Jansen v Salisbury Wrought Iron Works Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Magistrates Appeals: Civil)

JANSEN & ANOR v SALISBURY WROUGHT IRON WORKS PTY LTD & ANOR

[2007] SASC 73

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Anderson

8 March 2007

MAGISTRATES - JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE GENERALLY - PROCEDURE - ORDERS AND CONVICTIONS - SETTING ASIDE AND AMENDMENT

Appeal against a decision of a Magistrate to set aside a default judgment - whether the judgment had been entered - whether Magistrates Court (Civil) Rules 1992 (SA) r 87 applies irrespective of who was the defaulting party - whether Magistrates Court (Civil) Rules 1992 (SA) r 104 can be used to set aside a default judgment.

Held:  judgment had been entered onto the Court record - r 87 not available to first respondent - r 104(1)(b)(ii) applicable - matter remitted to Magistrate for further consideration.

Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA) s 3, s 19; Worker's Liens Act 1893 (SA), s 7(2); Magistrates Court (Civil) Rules 1992 (SA), rr 2, 87, 104; Magistrates Court Rules 1992 (SA), r 3.03; Magistrates Court Act 1983 (SA), referred to.
Driver v Driver [1950] SASR 8; Cavanagh-Lang v O'Callaghan [2000] SASC 187, applied.
SA Repairs & Painting Pty Ltd v Trenka Pty Ltd (1993) 171 LSJS 300; Harrison v Harrison [1955] Ch 260, considered.

JANSEN & ANOR v SALISBURY WROUGHT IRON WORKS PTY LTD & ANOR
[2007] SASC 73

Background Facts

  1. Salisbury Wrought Iron Works Pty Ltd (Salisbury) issued proceedings in the Magistrates Court against Jacobus and Barbara Jansen and Tony Quinlan trading as Quinlan Clay.  Salisbury sued for money due and owing for the supply and erection of “Structural  Steel Super Structure” at 1 Davey Crescent Seaview Downs.

  2. Tony Quinlan is the first defendant in the Magistrates Court action. He was allegedly the Project Manager and designer of the project or alternatively a building contractor in his own right. He denies any indebtedness to Salisbury and says that the second and third defendants are liable to pay Salisbury direct.

  3. The Jansens are the second and third defendants in the action in the Magistrates Court. They were the registered owners of the land at 1 Davey Crescent Seaview Downs and it is alleged that they entered into a contract for the provision of services and materials from Salisbury.

  4. Fabricated steel was supplied by Salisbury, at the request of Quinlan for the purpose of construction on the land. The steel was not paid for. The value of the steel supplied was $26, 590.30.

  5. On 7 March 2006 Salisbury served each of the defendants with Notices of Demand pursuant to s7(2) of the Worker's Liens Act 1893 (SA).

  6. On 14 March 2006 Salisbury registered a lien over the land as security for the payment of the sum of $26, 590.30.

  7. On 29 March 2006 the Jansens entered a defence denying indebtedness to the plaintiff.

  8. On 30 March, Tony Quinlan provided by way of letter, a denial of his indebtedness on the basis that the Jansens were to pay the plaintiff direct.

  9. On 16 June 2006 default…

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Details
Case
[2007] SASC 73
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Jansen v Salisbury Wrought Iron Works Pty Ltd, the court was tasked with determining the validity of a Magistrate's decision to set aside a default judgment that had been entered in favour of Salisbury Wrought Iron Works against the Jansens. The appeal centred around the interpretation and application of certain rules within the Magistrates Court (Civil) Rules 1992 (SA), specifically Rules 87 and 104. The key legal issues involved were whether the judgment had been formally entered, the applicability of Rule 87 irrespective of who the defaulting party was, and whether Rule 104 could be utilised to set aside a default judgment.

The court examined the nature of the default judgment and found that it had indeed been entered onto the Court record. The primary contention was whether Rule 87, which allows for the setting aside or varying of a judgment that is not final, was limited in its application to only those defendants who had defaulted. The court ruled that Rule 87(1) provides a general power to set aside or vary a judgment which is not final, and this power is not restricted to cases where the defendant is the party seeking to have the judgment set aside. Moreover, the court found that Rule 104(1)(b)(ii) was applicable in this instance, allowing the setting aside of a default judgment under specific circumstances.

In light of these findings, the court held that the Magistrate's decision to set aside the default judgment was valid, given that the circumstances justified such action. The court concluded that the appeal should be dismissed, and the matter was remitted back to the Magistrate for further consideration in line with the applicable rules and the principles of justice.

The final orders of the court were to dismiss the appeal and to remit the matter back to the Magistrate for further consideration in accordance with the applicable rules and the principles of justice. The court's decision underscores the importance of correctly interpreting procedural rules and exercising judicial discretion in the interest of justice.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

On 13 October 2006 the Jansens filed a further application seeking leave to further amend their defence, and that Salisbury's claim be dismissed and an order cancelling the lien over the property owned by the Jansens and other ancillary orders. This was made specifically returnable for 25 October 2006. On 25 October 2006, before Magistrate Kleinig, Counsel for Salisbury handed up submissions and foreshadowed an oral application to have the default judgment set aside. The Magistrate ordered that the Jansens' further application and Salisbury's oral application should be heard by a different Magistrate on 31 October 2006. The application to set aside judgment The learned Magistrate appealed from heard the Jansens' further application and also heard Salisbury's oral application. At the conclusion of submissions, the Magistrate indicated that he preferred the argument advanced on behalf of Salisbury. He ordered that the default judgment which Salisbury obtained against the first defendant, be set aside. The learned Magistrate later published his reasons on 3 November 2006. The Magistrate appealed from found that he had jurisdiction to order that the default judgment be set aside on the basis that MCR r 87(1) gave him power to do so. The learned Magistrate appealed from said at [15]:Rule 87(1) gives the court power to set aside or vary a judgment (not being a final judgment). With respect, I disagree with Mr Jenner’s submission that Rule 87 in its terms is clearly directed to an application by a party against whom judgment has been obtained. In making that submission he relies upon the mandatory requirements in Rule 87(2). The provisions of that sub-section are obviously directed towards the defendant against whom a judgment has been entered. In my view, however, there is no reason to read down the more general provisions of Rule 87(1) because of this. The important thing to remember is that this was not a final judgment. As such, it enlivens the discretion vested in the court by Rule 87(1). It is also probably the case that the court as a court of record has an inherent jurisdiction to set aside a judgment, which is not a final judgment. This is one of those rare cases where the party in whose favour the judgment was entered seeks to set it aside. The principle envisaged by Rule 87(1), however remains the same. The learned Magistrate went on at [19] to state:I find that I have the jurisdiction to set aside the judgment should the circumstances demand that in the exercise of discretion. I find that the circumstances clearly demand that the judgment be set aside. Mr Winter freely admits that he was at fault in not realising the ramifications of obtaining a judgment against one defendant. MCR r 87 provides that:(1) The Court may set aside or vary a judgment (not being a final judgment).(2)The Court must not set aside such a judgment unless the party seeking to set it aside establishes that he or she-(a) has an arguable case on the merits; and(b) has a reasonable excuse for not having complied with these rules, or an order of the Court, or any time limit fixed by these rules, or an order of the Court, in respect of the action or proceeding.(3) When setting aside a judgment the Court may order – (a) payment to the other party of costs thrown away(b) payment or security under rule 81.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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