thereafter. In my vlew it is not possibl~

to cor~clude thaL

I ,

the usefulness of such work 1 s	remote" as contended	by Lounscl
for the respondent.

It may be that the respondent could have deployed

it,<

employees in such a way that a1 i of the work upon !;hlch

Lh?

tram truck assemblers could be usefully Employed

or. 4 October

1977 was specifically allocated to certain employees so that as a consequence no such work remained for allocation to the remaining employees. Had that course been followed the

- 11 -

respondent would

have been entitled to stand down any employees

in respect

o f whom no work was available.

I agree with and adopt with respect the foilow~n7g passage

from the "observations'"

appearing in the Joint Judgmerit of

Mr Justice Spicer, the Chief Judge, and Mr Justice Smithers,

in the Australian Industrial

Court in the Carpenters and Jolners

Case (1371) 17

Federal Law Reports 330

at p.333:

(i) Where useful employxent is not available for

a11 the employees normally engaged

in a class

of work performed in

some aspect of production

but is available for one or more

of such employees

it cannot on that ground be said with respect

to any particular employee	that he cannot be
usefully employed.

(ii) When in the circumstances referred

to in

the last preceding sub-parasraph

some employee

or employees are engaged to perform the

availablc useful work then it can be said

with respect to the others that they

cannot

1 1

be usefully employed.

I adhere to the opinion that I expressed 1n the

Technical

Staff ( T . A . A . )

Ai$.arc! 1974 Case in a Judgment delivered 01

23 December 1977 a? follows:

1 1 In my view under the stand down provision

an ernployer 1 s not entitled to

deduct pqxent

for any day

an employee cannot bc usefully

employed' where on the day in qusstlon there

is work available for performance

by that

employee which

work the employer c-ould

as a

matter of law

ask' the employee to

perfom as

being work pursuant

to or reasonably incldental

to his contract of employxent.

In my view where such work

is a\*ailahle

to be

performed thc employer cxmot 'di-duct payment'

even thcugh:

- 1 2 -

(1)

the performance of

that

work on t h e day

i n q u e s t i o n

w i l l

n e c e s s a r i l y r e s u l t i n

t h e r e b e i n g

less

work	a v a i l a b l e f o r t h a t

employee

t o p e r f o r m a t t h e c e s s a t i o n

o f

t h e s t r i k e

upon which

the employer

re l ies

l e a d i n g t o h i s c l a i m e d r q h t

t o d e d u c t

payment ;

looking

a t

the ques t ion

(o f whe the r

t o

' s t and

down' an

employee)

as 2 matter

commercial

management, it would

the e rnployer ' s

f i n a n c i a l

i n t e r e s t s

C O

s tand dom

the

employee

and

thereby

avoid

havlng

to pay

him

f o r t h e d a y

o r

days

i n

ques t ion ,

e .g .

where ,

i n

t h i s

case ,

t he

employe

i s

Luf fe r i l l g

loss

a l l o r

v i r t u a l l y

a l l of

i t s revenue.

p o i n t

ou t

t ha t

t he p rov i s ion does no t confe r upon

employer

r i g h t

t o

d e d u c t

payment

...

where

i t would

i n t h e c r l p l o y e r ' s f i n a n c i a l

i n t e r e s t

t o

do so'

but

' a r i g h t

t o d e d u c t

payment	for any day	dn employee cannot be
1 II

u s e f u l l y

employed ...

I n

t h e f i r s t s e n t e n c e

t he pas sage

tha t

I have jus t quoted

ing

the

words

where

t h e d a y

i n q u e s t i o n

t h 2 r e

i s

hc,rk

a v a i l a b l e ' '

t h e

word

a v a i l a b l e "

\;as

u s e d

i n

t h e

sense used

( 2 5

u n d e r s t a n d i t )

Jus t ice Spicer

the Chief Judge and

J u s t i c e S m i t h e r s

i n

t h e C a r p e n t c r s

ancl

Jo jne r s Case

a t

3 3 ;

i n	s a y i n g :

'l I t

canno t be sa id

thz t an

emplcyee

cannot

u s e f u l l y

employed

p a r t i c u l z r day

i f t h e r e

i s

d a y ' s

work

a v a i l a b l c f o r

him

\$hlch , i f per iorn- .d

t h a t d a y ,

w i l l ,

h av ing

r e sa rd

the probLlble

cour se

t he

employe r ' s

bus iness ,

con t r ibu te

b e n e f l c i a l l y

t o

t h e r e a s o n a b l e a n d e f f l c i e n t

conduct

thereof .

For

the

reasons

which

have

given

I have core

the

conclus ion

t h a t

the

respondent had no

ght undcr

the

award

t o s t and down

witliout

pay

i n r e s p e c t

October

1977 any

of t h e 14 employees named i n

t h e

surmons ( a s amended)

except

- 13 -

James

John Murphy who on the ev

,idence was

employe

d so

lely

as the driver of

an electrically operated crane.

Accordingly the respondent was in

breach of the

award in failing

to pay the 13 employees for 4 October 1977 .

I have considered this matter

on the basis that it is

a suit for a penalty and not a criminal proceeding for

offence. In the case of Harris v. Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Limited (judgment

2 3 June 1978) I heard

argument on this question and decided

not to follow the decision

of the Australian Industrial

Court in the Vehicle Builders'

Employees' Federation of Australia

v. General Motors Holden

Pty Limited (1977) 18 A.L.R.

634 .

As it may be decided by

a full court of this court that

the correct view of the law is that expressed ln the V.B.E.F.

- 9 Case

I should add

that if I were to apply the

onus o t proof

appropriate to criminal proceedings my decision	on the
evidence in this case would be the sane.

As to penalty, in my view it is relevant that in thc

Carpenters and Joiners Case, as long as0 as 1 9 7 1 , the

Commonwealth Industrial

Court, speaking of a stand

down clause in substantially the

smc terns, said (at p.

3 3 5 ) :

I t ... in each case diligence is required to ensure

that the facts

as to the availabllity of work on

large construction sites are ascertained

with some

care before ven are

laid

o f f . 1 ,

- 14 -

I f

t he r e sponden t d ld no t

know

o f t h a t d e c i s i o n

i t

ce r t a in ly

ough

t o

have

known of It.

On the

idence

be fo re

c o n s i d e r

t h a t

f a i l e d t o e x e r c i s e s u f f i c i e n , d i l i g e n c e

o r c a r e b e f o r e

making

d e c i s i o n

t o t h e s t a n d i n z

do-.m

the

employees.

I t

i s t r u e

that

t h e r e

i s evidence

some

c a r e

i n t h a t

a quQ2stion was

asked by Mr

S c h o l t z a t the

t ime

as t o

whether Mr

B a r r e t t was

s u r e t h a t

other employees could be

employed

ques t ion which

led

ther

employees

ing

taken

o f f

t h e

l i s t of

employees

s tood

down.

However,

the

respondent

fa i led

approach

the

ques

ion

s t and down

i n the proper

way

and

i n p a r t i c u l e r f a i l e d t o

approach i t i n

t h e

way expounded I n the Carpenters

and

JolPk:rs

Case.

There

are

two

a s p e c t s as

t o

t h i s .

F i r s t ,

t h e

n o t l c c

signed on behalf

t h e Manager

t hc P res ton

Wor1cihops i:eted

3 October

1 9 7 7 which

said:

l 1 It

1,111

l o n z e r b e p o s s t b l e

t o

employ

everybody ga infu l ly .

The

word

"ga in fu l ly"

i s

not

what

the

award says

and in

my view i t could not

bc rezsonaSly

thought

to be

a s:;noqr11

i o r

t h e word	"useful ly" which	i s used	in	the award	as	<overnin,-
, l

employed".

The

provisior,

In the

award

could

not

have

been

reasonably

i n t e r p r e t e d by

anyone who

s t u d i e d

t h e I-.

Car3c:rtcrq

and Jo ine r s

Case.

Secondly, a5 Appears from the	eb idence	01 ?1r	j L h G L t .
I,

t o which

h a v e

a l r e a d y

r e f e r r e d ,

t h e

r e s p o n d e n t ' s

u sua l

p r a c t i c e h a s a l w a y s b e e n t h a t

t h e y h a v e a t

least

day ' s

work

a v a i l a b l e f o r

when

t h e v r e t u r n " ( i . e .

t o

work

a f t e r t h e s t a n d

1 5 -

*.‘

1	down period).	This practice insofar as it was applied as to
1 1

4 4 October 1977, related to work which would be useful to the

employer at or within approsimately 1 month after the resurlption

of work upon the lifting of the electricity restrictions. In

my view that approach to the question of standing

down was

plainly contrary to the award and to the principles enunciated

in the Carpenters

and Joiners Case.

In my view this is quite

a serious breach of the awaL.6.

On the other hand

I have taken into account the

matters rcferred

to by Mr Stockdale this morning and

I accept his submissis:. that

on the facts of this

case the standing down of the employ5e5

named is to be treated as constituting a single breach of the award. However, it is in my view proper to take into acLomt

the number of employees in respect

of \,,horn a breach has

beex

found

In all the circumstances, the court imposes

a penalty

of $500.

Under s.120 of the Act I order that the whole

of thE

penalty be paid to the

Federation which, through Mr Jarrd, has

brought these proceedings in the interds of its members. I order the respondent to pay to each of the employees namcc! :n

the summons, other than James

John Murphy, the amount of the

respect

under-payment

of 4 Oct

[1978] FCA 71

4 Aug 1978