by the sale of the schooner after the refusal of the defendant to take
delivery thereof.
The defence (so far as material to this report) was that time was of the essence of the contract and that the plaintiff was unable to deliver and did not deliver the vessel within the contract time, and that at all material times the plaintiff was not the registered owner of the vessel and was unable to give the defendant possession of and a title to the vessel; and that, consequently, the defendant had refused to proceed with the purchase of the vessel.
The contract was contained in certain letters and telegrams in which there was a stipulation that the vessel should leave Broome on a certain date, and on arrival at Fremantle should be delivered to the defendant. The vessel arrived at Fremantle on 28th Decem- ber 1918. At that time she was registered in Sydney in the name of Reginald Hocking, and the plaintiff had not taken, as it might have done, steps to put itself in a position to give a legal title to the defendant. The defendant refused to take delivery.
The action was heard by McMillan C.J., who, at the conclusion of the evidence, held that on the construction of the documents which had passed between the parties and from the nature of the transaction itself, time was of the essence of the contract; and that, as the plaintiff was not, on the arrival of the vessel at Fremantle, in a position to give the defendant a good title, the defendant was not bound to take delivery. His Honor, therefore, gave judgment for the defendant.
From this decision the plaintiff now appealed to the High Court, Downing (Draper, A.-G. for W.A., with him), for the appellant. The Court below should not have held that time was of the essence of this contract. If on the true construction of the documents the plaintiff was under an obligation to give title contemporaneously with delivery of the vessel, it was the duty of the defendant to tender the requisite bill of sale for execution by the plaintiff; in other words, the plaintiff's duty was to sign, the defendant's duty was to prepare, the instrument of transfer. As the defendant had not done this, it was immaterial whether the plaintiff could or could not have procured