Janet Lorraine Bullock v Mayne Nickless Limited
[1996] IRCA 81
•19 March 1996
DECISION NO: 81/96
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VI 5026 of 1995
B E T W E E N :
JANET LORRAINE BULLOCK
Applicant
AND
MAYNE NICKLESS LIMITED
Respondent
Before: Judicial Registrar Murphy
Place: Melbourne
Date: 19 March 1996
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The duties of an employer faced with a “one off” redundancy at a time of corporate restructuring and economic stringency were the focus of this proceeding under Division 3 of Part VIA of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (“the Act”).
The applicant’s service as a senior secretary
The respondent is a large, successful, public company that organises its operations in Australia into three business groups. Each group reports to the corporate head office located in St Kilda Road, Melbourne. One of the groups is the Transport Services Group (“the Transport Group”). The Transport Group is located at 60 Albert Road, South Melbourne. From there a number of different transport related businesses are managed by a small group of senior managers.
The applicant first commenced with the respondent in a secretarial capacity at its head office in 1978. She held positions as secretary to a number of senior executives within the head office until she resigned in 1989 for family reasons. In 1990 she resumed casual employment with the respondent and from May 1993 she was working three days per week. In August 1993 she was appointed to a full time position as a secretary within a division of the Transport Group. Her position was as secretary to Mr Clay Hayden, whose title was Director of the Express Distribution and Courier Services Division of the Transport Group. Her letter of appointment provided for a salary of $35,000 per annum and membership of a superannuation fund. The letter also provided that the employment relationship could be terminated upon one month’s notice. Also included was the right of the respondent to re-assign the applicant to other positions within its operation after appropriate consultation.
In March 1995 Mr Hayden, whose title by then was Chief Executive Officer of the Transport Group, decided that he required the services of an executive assistant. The job specifications for the position included a requirement that the incumbent hold a degree. The applicant, who was obviously keen to upgrade her position, was upset with this turn of events as she was unable to meet this requirement. She took the matter up with Mr Coonan, the Manager, Personnel Services, located in the respondent’s head office. Mr Hayden had a sharp exchange with the applicant over this matter. Subsequently the applicant was unsuccessful in obtaining the position as Mr Hayden’s executive assistant. The position was filled by Ms Evans, who commenced duties in July 1995.
With the arrival of Ms Evans the applicant was no longer required as Hayden’s secretary. Mr Hayden told her that henceforth she would work with two senior managers within the Group, Mr Desmond Powell, the Commercial Director and Mr David Cramwell, the Director, Business Development. Mr Powell had a discussion with the applicant in July and advised her that over the next three months a job description would be developed for her position as secretary to these two managers. The applicant continued to work for Mr Powell and Mr Cramwell until her services were terminated on 26 September 1996. At that time her salary was $39,000 per annum.
Organisational change within the respondent
Mr Powell gave evidence that the respondent as an organisation has been in a state of continual change for the last two to three years. The pace of change has accelerated in the last year. The changes have included divestiture of a number of business units both within the Transport Group and elsewhere within the respondent, amalgamation of operating businesses and the devolution of strategic planning and development from head office to group offices and then down to individual businesses within the groups. In his words there has been a “lot of downsizing and re-allocation of resources”. He said that the process has put enormous pressure on management within the head office and the business groups to reduce overhead expenses. Mr Powell, like all senior managers, had been asked to review all aspects of the Transport Group’s operation with a view to doing more with less.
In September 1995, as a result of reviews that Mr Powell was undertaking, three managers within the Transport Group left the respondent. These included one manager in Sydney, and two at the South Melbourne office. In September 1995 Ms Evans was working as Mr Clayton’s executive assistant and after the departure of the two managers just referred to, Mr Powell formed the view that within the management structure “we had one secretary too many”.
The reason he came to this view was that in June the senior management of the Transport Group had relocated from the 19th to the 17th floor at 60 Albert Road. This allowed the consolidation of additional staff who had been working elsewhere. Total staff numbers within the management of the Transport Group rose from 11 on the 19th floor to about 18 on the 17th floor. Mr Powell at that stage took the opportunity to appoint two women on a job-sharing basis to a new position of receptionist. They were also able to perform overflow typing work. Another secretary on the floor was Ms Prendergast, who had been working for Mr Bernhardt, the Group General Manager, Industrial Relations and Ms Hacy Tobias, the Group General Manager, Human Resource Development.
On 14 September Ms Tobias left the Transport Group. At this time the Security Manager, Mr Williams also left. The departure of Ms Tobias, who was not to be replaced and who had generated significant secretarial work, led Mr Powell to the conclusion that the Transport Group had excess secretarial capacity. He discussed the matter on two occasions with Mr Hayden who agreed with his conclusion.
The applicant is chosen for redundancy
For the respondent the question of which secretary was surplus to requirements came down to a choice between the applicant and Ms Prendergast. Ms Evans was not relevant as she was in a position of executive assistant to Mr Hayden. The only other secretary on that floor was Ms McLaughlin, whose duties were essentially clerical, and associated with the workers compensation functions of the Transport Group.
Mr Powell decided that the applicant would be made redundant. He chose the applicant over Ms Prendergast based on a number of criteria. The first was length of service. Ms Prendergast had been working within the Transport Group, in a number of locations, as secretary to senior managers for the previous six years. The applicant had only been with the Group for two years. The other reason for the choice was that after making “a judgment about skills and competency”, Ms Prendergast was superior. Mr Powell gave evidence that the judgment was based on how the two worked within the team and on their level and quality of output. Mr Powell said that he felt he had enough exposure to the two individuals to make an assessment as to who was the most suited for the respondent’s requirements and he chose Ms Prendergast. In making the assessment and the decision he did not call for the applicant’s personnel file. He knew, however, that she had had previous service within the head office of the respondent.
Mr Powell made the decision that the applicant would be retrenched and this decision was endorsed by Mr Hayden. Before implementing the decision Mr Powell sought advice from Mr Bernhardt about “the process”. He also sought advice from Mr Coonan. Mr Coonan was also contacted to ascertain whether there were any suitable positions on a monthly list of vacancies that is maintained by the respondent’s head office. Ms O’Brien, the Manager, Personnel Administration within the Transport Group, was asked whether there were any other vacancies within the Transport Group. When it was ascertained that there were no other positions available Mr Coonan prepared the final pay calculations applicable to the applicant. His calculations were based on her entitlements as a managerial employee and also on her entitlements as an award employee. The former entitlements were greater and Mr Powell directed that a cheque for the relevant amount be prepared.
The applicant is terminated
At 4.00 p.m. on 26 September the applicant was called to Mr Powell’s office. Ms O’Brien was present. Mr Powell told the applicant about the extensive changes occurring within the respondent at the head office and group level. He referred to the departure of other Transport Group executives and to the likelihood of future changes and downsizing. He also referred to the fact that the Transport Group had excess secretarial capacity and that the respondent had no other positions available for the applicant. He told the applicant she was to be made redundant and would not be asked to work out her notice. He handed the applicant a letter detailing her entitlements and explained them to her. He explained that an outplacement consultant was available in the next office to assist her. Despite Mr Powell’s attempts to soften the blow the applicant was very upset, and after briefly meeting the outplacement consultant, left the office.
A sound or capricious reason?
The respondent carries the onus of proof that it had a valid reason, in the sense of a “sound, defensible or well-founded” reason, based on its operational requirements, to terminate the applicant’s employment (see ss170EDA(1)(a) and 170DE(1) of the Act and Selvachandran v Peteron Plastics Pty Ltd (Industrial Relations Court of Australia, Northrop J, 7 July 1995)).
In Kenefick v Australian Submarine Corporation Pty Ltd (1995) 131 ALR 197, 208 Wilcox CJ adopted the comments in Selvachandran (above) and said :
“I respectfully agree, and I think it follows that the reason must be genuine, that there must be a causal relationship between the reason and the termination and that the termination must be a logical response to the employee’s capacity or conduct or the employers operational requirements. Of course, there is often more than one logical way of dealing with a problem. While the subsection requires the employer to establish that the termination was a logical way of dealing with the problem of employee capacity or conduct, or operational requirements, that gave rise to it, it does not require proof that this was the only logical course. The subsection was designed to inhibit capricious terminations, not to put the court in the employer’s managerial chair.”
Here the applicant argued that the decision to terminate her services was capricious and was based on prior animosity between herself and Mr Hayden. The redundancy, it was argued, was contrived to get rid of the applicant. Its timing was made to coincide with other departures at head office in order to disguise the decision.
The evidence in support of this argument was a number of incidents of friction between the applicant and Mr Hayden, leading ultimately to the applicant being replaced as Mr Hayden’s secretary by a new executive assistant, Ms Evans. Mr Powell’s evidence was that while he was aware that there had been some friction between the applicant and Mr Hayden in the past, he was not aware of the details. As far as he was concerned that was all in the past when the applicant came under his direct supervision and control commencing July 1995. He had indicated to her at that stage that these matters were to be put in the past and she was to start with him as his secretary on that basis. There was no suggestion of any friction between the applicant and Mr Powell. He denied that Mr Hayden’s prior differences with the applicant had any influence on his decision that the applicant be made redundant. He maintained the decision was his alone and was based on his judgment of the relative merits of the two individuals. The timing of the actual termination had been suggested by Mr Hayden to coincide with the departure of 20 senior executives, including some secretaries, from head office.
The applicant’s allegation that this was a capricious dismissal is serious. It was flatly denied by Mr Powell who was an impressive witness. Counsel for the applicant relied on the failure of the respondent to call anyone other than Mr Powell to explain the decision. He argued that adverse inferences should be drawn from this failure. I do not accept this submission. Mr Powell’s evidence was convincing. He was not shaken in cross-examination. He made the decision and the decision was confirmed by Mr Hayden. On the evidence before me I could not be comfortably satisfied that this was a disguised dismissal based on personal animosity. I am not prepared to draw any such inference. I am fortified in this conclusion by Mr Powell’s evidence that the applicant has not been replaced since her termination. The secretarial workload within the Transport Group has been shared among the remaining staff on a team approach. This is also evidenced by a circular from Mr Hayden dated 1 November 1995 (Exhibit A8).
It follows from this that I accept Mr Powell’s evidence that consequent upon the departure of Ms Tobias and Mr Williams, the appointment of Ms Evans, and the filling of a full-time receptionist position, in September 1995 the Transport Group had excess secretarial capacity. Further I am satisfied that at that stage, and in the foreseeable future, on the information available to Mr Powell, there were no other positions for the applicant within either the Transport Group or elsewhere within the respondent. In the climate of pressure to reduce overhead expenses within the Transport Group, and elsewhere within the respondent, the termination of the applicant’s services was a logical and defensible managerial response to the problem of excess secretarial capacity within the Transport Group. The termination of the applicant was thus directly related to the operational requirements of the respondent.
Having made these findings I am satisfied that the respondent had a valid reason pursuant to s170DE(1) of the Act to terminate the applicant’s services.
Was the termination harsh, unjust or unreasonable?
The applicant carries the onus of proof that the termination was not for a valid reason because it was harsh, unjust or unreasonable (ss170EDA(1)(b) and 170DE(2) of the Act).
In APESMA and Cross v Deniliquin Council (Industrial Relations Court of Australia, Moore J, 14 December 1995) the Court said :
“In construing s170DE(1) and applying its provisions to a particular set of facts, it is necessary to bear in mind the object of Division 3 of Part VIA. As earlier mentioned s170CA states that the object of Division 3 is to give effect to the Convention and Recommendation which are Schedules 10 and 11 to the Act respectively. The Recommendation contains provisions concerning termination for economic, technological, structural or similar reasons.
Article 19 provides:
“(1) All parties concerned should seek to avert or minimise as far as possible termination of employment for reasons of an economic, technological, structural or similar nature, without prejudice to the efficient operation of the undertaking, establishment or service, and to mitigate the adverse effects of any termination of employment for these reasons on the worker or workers concerned.
(2) Where appropriate, the competent authority should assist the parties in seeking solutions to the problems raised by the terminations contemplated.”
and article 21 provides :
“The measures which should be considered with a view to averting or minimising terminations of employment for reasons of an economic, technological, structural or similar nature might include, inter alia, restriction of hiring, spreading the workforce reduction of a certain period of time to permit natural reduction of the workforce, internal transfers, training and retraining, voluntary early retirement with appropriate income protection, restriction of overtime and reduction of normal hours of work.”
Thus a feature of the Recommendation is that an employer should avoid terminating an employee’s employment as a result of a restructuring if it is possible to place the employee in another position within the employer’s organisation.”
In Aitken v The Construction, Mining, Energy, Timberyards, Sawmills and Woodworkers Union of Australia - Western Australian Branch (Industrial Relations Court of Australia, Lee J, 7 August 1995) the Court also referred to the Convention and Recommendation and said :
“The object of these provisions (Division 3 of Part VIA of the Act) is to institute a level of practice in the management of labour which will tend to preserve the worth of the asset that labour represents.
.......
The question in this case is whether the employer gave due regard to all reasonable and fair considerations the employee was entitled to expect as part of the employer/employee relationship that existed between them prior to termination of the employee’s services. That is to say, acting fairly and having due regard to the interests of the employee did the employer do that which could be reasonably expected of it in the circumstances to avoid the termination operating harshly, unjustly or unreasonably?”
These authorities require a determination as to whether the respondent has met the obligations of a reasonable employer faced with a redundancy. Counsel for the applicant argued that the dismissal infringed s170DE(2) because the respondent had failed here to meet the requirements for consultation and selection laid down in a number of cases that have dealt with dismissals by reason of redundancy.
The importance of proper consultation in circumstances of redundancy, and termination of employment in general, has been recognised in a number of cases: see eg. Gregory v Philip Morris Ltd (1988) 80 ALR 455, 473-474; Mitchell-Collins v The Latrobe Council (1995) 60 IR 480, 490; Aitken (above); Sinclair v Anthony Smith and Associates Pty Ltd (Industrial Relations Court of Australia, von Doussa J, 1 December 1995) and Quality Bakers of Australia Ltd v Goulding (1995) 60 IR 327, 334-7.
In Kenefick (above at 210) Wilcox CJ found that where there was, in effect, a mass redundancy, consultation with the whole group of individuals likely to be affected was not required. He held, however, that the terms of the Award, which mirrored the provisions of Articles 19 and 21 of the Recommendation (see APESMA above), were “drafted with a different situation in mind : the elimination of a relatively small number of specific jobs, their occupants being readily identifiable and able meaningfully to be consulted.”
In Goulding (above at 337) the employee was given no warning that his position was to be made redundant. Beazley J said :
“In my opinion, notwithstanding that there were negotiations with the union, the failure to consult Mr Goulding about the redundancy, the failure to consider alternative employment options, either with him directly or with the union, and the failure to provide him with any counselling or assistance in relation to the redundancy or in obtaining other employment, made the termination of his employment harsh, unjust or unreasonable.”
Some of the purposes of consultation with the employee were set out by von Doussa J in Sinclair (above):
“The requirement for consultation is in the Award not only to permit the possibility of arriving at some rearrangement of the workplace which has lesser consequences than dismissal, but also to allow time for the employees to deal with the emotional, family and domestic stresses that are likely to descend upon them when their employment is brought to an end. The importance of these non-workplace personal facts cannot be underestimated, and finds expression in the reasons of various tribunals which have to consider clauses of this type. To put it into colloquial terms, it is desirable, as the Award recognises, that employees whose security of employment is about to be shattered be let down gently. If they are forewarned and counselled they are more likely to be able to accommodate to their new situation, to adjust themselves to the search for other work, and the like. Moreover, it is generally recognised that if an employee is in work and is given time off to go and look for other work, the prospects of finding new employment are somewhat better than if the person concerned is required to seek work as an unemployed person on social security. The failure to consult is a significant factor in this case. In my view it is also significant that no forewarning was given, and significant also that no counselling was provided”.
The failure to consult with the applicant deprived her of the opportunity both to properly prepare for her possible termination but also to properly explore with the respondent alternatives to her termination. Mr Powell’s evidence was that the respondent did consider alternatives to termination. He indicated that advice was sought as to positions within both the Transport Group and from the vacancy list at head office. The applicant, however, was not given any input into the range of possible alternative positions or options designed to ameliorate or avoid the need to terminate her services.
Another aspect of the decision here is that the actual criteria applied contravened what has been seen as reasonable employment practice. In Goulding (above) and Kenefick (above) the Court endorsed the principle that where redundancies are necessary it is desirable that objective selection criteria be applied. Here, the criteria applied by Mr Powell were both objective and subjective. An objective factor was length of service. A subjective factor was his reference to “skills and competency” and ability to fit in with the team. There was no opportunity for the applicant to have any input into the proposed criteria. Had she been given that opportunity she may have pointed out that the length of service criteria operated unfairly in her case, because of the break in her employment due to family reasons. Further, the use of “skills and competency” was a subjective criterion essentially based on Mr Powell’s judgment. The involvement of Mr Hayden in endorsing the redundancy decision would also have flawed the process, in the applicant’s eyes, given the prior differences between them.
The final argument of Counsel for the applicant in relation to the actual process was the failure to properly explore the relative merits of the applicant compared with other persons who were performing secretarial duties within the Transport Group. He referred to the position of job-share receptionists, and Ms McLaughlin, who was described in an organisation chart as a secretary. These women had less service than the applicant. Mr Powell’s response to this was that he had not considered the applicant for a position of receptionist as this was a lower paid position. He further considered that the applicant’s skills were unsuitable for the position that Ms McLaughlin held. Ms McLaughlin was primarily involved in a clerical function closely associated with the workers’ compensation liabilities of the respondent. The surplus secretarial capacity and skills of the applicant were in the traditional personal assistant/secretary roles and it was only the applicant and Ms Prendergast who were performing those duties. In response to this Counsel for the applicant submitted that the narrow selection criteria, as applied to the two possible candidates and not to a wider pool, meant the applicant was unable to assert a claim that her longer service, albeit broken, justified her retention over more junior employees.
Counsel for the respondent did not directly address the cases, referred to above, that Counsel for the applicant said impugned the process here. He sought to argue, however, that overall this termination was not harsh, unjust or unreasonable. He said that any lack of a prior warning was outweighed by other matters. He referred particularly to the fact that this was a genuine redundancy, the payment of a substantial severance amount to the applicant, and to the provision of outplacement services. He referred to the evidence of Mr Powell that there were, on any objective view, no other positions available within the Transport Group. Further, in the light of the structural change that the respondent was involved in, there were no other positions likely to be available there or elsewhere within the respondent. Finally, he argued, the choice was ultimately a matter of judgment and it was open to Mr Powell to make the decision that he did.
I accept that Mr Powell acted properly and without ulterior motive in relation to the process of making the applicant redundant. He acted on advice provided by Mr Bernhardt and Mr Coonan, but I am satisfied that he was let down by their advice. I am satisfied, on the basis of the above authorities, that the respondent has not acted “fairly and having due regard to the interests of the employee” (Sinclair above), in the manner in which it terminated the applicant’s services.
The applicant was denied her right to be consulted in relation to her termination. The selection criteria applied operated unfairly against her. The respondent did not give her the opportunity to adequately contribute to the judgment that Mr Powell ultimately made that her services were less valuable to the respondent than those of Ms Prendergast. These matters significantly outweigh the severance payment and the provision of outplacement services by the respondent. On the basis of these considerations the respondent has not acted as a reasonable employer in the circumstances and it is proper to characterise the applicant’s termination of employment as without valid reason because it was “harsh, unjust or unreasonable”. The respondent has breached s170DE(2) of the Act.
Remedy
The parties to the proceeding are in agreement that reinstatement is impracticable. The applicant does not wish to return to the respondent. Having regard to the circumstances of her termination and her prior differences with Mr Hayden this is understandable. Mr Powell’s evidence is that, in any event, there are no positions available for her. I accept that in the circumstances reinstatement is impracticable.
Where, following a finding of a contravention of the Act, reinstatement is impracticable, the Court is given a discretion, arguably widened as a result of amendments operative from 15 January 1996, to order that the respondent pay compensation of such amount as the Court thinks fit (s170EE(2)). The maximum compensation that may be ordered is six months salary (s170EE(3)(a)). In this case that comes to $19,500.
In working out the amount of compensation the Court is to have regard to the remuneration that the employee would have received or have been likely to have received had the employment not been terminated. This requires the Court to look to the future, had the employment not terminated.
Here Mr Powell gave evidence of the pressure on senior management within the operating groups of the respondent to cut overhead costs. The climate of change and the need to reduce overheads across the respondent is referred to in circulars from the Executive Chairman dated 15 and 26 September 1995 (Exhibits A4 and A5). Mr Powell gave evidence that a major business within the Transport Group was sold in October 1995. A further restructure within the Transport Group was announced in January this year.
In response to this landscape of change Counsel for the applicant argued that the management group of the Transport Group remained relatively unchanged, and, in his submission, expanded. He argued that had the applicant not been terminated in September 1995 she would still be there and would have remained in the employment of the respondent indefinitely.
I do not accept the applicant’s submission. Had she not been terminated there was no certainty that her employment would have continued indefinitely, or even for six months. I accept Mr Powell’s evidence of a climate of downsizing within the respondent. In these circumstances there was a real risk that the applicant, who was being paid as a senior secretary, would not have survived a properly conducted redundancy process of secretarial staff within the Transport Group. She may have, but it may have been at a lesser salary, or in a capacity that caused her to resign. The actions of the respondent, however, have cost the applicant the opportunity, in a proper redundancy selection process, of retaining a position within the Transport Group or elsewhere in the respondent at the same salary or at a lesser salary. Alternatively they have cost her the opportunity to leave the respondent after appropriate consultation and on her own terms. Placing a monetary value on the loss of these opportunities is not without difficulty.
It is now necessary to consider what are the applicant’s pecuniary losses as a result of the termination of her employment. After the applicant was dismissed she chose, for reasons that were not entirely convincing, not to avail herself of the services of an outplacement consultant provided by the respondent. The applicant, however, immediately registered with another personnel consultant and applied for a number of positions. By November she had obtained a part-time position and by the New Year was employed full time in a temporary position. She remains full time in the temporary position earning about $130 per week less than her previous position. To the date of trial the applicant has earned a total of $6,291. When the applicant was dismissed she was paid a gross amount of $11,648. This payment was described as “notice and severance”. She was entitled to one month’s pay in lieu of notice under her original contract of employment, and so on this basis she was paid her pay in lieu of notice and an extra eleven weeks severance pay. The latter amount compares favourably with industry standards, given that at the time of her termination she had only two years service.
Combining the moneys paid to the applicant by the respondent and the money she has earned, her position to date is that she has effectively suffered a pecuniary loss of about $500 as a result of her dismissal. Her actual employment situation, however, is less favourable as she now has only a temporary position that is due to expire on 30 March and is paid $130 per week less than her previous position. On 30 March she may be able to secure another position, or she may face a period of unemployment.
The matters considered above are circumstances that lead me to exercise my discretion to order compensation to the applicant consequent upon the breach of the Act by the respondent. The applicant has been denied the opportunity to retain her job or leave the respondent on her own terms. To date she has sustained a minor amount of pecuniary loss but faces a risk that this will be greater in the future.
Having regard to the various contingencies involved, favourable and unfavourable, I am of the view that a proper measure of compensation for the applicant is to fix compensation on the basis that she would have been employed by the respondent for an additional two months but for her dismissal on 26 September 1995. Over that period she would have been paid $6,500 and I find that is a proper amount of compensation. I propose to order that amount of compensation.
MINUTES OF ORDERS
THE COURT ORDERS:
That the respondent pay to the applicant the sum of $6,500 within 21 days.
NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with by Order 36 of the Industrial Relations Court Rules.
I certify that this and the preceding fourteen (14) pages are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judicial Registrar Murphy.
Associate:
Dated: 19 March 1996.
Solicitors for the Applicant: Testart Robinson & Pitts
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr J Bailey
Solicitors for the Respondent: Freehill Hollingdale & Page
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr C Blanden
Date of hearing: 22 February 1996
Date of judgment: 19 March 1996.
C A T C H W O R D S
INDUSTRIAL LAW - UNFAIR TERMINATION - REDUNDANCY - VALID REASON - OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS - HARSH, UNJUST OR UNREASONABLE TERMINATION - failure to consult or apply proper selection criteria before termination - COMPENSATION
Industrial Relations Act 1988 ss.170DE, 170EE
CASES:
Selvachandran v Peteron Plastics Pty Ltd (Industrial Relations Court of Australia, Northrop J, 7 July 1995).
Kenefick v Australian Submarine Corporation Pty Ltd (1995) 131 ALR 197
APESMA and Cross v Deniliquin Council (Industrial Relations Court of Australia, Moore J, 14 December 1995)
Aitken v The Construction, Mining, Energy, Timberyards, Sawmills and Woodworkers Union of Australia - Western Australian Branch (Industrial Relations Court of Australia, Lee J, 7 August 1995)Gregory v Philip Morris Ltd (1988) 80 ALR 455
Mitchell-Collins v The Latrobe Council (1995) 60 IR 480
Sinclair v Anthony Smith and Associates Pty Ltd (Industrial Relations Court of Australia, von Doussa J, 1 December 1995)
Quality Bakers of Australia Ltd v Goulding (1995) 60 IR 327
JANET LORRAINE BULLOCK -v- MAYNE NICKLESS LIMITED
No. VI 5026 of 1995
Before: Judicial Registrar Murphy
Place: Melbourne
Date: 19 March 1996.
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VI 5026 of 1995
B E T W E E N :
JANET LORRAINE BULLOCK
Applicant
AND
MAYNE NICKLESS LIMITED
Respondent
MINUTES OF ORDERS
Judicial Registrar Murphy 19 March 1996.
THE COURT ORDERS:
That the respondent pay to the applicant the sum of $6,500 within 21 days.
NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with by Order 36 of the Industrial Relations Court Rules.
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