James v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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James v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 91

James v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 383

NOTE: CHANGES TO THE MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION (MNC)

The Federal Court adopted a new medium neutral citation (FCAFC) for Full Court judgments effective from 1 January 2002.  Single Judge judgments will not be affected and will retain the FCA medium neutral citation.

The transitional arrangements are as follows:

  • All Full Court judgments delivered prior to 1 January 2002 will retain the FCA medium neutral citation.
  • All Full Court judgments delivered between 1 January 2002 to 30 April 2002 have been assigned parallel medium neutral citations in both the FCA and FCAFC series. 
  • All Full Court judgments delivered from 1 May 2002 will contain the FCAFC medium neutral citation only.

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

James v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 383

MIGRATION – Family (Residence) Visa – appeal from a single judge dismissing application for review of decision of Migration Review Tribunal – whether appellant an “aged dependent relative” for the purposes of reg 1.03 Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) – appellant living apart from wife but no decree of judicial separation – whether appellant “formally separated” in the context of definition of “aged dependent relative”

WORDS AND PHRASES – “formally separated”

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 1.03, 1.15A

Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 297 at 320 applied
Collector of Customs v Agfa-Gevaert Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 389 at 397, 400 – 401 applied
Ainslie v Ainslie (1927) 39 CLR 381 at 394, 408 cited
Williams v Williams [1921] P 131 at 135 cited
Fender v St John-Mildmay [1938] AC 1 at 24 cited
Walter v Walter [1921] P 302 cited
Lacey v Lacey (1931) 146 LT 48 at 49 cited
Besant v Wood (1879) 12 Ch D 605 cited
Exxon Corporation v Exxon Insurance Consultants International Ltd [1982] 1 Ch 119, 144 applied

SELLAPA JOACHIM JAMES v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
V 790 OF 2001

HEEREY, COOPER AND FINKELSTEIN JJ
8 APRIL 2002
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 790 OF 2001

On appeal from a single Judge of the Federal Court of Australia

BETWEEN:

SELLAPA JOACHIM JAMES
APPELLANT

AND:

THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

HEEREY, COOPER AND FINKELSTEIN JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

8 APRIL 2002

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is allowed.

2.The orders of the primary judge are set aside and in lieu thereof it is ordered that the application be remitted to the Migration Review Tribunal differently constituted for reconsideration.

3.The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal and at first instance.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 790 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

SELLAPA JOACHIM JAMES
APPELLANT

AND:

THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

HEEREY,…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCAFC 91
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of James v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the appellant, James, sought to challenge the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (MRT) which had dismissed his application for a subclass 435 visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The crux of the matter was whether the appellant was "formally separated" from his wife, a requirement for him to be considered an "aged dependent relative" for the purposes of the visa application. James, born in 1920, argued that his long-term physical and mental separation from his wife, coupled with their strained relationship, constituted a formal separation. The Tribunal, however, found that the separation was not formalised in a manner that met the legislative criteria.

The key legal issues revolved around the interpretation of the term "formally separated" within the context of the subclass 435 visa requirements. The Tribunal had to determine whether mere physical and mental separation, without any formal legal documentation or ceremony, could satisfy the statutory definition. The appellant contended that his separation, while not legally formalised through divorce or a separation deed, was nonetheless "formal" due to the cessation of cohabitation and communication. The Tribunal, however, held that the term "formal" implied a requirement beyond mere physical and mental separation, suggesting that some form of legal or ceremonial formalisation might be necessary.

In its reasoning, the Federal Court found that the Tribunal's interpretation of "formally separated" was not unreasonable and aligned with the ordinary meaning of the word. The court highlighted that the term "formal" indicated a requirement of form or ceremony, which was not evident in the appellant's situation. The court also noted that the Tribunal's scepticism towards the lack of contact between the appellant and his wife, particularly when she visited their daughter in Australia, was justified. The court concluded that the Tribunal's decision was not flawed and that the appellant had not provided sufficient evidence to meet the statutory criteria for being considered "formally separated."

The final orders of the court were to allow the appeal, set aside the orders of the primary judge, and remit the application to the MRT for reconsideration. Additionally, the respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal and at first instance.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is allowed.

2. The orders of the primary judge are set aside and in lieu thereof it is ordered that the application be remitted to the Migration Review Tribunal differently constituted for reconsideration.

3. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal and at first instance.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The appellant was born in 1920 and thus satisfied the age requirement in par (c). It was apparently not in dispute that he was dependent on his son within the meaning of par (b). The issue before the Tribunal, and on which the appellant failed, was whether he was “formally separated” from his wife within the meaning of par (a).Evidence before the Tribunal Before the Tribunal the appellant relied on two statutory declarations made by him, one on 26 November 1999 and the other on 29 September 2000, and a statutory declaration by his wife Leela Pushparanee James made on 28 September 2000. His son Immanuel gave oral evidence, as did the appellant himself. In his first statutory declaration the appellant stated that he was born on 18 December 1920 in Jaffna, Sri Lanka, and was married on 22 August 1954, also in Jaffna. He and his wife had six children, two of whom, Immanuel and Christy, were in Australia. There was a daughter in Canada, two sons in the United Kingdom and another son in Norway. Because of the “persecutory situation arising out of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka”, the appellant, his wife and Christy moved from Jaffna to Colombo. In October 1994 the appellant’s wife left for Canada to provide assistance to their daughter. In the following year the appellant and Christy were forced to leave Sri Lanka. They arrived in Australia on 13 November 1995 and made application for refugee status on or about 24 April 1996. This was refused and an application for review by the Refugee Review Tribunal was dismissed on or about 2 August 1996. However the appellant was subsequently granted a Sri Lankan sub-class 435 visa valid until 31 July 1997. The statutory declaration continues:“6. When my Application was declined by RRT, it was my expectation that my wife would return to Sri Lanka, and that we would continue to live there in our last days. Our main concern was the safety and well being of the children. As long as we felt they were “safe” it did not matter living our last days in Sri Lanka. I was becoming feeble, and felt I was being a burden to my son and desired to return home. My wife however thought otherwise and decided to stay in Canada.7. I requested my wife to return to Sri Lanka so that we may do whatever we can without being a burden to our children. She refused this request, since then our relationship became very strained. I offered to join her in Canada despite my unwillingness and concern over the cold weather. My wife did not advise me to join her in Canada. Although I persuaded her on many occasions, that I needed her at this time of my life and that we should cohabit and for that purpose to return to Sri Lanka. She refused.8. I also told her that with growing age I could not live in Canada, in that weather and the best option for us would be to return to Sri Lanka. She refused to do that. Our relationship continued to be strained, and with the physical separation between us, our strain began to widen and cemented our separation.9. I have no assets and even whatever I had in common with my wife are in the war-torn part of Sri Lanka and presently of no value. It is because of these reasons I did not see any necessity to seek any settlement of such assets or taking any further steps about our situation. I have more than clearly told my wife that or [sic] marriage has ended because of her refusal to cohabit and her choice to live in Canada.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

HEEREY, COOPER AND FINKELSTEIN JJ
The appellant’s son Immanuel referred to his father’s health and how he provided for him. The other children helped as well when they could. The appellant’s wife had been in Australia for four months and lived with Christy, who had applied for refugee status. Immanuel said that attempts to reconcile his parents had failed. They did not talk to each other. His father had not sponsored his wife for residency. His sister in Canada and brother in England largely supported their mother.Decision of the Tribunal For present purposes the relevant parts of the Tribunal’s decision were as follows:“19. Other than the Declarations, there appears to be no further documentation regarding the formalisation of the stated separation. Given the wording in paragraph (a) of the definition of an “aged dependent relative” it is clear from the use of the word “or” that formalisation in the form of divorce is not a requirement for being “formally separated”. Indeed, it seems that the use of the word “formally” requires something more than just mere physical separation.20. In the Macquarie dictionary (2nd Ed.) “formally” means “in a formal manner, as regards form; in form”. “Formal” in the same dictionary is stated to mean in part “marked by form or ceremony … made or done in accordance with forms ensuring validity being in accordance with prescribed or customary forms”.21. The Tribunal notes that Statutory Declarations were prepared well after the application was made and for the purposes of the application. This contrasts in part, from the situation in Re Gatenby (IRT Decision 569 30 December 1991), where the parties entered into a Deed of Separation before the application was made to the Department, with a view to divorce proceedings. Although that case dealt with the requirements for a “remaining relative” under the 1989 Migration Regulations, the preparation of the Deed was relevant to the decision in that case. The Tribunal finds that “formally separated” requires more than physical separation over a period of time, as reflected in the Family Court cases submitted. The use of the word “formally” as indicated earlier must have some meaning or it would not have been included by the Legislature if physical and mental separation was sufficient. Indeed, such separation could be achieved by a couple living in different households or in different countries or by stating that mental separation was present as in this case.22. In the circumstances the Tribunal feels, on balance, that the Visa Applicant’s description in the application form 887 that he was “married” was the correct description of his marital status and was most apt in reflecting his situation. Indeed, the Tribunal was somewhat sceptical of the evidence by the Visa Applicant and his son that there is no contact with the wife, even when she visited her son at the house where the Visa Applicant lived and his evidence that he did not talk to her on the telephone when telephoning his daughter in Canada.23. In spite of the Declarations produced and given the use of the word “formally” something more appears to be needed to formalise the stated separation. Perhaps in the required circumstances a Domestic Violence order by a Court, a formal Deed of Separation and the like could satisfy paragraph (a) of the definition of “aged dependent relative”. Given the evidence and material before it, the Tribunal finds on balance, that the Visa Application was not “formally separated” from his wife as submitted and he is therefore unable to satisfy the requirements for an “aged dependent relative”.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: HEEREY, COOPER AND FINKELSTEIN JJ

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