Janette Francis v Hartex Engineering Pty Ltd

[2019] FWC 5176

[2019] FWC 5176

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.394—Unfair dismissal

Janette Francis
v
Hartex Engineering Pty Ltd
(U2019/5979)

COMMISSIONER JOHNS SYDNEY, 29 JULY 2019

Application for an unfair dismissal remedy - Jurisdictional objection - Extension of time - Section 394(2) - Exceptional Circumstances.

Introduction

[1] The Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) provides that an applicant for an unfair dismissal remedy made pursuant to s 394 of the FW Act must lodge an application within 21 days after the dismissal took effect. 1 However, the Fair Work Commission (Commission) may allow a further period for lodgement in exceptional circumstances.2

[2] This decision is about whether the Commission should allow Janette Francis (Applicant) a further period for the lodgement of her application for an unfair dismissal remedy.

[3] The relevant circumstances (about which I make findings of fact) are as follows:

a) The Applicant commenced employment with Hartex Engineering Pty Ltd (Respondent) on 15 November 2016. She was employed on a full-time basis as a National Service Coordinator of the Respondent. She earned $65, 000 per annum.

b) On Monday, 18 March 2019 the Applicant was notified of her dismissal. The dismissal took effect that day.

c) On Tuesday, 19 March 2019 the Applicant wrote an email to representatives of the Respondent complaining about the termination of her employment. She wrote “I will put you on notice, I will be filing [an] unfair dismissal case against Hartex.”

d) 4 days passed.

e) On Saturday, 23 March 2019 the Applicant was admitted to hospital. The condition, which it is not necessary to disclose, was serious.

f) On Sunday, 7 April 2019 the Applicant was discharged from hospital.

g) On Monday, 8 April 2019 the 21 day time limit for filing an “in time” unfair dismissal application expired.

h) 17 days passed.

i) On Thursday, 25 April 2019 the Applicant was readmitted to hospital.

j) On Sunday, 5 May 2019 the Applicant was discharged from hospital.

k) 24 days passed.

l) On 29 May 2019 the Applicant lodged the present Form F2 unfair dismissal application.

[4] Therefore, the application was filed:

i. 72 days after the dismissal took effect;

ii. 51 days after the 21 day time limit provided for in the FW Act.

[5] In her F2 application the Applicant acknowledged that her application was filed late. She submitted,

“5 days after being terminated, I was admitted to Liverpool Hospital in a serious condition due to the stress and shock of the termination of employment (supporting documentation available)”.

The Jurisdictional Objection

[6] On 9 July 2019, the Respondent lodged with the Commission a Form F3 responding to the Applicant’s unfair dismissal application. A jurisdictional objection in relation to the 21 day time limit prescribed by s 394(2) was raised within the Respondent’s Form F3.

[7] On 15 July 2019 the matter was was allocated to me to determine the Respondent’s jurisdictional objection.

[8] On 16 July 2019, I wrote to the Applicant in the following terms,

“… You have provided some information about the medical reasons for the delay.

The Commissioner is prepared to make an Order to keep confidential the nature of that medical information.

However, it is necessary that a chronology of events be made known to both parties and each have an opportunity to make submissions about it.

Having regard to the material filed it seems that the following is the chronology:

1. Monday, 18 March 2019 - employment terminated.

2. (unexplained 5 day break)

3. Saturday, 23 March 2019 - Applicant admitted to hospital.

4. Sunday, 7 April 2019 - Applicant discharged

5. Monday, 8 April 2019 - 21 day time limit expires

6. (unexplained 17 day break)

7. Thursday, 25 April 2019 – Applicant readmitted to hospital

8. Sunday, 5 May 2019 Applicant discharged

9. (unexplained 24 day break)

10. Wednesday, 29 May 2019 – unfair dismissal application filed

Please confirm if the above chronology is correct.  If not, please advise of any corrections.

If the chronology is correct you will need to explain why you could not file your unfair dismissal application during the periods described as “unexplained”.  If you were medically unable to do so during these periods you must provide medical certificates.

Please respond with any additional information addressing the criteria in s.394(2) of the Fair Work Act 2009.

a) the reasons for the delay

b) whether the former employee first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect

c) any action taken by the former employee to dispute the dismissal

d) prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay)

e) the merits of the application, and

f) fairness between the former employee and other persons in similar positions.

See further information at the link below:

response (except for medical certificates and personal medical information) must be provided to the Respondent who will then be given an opportunity to reply.

Can we suggest that in correspondence being sent to the Respondent you use the phrase “the medical condition” rather than giving specifics about the same.

Any medical evidence should be submitted only to the “[email protected]” email address.

Please respond by 4 pm on Monday, 22 July 2019.”

[9] The Respondent was also directed to file any submissions about the Applicant’s application for an extension of time later that day.

Legislative Scheme

[10] Relevant to the Commission considering whether an extension of time to lodge the application should be granted is s 394(3) of the FW Act:

“394 Application for an unfair dismissal remedy

…

(3) The FWC may allow a further period for the application to be made by a person under subsection (1) if the FWC is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, taking into account:

(a) the reason for the delay; and

(b) whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect; and

(c) any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal; and

(d) prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); and

(e) the merits of the application; and

(f) fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position.”

[11] Section 394(3) of the FW Act states that the Commission may allow a further period to lodge an application provided there are “exceptional circumstances” taking into account the five nominated criteria. The principles are well established and set out in a decision of a Full Bench of Fair Work Australia (as the national tribunal was then called) in Nulty v Blue Star Group. 3 In that matter the Full Bench held the following in relation to “exceptional circumstances”:

[13] In summary, the expression “exceptional circumstances” has its ordinary meaning and requires consideration of all the circumstances. To be exceptional, circumstances must be out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon but need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare. Circumstances will not be exceptional if they are regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered. Exceptional circumstances can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. It is not correct to construe “exceptional circumstances” as being only some unexpected occurrence, although frequently it will be. Nor is it correct to construe the plural “circumstances” as if it were only a singular occurrence, even though it can be a one off situation. The ordinary and natural meaning of “exceptional circumstances” includes a combination of factors which, when viewed together, may reasonably be seen as producing a situation which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon.  4

Consideration of s 394(3) Criteria

Section 394(3)(a) - The reason for the delay

[12] In response to the email of 16 July 2019 and to address s 394(3)(a), the Applicant filed with the Commission on 17 July 2019 various hospital reports and medical certificates to substantiate her reason for delay. Due to the sensitive and personal nature of these hospital reports and medical certificates, I did not make the reports available to the Respondent. It was sufficient for the Respondent to know that the condition was serious.

[13] In addressing s 394(3)(a) the Respondent provided limited submissions bearing in mind that all the evidence for the Applicant’s reason for delay was not available to it. The Respondent submitted that,

“17. In respect of the approach to be taken by the Commission in according appropriate weight to the reason for the delay, it has been held that:

“[44] … the ‘reasons for the delay’ is a factor to be taken into account in deciding whether there are exceptional circumstances. There is no statutory basis for the adoption of a decision rule whereby if the applicant does not provide a credible explanation for the entire period of the delay then the matter in s.366(2)(a) tells against the finding of exceptional circumstances. Common sense would suggest otherwise, it is plainly a question of degree and weight.

[45] What if the period of the delay was 30 days and the applicant had a credible explanation for 29 of those days? It seems to us that such circumstances may weigh in favour of a finding of exceptional circumstances. Of course, as mentioned earlier if there was a credible explanation for the entirety of the delay that would weigh more heavily in favour of such a finding. Conversely, if the applicant failed to provide a credible explanation for any part of the delay that would tend to weigh against a finding of exceptional circumstances.” 5

18. Relevantly, it has also been found:

(a) It is not “unusual” for employees to be distressed when their employment is terminated, nor is the experience of “stress and shock”; 6

(b) Medical evidence in respect of one or more delays does not necessarily, of itself, constitute a “reason” for that delay weighing in favour of the existence of “exceptional circumstances” and the exercise of the Commission’s discretion to grant an extension of time. Rather, the Respondent submits that the Applicant must provide evidence of experiencing “…a level of incapacity following her termination creating circumstances which justify an extension of time” 7or was rendered “…incapable of taking any action…”.8

19. In the present matter, and by way of summary, the Chronology identifies the following relevant time periods, that are relevant to establishing the reason for the Applicant’s delays:

(a) 18 March 2019 (Termination Date) – 22 March 2019;

(b) 23 March 2019 – 7 April 2019;

(c) 8 April 2019 (Expiry of 21 day timeframe) – 24 April 2019;

(d) 25 April 2019 – 5 May 2019; and

(e) 6 May 2019 – 28 May 2019.

20. Based on the materials available to the Respondent (as outlined above), the Respondent understands that by way of summary, the Applicant has provided the following reasons and/or explanations, for the following delays:

(a) The Applicant firstly asserted, in respect of why the UD Application was not filed within the 21day timeframe: “5 days after being terminated, I was admitted to Liverpool Hospital in a serious condition due to the stress and shock of the termination of employment (supporting documentation available).” The Applicant has separately asserted that the entirety of the delay was caused by “major health reasons”;

(b) The Applicant also appears to have provided reasons for the entire delay: “in original email”, which the Respondent has not been provided;

(c) We understand that the Applicant has also provided to the Commission:

i. “full hospital reports” in respect of the period 23 March 2019 – 7 April 2019;

ii. a “medical certificate” in respect of the period 9 April 2019 – 24 April 2019;

iii. “full hospital reports” in respect of the period 25 April 2019 – 5 May 2019; and

iv. a “medical certificate” in respect of the period 6 May 2019 – 28 May 2019.

21. The Respondent therefore understands that:

(a) the Applicant has not provided any specific explanation in respect of the initial 5-day delay. While this was still within the 21-day timeframe, “…the circumstances from the time of the dismissal must be considered in determining whether the reason for the delay constitutes exceptional circumstances…”; 9

(b) based on the Applicant’s 22 July Email— during the initial 5-day period (18 – 22 March 2019) the Applicant sought legal advice in respect of the UD Application, and began to complete the UD Application;

(c) the Applicant was admitted to hospital for the periods 23 March 2019 – 7 April 2019 and 25 April 2019 – 5 May 2019 respectively; and

(d) the Applicant has provided medical certificates, from a General Practitioner or treating doctor, to account for two significant delays of 17 days (9 April 2019 – 24 April 2019) and 24 days (6 May 2019 – 28 May 2019) respectively.

22. Accordingly:

(a) The Applicant knew, immediately following her termination, that she could bring the UD Application, and was therefore likely aware of the 21day time limitation in respect of the UD Application. The Applicant has not provided an explanation in respect of why the Applicant did not, or was unable to, file the UD Application in that time 10 and to the contrary – the Applicant’s own evidence suggests that she was capable of, and did, take action in respect of the UD Application;11

(b) The Applicant appears to have provided medical evidence in support of the other delays identified in the Chronology. However, the Respondent is not aware that this supporting documentation shows:

i. the nature of the Applicant’s condition/s during the relevant periods;

ii. the extent to which the Applicant’s condition/s impacted on or prevented the Applicant from finishing and filing the UD Application; and/or

iii. whether the Applicant was, during one or more of the relevant periods, incapable of finalising and filing the UD Application. 12

In the absence of this evidence, the Applicant will be unable to satisfy the Commission (by way of the provision of medical evidence, or otherwise) that she was rendered medically incapable by reason of the “stress and shock of the termination”, to file the UD Application within the statutory timeframe due to her medical condition. Relevant to that consideration is also the fact that it is clear that the Applicant was capable of taking action in respect of the UD Application for at least 5 days following the dismissal including attempting to instruct solicitors and completed 31 pages of her UD Application.

23. The Respondent is otherwise unable, on the information available, to address the Commission in respect of the reason for the delay.”

[14] The facts demonstrate that 5 days after the termination of her employment the Applicant was admitted to hospital with a serious medical condition. She was discharged from hospital on 7 April 2019, that being one day before the 21 day time limit for the filing of an “in time” unfair dismissal application expired. Having regard to the nature of the medical condition and the likely condition of the Applicant on discharge, I accept that it was not reasonable to expect her to file her unfair dismissal application on 8 April 2019. The hospitalisation immediately before that date was out of the ordinary.

[15] However, the Applicant has failed to adequately explain why she could not file her unfair dismissal application before being admitted to hospital. On the day after the termination she was well enough to write a very detailed and lengthy letter of complaint to her employer about the termination of her employment. She wrote that she would be filing an unfair dismissal claim.

[16] In her submissions to me the Applicant wrote that she started to draft her unfair dismissal claim on 19 March 2019. She then fails to explain why she did not file at any stage over the following 4 days before her admission to hospital. Having given the Applicant every opportunity to explain this period, her failure to do so, entitles me to conclude that there were not extraordinary circumstances that prevented her from filing her unfair dismissal application in the 5 days following the termination of her employment.

[17] It is also to be observed that the Applicant was not admitted to hospital on 23 March 2019 until after 5.30 pm. Although she felt unwell on that day, she was “able to go out and vote” in the NSW State Election. She could have filed her unfair dismissal application at any time on that day too.

[18] The closest the Applicant came to explain the pre-hospitalisation period was to contend that she was suffering from “the stress and shock of the termination of employment.” 13 No doubt that was the case, however, such feelings are not out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon. In fact they are regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered by people terminated from their employment. This is not a case (like Hussey v Springmount Services Pty Ltd14) where the evidence supports a finding that the Applicant’s medical state (in the 5 days after the termination of her employment) prevented her from lodging an application. Evidence of treating practitioners would likely have assisted the Applicant, however, none was provided.

[19] In so far as the Applicant then relies upon her serious medical condition to explain why it took her so long to file her unfair dismissal application after the 21 day time period had expired, I accept that her circumstances were out of the ordinary. But that does not assist her in relation to the period 18 March 2019 – 22 March 2019.

[20] Therefore, this factor weighs against granting the Applicant a further period to make her application.

Section 394(3)(b) - Whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect

[21] In response to s 394(3)(b), the Applicant submitted on 17 July 2019,

“There was no warning of the dismissal at any stage prior to or after it taking place. My position was advertised on SEEK Friday 15th March. Termination took place 18th March - copy of job advertisement previously filed with Fair Work”.

[22] The Respondent submitted,

“24. The Applicant has not contested that she was aware that her employment had been terminated at the time of termination. The Applicant was issued with a letter of termination of employment clearly dated 18 March 2019, which was the date of dismissal.

25. In addressing this criterion, the Applicant raised that “there was no warning of the dismissal at any stage prior to or after it taking place.” 15 While this is factually incorrect, the Applicant’s contention that there was no prior warning that the dismissal was going to take place, or of the Respondent’s intention to dismiss the Applicant, is irrelevant to this criterion in any event because it is not the case that she became aware of the termination a period of time after it had already occurred.

26. Therefore, given the Applicant was aware of the dismissal when it took place and on her own evidence, took action in respect of the termination almost immediately, this factor weighs against granting the Applicant a further period in which to make her Application. 16”

[23] The Applicant was aware of the dismissal on 18 March 2019. She wrote an email complaining about the dismissal on 19 March 2019. She threatened to commence an unfair dismissal application. She was clearly aware of her rights.

[24] Therefore, this factor weighs against granting the Applicant a further period to make her application.

Section 394(3)(c) - Any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal

[25] In response to s 394(3)(c), the Applicant submitted on 17 July 2019,

“Commencement of unfair dismissal application 19 March”.

[26] In addressing s 394(3)(c), the Respondent submitted on 25 July 2019 that,

“27. It has been accepted that action taken by the Applicant to dispute the dismissal, other than the filing of an unfair dismissal application, may favour granting an extension of time. 17

28. In the present matter, the Applicant did not take any action to dispute the dismissal, aside from preparing to lodge the UD Application (and seeking advice in respect of this process). This weighs against a finding that there are exceptional circumstances. 18”

[27] It may be that the Applicant commenced her unfair dismissal application on 19 March, but she did not file it until 29 May 2019.

[28] As I have found above on Tuesday, 19 March 2019 the Applicant wrote an email to representatives of the Respondent complaining about the termination of her employment. She wrote,

“I will put you on notice, I will be filing [an] unfair dismissal case against Hartex.”

[29] This evidences a clear awareness of the unfair dismissal regime. However, the substantive action taken to file the application was not for a further 71 days.

[30] Therefore, this factor weighs against granting the Applicant a further period to make her application.

Section 394(3)(d) - Prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay)

[31] In response to s 394(3)(d), the Applicant submitted on 17 July 2019,

“No, the delay was caused by major health reasons”

[32] In addressing s 394(3)(d), the Respondent submitted on 25 July 2019 that,

“29. The Respondent will be prejudiced if the Applicant is granted an extension of time.

30. The Applicant initiated her application more than 7 weeks late. The Respondent was entitled by virtue of section 394 (2) to assume after 3 weeks that the dismissal was uncontested and to make alternative arrangements for the Applicant’s duties to be performed. This is particularly so in circumstances in which the Applicant did not notify the Respondent of her intention to challenge the lawfulness of the dismissal.

31. As a further consequence of the Applicant’s delay in initiating the Application, at the date of these submissions, more than four months have passed since the date on which the Applicant’s employment came to an end. To the extent that the passage of further time impacts upon the ability of the relevant personnel of the Respondent who were associated with the cessation of the Applicant’s employment by the Respondent to recall the details of the relevant events leading to and resulting in the termination of the Applicant’s employment, this would cause considerable prejudice to the Respondent. The Commission should draw a “general presumption of prejudice” towards the Respondent in this regard, arising from the delay. 19

32. This factor weighs against the grant of an extension of time.”

[33] In the Respondent’s submissions concerning the application for an extension of time, it does not demonstrate anything other than the usual prejudice associated with delay. Noting the 72 day delay the, Respondent is unable to assert any exceptional prejudice.

[34] The prejudice asserted by the Respondent is a neutral factor in relation to granting the Applicant a further period to make her application.

Section 394(3)(e) - The merits of the application

[35] In response to s 394(3)(e), the Applicant submitted on 17 July 2019,

“No grounds for dismissal, no misconduct, no wrong doing. Service Manager needed to get rid of me before i went to higher management and company owner about his work ethics, misconduct and theft of company funds.”

[36] In addressing to s 394(3)(e), the Respondent submitted on 25 July 2019,

“33. The Commission should not, for the purposes of subsection 394(3)(e), “embark on a detailed consideration of the substantive case”. 20

34. Notwithstanding the above, the Respondent observes the following in respect of the Form F2 filed by the Applicant (and which it says weighs against the grant of an extension of time to the Applicant):

a. The Applicant has stated in the Form F2 that she is seeking 31 weeks of pay, by way of compensation. This exceeds the maximum compensation which the Applicant is able to recover in this jurisdiction; and

b. The Applicant has not, in the Form F2, identified why she contends that her termination was harsh, unjust or unreasonable (with reference to the criteria contained in s 387 of the FW Act).

35. The Respondent does not otherwise propose to address the substantive aspects of the Applicant’s case, although notes for completeness that it denies the various allegations made by the Applicant and/or that the Applicant’s dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable in the circumstances. Rather, it contends that it had a fair reason for the Applicant’s dismissal and followed a fair process in effecting the dismissal.”

[37] In the matter of Kornicki v Telstra-Network Technology Group 21 the Commission considered the principles applicable to the extension of time discretion under the former s 170CE(8) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth). In that case the Commission said:

“The merits of the substantive application. If the application has no merit then it would not be unfair to refuse to extend the time period for lodgment. However we wish to emphasise that a consideration of the merits of the substantive application for relief in the context of an extension of time application does not require a detailed analysis of the substantive merits. It would be sufficient for the applicant to establish that the substantive application was not without merit.” 22

[38] The Commission, as presently constituted, adopts this reasoning of the Full Bench of the former Commission in relation to the consideration of merits.

[39] Accordingly, in conformance with the accepted practice in relation to jurisdictional hearings I do not in this decision embark upon a detailed consideration of the substantive case. In a jurisdictional hearing the Commission is not in a position to make findings of fact on contested issues. That is an assignment to be undertaken by the Commission during the substantive hearing.

[40] The substantive factual contest between the Applicant and the Respondent is whether there was a valid reason for the dismissal and whether the Applicant was afforded procedural fairness. These are not factual disputes that can be resolved at a jurisdictional hearing.

[41] For present purposes, the Commission, as presently constituted, is satisfied that the Applicant’s case is not one that is without merit or lacking in any substance.

[42] If the Applicant can establish to the satisfaction of the Commission that there was no valid reason for the dismissal and/or, that she was not afforded procedural fairness, then she may well be able to establish that the termination of her employment was harsh, unjust or unreasonable. It would be open to the Commission, after considering each of the elements of s 387 of the FW Act, to find that the termination of the Applicant’s employment was harsh, unjust or unreasonable.

[43] Because the Applicant’s case is not without merit or lacking in any substance this factor weighs in favour of granting her a further period to make her application.

Section 394(3)(f) - Fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position

[44] In response to s 394(3)(f), The Applicant submitted on 17 July 2019,

“No other persons in similar positions within company.”

[45] In addressing s 394(3)(f), the Respondent submitted on 25 July 2019 that,

“36. In respect of this criterion, it has been observed that:

“Cases of this kind will generally turn on their own facts. However, this consideration is concerned with the importance of the application of consistent principles in cases of this kind, thus ensuring fairness as between the Appellant and other persons in a similar position. This consideration may relate to matters currently before the Commission or matters previously decided by the Commission. 23”

37. On the information available to it, the Respondent is unable to identify similar cases determined by the Commission previously that may impact on its consideration of the present case, and whether such considerations weigh for or against the Applicant in determining whether there are “exceptional circumstances” for the purposes of section 394(3).

38. The Respondent contends that this should be a neutral consideration for the Commission in the circumstances.”

[46] There is no apparent comparator relevant in this matter.

[47] Therefore, this factor is a neutral consideration when it comes to deciding whether to grant the Applicant a further period to make her application.

Conclusion

[48] When the s 394(3) factors are considered in totality, I am not satisfied that they demonstrate circumstances that are out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon.

[49] Consequently, for the reasons set out above, on balance, the Commission is satisfied that there are not exceptional circumstances warranting the Applicant being allowed a further period for her application to be made (i.e. being granted an extension of time to lodge her application).

[50] An order to this effect will be issued with this decision.

COMMISSIONER

Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer

<PR710689>

 1   Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 394(2)(a) (‘FW Act’); Note that the 21 days for lodgment does not include the date that the dismissal took effect by reason of the operation of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s.36(1) (item 6—where a period of time ‘is expressed to begin after a specified day the period ‘does not include that day’)

 2 Ibid s 394(3)

 3 [2011] 203 IR 1

 4   Ibid [13]

 5   Stogiannidis v Victorian Frozen Foods Distributors Pty Ltd t/a Richmond Oysters[2018] FWCFB 901, 44-45

 6   Sonja Templin v O’Connor & Houle Pty Ltd T/A O’Connor + Houle Architecture[2019] FWC 5072, 35-36 citing Giles v Mandurah Aquatic and Recreation Centre [2015] FWC 1881, 8 and Casey v Guardian Community Early Learning Centres [2014] FWC 4002, 16

 7   Ibid at 37

 8   Neil Thorogood v PALT Holdings Pty Ltd T/A Findlay Evans Waterproofing [2016] FWC 2138, 22; see also Mr Brenden Ede v Global Traffic Equipment Pty Ltd ATF [2018] FWC 7618, 15

 9   Ms Laetisha Diotti v Lenswood Cold Stores Co-op Society t/a Lenswood Organic [2016] FWCFB 349, 31

 10   See for example Neil Thorogood v PALT Holdings Pty Ltd T/A Findlay Evans Waterproofing [2016] FWC 2138,16-17

 11   See for example a consideration of the post-dismissal action taken by the Applicant in Mr Brenden Ede v Global Traffic Equipment Pty Ltd ATF [2018] FWC 7618, 15

 12   Mr Brenden Ede v Global Traffic Equipment Pty Ltd ATF [2018] FWC 7618, 15

 13 Question 1.5 F2 Application

 14   [2019] FWC 5010

 15   Applicant’s Email to Associate to Commissioner Johns, 17 July 2019

 16   Mr Brenden Ede v Global Traffic Equipment Pty Ltd ATF [2018] FWC 7618, 16

 17   Neil Thorogood v PALT Holdings Pty Ltd T/A Findlay Evans Waterproofing [2016] FWC 2138, 29, citing Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Ltd (1995) 67 IR 298

 18   Ibid 30

 19   Lili (Karen) Zhang v Australian Postal Corporation [2015] FWC 4202, 45

 20   Neil Thorogood v PALT Holdings Pty Ltd T/A Findlay Evans Waterproofing [2016] FWC 2138, 34 citing Kyvelos v Champion Socks Pty Ltd (unreported, AIRC, Giudice J, Acton SDP, Gay C, 10 November 2000) Print T2421, 14

 21   Print P3168, 22 July 1997 per Ross VP, Watson SDP and Gay C

 22   Ibid

 23   Todd Perry v Rio Tinto Shipping Pty Ltd T/A Rio Tinto Marine[2016] FWCFB 6963, 41