Jakudo Pty Ltd v South Australian Telecasters Ltd

The appeal was brought by South Australian Telecasters Ltd (the appellant) against an interlocutory injunction granted by a single judge of the Supreme Court of South Australia. The injunction restrained the appellant from advertising, transmitting or otherwise publishing a television program concerning the respondent's nursing home. The injunction was granted on the application of the respondent, Jakudo Pty Ltd, which had instituted proceedings for defamation against the appellant. The Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia allowed the appeal and discharged the interlocutory injunction. The Court was of the opinion that the grant of interlocutory injunctions to restrain the publication of material alleged to be defamatory was not the subject of principles unique to that area of law. Instead, the same equitable principles applied in all cases. These principles involved determining whether there was a serious question to be tried as to the plaintiff's entitlement to relief, the plaintiff was likely to suffer irreparable injury for which damages would not be an adequate compensation unless an injunction was granted, and the balance of convenience favoured the granting of an injunction. The Court also considered the so-called "Polly Peck" principle, which held that a failure to justify a particular imputation would not result in the defendant being liable if that particular imputation was encompassed within the "common sting" of other defamatory allegations which were justified. The Court found that it was fairly arguable that the two imputations upon which the lower court relied fell within the general sting of the allegations in respect of which there was reason to think that the appellant might be able to prove truth. Alternatively, it was fairly arguable that there was material upon which it was reasonable to think that the appellant might be able to prove truth in respect of the two particular imputations. Therefore, the injunction should have been refused. The appeal was allowed, the interlocutory injunction was discharged, and the suppression orders made as part of the same order were also revoked. The Court wished to hear from the parties on the question of the costs of the application for the injunction and of the costs of the appeal.