James Tomkinson v A Raptis & Sons Pty Ltd

[2017] FWC 1779

[2017] FWC 1779

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.365—General protections

James Tomkinson
v
A. Raptis & Sons Pty Ltd
(C2017/236)

DEPUTY PRESIDENT LAWRENCE SYDNEY, 30 MARCH 2017

Application to deal with contraventions involving dismissal.

[1] On 13 January 2017 Mr James Tomkinson (the Applicant) lodged a General Protections application involving a dismissal pursuant to s.365 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act). The application alleged that the Applicant had been dismissed by A. Raptis & Sons Pty Ltd. (the Respondent).

[2] The Applicant says that he commenced employment with the Respondent on 10 August 2016. He was a marine engineer on a fishing boat out of Darwin. He says that he was dismissed on 21 September 2016 and the dismissal took effect on that day.

[3] The application was lodged 93 days out of time.

Alleged Contravention

[4] The Applicant submits that he was dismissed because he was unfairly targeted and blamed for some mechanical problems with the boat. A breach of s.340 is alleged. Sections 343 and 344 were also nominated in the application.

Respondent’s Submissions

[5] The Respondent denies these allegations and further denies that there has been a breach of the General Protections provisions of the Act.

[6] The Respondent says that the Applicant resigned his position and, in any event, he was a “share fisherman” (independent contractor) rather than an employee of the Respondent.

Relevant Legislation

[7] Section 366 of the Act provides:

366 Time for application

366(1) An application under section 365 must be made:

(a) within 21 days after the dismissal took effect; or
(b) within such further period as the FWC allows under subsection (2).

366(2) The FWC may allow a further period if the FWC is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, taking into account:

(a) the reason for the delay; and
(b) any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal; and
(c) prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); and
(d) the merits of the application; and
(e) fairness as between the person and other persons in a like position.”

Approach of the Commission

[8] The considerations relevant to the assessment of whether exceptional circumstances exist have been dealt with by Full Benches (see: McConell v A & PM Fornatoro t/a Tony’s Plumbing Service (2011) 202 IR 59; Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd (2011) 203 IR 1; (Nulty) and Robinson v Interstate Transport Pty Ltd (2011) FWAFB 2728). The following useful summary was provided in Nulty:

“[13] In summary, the expression "exceptional circumstances" has its ordinary meaning and requires consideration of all the circumstances. To be exceptional, circumstances must be out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon but need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare. Circumstances will not be exceptional if they are regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered. Exceptional circumstances can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. It is not correct to construe "exceptional circumstances" as being only some unexpected occurrence, although frequently it will be. Nor is it correct to construe the plural "circumstances" as if it were only a singular occurrence, even though it can be a one off situation. The ordinary and natural meaning of "exceptional circumstances" includes a combination of factors which, when viewed together, may reasonably be seen as producing a situation which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon.”

[9] The onus of establishing exceptional circumstances is on the Applicant who needs to provide a credible reason for the whole of the period that the application was delayed. (See: Cheval Properties Pty Ltd (t/as Penrith Hotel Motel) v Smithers [2010]197 IR 403).

[10] This point was emphasised by the Full Bench in the recent decision of Diotti v Lenswood Cold Stores Co-op Society t/a Lenswood Organic[2016] FWCFB 349 which, although concerned with the unfair dismissal application, contained the following statement, which is equally applicable to a s.365 application:

“[29] The appellant relies upon the Full Bench decision in Mitchell Shaw v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited T/A ANZ Bank[2015] FWCFB 287 (Shaw and ANZ), at paragraph [12] the majority decision states:

‘[12] This decision makes an important point which we consider deserves re-emphasising. The delay required to be considered is the period beyond the prescribed 21 day period for lodging an application. It does not include the period from the date of the dismissal to the end of the 21 day period. …’

[30] This extract must be read in its entirety. The decision goes on to state:

‘[12] … The circumstances from the time of the dismissal must be considered in order to determine whether there is a reason for the delay beyond the 21 day period and ultimately whether that reason constitutes exceptional circumstances.’

[31] Hence, the decision emphasised that while the delay to be considered is the period subsequent to the expiration of 21 days, the circumstances from the time of the dismissal must be considered in determining whether the reason for the delay constitutes exceptional circumstances. For example if an applicant is in hospital for the first 20 days of the 21 day period this would be a relevant consideration if the application was filed 2 days out of time as occurred in this matter. The reason for the delay by reference to the circumstances from the date the dismissal took effect is as expressed in Shaw and ANZ  the correct approach.”

Commission Proceedings

[11] On 2 February 2017, the parties were advised by the Fair Work Commission (the Commission) that the application had not been made within 21 days of the dismissal taking effect. Directions were issued for the filing of witness statements and submissions as to whether the Commission should grant further time for lodgement pursuant to s.366(2) of the Act. The matter was listed for hearing on 17 February 2017.

[12] The Applicant was self-represented. The Respondent was represented by Mr I. Thompson and Mr P. Robson.

Matters to be taken into account pursuant to s.366(2)

[13] In deciding whether to allow a further period for an application to be made the Commission must take into account the matters set out in s.366(2) above. I will deal with each of those matters separately.

(a) The reason for the delay

[14] The Applicant says that the reason he delayed lodging the application for such a long time was that he was waiting for his final pay and pay statement. Obviously this is not a reason which can be relied on by an applicant in justifying such a long period of delay.

[15] Accordingly, the reasons for delay cited by the Applicant fall short of establishing exceptional circumstances.

(b) Any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal

[16] There is no evidence of the Applicant taking steps to challenge the dismissal.

(c) Prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay)

[17] Given the overall facts, the Respondent would be prejudiced by the time and costs involved in further litigation.

(d) Merits of the application

[18] There are two issues which would need to be determined in this matter:

● Whether the Applicant was an employee of the Respondent;

● Whether the Applicant was dismissed or resigned.

[19] In addition, the Applicant does not, on the basis of the material filed, make out the basis of a General Protections application.

[20] I do not consider that the merits of the application give weight to the existence of exceptional circumstances.

(e) Fairness as between the person and other persons in a like position

[21] This factor was not addressed and has not been taken into account.

Conclusion and Order

[22] Having considered all of the factors set out in s.366(2), I am not satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances warranting the granting of a further period for the making of an application under s.366(2). Accordingly, the application is dismissed.

Order

Pursuant to s.587 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act), the application made by James Tomkinson under s.365 of the Act is dismissed.

DEPUTY PRESIDENT

Appearances:

J. Tomkinson, Applicant;

P. Robson with I. Thompson for the Respondent.

Hearing details:

Telephone Hearing:

2017

February 17.

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