| [2024] FWC 680 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
| DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.394—Unfair dismissal
Jamileh Anna Hargreaves
v
Youth Development Australia
(U2023/12359)
| DEPUTY PRESIDENT CLANCY | MELBOURNE, 15 MARCH 2024 |
Application for an unfair dismissal remedy – voluntary liquidation – application stayed.
On 11 December 2023, Ms Jamileh Hargreaves made an application to the Fair Work Commission (the Commission) for a remedy for unfair dismissal under s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act). Ms Hargreaves’ application did not identify a Respondent and following correspondence with the Commission, Ms Hargreaves filed an amended application naming Youth Development Australia as the Respondent (the Respondent) to her application.
A conciliation conference before a staff conciliator of the Commission was listed for Friday, 2 February 2024. On 5 February 2024, in conversation with a Commission staff member, the Respondent advised that it was in liquidation. The Respondent later emailed the Commission noting that Andrew Poulter and Nick Davies of IRT Advisory had been appointed to manage the liquidation process for the Respondent.
On 8 January 2024, a representative from IRT Advisory contacted the Commission via telephone to advise that it would not participate in a conciliation conference. Shortly after, the Commission received an email from IRT Advisory to the same effect. An ASIC Form 505 was attached to this correspondence, which confirmed the type of administrator appointed as a liquidator of creditors’ voluntary liquidation.
On 23 January 2024, the matter was referred to me for consideration. A review of the ASIC notices database showed that a general meeting of the members of the Respondent was held on 29 November 2023, where it was resolved that the Respondent would be wound up and that Andrew William Poulter had been appointed as a liquidator.
That day, I caused correspondence to be sent to Ms Hargreaves. This correspondence advised Ms Hargreaves that the creditors of the Respondent had passed a resolution to voluntarily wind up the company and had appointed a liquidator. The correspondence referred Ms Hargreaves to s.500(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (the Corporations Act) and stated that it was my view that her claim could not proceed unless she obtained leave of the Court. Ms Hargreaves was requested to confirm whether she intended to seek leave of the Court by Wednesday, 7 February 2024.
Some further correspondence ensued, culminating on 6 March 2024 when Ms Hargreaves wrote to the Commission to advise that she intends to proceed with her application to the Court.
Section 500(2) of the Corporations Act provides as follows:
“After the passing of the resolution for voluntary winding up, no action or other civil proceeding is to be proceeded with or commenced against the company except by leave of the Court and subject to such terms as the Court imposes.”
Section 58AA of the Corporations Act provides the following definition in relation to the meaning of “court” and “Court”:
“(1) Subject to subsection (2), in this Act:
"court" means any court.
"Court" means any of the…
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- Case
- [2024] FWC 680
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Deputy President were whether the FWC had the authority to grant leave under section 500(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 to proceed with Ms Hargreaves’ application for unfair dismissal against Youth Development Australia, which was in voluntary liquidation. The Deputy President considered the definition of "Court" under section 58AA of the Corporations Act and the decision in Smith v Trollope Silverwood & Beck Pty Ltd, which clarified that the FWC is not a "Court". The Deputy President also reviewed the decision in Silalahi v CMI Industrial (Forge), which determined that an application under section 394 of the Act constitutes a civil proceeding.
The Deputy President concluded that the FWC was not a "Court" and thus lacked the authority to grant the leave required under section 500(2) of the Corporations Act. Therefore, Ms Hargreaves' application for unfair dismissal could not proceed in the FWC without leave from the Court. The Deputy President stayed Ms Hargreaves' application, indicating that it could not proceed further in the FWC without leave from the Court.
This decision underscores the limitations on the FWC's jurisdiction in cases where the company is in liquidation and the need for leave from the Court to proceed with applications for unfair dismissal. The application is stayed pending Ms Hargreaves' application for leave from the Court.
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