Jadidi and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Migration)

Jadidi and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2022] AATA 2217 (22 June 2022)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number: 2022/2777
Re:Pouria Siahpoush Jadidi
APPLICANT

AndMinister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs
RESPONDENT

Decision
Tribunal:Senior Member Theodore Tavoularis
Date:22 June 2022
Date of Written Reasons: 11 July 2022
Place:Brisbane

Pursuant to section 43 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), the Tribunal affirms the decision made by the delegate of the Respondent, dated 30 March 2022, to not revoke the mandatory cancellation of the Applicant’s visa.
...........................[SGD].................................
Senior Member Theodore Tavoularis
Catchwords
MIGRATION – Non-revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a Resident Return (Subclass 155) visa – where Applicant does not pass the character test – whether there is another reason to revoke the mandatory cancellation decision – consideration of Ministerial Direction No. 90 – extensive criminal history – various drug-related and traffic offences – violent offending committed against police officers – non-refoulement obligations (Iran) and indefinite detention considerations – decision under review affirmed
Legislation
Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Migration Amendment (Clarifying International Obligations for Removal) Bill 2021 (Cth)
Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld)
Cases
Ali v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 109
Apire and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] AATA 193
Bartlett and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] AATA 1561
FYBR v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 272 FCR 454
Gaspar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1166
Khalil v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 271 FCR 326
M1/2021 v MHA [2022] HCA 17
Marzano v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 66
Minister for Home Affairs v Buadromo [2018] FCAFC 151
Minister for Home Affairs v Omar (2019) 272 FCR 589
PGDX and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 1235
S270/2019 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2020) 383 ALR 194
Secondary Materials
Direction No. 90 – Visa refusal and cancellation under section 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under section 501CA
Direction No. 79 – Visa refusal and cancellation under s501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under s501CA
Contents
Decision
Catchwords
Short Form Decision (22 June 2022)…………………………………………………………….8
REASONS FOR DECISION
Introduction and background
An important procedural aspect of the matter
Legislative framework
Does the Applicant pass the Character Test?
Is there another reason for the revocation of the cancellation of the Applicant’s visa?
The principles in paragraph 5.2
The Primary and Other Considerations

Primary Consideration 1 – Protection of the Australian Community
The nature and seriousness of the non-citizen’s conduct to date
Paragraph 8.1.1(1)(a)(i)
Paragraph 8.1.1(1)(a)(ii)
Paragraph 8.1.1(1)(a)(iii)
Paragraph 8.1.1(1)(b)(i)
Paragraph 8.1.1(1)(b)(ii)
Paragraph 8.1.1(1)(b)(iii)
Paragraph 8.1.1(1)(b)(iv)
Paragraph 8.1.1(1)(c)
Paragraph 8.1.1(1)(d)
Paragraph 8.1.1(1)(e)
Paragraph 8.1.1(1)(f)
Paragraph 8.1.1(1)(g)
Conclusion about the nature and seriousness of the Applicant’s conduct

The risk to the Australian community should the Applicant commit further offences or engage in other serious conduct
The nature of the harm to individuals or the Australian community were the Applicant to engage in further criminal or other serious conduct
The likelihood of the non-citizen engaging in further criminal or other serious conduct (paragraph 8.1.2(2)(b))
Summary of the Applicant’s position on recidivist risk
The Applicant’s oral evidence in chief
The Applicant’s oral evidence in cross-examination
Summary of findings around recidivist risk

Conclusion: Primary Consideration 1
Primary Consideration 2: Family Violence
Primary Consideration 3: The Best Interests of Minor Children in Australia
Identification of the relevant minor children
The parties’ respective contentions
The Applicant’s evidence in chief
The Applicant’s evidence in cross-examination
Evidence in chief of Ms Neville
Evidence of Ms Neville in cross-examination
Application of factors in paragraph 8.3(4) of the Direction to the relevant children
Conclusion: Primary Consideration 3
Primary Consideration 4: Expectations of the Australian Community
Conclusion: Primary Consideration 4
Other Considerations
Other Consideration (a): International non-refoulement obligations
Law
The Applicant’s claims – written
The Applicant’s claims – oral
The claimed fears of harm – analysis
Findings and allocation of weight to Other Consideration (a)

Other Consideration (b): Extent of impediments if removed
The Applicant’s written submissions
The Respondent’s written submissions

Other Consideration (c): Impact on victims
Other Consideration (d): Links to the Australian Community
(1) Strength, nature, and duration of ties
1. Impact of non-revocation on the Applicant’s immediate family
2. Strength, nature and duration of “other ties” – length of residence
3. Strength, nature and duration of “other ties” – family and other social links
(2) Impact on Australian business interests
Weight allocable to Other Consideration (d): links to the Australia community

Further Other Consideration (e): Prolonged or Indefinite Detention
Findings: Other Considerations
CONCLUSION
Is there another reason to revoke the cancellation of the Applicant’s visa?
DECISION
Administrative Appeals Tribunal

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL	)
)	No: 2022/2777
GENERAL DIVISION	)

Re: Pouria Siahpoush Jadidi
Applicant
And: Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs Respondent
DECISION

TRIBUNAL:  Senior Member Theodore Tavoularis
DATE:  22 June 2022
PLACE:  Brisbane
DECISION:  Pursuant to section 43 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), the Tribunal affirms the decision made by the delegate of the Respondent dated 30 March 2022 to not revoke the cancellation of the Applicant’s visa.
The Tribunal will give written reasons for this decision within a reasonable time of the decision.

………….………[SGD]…..…………….
Senior Member Theodore Tavoularis
REASONS FOR DECISION
Senior Member Theodore Tavoularis
11 July 2022
introduction and background

Pouria Siahpoush Jadidi (“the Applicant”) is a 40-year-old male, born in Iran on 17 May 1982.[1] His movement history indicates that he arrived in Australia on 18 June 1987 and has never departed this country.[2] The Applicant has a very significant criminal offending history in Australia, commencing when he was a juvenile. His criminal history runs from (in terms of sentencing episodes) 19 November 1998 to 21 April 2020, a period of some 21-22 years.[3] Excluding the occasions on which he found himself before a court for re-sentencing consequent upon his commission of further unlawful conduct that post-dated sentences compelling him to not further offend, his history is indicative of the commission of some 106 separate offences that were dealt with at 23 separate sentencing episodes.
[1]     R1, G3, page 12.
[2]     Ibid, G35, page 333.
[3]     Ibid, G4, pages 37-47
This Applicant’s visa status has been mandatorily cancelled twice. On 6 April 2016, a delegate of the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (“the Respondent”) mandatorily cancelled the Applicant’s Resident Return (Subclass 155) visa (“visa”) under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”). On 11 May 2017, the Respondent made the decision to revoke that first visa cancellation under s 501CA(4) of the Act and, instead, issued the Applicant with a formal warning not to reoffend so as not to imperil his visa status to remain here.[4]
[4] Ibid, G33, pages 271-273.
Despite this restoration of his visa status and accompanying formal warning, the Applicant found himself before the Southport Magistrates Court on 16 March 2018 to be dealt with for the commission of some eleven new offences. Stated cumulatively, the Applicant received custodial terms amounting to fourteen months imprisonment. It suffices to say that this was not the only offending that followed this first cancellation. The Applicant’s criminal history indicates that he committed a further fifteen offences for which he received (in cumulative terms) an additional eighteen months of custodial time.
Unsurprisingly, on 22 January 2020, the Respondent, for a second time, mandatorily cancelled the Applicant’s visa under s 501(3A) of the Act on the basis that the Applicant did not pass the character test and was serving a full-time custodial sentence.[5] On 17 February 2020, the Applicant made written representations to the Respondent requesting revocation of the cancellation of his visa. On 30 March 2022, the Respondent decided not to revoke the cancellation.[6] On 6 April 2022, the Applicant sought review of that decision in this Tribunal.[7]
[5]     Ibid, G36, pages 334-339.
[6]     Ibid, G3.
[7]     Ibid, G2.
The hearing of this application proceeded before me, in person, on 13 and 20 June 2022. The hearing received both oral and written evidence. In terms of the former, oral evidence was received from the Applicant, his former defacto partner (Ms Jenna Maree Arlee Neville) and the Applicant’s mother (Ms Khadijeh Shabandi). In terms of the later evidence, I caused the written material to be reduced to an agreed Exhibit List, a true and correct copy of which is attached to these Reasons and marked, “Annexure A”. At the commencement of the hearing, I sought and obtained the parties’ approval to this Exhibit List.[8]
[8] Transcript (16 June 2022), page 2, lines 17-29.
An important procedural aspect of the matter
As mentioned, this hearing commenced before me on 13 June 2022. On that day, the Applicant gave his evidence-in-chief and commenced giving his evidence in cross-examination. During the course of that cross-examination it emerged that the Respondent’s representative was putting questions to the Applicant arising from material that had been filed on behalf of the Applicant and received by the Tribunal on 8 June 2022.[9] Although this material was filed on 8 June 2022, the Applicant was precluded from filing any written submissions arising from that further material because to do so after 8 June 2022, and prior to commencement of the hearing on 13 June 2022, would have offended s 500(6H) of the Act.
[9] See Exhibit A5 comprising: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Information Report – for Iran – dated 14 April 2020.
Therefore, with the agreement of the parties,[10] I made certain procedural directions facilitating receipt of any written submissions by the Applicant and re-listing the hearing of this matter for the 82^nd and 83^rd days of the 84 day paradigm applicable to these matters by virtue of s 500(6L)(c) of the Act. Attached to these Reasons is a true and correct copy of those further procedural directions made on 13 June 2022 and marked, “Annexure B”. On the 84^th day, I caused a short-form decision to be published to ensure the Tribunal met its obligation pursuant to s 500(6L)(c) of the Act.[11] Also attached to these reasons (see above) is a true and correct copy of that short-form decision. I now publish my detailed written reasons for that short-form decision.
[10] See Transcript (16 June 2022), page 38, lines 4-47; pages 39-40; and page 41, lines 1-26.
[11] Khalil v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 271 FCR 326 underscores that there is a distinction between the decision of the Tribunal, which discharges the obligation under s 500(6L) of the Act and the Tribunal’s written reasons (which can be delivered later): See specifically, paras [41]–⁠[48].
legislative framework
Revocation of the mandatory cancellation of visas is governed by s 501CA(4) of the Act. Relevantly, this provides that:
4 The Minister may revoke the original decision if:
the person makes representations in accordance with the invitation; and
the Minister is satisfied:
i) that the person passes the character test (as defined by section 501); or
ii) that there is another reason why the original decision should be revoked.
I am satisfied that the Applicant made the representations required by s 501CA(4)(a) of the Act. Thus, the issue is whether the discretion to revoke the mandatory cancellation of the Applicant’s visa may be exercised. As a starting point, it is necessary to refer to the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia’s observations in Minister for Home Affairs v Buadromo:[12]
“…there has been some discussion in the authorities as to whether s 501CA(4) contains a residual discretion in the decision-maker by reason of the use of the word ‘may’ in the chapeau of the subsection, or whether the balancing of the factors favouring a refusal to revoke the cancellation is part of the one exercise of determining whether there is another reason the original decision should be revoked. The weight of authority in this Court favours the latter view…”[13]
[12] [2018] FCAFC 151.
[13] Ibid, para [21], citing, inter alia, Gaspar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1166, (2016) 153 ALD 337, para [38] (North ACJ); Marzano v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 66, (2017) 250 FCR 548, para [31] (Collier J, with whom Logan and Murphy JJ agreed).
There are therefore two issues presently before the Tribunal:
(1)whether the Applicant passes the character test; and
(2)whether there is another reason why the decision to cancel the Applicant’s visa should be revoked.
Does the Applicant pass the Character Test?
The character test is defined in s 501(6) of the Act. Under s 501(6)(a), a person will not pass the character test if they have a, “substantial criminal record”. This phrase, in turn, is defined in s 501(7), which relevantly provides that a person will have a substantial criminal record if:
“…
(c) the person has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more;
(d) the person has been sentenced to 2 or more terms of imprisonment, where the total of those terms is 12 months or more;
…”
There is a ready concession in the Applicant’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions (“SFIC”) that he does not pass the character test.[14] This concession parallels an identical contention appearing in the Respondent’s SFIC.[15] I am therefore satisfied (and I find) that the Applicant has a, “substantial criminal record”. Accordingly, he does not pass the character test. He therefore cannot rely on s 501CA(4)(b)(i) of the Act for the mandatory cancellation of his visa to be revoked.
[14] A1, page 12, paras [33]-[35].
[15] R2, page 5, para [21].
Is there another reason for the revocation of the cancellation of the Applicant’s visa?
In considering whether to exercise the discretion in s 501CA(4) of the Act, the Tribunal is bound by s 499(2A) to comply with any directions made under the Act. In this case, Direction No. 90 – Visa refusal and cancellation under section 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under section 501CA (“Direction” or “Direction 90”) has application.[16]
[16] Direction No 90 commenced on 15 April 2021. It replaces Direction No. 79 – Visa refusal and cancellation under s501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under s501CA.
The Direction provides guidance for decision-makers on how to exercise the discretion. Relevantly, it states that:
“Informed by the principles in paragraph 5.2, a decision-maker must take into account the considerations identified in sections 8 and 9, where relevant to the decision.”[17]
[17] Direction No 90, para [6]. See also Direction, para [4(1)] which provides that a, “decision-maker” includes the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in making a decision under s 501 or 501CA of the Act.
The principles in paragraph 5.2
Paragraph 5.2 of the Direction is designed to, “provide a framework within which decision-makers should approach their task” under s 501 or 501CA (as the case may be). Summarised where appropriate, the principles are:
(1) Australia has a sovereign right to determine whether non-citizens who are of character concern are allowed to enter and/or remain in Australia.
(2)Non-citizens who engage in, or have engaged in, criminal or other serious conduct should expect to be denied the privilege of coming to, or forfeit the privilege of staying in, Australia.
(3)The Australian community expects that the Australian Government can and should refuse entry to non-citizens, or cancel their visas, if they have engaged in conduct in Australia or elsewhere that raises serious character concerns (regardless of whether the non-citizen poses a measurable risk of causing physical harm to the Australian community).
(4)Australia has a low tolerance of any criminal or other serious conduct by visa applicants or those holding a limited stay visa, or by other non-citizens who have been participating in, and contributing to, the Australian community only for a short period of time. However, Australia may afford a higher level of tolerance of criminal or other serious conduct by non-citizens who have lived in the Australian community for most of their life, or from a very young age.
(5)Decision-makers must take into account the primary and other considerations relevant to the individual case. In some circumstances, the nature of the non-citizen’s conduct, or the harm that would be caused if the conduct were to be repeated, may be so serious that even strong countervailing considerations may be insufficient to justify not cancelling or refusing the visa, or revoking a mandatory cancellation. In particular, the inherent nature of certain conduct such as family violence and the other types of conduct or suspected conduct mentioned in paragraph 8.4(2) (Expectations of the Australian Community) is so serious that even strong countervailing considerations may be insufficient in some circumstances, even if the non-citizen does not pose a measurable risk of causing physical harm to the Australian community.
The Primary and Other Considerations
Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Direction respectively stipulate four “Primary Considerations”, and four “Other Considerations” by which I must be guided in making my decision.
The Primary Considerations I must take into account are:
“(1) protection of the Australian community from criminal or other serious conduct;
(2) whether the conduct engaged in constituted family violence;
(3) the best interests of minor children in Australia;
(4) expectations of the Australian community.”[18]
[18] Ibid, para [8].
The Other Considerations which, where relevant, I must take into account, “include but are not limited to”:
“a) international non-refoulement obligations;
b) extent of impediments if removed;
c) impact on victims;
d) links to the Australian community, including:
i) strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia;
ii) impact on Australian business interests”[19]
[19] Ibid, para [9(1)].
Paragraph 7 of the Direction also provides guidance as to how to take into account each Primary and Other Consideration. Briefly summarised, the Direction instructs decision-makers that:
(1)Information from independent and authoritative sources should be given appropriate weight;
(2)Primary Considerations should “generally” be given greater weight than Other Considerations; and
(3)One or more Primary Considerations may outweigh other Primary Considerations.
I will now turn to addressing the abovementioned Primary and Other Considerations.
primary consideration 1 – protection of the australian community
In considering this Primary Consideration 1, paragraph 8.1(1) of the Direction compels decision-makers to keep in mind the Government is committed to protecting the Australian community from harm as a result of criminal activity or other serious conduct by non- citizens. Decision-makers should have particular regard to the principle that entering or remaining in Australia is a privilege that this country confers on non-citizens in the expectation that they are, and have been, law abiding, that they will respect important institutions and that they will not cause or threaten harm to individuals or the Australian community.

In determining the weight allocable to this Primary Consideration 1, paragraph 8.1(2) of the Direction requires decision-makers to consider:
(1)The nature and seriousness of the non-citizen’s conduct to date; and
(2)The risk to the Australian community should the non-citizen commit further offences or engage in other serious conduct.
I will consider each in turn.
The nature and seriousness of the non-citizen’s conduct to date
When assessing the nature and seriousness of a non-citizen’s criminal offending or other conduct to date, decision-makers must have regard to the factors set out in paragraph 8.1.1(1) of the Direction. I have earlier referred to the Applicant’s very significant criminal offending history in Australia. It is a history that runs for approximately eleven pages of single-spaced text.[20] It is, without question, offending that has consumed more than its fair share of Australia’s law enforcement resources and judicial sentencing apparatus.
[20] R1, G4, pages 37-47.
I will now apply the relevant sub-paragraphs appearing in Paragraph 8.1.1(1) of the Direction to ascertain the nature and seriousness of the Applicant’s unlawful conduct in this country.
Paragraph 8.1.1(1)(a)(i)
This specific subparagraph looks for the commission of violent and/or sexual crimes. If an Applicant has committed such offences, this sub-paragraph deems that such conduct must be viewed, “very seriously” by the Australian Government and the Australian community. On 17 March 2016, at the Southport Magistrates Court, the Applicant was convicted on one count of, ‘Assault or obstruct police officer (on 10/11/2015)’.[21] The circumstances of the offending are as follows:
“Charge 5 – assault or obstruct police officer:
At that time police have exited their vehicles and have attempted to arrest the defendant. The defendant refused to exit the vehicle and as such police were forced to smash the windows. The defendant was repeatedly told to exit but refused to do so. A police dog squad handler, Senior Constable[redacted], deployed police dog (PD305) into the front left passenger side of the vehicle.
The defendant again refused to get out of the vehicle and has punched the PD305 to the face and mouth. The dog was then released, biting the defendant on the hand and arm. The defendant then punched the police dog numerous times to the face again. The Senior Constable [redacted] has attempted to restrain the defendant at that time. The defendant also punched the dog squad officer numerous times to the face with a closed fist, causing lacerations to [the] Senior Constable’s [redacted] left ear and temple. Senior Constable [redacted] later received treatment from Queensland Ambulance for the bodily harm caused by the defendant.
Constable [redacted] was at this time also attempting to effect the arrest of the defendant. Constable [redacted] attempted to handcuff the defendant by placing his arms through the now broken driver's side window. As Constable [redacted] did so, the defendant obstructed the officer by pushing him away and resisting arrest. Constable [redacted] sustained a deep laceration to his right arm due to the physical struggle that ensued because of the defendant's resistance.
Another officer, Senior Constable [redacted] has at that time deployed OC spray, which contacted the defendant to the face and eyes. The defendant continued to fight police off with his hands for several seconds but has eventually been overcome by the effects of the spray. The defendant placed his hands out towards police and was handcuffed and removed from the vehicle. Police placed the defendant under arrest at 5:30pm as he was removed from the vehicle.
The defendant was sat down next to the front-left passenger door and after care was provided by police. Police have observed through the open door a pillow case wrapped around a solid object, which was sitting on the passenger seat.
Police have exercised PPRA search powers and have conducted a search of the stolen vehicle at that time.”[22]
[My redactions]
[21] Ibid, page 41. Pursuant to s 790(1) of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld).
[22] Ibid, G10, page 96.
The Applicant’s conduct, as recorded in these police facts, is unquestionably violent. It was violent towards two police officers and an equally unfortunate trained police dog. The violence is not just inherent in the way the Applicant physically resisted attempts by intervening police trying to control him. To my mind, the more significant aspect of this violent conduct derives from the Applicant forming the view to physically impose himself on people and at least one police dog. He could have, for example, sought to make his point orally but elected to automatically default to violent physical means of doing so.
There is at least one further incident of violent conduct by the Applicant. It occurred on 22 November 2008 at Broadbeach on the Gold Coast and resulted in the Applicant being convicted on three counts of common assault[23] at the Southport Magistrates Court on 16 July 2009. This conduct arose when the Applicant sought to become overly familiar with two female complainants, resulting in intervention by at least one male who was displeased with the Applicant’s unreciprocated advances. The relevant incident is reported in the material thus:
[23] Pursuant to s 335 of the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld).
“The Offence location is Phillip Avenue and Surf Parade, Broadbeach, Opposite the Broadbeach Police Station, the offence time is approximately 00;30am on 22/11/2008
The Defendant in this matter is Pouria JADIDI
Complainant 1 in this matter is [redacted]
Complainant 2 in this matter is [redacted]
Complainant 3 in this matter is [redacted]
The 3 complainants in this matter attended Broadbeach CBD for a night out, the defendant who is unknown to them has also been out and as a result of a chance meeting the defendant has been invited back to the complainants unit for a drink with the 2 female complainants.
During the walk back the defendant has slapped the backside of one of the female complainant [redacted] (Listed as complainant 1) to which she replied, "Fuck off'. Complainant 1 alleges that the defendant has grabbed her buttock a number of times before being told to fuck off again. Complainant 3 [redacted] has then raised his voice and told the defendant to not touch his girlfriend.
Complainant 2 [redacted] then states that he has grabbed her buttock from behind causing her to jump and causing some pain.
As a result of this complainant 3 [redacted] and the defendant commenced a verbal argument with the defendant and the defendant has struck the complainant in the facial area. During the insuring (sic) fight where both defendant and the complainant have struck each other, the defendant has been on top of complainant 3 [redacted] on the roadway when complainant 3 has produced a knife and stabbed the defendant in the left had side of the stomach resulting in a 15cm wound.
The complainants have left the scene and been detained by police a short distance away. Police attended and located and the defendant was transported to Gold Coast Hospital by OAS for his injuries.”[24]
[24] R3, R1, page 18.
While this particular incident was, to an extent, of perhaps a lesser level of seriousness than the first incident it was nevertheless violent and, indeed, the incident saw the violence turned on the Applicant himself. I am mindful of the Applicant’s oral evidence at the hearing purporting to put forward an alternate explanation for these incidents. His evidence should be rejected as little more than a self-serving narrative otherwise entirely uncorroborated.[25]
[25] See generally, Transcript (20 June 2022), pages 49-52.
I have little or no hesitation in finding that both incidents (and convictions) fall within the auspices of sub-paragraph 8.1.1(1)(a)(i) of the Direction such that the Applicant’s violent crimes must be viewed very seriously.
Paragraph 8.1.1(1)(a)(ii)
This subparagraph refers to crimes of a violent nature against women or children and, if such offences have been committed by an Applicant, those offences are deemed to be viewed, “very seriously” by the Australian Government and the Australian community. I have looked through the material referable to the Applicant’s history of offending and cannot glean any reference to his commission of crimes of a violent nature against either women or children. This sub-paragraph 8.1.1(1)(a)(ii) is therefore not relevant.
Paragraph 8.1.1(1)(a)(iii)
This particular sub-paragraph looks for acts of family violence in an Applicant’s offending history and, if there has been such offending, provides that it is viewed, “very seriously” by the Australian Government and the Australian community. I have again looked through the material for any reference to offending conduct in the realm of family violence, regardless of whether a conviction was imposed for such conduct.
The criminal history has nothing to say about convictions in this realm. Likewise, the balance of the material is silent about a domestic violence incident that, for example, saw police attend, make a report, but for one reason or another, not make a temporary and/or permanent protection order. There is nothing to this effect in the material as best I understood it. Therefore, this sub-paragraph 8.1.1(1)(a)(iii) is therefore not relevant.
Paragraph 8.1.1(1)(b)(i)
There is no oral or written evidence to the effect that this Applicant has committed any offences in the realm of causing a person to enter into or being a party to a forced marriage. There is no formally recorded conviction for such offending nor is there any reference to it in any police narrative (or equivalent) that did or did not result in any conviction. This particular sub-paragraph is therefore not relevant to the assessment of the nature and seriousness of the Applicant’s unlawful conduct.
Paragraph 8.1.1(1)(b)(ii)
This sub-paragraph looks for the commission of any offence against what is described as, “vulnerable members of the community such as the elderly and the disabled, or government representatives or officials…in the performance of their duties”. I will resist the temptation to conflate the Applicant’s conduct involving (1) a refusal to follow lawful authority or to otherwise comply with a lawfully imposed obligation upon him compelling him to do or not do certain things with (2) actual violence perpetrated by him on police officers who were seeking to deal with him. This does not mean that for the purposes of these Reasons, I will not take into account his conduct in the former category. I most certainly will do so, but at the point where I think such conduct can be more safely mentioned as a means of assessing the nature and seriousness of this conduct.
For this part of my Reasons, all that needs to be taken into account is his demonstrated pattern of conduct resulting in multiple convictions for actual violence against police officers. In terms of convictions, this is what the criminal history has to say:
·17 March 2016 – Conviction for ‘Assault or obstruct police officer’ on 10/11/2015 (two counts); and
·3 May 2016 – Conviction for ‘Assault or obstruct police officer’ on 24/04/2014.
I have earlier described the Applicant’s conduct in relation to the first two offences committed against police officers on 10 November 2015. The second above dot-pointed offence derives from a series of six charges proffered against the Applicant for his conduct on 24 April 2014. The fifth of those six charges is for ‘assault or obstruct police officer’. The material records the particulars of that conduct thus:
“Charge Five.
At around 8.00pm on Thursday the 24th day of April 2014, Police from. Taskforce Takeback were performing patrols of the Labrador area.
Police attention has been drawn to a male person walking along Robert Street near the corner of Turpin Avenue. This male person was observed by Police to have a small black zip up bag slung over his shoulder.
Police commenced a U Turn and pulled their vehicle alongside the male person in front of the residence at 94 Robert Street. At this time the male person no longer had the black bag over his shoulder. Police exited their vehicle and approached the male person. He was later identified as Pouria JADIDl, the defendant in this matter.
Police asked the defendant where his black bag was to which the defendant replied that he was never carrying one and that he was simply going for a walk and eating a piece of fruit. The defendant was highly nervous around Police, as his hands were shaking and he was hesitant to stand still, constantly trying to end the conversation with Police and walk off.
Police subsequently informed the defendant that he was being detained under the provisions of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act for the purposes of a search. After being informed he was detained, the defendant reached into his pockets removed two mobile phones and a quantity of cash and placed it on the ground. Around this time the defendant became argumentative with Police and attempted to leave the area, questioning Police powers. At this time the defendant was becoming highly agitated. Police again reiterated their detention powers to the defendant.
Police conducted a search of the nearby area and in the front yard garden bed of number 90 Robert Street Police located the black bag they had moments earlier seen being carried by the defendant. Inside this bag Police located a substantial amount of dangerous drugs and drug related paraphernalia.
Police informed the defendant that he was under arrest in relation to dangerous drugs. The defendant had been placed in handcuffs at this time and was being escorted to the nearby Police vehicle when suddenly he has kicked off his thongs and proceeded to run from Police east on Robert Street. Police have shouted several times, calling on the defendant. 'Stop!' The defendant ignored Police and kept on sprinting away. After some time the defendant has fallen forward and landed on his stomach on the footpath where Police were able to capture him and escort him back to the Police vehicle.”[26]
[26] R3, R1, page 127.
To repeat, I have only taken the above convictions into account for the specific purpose of isolating conduct of the Applicant constituting, “crimes committed against…government representatives or officials due to the position they hold, or in the performance of their duties”. Much of the remainder of the Applicant’s conduct has involved him dealing adversely with police but has not resulted in convictions for offences committed against the police.
Be that as it may, the Applicant cannot cavil with a finding that the auspices of this sub-paragraph 8.1.1(1)(b)(ii) are duly engaged and can be applied towards a finding that the nature of his unlawful conduct in Australia has indeed been of a serious, more likely very serious, nature.
Paragraph 8.1.1(1)(b)(iii)
This sub-paragraph refers to serious conduct involving, “any conduct that forms the basis for a finding that a non-citizen does not pass an aspect of the character test that is dependent upon the decision-maker’s opinion”. There is no reference in either SFIC (or any other oral or written submission) propounding or mentioning this component of the Direction. I therefore find that this sub-paragraph of the Direction is not relevant to any assessment of the nature and seriousness of the Applicant’s conduct.
Paragraph 8.1.1(1)(b)(iv)
This sub-paragraph refers to (and renders, “serious”) any crime committed by a non-citizen while in immigration detention. None of the offences appearing in the Applicant’s criminal history are referable to conduct that occurred during his time in immigration detention, during an escape from immigration detention, or any of the other componentry appearing in the language of this sub-paragraph.
There is reference in the Applicant’s material to, “…an incident last year on 23 June 2021 where the guards at the detention centre called the police.”[27] The Applicant’s more detailed version of these incidents during his time in immigration detention are described thus in his statement:
“There was an incident last year on 23 June 2021 where the guards at the detention called the police. The police found contraband drug items in my room. I admit that I was going to use the cannabis. It was a small amount and I was using it to destress and escape my daunting circumstances of being deported back to Iran really scares me I was offered the cannabis by another detainee and I know it was wrong I relapsed. However, the syringe that was found was not mine – it was accidentally left behind from who gave me the cannabis obvious being left behind after smoking a joint I’m sorry for taking part in this and I hope my positive contributions volunteering to represent our compound in the DCC meeting and always lending a helping hand where possible reflects a bit more of a positive light and shows I’m remorseful.
Other than the incident with the cannabis, I have not used drugs since before I went to jail over three years ago. I have not smoked meth since that time. I have made an effort to not take any drugs, especially meth. I haven’t had any incidents since last year, and I even changed units to get myself away from that bad situation or negative influences.”[28]
[27] A1, page 14, para [44].
[28] A2, A1, page 4, paras [34]-[35].
At the hearing, the Applicant was cross-examined about the abovementioned cannabis use while in immigration detention. The following transpired between him and the Respondent’s representative in cross-examination:
“MR KYRANIS: I want next to move on to some of the incidents in relation to detention. I initially told the Department didn’t you that the green leafy material that was found on 23 June last year wasn’t yours?
APPLICANT: That’s correct.
MR KYRANIS: And now you have said to the tribunal that it was yours. It was cannabis and someone gave it to you and you were stressed so you smoke it. You smoked it?
APPLICANT: Yes that’s correct.
MR KYRANIS: There was also a syringe found when the officers searched your room. You saying that that wasn’t yours?
APPLICANT: That’s correct.
MR KYRANIS: So why should the tribunal believe you that the syringe wasn’t yours, but you previously said that about the cannabis and now you are admitting to using the cannabis in detention?
APPLICANT: Mr Kyranis it’s not like I could say, like, the tribunal to take my word for it with my history. I’ve got a really bad history. And it doesn’t look good for me. But - No, that’s all.”[29]
[29] Transcript (20 June 2022), page 63, lines 39-45; page 64, lines 1-8.
To my mind, this evidence about the Applicant’s cannabis use whilst in immigration detention goes more to his recidivist risk than to any relevance for the purposes of this sub-paragraph 8.1.1(1)(b)(iv) of the Direction. This is because whatever incident or incidents are recorded in the material as having arisen during the Applicant’s time in immigration detention,[30] none have resulted in the Applicant being convicted of, “…a crime committed while [he] was in immigration detention…”.
[30] See R1, G30, pages 219-223.
We can be certain of this because the Applicant appears to have engaged legal representation consequent upon charges that did initially spawn from the abovementioned incidents in immigration detention. Those charges related to drug possession and failure to take care to properly dispose of needles/syringes associated with drug use. The letter from the retained lawyers to the Applicant is dated 21 March 2022 and, relevantly, says the following about those charges:
“…Dear Pouria
RE: CHARGES (JUNE 2021)
We refer to the above matter and to our attendance at the Brisbane Magistrates Court on 18 March 2022.
The prosecution offered no evidence in relation to charges for drug possession and failure to take care of needles/syringes on 23 June 2021, and you were discharged in relation to these matters...”[31]
[31] R1, G29, page 218.

Thus, the auspices of this sub-paragraph 8.1.1(1)(b)(iv) cannot be safely engaged for the purpose of assessing the nature and seriousness of the Applicant’s unlawful conduct in this country. It is not relevant for the purposes of this determination.
Paragraph 8.1.1(1)(c)
In applying this particular sub-paragraph, I am precluded from taking into account sentences imposed on this Applicant for: (1) any violent offending he may have committed against women;[32] (2) acts of family violence;[33] and (3) any sentence he received relating to conduct whereby he caused a person to enter into (or to become a party to) a forced marriage.[34]
[32]    Direction No 90, para [8.1.1(1)(a)(ii)].
[33]    Ibid, para [8.1.1(1)(a)(iii)].
[34]    Ibid, para [8.1.1(1)(b)(i)].
As will be recalled, the Applicant does not have convictions for violent offending against women, or for conduct amounting to family violence. He does not have any convictions involving conduct that caused a person to enter into or become a party to a forced marriage. Even without convictions for these types of offences, the Applicant’s offending and consequential sentencing history is very significant. The sheer number of offences is so vast and the punishments imposed for it so extensive, that the temptation becomes one of simply saying he has received a large number of offences and leaving it at that.
But, the scope of this sub-paragraph 8.1.1(1)(c) is, of course, broader than that. In addition to the number of sentences that have been imposed on him, the variety of those sentences is similarly extensive. Just a cursory review of his sentencing history reveals he has received sentences as varied as:
·being dealt with by a court in terms of being convicted for unlawful conduct but having a “no conviction recorded” notation placed in his criminal history;
·the imposition of probation orders that precluded him from spending time in actual custody;
·the imposition of good behaviour bonds (and the like);
·the imposition of monetary fines in lieu of actual custodial time;
·the imposition of community service orders in lieu of actual custodial time; and
·the imposition of terms in actual custody that were either wholly or partially suspended.
It suffices to say that this Applicant has had a very comprehensive range of sentences imposed on him for his offending. One can think of few other sentencing options available to a judicial sentencing officer. There can be surely no cavilling with the proposition (and finding) that the extraordinary range of sentences that have been imposed upon him must, in and of themselves, point to the nature and extent of his unlawful conduct in Australia. I am therefore satisfied that the sentences imposed upon this Applicant across the almost 22 years of his offending history strongly militates in favour of a finding that his offending has been of a very serious nature.
Paragraph 8.1.1(1)(d)
This sub-paragraph deals with (1) the frequency of a person’s offending and (2) whether there is any trend of increasing seriousness in that offending. First, there is surely no contest about the frequency of the Applicant’s offending. His is a criminal history that runs for eleven pages of single-spaced entries. It is both an appalling and an extraordinary history. It involves the commission of some 106 separate offences that caused him to come before lawful authority for sentencing on some 23 separate occasions. Put simply, he has been offending for approximately 22 years in Australia at the rate of approximately five offences per year. He has been before the courts for sentencing at a rate of over once per year across that 22-year offending period. I have no hesitation in finding that his offending has been frequent.
Second, there is likewise little to cavil with the proposition (and finding) that his offending demonstrates a trend of increasing seriousness. Put at its most favourable for the Applicant, it may be said that the earlier phases of his offending – especially from November 1998 until March 2005 – involved offences that did not directly implicate other innocent persons and related only to him. Thereafter, the nature of the offending is significantly more serious. As early as July 2009, he was convicted and sentenced for the abovementioned assaults of the police officers. There follows a pattern of offending which is all too typical of an offender who is seriously addicted to illicit substances.
Post-July-2009, not only are there repeated convictions for possession of unlawful drugs and paraphernalia associated with that, there is the significantly more serious offending that results from the Applicant having a more commercially-oriented involvement in the drug trade. This can be seen in his multiple convictions for ‘unlawful use of a motor vehicle’ and ‘unlawful possession of a weapon’. Without question, this conduct – whether it be through dangerously irresponsible use of a motor vehicle or via participation in a broad dissemination of illicit substances into the community – could very well have drawn other members of the community into its orbit with extremely serious and, indeed, catastrophic outcomes.
It is not possible for the Applicant to explain away or otherwise now purport to alternately characterise his offending. It has been very serious and, via the extreme disorientation of his moral compass resulting from his gradual descent into a world of seemingly never-ending illicit drug abuse, it has, without question, taken on a character of increasing seriousness throughout its evolution. I am satisfied as to (1) the frequency of the Applicant’s offending and (2) that his offending has demonstrated a trend of increasing seriousness. Thus, both elements of this sub-paragraph 8.1.1(1)(d) are satisfied such that it very strongly militates in favour of a finding that the totality of the Applicant’s offending in this country has been of a very serious nature.
Paragraph 8.1.1(1)(e)
This sub-paragraph looks for any cumulative effects resulting from a non-citizen’s offending and how those effects are informative of the level of seriousness of that person’s offending in this country. The offending history of this Applicant is so extensive that one can readily find a strong number of cumulative effects arising from his offending. First, the Applicant’s criminal history demonstrates an abject failure to observe and otherwise meet the requirements of lawful authority. He has breached orders for bail, community service orders and the terms of orders that were conditionally suspended in his favour. He has assaulted and obstructed police officers on numerous occasions. His unlawful conduct in this realm has caused him to not respect the boundaries of lawful authority and to simply go about his business in the community as if the laws of that community do not apply to him.
Second, despite the best efforts of judicial sentencing officers to impose progressively stringent sentences on the Applicant in an effort to deter him from further offending, I am hard-pressed to see how, if at all, he has experienced any measure of a deterrent effect from those sentences. His unlawful conduct involving drug offending provides an apt example. One of the Applicant’s more recent drug offences involves a conviction for possession of dangerous drugs that came before the Brisbane Supreme Court for sentencing on 30 March 2016. He was found to be in possession of slightly under seven and a half grams of pure methylamphetamine. Several years earlier on 9 July 2012, he was fined $1800 for being found in possession on 2.2 kilograms of cannabis. In addition to these drug offences, he has further convictions for something in the order of 26 offences involving possession of dangerous drugs (not including the ancillary charges of ‘possess utensils or pipes’). This pattern of repeated offending can also be seen in the Applicant’s multiple convictions for offences relating to property and in the unlawful use of a motor vehicle (involving him being found to be driving stolen vehicles) on at least five occasions.
Third, on his own evidence, the Applicant has experienced a very troubled involvement with an addiction to illicit substances. Perhaps the only way to understand the sheer size and scope of his offending history and the brazen nature of it, is to accept that his moral compass had been so significantly skewed by illicit drugs so as to blind him from being able to tell the difference between right and wrong. It is offending that is demonstrative of a person singularly focused on satiating a craving for illicit substances such that he could convince himself to do whatever it took to satisfy that craving. Indeed, such was the level of his immersion into the illicit drug culture that it came to dominate his life and displaced any other intention or resolve he may have had to earn his living through legitimate means.
Fourth, the Applicant’s conduct at the wheel of a motor vehicle in this country has been both shocking and brazenly wanton. It is somewhat of a miracle that a member or members of the community were not either seriously injured or killed as a result of his unlawful conduct whilst operating a motor vehicle. We are talking about (1) car chases across public thoroughfares which required police to deploy road spikes and overhead observational helicopters in a bid to bring the Applicant and his vehicle under some kind of control; (2) conduct involving him refusing a lawful command to pull over and remain stationary while the police dealt with him but, instead, suddenly driving away from the scene without lawful explanation.
His unlawful conduct involving motor vehicles has its parallel in the Applicant’s extensive traffic history for such offences committed in both Queensland and New South Wales. It suffices to say that there are multiple infringements and offences in the realms of speeding, driving under the influence of drugs, driving under the influence of alcohol, driving while disqualified as well as the imposition of multiple disqualifications from driving.[35] In an earlier decision, I have found that laws that protect road users, “go to the essential safety of the community”.[36] A similar finding can be made for present purposes.
[35]    R3, R4; R5, pages 236-244.
[36]    See Bartlett and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] AATA 1561, at para [45], citing Apire and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] AATA 193, at para [16].
Fifth, this Applicant’s offending has been of such an extensive nature such that it has, without question, consumed a disproportionate amount of the community’s law enforcement resources and judicial sentencing apparatus. It would be, to my mind, safe to find that his offending has also consumed a significant portion of the community’s healthcare resources because difficulties resulting from the use of illicit drugs within the community very often result in devastating impacts not just upon the users themselves, but upon the families and connections of those users who are often left to bear the consequences of an addict’s difficulties with the law and their own health. It is a dreadfully destructive spiral that has, for too long, afflicted our community’s resources.
I am satisfied that the abovementioned cumulative effects of this Applicant’s repeated offending cause this sub-paragraph 8.1.1(1)(e) to militate in favour of a finding that the totality of his offending in this country has been of a very serious nature.
Paragraph 8.1.1(1)(f)
This sub-paragraph looks at whether a non-citizen has provided false or misleading information to the Minister’s department, including by not disclosing criminal offending. This sub-paragraph most commonly has application when an Applicant leaves from and returns to Australia. As mentioned earlier, the Applicant’s movement history only refers to his arrival in Australia on 18 June 1987. He has never left Australia since that time. Accordingly, it cannot be found that the Applicant has provided false or misleading information to the Minister’s Department, certainly at least as far as any incoming passenger card(s) may be concerned.
I have checked the material and cannot find any reference to the Applicant providing false or misleading information to the department in terms of any other issue. As best as I recall the submissions, neither side is propounding the application of this particular sub-paragraph and it is thus not relevant to determination of this application.
Paragraph 8.1.1(1)(g)
The enquiry compelled by this sub-paragraph involves the issue of whether or not an Applicant has re-offended since being formally warned about the consequences of further offending in terms of his visa status to remain here.
The usual circumstance where the auspices of this sub-paragraph are engaged involves an Applicant receiving a letter from the Respondent’s department providing a formal warning that (1) the nature an extent of that person’s offending has come to the attention of the Department and that (2) the extent of that offending would allow the Respondent to cancel that person’s visa, but that (3) the Respondent was prepared to give a formal warning to that person that any further offending by that person could result in an actual cancellation of their visa.
This is not what has occurred in this matter. This Applicant received more than a mere formal warning, by virtue of a stern letter from the Department. On 6 April 2016, the visa he then held was mandatorily cancelled, pursuant to s 501(3)(A) of the Act. After the Applicant provided the Respondent’s Department with certain representations, the Applicant received the benefit of the following outcome, as noted in the relevant letter, dated 11 May 2017, from the Respondent’s Department:
“…Please note: the delegate has issued the following warning:
‘This case was very finely balanced but in this instance I have decided to revoke the visa cancellation. Mr SIAHPUOSH JADIDI needs to be absolutely aware that if he reoffends, his visa may be cancelled and he may be removed from Australia permanently and this warning will be taken into account in any such decision. It is in Mr SIAHPOUSH JADIDI’s best interests not to reoffend’.”[37]
[Bolding in original]
[37] R1, G33, page 271.
There can be no question that the Applicant received this letter restoring his visa status to him. There is a signed receipt in the material, dated 11 May 2017. This signed receipt is countersigned on the same day by an independent person.[38] At the hearing before me, the Applicant confirmed the signature on the receipt was indeed his signature.[39]
[38] Ibid, page 273.
[39] Transcript (16 June 2022), page 32, line 18.
By the time of this first cancellation (on 6 April 2016) the Applicant had committed some 71 separate offences in Australia. Despite the benefit of having his visa status restored to him (as per the Department’s letter of 11 May 2017) the Applicant went on to commit an additional 26 offences after May 2017. I am hard-pressed to understand how the language of the Department’s abovementioned letter could have been any clearer for this Applicant as a means of compelling him to cease his unlawful conduct.
He took nothing from this previous cancellation of his visa and the subsequent restoration of his visa status to remain here. There is no question that a previous revocation of a mandatory cancellation decision constitutes a formal warning to an Applicant about the consequences of further offending in terms of that person’s migration status in this country. There can be no other finding except that the terms of this sub-paragraph 8.1.1(1)(g) militate very strongly in favour of a finding that the nature of the Applicant’s offending in Australia has been of a very serious nature.
Conclusion about the nature and seriousness of the Applicant’s conduct
I have applied each of the relevant sub-paragraphs appearing in paragraph 8.1.1(1) of the Direction. Having regard to the relevant and applicable sub-paragraphs to which I have referred, I am of the view that the totality of this Applicant’s unlawful conduct in Australia can be readily characterised as, “very serious”. I note this characterisation of the Applicant’s unlawful conduct is consistent with the position taken by both parties.[40]
The risk to the Australian community should the Applicant commit further offences or engage in other serious conduct
[40] See A1, page 13, para [41]; see also, R2, page 6, para [23].
Paragraph 8.1.2(1) provides that, in considering the risk to the Australian community, a decision-maker should have regard to the Government’s view that the Australian community’s tolerance for any risk of future harm becomes lower as the seriousness of the potential harm increases. Some conduct and the harm that would be caused, if it were to be repeated, is so serious that any risk of it being be repeated may be unacceptable.
Paragraph 8.1.2(2) provides that, in considering the risk to the Australian community, a decision-maker must have regard to the three following factors on a cumulative basis:
(1)the nature of the harm to individuals or the Australian community should the non-citizen engage in further criminal or other serious conduct;
(2)the likelihood of the non-citizen engaging in further criminal or other serious conduct, taking into account:
(i)information and evidence on the risk of the non-citizen re-offending; and
(ii)evidence of rehabilitation achieved by the time of the decision, giving weight to time spent in the community since the most recent offence; and
(3)where consideration is being given to whether to refuse to grant a visa to the non-citizen – whether the risk of harm may be affected by the duration and purpose of the non-citizen’s intended stay, the type of visa being applied for, and whether there are strong or compassionate reasons for granting a short stay visa.
The nature of the harm to individuals or the Australian community were the Applicant to engage in further criminal or other serious conduct
Sub-paragraph 8.1.2(2)(a) requires an assessment of the nature of harm to an individual or the Australian community were the Applicant to engage in further criminal or other serious conduct. The following paragraph appears in the Applicant’s SFIC:
“[51] We also note that it is relevant to this consideration the gravity of the potential future offending, and degree of harm that should occur if the Applicant were to re-offend. In this case, the majority of the Applicant’s criminal offending was drug possession and property offences, which are not of direct physical risk to the Australian community.”[41]
[Internal citation omitted]
[41] A1, page 17, para [51].
I respectfully disagree with and otherwise reject the above contention both as to its content and on the basis on which it is put. It is trite to suggest that drug possession and property offences are generic to the offender and are somehow not redolent of any physical risk to the Australian community. First, it is plain from the material that the predominant amount of the Applicant’s offending has been committed as a result of his difficulties with and addiction to illicit drugs. Being in possession of such drugs means that he will inevitably consume them which, in turn, means he will be predisposed to re-offend in such a way that could quite realistically draw members of the Australian community into its orbit (i.e., driving whilst under the influence of illicit drugs). This is not at all a stretch of the evidence or otherwise an unreasonable inference to draw.
Second, it is likewise trite to suggest that property offending does not present members of the community with physical risk – of course it does. This is because members of the community (in the main) work hard to acquire the property they own. They are consequently entitled to enjoy that property and for that right to never be interfered with as a result of offenders committing offences against that property. I will not engage in splitting hairs about the nature of offences committed by a non-citizen, especially in the case of someone like this Applicant who has compiled such a significantly comprehensive criminal history in this country.

ANNEXURE B – TRIBUNAL DIRECTION (13 June 2022)
Administrative Appeals Tribunal

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

)

)

No: 2022/2777

General Division

)

Re: Pouria Siahpoush Jadidi
Applicant

And: Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs
Respondent
DIRECTIONS
TRIBUNAL:              Senior Member Theodore Tavoularis
DATE:   13 June 2022
PLACE:                    Brisbane
The Tribunal DIRECTS:
1.The hearing scheduled for 14 June 2022 be vacated.
2.On or before 15 June 2022, the Applicant must lodge with the Tribunal and provide to the Respondent any submissions or evidence in reply which the Respondent intends to rely upon at the hearing, or a letter indicating that the Respondent does not intend to do so.
3.On or before 4:00pm (AEST) on 17 June 2022, the Respondent must lodge with the Tribunal and give to the Applicant any evidence in reply which the Respondent intends to rely upon at the hearing.
4.The matter be listed for a further two (2) days of hearing on 20 & 21 June 2022.
a.If the Applicant remains in Brisbane Immigration Transit Accommodation at the time of the hearing, the Respondent undertakes to make the necessary arrangements for the Applicants in-person appearance in the Brisbane Registry.

NOTATIONS
A.The Tribunal NOTES that it will publish its decision by no later than 2:00pm (AEST) on 22 June 2022, with written reasons to be provided to the parties within a reasonable time thereafter.

……………………………[SGD]…..………………..
Senior Member Theodore Tavoularis

[2022] AATA 2217

22 June 2022

Key Legal Topics

Areas of Law

Immigration

Administrative Law

Legal Concepts

Judicial Review

Procedural Fairness

Statutory Construction

Natural Justice

Jurisdiction