Jain v Sydney Metro

[2024] NSWSC 387

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

Jain v Sydney Metro [2024] NSWSC 387

Hearing dates:

10 April 2024

Date of orders:

12 April 2024

Decision date:

12 April 2024

Jurisdiction:

Equity

Before:

Hammerschlag CJ in Eq

Decision:

(1) The application for relief in prayer 11 of the Summons is dismissed;

(2) I fix the balance of the Summons and the Cross-Summons for hearing before me commencing on 22 July 2024;

(3) The parties are, within 2 business days, to bring in short minutes providing for the filing and service by the plaintiffs of points of claim (which are to include a statement of the facts contended for by the plaintiffs, the propositions of law contended for by the plaintiffs, and the outcome of the application of the former to the latter), the filing and service by the defendants of points of defence (which are to include any further facts contended by either of them, and any propositions of law for which they contend), the filing and service by the plaintiffs of any points in reply, the service of any further evidence, written submissions and the preparation of a court book; and

(4) Liberty to apply on 48 hours’ notice.

Catchwords:

CIVIL PROCEDURE – Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) ss 149B, 149E – Application for transfer of proceedings instituted in this Court to the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales for the predominant purpose, not of seeking the substantive relief claimed in this Court, but of transferring the proceedings to that Court to have the outcome that that Court will have jurisdiction with respect to issues having arisen in proceedings in that Court in respect of which it may not have jurisdiction – Where no application is made to that Court to transfer the proceedings, or any part of them, in that Court to this Court – HELD the application for transfer should be refused because it is an abuse of the processes of this Court – HELD FURTHER that it is in any event not more appropriate for the proceedings to be heard in that Court than this one

Legislation Cited:

Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW)

Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW)

Land and Environment Court Act 1979 (NSW

Strata Schemes Development Act 2015 (NSW)

Strata Schemes Management Act 2015 (NSW)

Cases Cited:

Carre v Owners Corporation – Strata Plan 53020 (2003) 58 NSWLR 302

Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461; 67 ER 189

Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

Sukender Jain, Nitin Gupta, Duncan Fairweather, Ben Hewlett and Salvatore Cammarata (Plaintiffs / Cross-Defendants)

Sydney Metro ABN 12 354 063 515 (First Defendant)

Owners Corporation Strata Plan 58859 ABN 56 763 596 570 (Second Defendant / Cross-Claimant)

Representation:

Counsel:
M R Hall SC (Plaintiffs / Cross Defendants)
G A Sirtes SC / A C Hemmings / C D Norton (First Defendant)
H Grace (Second Defendant / Cross-Claimant)

Solicitors:
WKA Legal (Plaintiffs / Cross-Defendants)
Ashurst (First Defendant)
Bick & Steele (Second Defendant / Cross-Claimant)

File Number(s):

2024/00093199

Publication restriction:

Nil

JUDGMENT

SYNOPSIS

1. In 2019, the NSW Government announced that it would undertake the Sydney Metro West Project, a 24km railway line connecting Parramatta and the Sydney CBD, with a number of stations in between.

2. One of those stations, the Hunter Street Station, necessitated the acquisition of land at 37 Bligh Street, Sydney (the Land) on which stood a 14-storey building with two basement levels, which was held in strata title (the Scheme) under the Strata Schemes Management Act 2015 (NSW) and the Strata Schemes Development Act 2015 (NSW) (SSD Act).

3. The Scheme comprises 68 individual lots and common property.

4. This controversy arises out of the compulsory acquisition of the Land by the first defendant, Sydney Metro, an authority of the State.

5. Sydney Metro has settled compensation payable to all but seven lot owners. Those lot owners have commenced proceedings in the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales (L&E Court) challenging the Valuer-General’s assessment of the compensation payable to them.

6. On 1 September 2022, the Owners Corporation for the Scheme (the OC) (then still under the control of the lot holders) resolved to, and then lodged, a claim for compensation for dispossession of the entirety of the common property of the Scheme. The assertion is that the common property, in its entirety, is itself worth some $60 million because the highest and best use of the Land is full redevelopment. The compensation assessed and paid under the settlements was for the value of the individual lots, together with their share in the common property. The contention is that each lot owner should get an aliquot share of the value of the entire building on a redevelopment basis, rather than the value of their individual lot, together with its share in the common property. I express no view as to the merits of this contention.

7. The next day, 2 September 2022, Sydney Metro compulsorily acquired all the lots and the common property. It elected for the Scheme nevertheless to continue (for which the SSD Act makes provision). From the date of its acquisition, the OC came under its control as the sole owner of the Land (and, for that matter, each existing lot and the common property of the Scheme).

8. On 3 November 2022, the Valuer-General valued the common property, on its own, at nil.

9. On 30 January 2023, although control of the OC had passed to Sydney Metro, erstwhile individual members of the OC Committee (the Committee) initiated Class 3 proceedings in the L&E Court challenging the Valuer-General’s assessment. The Committee members were Messrs Sukender Jain, Nitin Gupta, Duncan Fairweather, Ben Hewlett and Salvatore Cammarata. They cited as the Applicant the OC and/or each of themselves individually “on behalf of the Former Owners Corporation constituted by the Former Owners of Strata Plan No 58859”.

10. Sydney Metro and the OC, then and now controlled by Sydney Metro, took the stance that the Committee had no right to represent the OC in its own name or in theirs. The OC filed a Notice of Change of Solicitor.

11. Sydney Metro and the OC each filed motions in the L&E Court seeking orders which, if granted, would have the effect of bringing the proceedings to an end.

12. For their part, on 5 October 2023, the Committee filed a Notice of Motion, purportedly on behalf of the OC and themselves as Applicant, seeking a series of orders including an order that the proceedings continue with the Applicant being named as the OC with such title being taken to mean the OC as constituted by all of those lot owners whose lots had been compulsorily acquired which they defined as “Dispossessed Owners”. They also sought an order that the Notice of Change of Solicitor is void and of no effect, and an order granting leave to the Committee or to such additional or alternative Dispossessed Owners as the Court may appoint or direct to prosecute the proceedings on behalf of the OC.

13. The motions came before Duggan J in the L&E Court on 4 March 2024. Her Honour (unsurprisingly) questioned the jurisdiction of that Court to make the orders sought by the Committee. Upon an undertaking by the Committee to initiate proceedings in this Court, Her Honour stood the motions over to 16 April 2024, part-heard. It is fair to say that it was in contemplation that there would be an application to this Court to transfer those proceedings to the L&E Court.

14. By Summons sued out of this Court on 11 March 2024, the Committee initiated proceedings containing a comprehensive set of prayers for relief designed to determine that they have, or should be given, standing to prosecute the OC’s claim in the L&E Court. The terms ‘Committee’ and ‘plaintiffs’ are hereafter used interchangeably.

15. The Summons contains a prayer (paragraph 11) that the Court order, pursuant to s 149B of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) (CPA), that the proceedings in this Court be transferred to the L&E Court.

16. It is apt to set out ss 149B and 149E CPA.

17. Section 149B provides:

149B   Transfer of proceedings between Supreme Court and Land and Environment Court

(1)   If either the Supreme Court or the Land and Environment Court is satisfied, in relation to proceedings before it, that it is more appropriate for the proceedings to be heard in the other court, it may, on application by a party to the proceedings or of its own motion, order that the proceedings be transferred to the other court.

(2)   If either the Supreme Court or the Land and Environment Court is satisfied, in relation to proceedings before it, that—

(a)   there are related proceedings pending in the other court, and

(b)   it is more appropriate for the proceedings to be heard, together with the related proceedings, in the other court,

it may, on application by a party to the proceedings or of its own motion, order that the proceedings be transferred to the other court and heard together with the related proceedings.

(3)   No appeal lies against a decision of the transferor court to make, or not to make, an order under this section.

18. Section 149E provides:

149E   Jurisdiction of transferee court

The transferee court has, and may exercise, all of the jurisdiction of the transferor court in relation to any proceedings to which a transfer order relates, including jurisdiction to determine any question arising in any such proceedings.

19. As is readily apparent, if this Court transfers the proceedings to the L&E Court, that Court may exercise jurisdiction which it otherwise does not have. The only relief presently sought by the plaintiffs is the transfer. It is not in dispute that the proceedings in this Court were instituted for the predominant purpose of conferring that jurisdiction on the L&E Court to deal with the Committee’s motion.

20. For the reasons which follow, I decline to transfer these proceedings to the L&E Court.

21. I make no finding as the jurisdiction of the L&E Court to determine any matter before it.

BACKGROUND

22. For ease of understanding, the following chronology repeats some of the matters referred to in the preceding introduction.

Compulsory Acquisition

23. Part 2 of the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW) (the Just Terms Act) contains provisions for the acquisition of land by compulsory process.

24. References below to parts and sections are, unless otherwise stated or the context indicates differently, references to parts and sections of the Just Terms Act.

25. Section 10A makes provision for a minimum period of negotiation for acquisition by agreement before the initiation of the compulsory acquisition process.

26. Sections 11 and 12 make provision for the authority of the State proposing to acquire land to give a proposed acquisition notice.

27. In July 2021, at a time when it did not own any of the lots, Sydney Metro initiated negotiations with each lot owner with a view to reaching agreement on the terms of acquisition.

28. On or about 11 May 2022, Sydney Metro gave a proposed acquisition notice to the OC and the lot owners.

29. On 17 August 2022, the Committee convened an Extraordinary General Meeting of the Owners to be held on 26 August 2022 for the purpose of passing a number of special resolutions including that the OC make a claim for compensation under the Just Terms Act. The drafting of the instrument is infelicitous but it is clear that it intended to appoint the OC and the Committee as agents for and on behalf of all owners to engage lawyers for the purposes of the claim.

30. On 22 August 2022, the Committee resolved to approve agreements for the retention of solicitors WKA Legal and to prepare the motions for the upcoming Extraordinary General Meeting.

31. The convened meeting was held on 26 August 2022 and the resolutions were passed.

32. On 1 September 2022, the OC, then represented by WKA Legal, made a claim for compensation in the amount of $25,460,000, later amended to $61,182,283.76, to the Valuer-General and Sydney Metro in respect of the common property of the Scheme (see s 39 of the Just Terms Act).

33. By 2 September 2022, Sydney Metro had, by agreement, acquired 18 lots via off-market sales and had entered into contracts to buy a further 41 lots. Nine lots were left.

34. On 2 September 2022 by Government Gazette no. 405, Sydney Metro compulsorily acquired all lots and the common property of the Scheme. Under s 114(2) of the SSD Act, Sydney Metro elected that all lots and the common property remain in the Scheme.

35. On 3 November 2022, the Valuer-General determined the OC’s claim for compensation as nil.

36. On 20 January 2023, all members of the Committee resigned their offices and a nominee of Sydney Metro was appointed as the strata committee.

The Land and Environment Court Proceedings

37. On 30 January 2023, the Committee commenced the L&E Court proceedings in Class 3 of the jurisdiction of that Court seeking an order that, in accordance with the Just Terms Act, compensation is payable by Sydney Metro to the Applicants in the amount of $61,247,121.

38. I interpolate that the Plaintiffs now accept that the only proper Applicant in the L&E Court can be the OC itself. This is plainly correct. The citation of a party as individuals on behalf of the Former Owners Corporation constituted by the Former Owners of Strata Plan 58859 invokes a concept unknown to the law.

39. At a first directions hearing in the L&E Court, Sydney Metro objected to the Committee using the name of the OC, which was by then controlled entirely by Sydney Metro. It took the position that the Committee had no legal standing to act for the OC.

40. There were various later directions hearings.

41. On 1 September 2023, at a General Meeting of the OC (under the control of Sydney Metro), it was resolved to terminate all arrangements appointing WKA Legal and to appoint other solicitors to act for the OC.

42. On 7 September 2023, Bick & Steele filed and served a Notice of Change of Solicitor, thereby becoming the solicitors for the OC.

43. On 15 September 2023, the OC (under the control of Sydney Metro) filed a Notice of Motion seeking leave to discontinue the proceedings on the basis that there be no order as to costs, or that the OC be removed as an Applicant.

44. On 5 October 2023, the Committee filed their Notice of Motion referred to earlier.

45. On 2 November 2023, the L&E Court fixed the principal proceedings for hearing to commence on 26 August 2024 for four weeks. The proceedings by the lot owners who have not settled with Sydney Metro are, I was informed from the Bar table, to be heard at that time.

46. On 8 December 2023, Sydney Metro filed a Notice of Motion seeking that the proceedings be struck out and dismissed so far as the individual plaintiffs are said to be acting on behalf of the Former Owners Corporation constituted by the Former Owners of Strata Plan no. 58859.

47. As referred to earlier, when the matter came before Duggan J on 4 March 2024, Her Honour expressed reservations as to whether that Court had jurisdiction under ss 16 and 25 of the Land and Environment Court Act 1979 (NSW) to grant the relief claimed by the Applicants in their Notice of Motion.

48. Her Honour adjourned the motions part heard on the undertaking by the plaintiffs that they would commence proceedings in this Court within seven days.

The Proceedings in this Court

49. On 11 March 2024, there was sued out of this Court a Summons citing the Committee members as plaintiffs, Sydney Metro as first defendant and the OC as second defendant. Although it will contribute to the prolixity of this judgment, it is appropriate to set out in full the final relief claimed in the Summons:

1   An order that for the purposes of the Land & Environment Court Proceeding 2023/00031538 (the ‘LEC Proceeding’), the defendants must treat the Second Defendant Owners Corporation as being either constituted by the dispossessed owners of lots in SP58859 whose lots were acquired by Sydney Metro by any means (Dispossessed Lot Owners) or obliged to act in accordance with their instructions.

2 A declaration that on a true construction of section 118(b) of the Strata Schemes Development Act, 2015 (SSDA), on the date of the public announcement or such other date as the Court determines, for the purposes of any claim for or the payment of compensation for the acquisition of the common property in SP 58859: (i) a trust was imposed upon the Owners Corporation of Strata Plan 58859 for the benefit of the Dispossessed Lot Owners and that (ii) the Owners Corporation as constituted by those Lot Owners is authorised to maintain the proceedings in the name of Owners Corporation Strata Plan 58859 as trustee for the Dispossessed Lot Owners.

3   In the alternative, a declaration that on their true construction the resolutions of the Owners Corporation of 22 and 26 August 2022, the Owners Corporation assigned all of its right, title and interest in the Owners Corporation’s claim for compensation (Claim) to the members of the Strata Committee jointly as assignees and/or trustees of the Claim.

4   In the further alternative, a declaration that for the purposes of any claim for or the payment of compensation for the acquisition of the common property of Strata Plan 58859 the Second Defendant (Sydney Metro Owners Corporation) (SMOC) is constituted by, or is obliged to follow the resolutions of the Dispossessed Lot Owners (and of the Strata Committee elected by them).

5   In the further alternative, a declaration that the Second Defendant, SMOC, and/or the First Defendant, Sydney Metro, holds upon trust for the Dispossessed Lot Owners:

(a)   any claim to compensation (including but not limited to the Claim) for the compulsory acquisition of the Common Property in Strata Plan SP58859 by Sydney Metro on 2 September 2022,

(b) any right to object to the amount of compensation with respect to the any claim for that acquisition under ss.66 or 67 of the Just Terms Act, and

(c)   any compensation received with respect to any claim.

6   An order that Sydney Metro and the SMOC be restrained from taking any step, whether by Sydney Metro exercising its voting rights in meetings of the SMOC or otherwise, to terminate, or otherwise interfere with in the SMOC’s conduct of the LEC Proceedings.

7   In the further alternative to the above, grant leave to the Plaintiffs or to such additional or alternative Dispossessed Lot Owners as the Court may appoint or direct, to prosecute the proceeding for and on behalf of the Second Defendant, SMOC:

a.   As assignees of that claim from the First or Second Defendant;

b.   As trustees of the claim; and/or

c.   As a derivative action.

8   An order that the Owners Corporation or the Plaintiffs or such other persons or entities acting in the name of the Owners Corporation (as the case may be) after the determination at the final hearing of compensation payable to the Owners Corporation be given Judicial Advice under section 63 of the Trustee Act prior to distributing any compensation monies paid to the Owners Corporation and to that end serve on each former or Dispossessed Lot Owner a copy of the application for Judicial Advice and any material in support.

9 Any such other orders as the Court deems appropriate to give effect to the above orders or to provide to the Plaintiffs or the Owners Corporation as constituted by the Dispossessed Lot Owners, or to the Dispossessed Lot Owners or any of them any relief available to them in this Court as Applicants in the LEC Proceedings so as to fully and finally determine the compensation payable to the Owners Corporation and/or the Dispossessed Lot Owners under the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (Just Terms Act) and the SSDA and any related legislation.

10   An order that the costs of this Summons be costs in the Land & Environment Court proceeding numbered 2023/00031538.

11 An order pursuant to s 149B of the Civil Procedure Act that this proceeding be transferred to the Land & Environment Court of NSW.

50. On 27 March 2024, the OC (controlled by Sydney Metro) filed a Cross-Summons, seeking an order that there be determined as a separate question the validity of resolutions ostensibly passed at an Extraordinary General Meeting of the OC on 26 August 2022, and claiming substantive relief in the form of a declaration that those resolutions are invalid. The OC moves for an order for separate determination of that question.

CONSIDERATION

51. The Court received written submissions from all parties and heard oral argument on the application.

52. Despite the complexity of the drafting of the Summons, the plaintiffs’ oral argument revealed that the bases upon which they say they have or should be given leave to motivate the L&E Court proceedings on behalf of the OC are that:

1. the resolutions passed by the Committee on 26 August 2022, on their proper construction, effected an assignment to all of the erstwhile lot owners generally, or the erstwhile Committee, of the OC’s claim in the L&E Court proceedings;

2. the lot owners generally or the erstwhile Committee are trustees of the chose in action the subject of the L&E Court proceedings; and

3. the Court should make orders (Foss v Harbottle [1] or derivative action orders) that the (erstwhile) Committee be at liberty to prosecute, on behalf of the OC, the proceedings in the L&E Court.

   1. (1843) 2 Hare 461; 67 ER 189.

53. It was argued on behalf of the plaintiffs that factors favouring the transfer to the L&E Court are that:

1. there should not be a “bifurcation” of the motions in the L&E Court and the principal proceedings in that Court because the motions before Duggan J are part-heard and the benefit of Her Honour’s exertions in hearing the motions to this point will be lost;

2. the proceedings in this Court and the motions are interrelated;

3. the proceedings in this Court and the principal proceedings in the L&E Court are intimately related;

4. the L&E Court is a specialist Court with respect to the principal proceedings and there are a number of related proceedings pending in that Court and set down to be heard together with the principal proceedings;

5. the usual costs regime in Class 3 applications is that each party bears their own costs and the plaintiffs may lose the benefit of such a presumption if the proceedings are not transferred to the L&E Court; and

6. there is detriment to the plaintiffs in having to be parties to two sets of proceedings in different courts.

54. There is no doubt that the proceedings initiated in this Court bear a close factual relationship with the plaintiffs’ motion in the L&E Court. They were commenced because of the very existence of that motion and to cure a real or perceived difficulty with that Court’s jurisdiction to deal with the motion.

55. It was argued on behalf of the OC that they are not related proceedings within the meaning of s 149B(2)(a) CPA because related proceedings means proceedings in the other Court in which that Court has jurisdiction whereas, here, the L&E Court does not have jurisdiction in respect of the motion. It is not necessary to decide this. I do, however, have significant doubt that where the section refers to “related proceedings pending in the other court”, that this means proceedings which have been commenced for the purpose of creating such a relationship to enliven the operation of the section.

56. The following exchange occurred between the Court and Senior Counsel for the plaintiffs:

HIS HONOUR: All right. Can I ask you to give me some assistance on this proposition, in your summons you've got all of the final relief set out which is intended to reflect the contentions which I referred to in your paragraph 14 of your outline.

HALL: That is correct.

HIS HONOUR: And the only prayer that you're moving for is an order under section 149B?

HALL: Yes.

HIS HONOUR: So the irresistible inference, is it not, that the plaintiffs on issuing of these proceedings have no intention of asking this Court for any of the final relief apart from 11 and that the purpose of the summons is, and there's no criticism in this, that the purpose of the summons is to cross‑vest, using the term neutrally, these proceedings to the Land and Environment Court so as to give that court jurisdiction to determine the matters in 14 under section 149E of the Civil Procedure Act?

HALL: There's no disguising any of that except for this proposition your Honour. If we find ourselves unable to cross‑vest the matter and her Honour Duggan J determines in a week's time that without jurisdiction she cannot uphold any of our relief, then I have to come back here and ask this court to do it for me.

57. The only part of the Summons which the plaintiffs intended to motivate, at the time the proceedings were commenced and now, was the order seeking transfer. Their fallback position might be that, if they have to (meaning that if they fail in an attempt to persuade the L&E Court that it has jurisdiction), they will move for the rest of the relief claimed in the Summons, but their predominant motive in commencing proceedings in this Court was, I find, to have only the transfer application dealt with, not the substantive relief. Indeed, their intention was to have the substantive relief not dealt with by this Court.

58. I consider that the Summons is being used for a predominant purpose other than that for which the proceedings embodied in the Summons must be taken to have been designed and exist: Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509, 522, namely, obtaining substantive relief to enable the plaintiffs’ camp to procure that the OC prosecutes the claim they say it has. This makes the present application an abuse of process. This is so even though there might otherwise exist circumstances constituting sufficient reason under s 149B to transfer the proceedings to the L&E Court.

59. This is enough, on its own, to warrant the Court declining to transfer the proceedings. The Court declines to do so.

60. However, even if it was not an abuse of process, I am not satisfied that it would be more appropriate for the Summons to be heard in the L&E Court than in this Court.

61. The transcript of proceedings before Duggan J on 4 March 2024 reveals that Her Honour (as would I, had I been in Her Honour’s position) was entitled to receive significant further assistance with respect to the motions, before Her Honour would have fairly been in a position to have been able to deal with them. As to jurisdiction, Her Honour appears not to have received comprehensive submissions on that subject. In light of my refusal to transfer the proceedings and noting that I will fix the Summons to be heard by me on 22 July 2024, it is a matter entirely for Her Honour whether she entertains any argument on jurisdiction before I deal with the Summons. If Her Honour entertains that argument and by 22 July 2024 has either delivered judgment finding jurisdiction or is reserved, it is close to inevitable that I will vacate the hearing.

62. I do observe that it appears to be implicit from what counsel said in the exchange quoted earlier, that the plaintiffs intend to argue that the L&E Court has jurisdiction to determine the motions. This raises the spectre that the remainder of the Summons might become an abuse of process if the L&E Court finds that it has jurisdiction and the Summons remains on foot.

63. Having regard to the written and oral submissions before me, I do not consider that I am in a less advantageous position to deal with the Summons than Her Honour would be. Indeed, given that the plaintiffs’ motion before Her Honour differs materially from the Summons, it might be thought that I am presently in a better position to deal with it.

64. The Summons, it seems to me, raises issues which are discrete from those in the principal proceedings, and it is my intention, if I am in a position to do so, to deliver judgment on the Summons well before the proposed start date of the principal proceedings (if that date is maintained). I do not consider that there is any disadvantage to the parties in this Court dealing with the Summons, or that there is any detriment to the parties having two sets of proceedings in different courts.

65. I do not accept the plaintiffs’ submission that the different costs regime in the L&E Court is a material factor favouring transfer. Firstly, costs in this Court are entirely within its discretion. Secondly, I have significant doubt that the underlying policy for the general costs regime in Class 3 proceedings has any application where matters such as those in the Summons (including a claim for leave to bring a derivative action) are in play. Traditionally, a party who seeks to bring derivative relief must indemnify the relevant corporation in respect of its costs.

66. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, matters involving the construction of corporate resolutions, the existence or otherwise of trusts and their terms, and applications for leave to bring derivative actions are matters routinely dealt with by specialist judges in this Division of the Court. In connection with Foss v Harbottle combined with strata title, see for example Carre v Owners Corporation – Strata Plan 53020 (2003) 58 NSWLR 302 per Barrett J.

67. I do not in any way, however, diminish the competence of judges in the L&E Court to deal with any matter properly before that Court. Rather, I am merely not satisfied that it is more appropriate that that Court deal with the Summons.

CONCLUSION

68. I make the following orders:

1. The application for relief in prayer 11 of the Summons is dismissed;

2. I fix the balance of the Summons and the Cross-Summons for hearing before me commencing on 22 July 2024;

3. The parties are, within 2 business days, to bring in short minutes providing for the filing and service by the plaintiffs of points of claim (which are to include a statement of the facts contended for by the plaintiffs, the propositions of law contended for by the plaintiffs, and the outcome of the application of the former to the latter), the filing and service by the defendants of points of defence (which are to include any further facts contended by either of them, and any propositions of law for which they contend), the filing and service by the plaintiffs of any points in reply, the service of any further evidence, written submissions, and the preparation of a court book; and

4. Liberty to apply on 48 hours’ notice.

69. The exhibits are to be returned.

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Endnote

Decision last updated: 12 April 2024