Jaeger & Laidley
[2022] FedCFamC2F 1744
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia
(DIVISION 2)
Jaeger & Laidley [2022] FedCFamC2F 1744
File number(s): ADC 2141 of 2019 Judgment of: JUDGE BROWN Date of judgment: 15 December 2022 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – Interim Parenting proceedings – 3 children aged 10, 8 and 7 – where one child is in the care of the Minister – care arrangements for the 2 children – where parents have no capacity to co-parent – children in the full time care of the father pending involvement of the Department for Child Protection following allegation of physical abuse – mother seeks to spend unsupervised overnight time – father proposes supervised time – absence of any agreed lay supervisor – assessment of risk – matters to be considered – best interests Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Pt VII, ss 4(1), 60B, 60CA, 60CC, 61DA, 68L Cases cited: B & B (1988) FLC 91- 957
Deiter & Deiter [2011] FamCAFC 82
Eaby & Speelman (2015) FLC 93-654
Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 92-286
Jurchenko & Foster (2014) 51 Fam LR 588
M & M (1988) FLC 91-979
Marvel & Marvel (No 2) [2010] FamCAFC 101
Mazorski v Albright (2007) 37 Fam LR 518
Slater & Light [2013] FamCAFC 4
SS v AH [2010] FamCAFC 13 at [100]
W & W (abuse allegations: unacceptable risk) [2005] FamCA 892
Division: Division 2 Family Law Number of paragraphs: 131 Date of hearing: 8 December 2022 Place: Adelaide Solicitor for the Applicant: Ms O’Brien, Legal Services Commission of SA Solicitor for the Respondent: Mr Gallasch, Dixon Gallasch Pty Ltd Counsel for the Independent Children’s Lawyer: Mr McQuade Solicitor for the Independent Children’s Lawyer: The Family Law Project Representative for the Department for Child Protection: Ms Holden ORDERS
ADC 2141 of 2019 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: MR JAEGER
Applicant
AND: MS LAIDLEY
Respondent
and: INDEPENDENT CHILDREN'S LAWYER
order made by:
JUDGE BROWN
DATE OF ORDER:
15 December 2022
UPON NOTING THAT:
A.If in any proceedings there are allegations of family violence and the provisions of section 102NA of the Family Law Act 1975 apply, any unrepresented party will not be permitted to personally cross-examine the other party/parties.
B.Affected unrepresented parties may apply to the Commonwealth Family Violence and Cross-Examination of Parties Scheme (“the Scheme”) for representation but any such application must be made at least 12 weeks prior to the final hearing.
C.Further information about the legislation and the Scheme can be found at Part 4 of the Family Violence Information Sheet.
D.If s102NA applies and a party becomes unrepresented after trial directions have been made, that party is required to promptly advise the Court.
THE COURT ORDERS THAT Until further or other order:
1.That the children of the relationship X, born in 2012 and Y, born in 2013 (“the children”) live with the father.
2.That all previous orders in respect of the parenting of the children be discharged.
3.That within 7 days the parties enrol with a Children’s Contact Service as agreed between the parties or failing agreement as nominated by the Independent Children’s Lawyer.
4.Upon the conclusion of six (6) visits the mother obtain, file and serve an Observational Report from the Children’s Contact Service at her sole expense.
5.That both parties be restrained and injunctions are hereby granted restraining them from:
(a)Physically disciplining the children or allowing any other person to do so;
(b)Discussing the matters raised in these proceedings or the Department for Child Protection investigation in the presence or hearing of the children or from allowing any other person to do so;
(c)Abusing, criticising or denigrating the other party in the presence or hearing of the children or from allowing any other person to do so.
6.Pursuant to s 62G(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), the parties and the children attend upon Ms B, a Family Consultant appointed under Regulation 7, (referred to as the Family Consultant) for the purposes of the preparation of an Updated Family Report, such report to be released by 31 April 2023 and that the family report address:
(a)any views expressed by the children and any matters (such as the children maturity or level of understanding) that would affect the weight that the court should place on those views;
(b)the matters set out in ss 60CC, 61DA and 65DAA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth);
(c)the impact upon the children and upon their relationship with the mother if the Court made orders as sought by the father;
(d)the impact upon the children and upon their relationship with the father if the Court made orders as sought by the mother;
(e)any other matters that the Family Consultant considers important to the welfare or best interests of the children.
7.Not later than 4.00 pm on 22 December 2022 the parties must provide their contact telephone numbers and email addresses to Final[email protected].
8.Each party will do all things necessary to ensure the children attend upon to the Family Consultant pursuant to Section 62G(3A), unless otherwise determined by the Court Child Expert that Section 62G(3B) applies.
9.The parties and the children shall attend for interviews at such times, dates and places, and by such means as the Family Consultant may advise.
10.The Family Consultant shall be at liberty to inspect any material filed by the parties or material produced to the Court by the Department for Child Protection throughout these proceedings.
11.Upon the family report being provided to the Court, the Court will release the report and provide a copy to each party (or if represented, the party’s lawyer) and to any Independent Children’s Lawyer in the proceedings.
12.Unless a party objects in writing within 14 days of the date of releasing the family report, a copy of the family report may further be provided to the following, if the Court is requested to do so for a purpose related to the care, welfare or development of the children:
(a)a Children’s Court;
(b)a child protection authority;
(c)a State or Territory legal aid authority; and
(d)a convener of any legal dispute resolution conference.
13.Unless otherwise ordered, no person shall release the family report, or provide access to the family report to any other person.
14.This matter be listed for final hearing before Judge Brown on 31 July, 1 & 2 August 2023 at 10.00am NOTING 3 days hearing time has been allocated and will not be exceeded without leave of the Court.
15.Further consideration of the matter is adjourned to 8 May 2023 at 9:30am for trial directions NOTING the proceedings will be conducted face to face at Court.
16.The Application in a Proceeding filed by the applicant on 7 November 2022 is dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym Jaeger & Laidley has been approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE BROWN:
INTRODUCTION
These are interim parenting proceedings relating to two children – X born in 2012; and Y (“Y”) born in 2013. The parties to the proceedings are the children’s parents – their father, Mr Jaeger and their mother, Ms Laidley.
The proceedings have been on foot, in one form or another, since May 2019. During this period, each of the parties has made serious allegations that the other represents a serious level of risk to the children. The immediate task for the court, in the context of the current proceedings, is to assess this risk and put in place a proportionate response to the degree of risk it so assess.
Currently, the father asserts that the mother’s recent conduct, in the context of Y having sustained unexplained bruising, warrants her having only rigorously professionally supervised time with the children. The major consequence of such an outcome, will be that neither child will interact with their mother for a period of approximately six months or perhaps more.
There is no controversy that the mother has provided the vast majority of care for both children until recently. As such, she asserts that it will be emotionally debilitating for both children if their significant relationship with her is severed for such an extended period of time, particularly given the origin of Y’s bruising remains unexplained and she denies being involved in inflicting any injury.
Not only in this context, but also due to the fact that both the father and the mother have experienced difficulties in parenting in the past, leading each to make significant allegations of abusive care of the children by the other, the family is well known to the authorities. As a consequence, the court has sought assistance from the South Australian state government department charged with the responsibility for protecting children in the state – the Department for Child Protection[1] to assist it in the making of appropriate orders over many years.
[1] Hereinafter referred to as “DCP” or “the Department”.
To the credit of the DCP this assistance has been readily forthcoming and, as a consequence, the court has been provided with many reports detailing the extent of involvement of various workers with the family concerned. However, the Department has rejected the court’s invitation to become a formal party to the proceedings.
In the context of the parties’ child protection involvement, it is necessary to indicate that they are the parents of third child – Z born in 2015. Z has been diagnosed with autism and is non-verbal. He has been placed in the permanent care of the department due to him sustaining unexplained injuries.
The first report from DCP to the court occurred in March of 2021. The department reported as follows:
There is significant child protection history for [X], [Y] and [Z] dating back to 2013, with reported concerns primarily relating to domestic violence perpetrated by the mother [Ms Laidley], towards the father, [Mr Jaeger], [Ms Laidley] exposing the children to chronic and ongoing neglect, alleged inflicted injuries and bruising, the children having developed an insecure attachment with [Ms Laidley] and [Ms Laidley]’s inability to manage the children’s complex behaviour.
The department initiated an investigative response in September 2020 in relation to Z retuning from [Mr Jaeger]’s care with significant bruising. The department substantiated ‘unexplained injury’ in relation to [Mr Jaeger] and identified the children as being at risk in [Mr Jaeger]’s care. [Ms Laidley] was identified as being protective at this time and the department proceeded to case closure. A second investigative response was initiated in November 2020 in relation to further bruising identified on [Z], however it was assessed that this brusing (sic) was likely a result of the children’s rough playing/fighting.[2]
[2] See report from DCP dated 18 March 2021.
Given these issues, on 11 May 2021, an order was made that all three children be independently represented in these proceedings pursuant to the provisions of section 68L of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).[3] The Independent Children’s Lawyer is to be regarded as party of equal standing to each of the parents in the case.
[3] Hereinafter referred to as “the Act”.
BACKGROUND
Prior to summarising the procedural history of this complicated matter, it is necessary to delineate the current areas of dispute between the parties. On 27 October 2022, DCP received a notification that Y had presented to school with significant bruising on his arm. It was the department’s view that, given Y had last interacted with Mr Jaeger on 16 October 2022, the injuries could not have occurred whilst the child was in his father’s care.
In these circumstances, the department assessed X and Y as being at imminent risk of harm and neglect in the care of their mother. As a consequence, they placed the children in their father’s care, pursuant to an informal Safety Plan. Subsequently, the department has provided several reports to the court. Y himself has been medically examined and has been interviewed. However, Y has also been diagnosed with autism and has issues with communication.
X and Y have not interacted with their mother since 27 October 2022. For various reasons, Ms Laidley does not trust the department and its workers and is extraordinarily reluctant to engage with them.
In the past, the department has expressed concerns about the parenting capacity of both Mr Jaeger and Ms Laidley, each of whom has been described as having some level of intellectual disability. Ms Laidley has rebuffed overtures provided to her, by the department, to spend periods of time, with the children, subject to departmental supervision.
For his part, recently, Mr Jaeger has described to departmental workers his significant difficulties with managing the children’s behaviour in his home, particularly X, who has also been diagnosed with behavioural issues.
It is Ms Laidley’s position that neither she nor her husband, Mr C, were involved in inflicting the bruising observed on Y. Initially, she sought the immediate return of the children to her care on the basis that she had been their primary carer since the time of each of their respective births.
However, at the present time, she seeks to be able to spend overnight weekend time with the children. She opposes any need for this time to be subject to any form of supervision. In any event, given the ill health of her mother, it is her position that she has no one available to her to provide any such supervision, other than her husband. Mr C is not acceptable, as a supervisor, either to Mr Jaeger or the department, given that he was present in the household, when Y was bruised.
For his part, Mr Jaeger asserts that any time between the children and their mother needs to be subject to rigorous independent supervision. In the absence of an acceptable lay supervisor, and the refusal of Ms Laidley to be involved with the department, this leaves only a Children’s Contact Centre (“CCC”), as a means for X and Y to interact with their mother. At present, the waiting time for the most accessible CCC, at Suburb D, is approximately 14 weeks.
Accordingly, the dilemma presented by the case is that if the court adopts the father’s proposal, it will mean that the children will not be able to spend time with their mother for a period approaching six months. On any view, this must have significant implications for the nature of their relationship with her. Ms Laidley asserts that it must be the case that the children are missing her and their home, particularly their animals.
Accordingly, this case is centred on risk and its assessment, in the context of a provisional hearing, in which evidence is necessarily limited. On the one hand, there is the risk that the children may suffer some species of harm, if they intersect with their mother in the absence of some form of safeguard.
On the other hand, there is also the risk that the children will lose, or have damaged, their relationship with a person who is significant to their long term welfare and development, namely their mother, on the basis of allegations, which are incapable of definitive substantiation one way or the other.
This is not the end of Mr Jaeger’s concerns in respect of the mother’s interaction with the children. It is his case that Ms Laidley, due to her longstanding animosity for him, is incapable of supporting the children’s relationship with him and will do whatever she can to sabotage that relationship, including enmeshing the children in the parental conflict.
In addition, it is his position that Ms Laidley lacks parental insight and has no capacity to accept professional assistance, which she and the children sorely need, given their significant level of disability. Accordingly, it is his position that the mother’s rejection of professional assistance is another element of the risk, which she represents to the children.
It is Mr Jaeger’s case that he is willing to work with both the department and the various professionals, who have hitherto been involved with the family; whereas Ms Laidley is not. At this stage, the department shares this assessment and its recent reports have been supportive of Mr Jaeger remaining the children’s primary carer.
The Independent Children’s Lawyer is Ms Shaya Lewis-Dermody, an experienced Adelaide family lawyer. She has briefed Mr McQuade to appear on her behalf at this hearing. Pursuant to the provisions of section 68L of the Act, Ms Lewis-Dermody and Mr McQuade are required to assess all the evidence available to them and then advocate to the court the outcome, which they consider will best serve the interests of the children.
At this stage, problematic as it is, Mr McQuade supports, the father’s position in the case, as does the department. From the mother’s perspective, she is aggrieved that the department has apparently taken against her on such a flimsy pretext. She refutes the suggestion that she is not open to receiving professional assistance for Y and X. She characterises Mr Jaeger as the compromised parent.
Most significantly, she asserts that to up-end the long-standing care arrangements for the children and remove them from the home environments and the pets with which they are familiar, cannot be in their best interests. It is her position that it is axiomatic that they must be missing her and be emotionally traumatised as a consequence of what she would characterise as the department’s heavy-handed and biased intervention.
CHRONOLOGY
The father was born in 1984. The mother was born in 1987. The parties began to live together in April 2012 and separated on a final basis in January 2015. After the parties separated, the father moved to Canberra in April 2015 and remained there until February 2016. During this period, he spent no time with the children.
The father commenced proceedings, in this court, on 28 May 2019. He did not seek to upturn the longstanding arrangement, which saw the children living predominately with their mother. Rather, he sought to spend time with the children, on an incrementally increasing basis, until he had overnight alternate weekend time with them, along with extended periods, during school holidays.
In April of 2017, the mother began to live with her now husband, Mr C, whom she met online. Mr C originates from the Country E. It is the father’s case that he was instrumental in the mother ceasing his time with the children.
The mother was served with the father’s application on 6 June 2019. However, she did not file responding documents until March of 2020. However, in October of 2019, she agreed, via her solicitor, to the father commencing to spend time with all three children, for 6 hours on Saturdays. The parties were also directed to attend a Legal Services Commission Family Dispute Conference on 12 February 2020.
The time envisaged in the orders of 9 October 2019 did not proceed without difficulty. It is Mr Jaeger’s case that the mother was non-compliant with the orders he himself acknowledged difficulties with supervising both Y and Z, due to their respective behavioural issues, resulting from their autism.
In October of 2020, Z apparently suffered bruising to his right cheek, whilst in his father’s care. Thereafter, the mother made a notification to the department regarding this incident and the mother suspended the father’s time with the children.
Given the difficult parental dynamic between the parties, on 25 August 2020, the court had ordered that a family report be prepared. Its author was Ms B, who released her report on 11 January 2021. She reported that DCP found that Z had sustained an unexplained injury, whilst in his father’s care. However, they were not able to confirm abuse.
In her interview with Ms B, Ms Laidley reported that her preference was that the father have no time with any of the children, as she did not trust him. In contrast, the father proposed spending time separately with Z, on the one hand, and X and Y on the other. He sought to spend only day time periods with the children.
Ms B was able to observe the children with each of their parents. In this context, Ms B reported as follows:
All three children presented with disorganised and chaotic behaviour. The two boys have been identified as having Autism Spectrum Disorder and this would be consistent with some of the behaviours observed throughout the assessment process. However, concern remained that overall the children's presentation was likely also indicative of a neglectful and potentially abusive parenting environment.
The children's behaviours displayed at the assessment would suggest that the children required highly attentive, skilful and emotionally attuned parenting, this appearing beyond what [Ms Laidley] was capable of providing the children as their primary carer. Furthermore, should the Court accept the children's claims that their mother and partner physically abuse them as regular forms of discipline, then concern would remain that the children were at unacceptable risk of harm in their care. Adding weight to these concerns was the DCP history before the Court, with injuries cited on the children as recent as November 2020.
The children appeared somewhat more settled in their father's care at the assessment, noting he had the support of a second person, [Ms F], to attend to the children's collective needs. He also appeared more empathic towards the children, in particular [Y] and [Z], and patient in his response to their needs. In interview he appeared seemingly reliable and forthcoming with information, and also balanced in his views with respect to time spending. Some concern did remain as to his ability to effectively care for the children, in particular all three children simultaneously, and concerns also remained before the Court as to allegations of physical abuse against [Z].
[Y]'s reports of concern that his father hurts him appeared to be in the context of his father restraining him when hyperactive and aggressive in his play, consistent to that observed during their shared interactions at the family assessment. Concern did remain that the father had smacked the children in the past, as admitted by the father himself. However, the Consultant was hopeful the father was honest in his claims to no longer resort to physical discipline and to understand the consequence (for himself and the children) if he was to do so. This being said, concern did remain that the father may be limited in his ability to manage the children effectively, particularly if without additional adult support, given the children's highly demanding behaviours and complex needs.
In addition, concerns remained as to the children's exposure to adult issues in their mother's care, and their mother's willingness and ability to genuinely support the father's positive attachment with the children through meaningful time spent together. Concerns also remained as to the mother's tendency to rely on [X] to supplement her care of [Z], leaving [X] burdened with a responsibility beyond her years and capability.
At the conclusion of this assessment the Consultant was not confident the children were safe in the mother's and her partner's care. As such, the Consultant would recommend the Court to invite the Department to intervene. Meanwhile, and/or should they decline, then it did appear best to support the father's proposal for time spending, not only to afford the father quality time with the children, but also provide the mother a level of respite from the children.
It would also be recommended that the mother seek guidance from her paediatrician and/or Autism SA to best determine [Z]'s and [Y]'s needs (i.e. for medication and or therapeutic support) and for Court Orders to be made to ensure the mother remains compliant with these recommendations. It would also be recommended that the father be provided with all relevant details of the children's medical involvements and be at liberty to liaise with these staff himself.[4]
[4] See Family Report of Ms B dated 11 January 2021 at [78] to [84].
It was against this background that, on 12 February 2021, the department was invited to intervene in the proceedings, as recommended by Ms B. It also appears to be the case that in the latter part of 2020, and the first months of 2021, departmental workers became increasingly concerned that the mother was not appropriately parenting Z, who presented with unexplained bruising.
In December of 2020, departmental notes indicated that the mother was not able to control the children; X has reported that her mother smacked her; and both Y and Z appeared more settled in their father’s care.
In this context, the department had intervened due to Z and Y’s out of control behaviour, which was noted to be possibly trauma related following the mother’s inability to address their behaviour. Concerns were also raised regarding the risk that X was being required to parent the children.[5]
[5] See affidavit of Anna Kate O’Brien filed 19 March 2021 in which documents provided by the Department, pursuant to s 69ZW of the Act are delineated.
Following the release of the family report, the mother’s solicitor withdrew. Ms Laidley herself did not appear, when the case came on for hearing on 24 March 2021. In these challenging circumstances, in April of 2021, the department provided a lengthy report regarding its interaction with the family. At this stage, they assessed that Ms Laidley was meeting the children’s basic physical care needs appropriately.
However, they were concerned about the poor state of cleanliness in her home and her difficulties in navigating the complicated NDIS system, pursuant to which Z and Y had been assessed as requiring speech and occupational therapy.
At this stage, the department indicated that they had some concerns relating to Mr Jaeger’s capacity to provide a safe and adequate level of care for the children. They recommended that he spend short periods of time with the children, in a supervised setting.
It was in this context that the order was made in respect of the children being independently represented, it being apparent that there was a divergence in the professional opinions between those expressed by Ms B and those of the departmental workers concerned.
In May of 2021, the department was notified regarding Z having sustained bruising, whilst in his mother’s care. In a report dated 29 June 2021, the department reported difficulty in contacting Ms Laidley in respect of these issues and described their working relationship with her as being turbulent, with the mother sporadically disengaging when challenged by departmental workers. For her part, Ms Laidley complained that she felt picked on by the department.
In this context, the department sought further time to investigate issues relating to the family. When the case returned to this court, on 9 July 2021, orders were made permitting the children to spend time with their father, during daylight hours, on each Saturday (X and Y) and each Sunday (Z).
In this context, on 11 October 2021, the department prepared a further report to the court. In this report it was indicated that it was seeking a 3 month care and protection order, in respect of Z because it was considered that it was likely that he had suffered harm, whilst in the care of his mother. The salient features of the report can be summarised as follows:
·The department was concerned about the state of Ms Laidley’s home, which was described as chaotic. Multiple notifications had been received that the property was cluttered and had a noticeable odour of faeces and urine;
·The department continued to be concerned regarding Ms Laidley’s ability to work with it and therapeutic service providers for the children in order to address child protection concerns and increase her capacity to meet the children’s needs;
·The department were concerned that Ms Laidley was belligerent in her behaviour, which supported Mr Jaeger’s account that both parents had been perpetrated of family violence;
·The department did not believe that Mr Jaeger has sufficient parental capacity to provide adequate care for Z;
·Y and X were assessed to be vulnerable children.
In these circumstances, the department had determined as follows:
The department have assessed that at this time, the current care arrangement stipulated within the family court documents for [Y] and [X] to reside with [Ms Laidley] is appropriate. While the children have reported having fun while staying with [Mr Jaeger], the department remains concerned that he has demonstrated a significant deficit in his ability to manage children with complex and challenging behaviour resulting in serious harm. The department remains supportive of the current family contact arrangements for [Y] and [X] as this ensures they are able to maintain a positive connection with [Mr Jaeger].[6]
[6] See report from the Department for Child Protection dated 11 October 2021 at page 7.
Following the release of this report, Ms Laidley failed to appear at court on the adjourned date (19 October 2021). This followed the withdrawal of her third solicitor in September 2021. In these circumstances, on 19 November 2021, Mr Jaeger filed an interim application, seeking that his time with X and Y be increased, to include overnight time. He also sought some specific orders in respect of the forthcoming Christmas period.
Once again, Ms Laidley did not appear, when the matter returned to court on 26 November 2021. In these circumstances, I was prepared to make the orders sought by the father, subject to the proviso that the mother could apply to have them set aside. It being the case that she had not filed any answering material, in respect of the father’s application and thus the court was somewhat hamstrung in advancing the matter.
In November of 2021, the department published a further report, which was directed to assessing Ms Laidley’s parental capacity, in light of the removal of Z from her care. In these circumstances, the department’s initial view was that her deficits, so far as parenting all three children was concerned, has been significantly impacted by Z’s extremely high care needs.
In this context, it was noted that, with the removal of Z from her household, Ms Laidley has demonstrated a commitment to work with G Families to increase her parenting capacity. As such, the department considered Ms Laidley to be the most appropriate caregiver for Y and X.
Once again, Ms Laidley did not attend at court on the next court hearing date. In these circumstances, the court was left with little alternative other than to force Ms Laidley’s attendance compulsorily through a police warrant. At this stage, for obvious reasons, Mr Jaeger was becoming increasingly frustrated by the process, which from his perspective was characterised by Ms Laidley’s essential disregard of the court orders, which envisaged X and Y spending regular periods of time with him.
Police brought the mother to court on 23 February 2022. At this stage, I determined that the father should commence spending weekend time, from Friday until the following Sunday, with the handover to occur at the children’s school. I arranged for the principal of the school to have a copy of the orders. The intention of this regime was to obviate the need for the parties to directly interact, with one another, at handover.
The next court date was 13 April 2022. Once again, the mother did not appear and the case was adjourned until 11 May 2022, with an intimation from the court that a further warrant would be issued, if she did not appear as directed. This led to her appearance, on the adjourned date, being 11 May 2022.
In May of 2022, the department advised the court that it was seeking a permanent guardianship for Z. It further advised that the father’s contact with Z had been suspended due to his poor attendance. Ms Laidley, X and Y had contact with Z fortnightly, subject to the supervision of the department for approximately 1 hour per visit.
At this stage, the department also advised that it had received a number of notifications that X and Y had been subject to abusive behaviour, whilst in the father’s care. It was alleged that X had disclosed that her father hit and scratched her; whilst Y had returned from his father’s care allegedly with a bruise on his hip. It was further alleged that the children were not being properly fed by the father.
On 11 May 2022, it was ordered that a Child Impact Report be prepared. This was allocated to Ms H. Regrettably, Ms Laidley declined electronic invitation to attend an interview with Ms H. Accordingly, Ms H was not able to interview X or Y. Accordingly, from the perspective of both the Court Child Expert and Mr Jaeger, the Child Impact Report process was futile. In these circumstances, Ms H doubted that the parties were suitable for any form of alternative dispute resolution.
On 10 August 2022, the court issued a further invitation to the department to intervene in the case. Departmental protocol dictates that 4 to 6 weeks be utilised for consideration to be given as to whether such an invitation is or is not accepted. In this context, on 25 August 2022 and 31 October 2022, a reports were provided. In early October of 2022, Ms Laidley obtained fresh legal representation.
It was at this stage that the most recent notification of child abuse came to light, which related to bruising being sighted on Y’s arms and chest at school. When questioned, Y indicated that the injuries had occurred the previous Saturday and had been caused by a fall in his backyard. When interviewed, X reported that Y had bitten himself, which had caused the bruising. When interviewed by department workers, the mother was being characterised by a lack of transparency and heightened emotion, which led to her being verbally abusive to the workers.
In these circumstances, the report of 31 October 2022 indicated the following:
Departmental worker attempted to explain the seriousness of the injuries observed on [Y] however [Ms Laidley] proceeded to threaten to give the departmental worker a bruise. [Ms Laidley] declined to participate in a safety plan and it was explained the department would therefore need to formally secure the children’s safety. [Ms Laidley] again heightened and stepped towards the departmental worker in an aggressive manner asking if removing children ‘turns you on’.
The department subsequently invoked Section 41 of the Children and Young People (Safety) Act 2021, placing [X] and [Y] under custody of the Chief Executive to enable the department to place the children with [Mr Jaeger]. It is noted that neither [X] nor [Y] expressed any concerns when advised they would be entering [Mr Jaeger]’s care and transitioned into his home environment with no issues.
On 28 October 2022, the department held further consultation with CPS and SAPOL regarding the outcome of the medical assessment for [Y]. CPS advised that following the medical they were unable to definitively determine whether the bruises were inflicted injuries particularly given no consistent narrative has been provided in relation to how the bruising occurred. CPS noted the bruising is unusual in the sense that it is suspicious and is not commonly seen in accidents or injuries. CPS assessed the bruising was unlikely to have been caused by a fall given the skin had no abrasions.[7]
[7] See report from the Department for Child Protection dated 31 October 2022.
The department assessed Mr Jaeger as being able to provide for the children’s needs. In this context, it was noted that he had done two courses relating to the parenting of children with autism and had commenced engagement with Y’s NDIS in-home support worker. Essentially, the department assessed Mr Jaeger as being amenable to its directions; whilst Ms Laidley was not.
Since this report, the department has prepared two further reports, dated 24 November 2022 and 5 December 2022 respectively. The context of these reports can be summarised in the following terms:
·Mr Jaeger’s home was observed to be generally tidy, although some concerns were noted. Mr Jaeger reported receiving financial counselling;
·On 14 November 2022, Mr Jaeger reported having extreme difficulties in managing both children’s meltdowns, particularly those of X;
·X and Y indicated to workers that living with Mr Jaeger was ok;
·Y was receiving occupational therapy; behavioural therapy; speech therapy; and light coordination; on five occasions per week, at his home. Mr Jaeger was also provided with the assistance of a cleaner, once per week;
·The children and Mr Jaeger were attending support groups for families and children diagnosed with autism.
In these circumstances, the department assessed Mr Jaeger as having the ability to meet X and Y’s needs appropriately. However, it was also noted that Mr Jaeger himself had expressed difficulty in managing the children’s challenging behaviour.
On the other hand, concerns were noted in relation to the mother’s inability to engage with the department, which was assessed as being a long standing issue. It was also of concern that this non-engagement had resulted in Y not receiving the comprehensive in-home supports, which had been offered to him and which Mr Jaeger had taken up.
I have been provided with a forensic medical report and photographs in respect of Y’s bruising. The doctor who examined him described him as a child who could answer simple questions but who did not have adequate language skills for his age and so had difficulty understanding some of the propositions to put to him.
The doctor attributed blunt trauma to the large bruises on Y’s arms, which were not consistent with having occurred during play. As such it was difficult to exclude the possibility of inflicted injuries. The diagnosis was that the injuries would have caused Y pain and discomfort lasting for several days.
The case returned to court on 28 November 2022. Ms Laidley was present with her solicitor, as was the ICL and the relevant department workers. The Department’s report was discussed. I urged Ms Laidley to consider the possibility of taking up the offer made by the Department to spend some time with the children subject to its supervision pending the interim hearing on 8 December 2022.
From the most recent report of the Department (5 December) it is clear that Ms Laidley did not take up this offer. The Department reports as follows:
Ongoing concerns exist in relation to [Ms Laidley]’s inability to engage with the department and this presenting as a significant barrier to addressing the child protection concerns. Of significant concern is that following the previous Family Court hearing, [Ms Laidley] maintained her refusal to engage with the department knowing this meant she would be unable to have contact with [X] and [Y]. [Ms Laidley] appears to not appreciate the impact this period of no contact is having on the children and that this could be experienced by the children as rejection.
The department considers that the children’s safety is best secured in [Mr Jaeger]’s care and that short time spending with [Ms Laidley], in a supervised setting would likely not pose a risk to the children’s imminent physical and emotional safety.[8]
[8] See report from the Department for Child Protection dated 5 December 2022 at page 6.
THE FATHER’S POSITION
Mr Jaeger complains that Ms Laidley has not provided him with items of Y’s therapy equipment and X’s tablet. He concedes that he has difficulties, from time to time, with managing Y’s behaviour and X has struggled emotionally since she came into his care. He would like X to receive counselling. As reported by DCP, he has ensured that Y receives the various forms of therapy approved for him by NDIS.
It is his position that the documentary evidence indicates that there are many aspects of the mother’s parenting of the children, which support his view that her long-term parental capacity is significantly compromised. Accordingly, he asserts that there is a serious level of risk associated with her having anything other than supervised time with the children.
In addition, he submits that the mother is not capable of supporting the children having any reasonable form of relationship with him. A state of affairs, which is demonstrated by her perennial disregard of court orders and her inability to engage in these proceedings with a proper degree of regularity.
Most significantly, it is his position that the mother has no capacity to accept advice or guidance from professionals, including departmental workers, as to how the children’s physical and emotional needs can be appropriately met but rather is defensive, obstructive and dismissive of such assistance, which is not helpful for the children, particularly Y, who has very significant special needs.
Mr Jaeger accepts that the children need to spend some time with their mother. However, it is his position that the concerns, he has raised, which the Department shares warrant supervision. However, he does not accept that Mr C is a suitable supervisor for any time between the mother and the children. Accordingly, the only viable option is CCC time notwithstanding the delays involved.
THE MOTHER’S POSITION
Ms Laidley did not attend court on 8 December 2022. I was told by her solicitor, Mr Gallasch that she and Mr C were taking a prearranged holiday. She did not avail herself of any opportunity to spend time with the children subject to departmental supervision.
Ms Laidley denies having any knowledge of the bruising on Y’s arm, whilst she walked him to school on the morning of 27 October 2022, as he was wearing a school jumper. During the walk, she deposes that he told her he had bruised himself but she did not have time to examine the injury, planning to inspect it when Y returned home from school later that afternoon. Accordingly, it is the effect of her evidence that she was shocked and angry to be confronted with DCP workers, when she re-attended at the school that afternoon.
Ms Laidley believes Y may have accidentally injured himself at school on play equipment. She concedes that she and the children attended a contact visit with Z in the afternoon of 26 October 2022 but asserts that, once again, Y was wearing a long-sleeved jumper and was not inspected by departmental workers.
In these circumstances, she rejects as conjecture the proposition that he must have been injured at sometime between Wednesday afternoon and Thursday morning. In this context, she asserts that Y showered and dressed himself on Thursday morning and she did not inspect him physically. She emphatically denies inflicting any injury on him. She denies any suggestion that her explanation of the circumstances surrounding the bruising is in any way inconsistent.
Ms Laidley has not been interviewed by police. She is aggrieved that she has not been provided with any forensic reports in respect of Y. More significantly, she complains that departmental workers are unduly critical of every aspect of her parenting. She denies not being responsive to their calls. She has a practice of not responding to calls which come to her phone from private numbers. She now assumes these are calls from DCP.
THE NATURE OF INTERIM HEARING
By their nature, interim hearings invariably arise against a background of serious family crisis and controversy. Given the urgency arising, such cases have to be listed expeditiously. However due to the pressure of its business, the court is rarely afforded the opportunity to conduct a lengthy hearing, involving cross-examination of parties, which would enable factual issues to be resolved on the basis of findings of credit, at this interim stage.
The Full Court has described the nature of the hearing, at the interim stage, as being significantly curtailed. In these circumstances, it has cautioned first instance courts, such as this one, about being drawn into issues of fact or matters relating to the merits of the substantive case where findings are not possible.[9]
[9] See Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 92-286 at 80,901 [68].
As a consequence, any orders made by the court, at this stage, are provisional in nature and so capable of revision later, following a more detailed inquiry, involving a more thorough canvassing of evidence, which is also later likely to be more extensive, particularly in terms of expert evidence.
The Full Court, in the case of Marvel & Marvel (No 2)[10] summarised the difficulties arising for the court at the interim stage and said as follows in respect of the nature of the approach to be taken and the rationale for such an approach:
Decisions judicial officers have to make in interim proceedings are difficult and, often for very good reason, a conservative approach, or one which is likely to avoid harm to a child is adopted. This is often to the understandable distress of a party who may not achieve the outcome he or she desires or thinks to be in the best interests of their child or children. Interim parenting orders are frequently modified or changed after a final hearing, and any allocation of parental responsibility made at an interim hearing is disregarded at the final hearing.
[10] See Marvel & Marvel (No 2) [2010] FamCAFC 101 at [120].
I remind the parties that I am not deciding final arrangements for the parenting of X and Y in the context of the current proceedings.
There are many areas of controversy arising between the parties concerned in the present matter. The chief one being how Y came to be seriously bruised. Given Y is an eight year old child with difficulties with expressing himself verbally, it may be impossible to ascertain definitively whether he has intentionally injured, given the obvious reluctance of any such assailant to admitting assaulting. However, limitations in the evidence do not abrogate the court’s responsibility to assess the available evidence in the context of determining the level of risk which arises from him being injured again or subject to some other form of abuse.
In Deiter & Deiter[11] the Full Court said as follows:
The assessment of risk is one of the many burdens placed on family law decision makers. Risk assessment comprises two elements – the first requires prediction of the likelihood of the occurrence of harmful events, and the second requires consideration of the severity of the impact caused by those events. In our view, the assessment of risk in cases involving the welfare of children cannot be postponed until the last piece of evidence is given and tested, and the last submission is made. We accept, however, that it is always a question of degree depending on the evidence that is before the Court.
[11] See Deiter & Deiter [2011] FamCAFC 82 at [61].
In SS v AH[12] the Full Court indicated, in the context of discussing the obligations of the court, whilst conducting interim children’s proceedings, in circumstances where the evidence available was contradictory in nature, but nonetheless raised significant welfare concerns for the children concerned, as follows:
Apart from relying upon the uncontroversial or agreed facts, a judge will sometimes have little alternative than to weigh the probabilities of competing claims and the likely impact on children in the event that a controversial assertion is acted upon or rejected. It is not always feasible when dealing with the immediate welfare of children simply to ignore an assertion because its accuracy has been put in issue.
[12] See SS v AH [2010] FamCAFC 13 at [100].
In Eaby & Speelman[13] the Full Court endorsed this approach as enabling the court to appropriately and carefully deal with contentious issues relevant to the welfare of the child, and for those issues to not be ignored. In essence, the court is not in a position to ignore child protection issues, merely because those issues are incapable of definite resolution, at the interim stage. This is the position in the matter currently before the court.
[13] See Eaby & Speelman (2015) FLC 93-654 at 80,332 [19]
In addition, in this context, there are other concerns, which have been ventilated by both the Department and the father regarding the mother’s level of parental capacity and insight. That is not to say that there are not also concerns relating to the father and his parental capacity. Clearly, this is a multi-facet and complex case, replete with issues of risk, which the court must assess, as best it can.
Necessarily how risk is approached will depend on the degree of risk involved and the individual circumstances of the case concerned. As indicated at the outset, more often than not, the court adopts a more cautious approach, at the interim stage, being aware that a conservative interim order can be reversed or extended upon when further material is to hand.
In M & M,[14] the High Court formulated a test, which has since been referred to as the “unacceptable risk test” as means of balancing the benefits arising for a child of interacting with a parent with possible detriments arising from exposure to that parent.
[14] See M & M (1988) FLC 91-979 at page 77,081.
Essentially the court should not grant time to a parent with a child, if the situation envisaged would expose the child concerned to an unacceptable risk suffering some form of harm or abuse. The standard of proof applicable to the assessment of risk, in this context, is the ordinary civil standard.[15] The Full Court in Slater & Light[16] expressed the task of assessing risk in the following terms:
The nature of the risk is best expressed by the term ‘unacceptable risk’. It is an evaluation of the nature and degree of the risk and whether, with or without safeguards, it is acceptable.
[15] See B & B (1988) FLC 91- 957 at 76,935.
[16] Slater & Light [2013] FamCAFC 4 at [37].
The court is required, in assessing risk, to subject the various allegations concerned to some level of scrutiny, bearing in mind the consequences of making a wrong assessment which may, on the one hand, compromise the child’s level of relationship, with their mother, for a significant period of time or on the other hand, expose them to a risk of coming to harm, in either a physical or emotional sense.
In addition the court cannot ignore the obvious fact that the parties in the current proceedings have had an extremely acrimonious and dysfunctional parenting relationship for many years. Clearly, such an environment is likely to provide fertile ground for abuse allegations to be made. In addition, Y is a physically active child. It remains feasible that he accidentally injured himself.
The court should not countenance an outcome which presents an unacceptable level of risk that a child or children will come to harm. In making this assessment, the court is not required to determine definitively whether a person actually harmed a child – this may be impossible, particularly if the abusive incident occurred in the absence of witnesses and the child concerned is of tender years or unable to provide a clear narrative of what happened.
Nor should the court attempt to completely neutralise a nebulous degree of risk. This may be unrealistic, particularly if its consequence is that a child is deprived of spending time and maintaining a proper degree of relationship with a person who is significant to him or her. The test is a balancing one, which must be exercised carefully and judicially.
In W & W (abuse allegations: unacceptable risk)[17] the Full Court summarised a number of authorities dealing with abuse allegations and provided guidelines to the assessment of unacceptable risk, which can be summarised as follows:
[17] W & W (abuse allegations: unacceptable risk) [2005] FamCA 892.
·The unacceptable risk test requires the court to give real and substantial consideration to the facts of the case concerned in determining whether there is or is not an unacceptable risk of harm befalling a child;
·In so doing, the sorts of questions, which the court should pose for itself, in respect of the allegations concerned, include the following:
·What is the nature of the events alleged to have taken place?
·Who has made the allegations?
·To whom have the allegations been made?
·What level of detail do they involve?
·Over what period of time are the events alleged to have occurred?
·What are the effects exhibited by the child?
·What is the basis of the allegations?
·Are the allegations reasonably based?
·Are the allegations genuinely believed by the person making them?
·What expert evidence has been provided?
·Are there satisfactory explanations for the allegations apart from abuse?
·What are the likely future effects on the child concerned?
·The weight to be attached to the answers arising from these questions will vary from case to case.
Also in W & W the Full Court indicated that any order involving issues of supervision, whether professional or lay, had the potential to have long term consequences for any child concerned and, as such, required careful consideration. The Full Court declined to provide guidelines as to when supervised time should or should not be order.[18]
[18] See W & W (abuse allegations: unacceptable risk) [2005] FamCA 892 at [115].
As indicated above, it is the father’s position that a proportionate response to the risk he identifies in respect of Ms Laidley interacting with X and Y is professional supervision.
From the mother’s perspective, such a response would be disproportionate to the risk as identified by the father and DCP and constituting its own inherent risks, namely the prospect of the children suffering emotional trauma as a consequence of not being able to interact with her in a normal familial environment and their parental relationship with her being potentially subject to irreparable damage.
In this context, the court must have regard to the nature of the evidence available to it to assess risk. Essentially, as previously indicated, it may ultimately be impossible to determine how Y suffered bruising.
In my view, in this particular matter, it is significant that it is DCP not a parent who raises the allegations of abuse. In addition, there is medical evidence, which indicates a reasonably serious level of injury and rules out accidental play injury as likely to have caused the more significant of the bruising.
In these circumstances, it is the child protection authorities which urge caution and who have acted pursuant to their child protection criteria to put in place a child protection plan rather than a parent who may be view as having acted disproportionately due to subjective emotional potency of the situation. In my view, these are significant factors in assessing the degree of risk arising.
LEGAL PRINCIPLES RELATING TO PARENTING PROCEEDINGS
At the outset, it is to be noted that, although the nature of the hearing is different, at the interim stage as opposed to the final hearing stage, the legal principles to be applied are the same. They are contained in Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975.
In deciding whether to make any particular parenting orders, in relation to a child, the court must regard the best interests of that child as the paramount or most important consideration.[19]
[19] Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60CA.
The matters which the court must take into account, in deciding how a child’s best interests are to be served, are set out specifically, in list form, in section 60CC.
The section creates two classes of considerations which are relevant – primary considerations and a longer list of additional considerations. Generally speaking, the court should give greater weight to the primary considerations, which closely tie in with the overall objects and principles of the Act set out in section 60B.
There are two primary considerations, which are as follows:
a)The benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of the child’s parents; and
b)The need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm, from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence.
As a result of the insertion of section 60CC(2A) into the Act, the court is now directed in applying the primary considerations “to give greater weight” to the primary consideration relating to protective concerns applicable to the children who are the subject of the relevant proceedings.
In the words of the relevant explanatory memorandum where child safety is a concern, this new provision will provide the court with clear legislative guidance that protecting the child from harm is the priority consideration. Future protective issues for a child are the court’s priority.
The expression meaningful is not specifically defined in the Act. It is an ordinary English word. In Mazorski v Albright[20] Brown J indicated that a meaningful parental relationship is one which is important, significant and valuable to the child” concerned.
[20] See Mazorski v Albright (2007) 37 Fam LR 518 at 526 [26].
The expression meaningful is also used in section 60B(1)(a). The court is directed to ensure that a child’s best interests are met by ensuring the children have the benefit of both their parents having a meaningful involvement in their lives. As a verb, involve means to participate or share experience.
Accordingly, in my view, the rationale of Part VII of the Act is that children derive benefits from feeling that their parents are involved or participating in their lives. A child’s life is, by necessary definition, every activity in which the child takes part. Literally, it means the child’s existence, as an individual. However, as the Full Court has also noted:
[H]aving a “meaningful relationship” with both parents is but one part of a set of arrangements that makes up a care arrangement. All parts of the arrangement must be considered before deciding what outcome is in the child’s best interests.[21]
[21] See Jurchenko & Foster (2014) 51 Fam LR 588, 618 [123] (Bryant CJ, Thackray and Duncanson JJ).
Other specific criteria, relating to how the court is directed to consider how the best interests of any children concerned may be served, by any order which is made, are set out in section 60CC(3). There are fourteen such criteria, which are categorised as being additional considerations. Depending on the circumstances of the case concerned, one or more of these factors may come to the fore.
In this particular case, sub-paragraphs (b);(d);(f);(i); and (j); of section 60CC(3) are relevant. These subparagraphs deal with the following issues:
·The nature of the child’s relationship with parents and significant other persons, including grandparents;
·The effects of any change in the children’s circumstances;
·The capacity of parents to provide for the child’s emotional and intellectual needs;
·The attitudes to the responsibilities of being a parent demonstrated by the parties concerned; and
·Family violence.
Pursuant to section 60CC(3)(m), the court is empowered to have regard to any other fact or circumstance, which it considers relevant. This ensures that the infinite variety of individual children’s circumstances may be addressed in any order which the court makes.
Abuse, in respect of a child, is defined by section 4(1) of the Family Law Act. It means an assault, including a sexual assault, of the child. Accordingly, if Y has been intentionally struck, I am satisfied this constitutes abuse for the purposes of the Act.
In this matter I do not consider, in all the circumstances, particularly the mutual allegations of abuse and family violence, that it would be reasonable to apply the presumption of equal shared responsibility, as envisaged by section 61DA, to the parents in this case.
CONCLUSIONS
This is a particularly difficult case in respect of a case that has been on foot for many years due to its complexities and the extensive involvement of the DCP. It involves two comparatively young children, one of whom has significant special needs. As such, each child must be regarded as extremely vulnerable.
In addition, it is apparent that both parents have significant personal challenges in discharging the responsibilities of being a parent. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the Department did not consider either of them as being able to parent Z adequately.
I am also acutely aware that I am determining the case on an interim or provisional basis. As such, the outcome to be imposed today is capable of being reversed if further evidence comes to hand. In this context, I am going to order an up-dating family report.
In these circumstances, the court, in my view, is required to prioritise child safety concerns. These centre not only on the need to protect Y from physical injure but also to insure that he receives the professional assistance which he requires in respect of his ASD.
In this context, the court must make some sort of assessment of the respective level of insight of the parties concerned in respect of the responsibilities of being a parent. At this juncture, the evidence indicates that Mr Jaeger has a superior level of capacity, in this regard, than the mother. The DCP evidence, which is, in my view, extensive, indicates that he is welcoming of assistance, not only from it but also from the other allied health professional who have been engaged to assist Y.
Regrettably, in my view, Ms Laidley has behaved defensively and evasively so far as the court process is concerned. More significantly, she has not been supportive of X and Y having a significant level of relationship with their father. One of the responsibilities of being a parent is to support an appropriate level of relationship with the other parent concerned.
It is clearly the case that Y received a significant injury. It seems undeniable that the injury occurred whilst in his mother’s care. However, the exact chain of events, which led to the injury, remain clouded with uncertainty. As indicated above, this lack of clarity does not absolve the court to act protectively.
In this case, the allegation of abuse originates with the DCP not with an aggrieved parent, who may have an axe to grind or some form of hidden agenda to pursue. It is supported by some level of medical evidence and arises in the context of an active child, who presents a challenge to parent. In my view, there is, at this stage, a level of risk arising from the child interacting with his mother, without some form of safeguard, at least until more evidence is to hand. This level of risk certainly militates against the children being returned to the full time care of their mother.
In this context, I note the incontrovertible fact that Ms Laidley has been the children’s primary if not largely sole provider of care since they were each born. As a consequence, the implications of this dramatic change of circumstances must be extremely significant, on any view. To his credit, Mr Jaeger acknowledges that he has experienced a high degree of difficulty in dealing with the children’s deregulation, particularly so far as X is concerned.
The children need to interact with their mother. In this context, the case creates a dilemma. Ms Laidley is unwilling to interact with the children on anything other than her own terms. Given the suspicion which exists between the parties, I accept that Mr C is not a suitable supervisor. Indeed the Department have some concerns in this regard.
Ms Laidley is not prepared to accede to spending time with the children at DCP, even on a limited basis. That is her prerogative but, in my view, is not congruent with an insightful attitude to the responsibilities of being a parent.
Given the difficult and mistrustful dynamic between Mr Jaeger and Ms Laidley, at the present time, which arises in the context of Ms Laidley being resistant and resentful of any court involvement in her life, I do not consider that it is viable that orders be made which would require the parties to exchange the children between them regularly pursuant to a concrete regime of times and dates. Regrettably, I fear that Ms Laidley would not abide by such a regime and it would likely lead to further confrontations between the parties, which would not be helpful to the children’s on-going emotional stability.
Accordingly, in the absence of some other trusted and proficient lay supervisor, this leaves only professional supervision at a Children’s Contact Centre, with all the drawbacks arising from delay; limited availability of time; and artificiality of environment. However, in my view, given the gravity of the allegations made against Ms Laidley, this is, at present, the only viable outcome in the case.
In these circumstances, I will make the orders as proposed by Mr Jaeger and as supported by the ICL. For all these reasons, the orders of the court will be as set out at the commencement of these reasons for judgment.
In addition, in my view, the case needs to be managed towards a conclusion. In these circumstances, in tandem with the preparation of the updated family report, I will allocate a time for final hearing. I will allow three days for the hearing.
I certify that the preceding one hundred and thirty-one (131) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Brown. Associate:
Dated: 15 December 2022
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