IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Adelaide No A41 of 2021
B e t w e e n -
STEVEN JOSEPH JACQUES
Applicant
and
THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
KEANE J
GORDON J
STEWARD J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA BY VIDEO CONNECTION
ON THURSDAY, 5 MAY 2022, AT 12.30 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
KEANE J: In accordance with the Court’s protocol when sitting remotely, I will announce the appearances for the parties.
MR S.A. McDONALD, SC appears with MS M.E. SHAW, QC for the applicant. (instructed by Patsouris and Associates Lawyers)
MR B.J. POWER, QC appears with MS S.E. HARBURG for the respondent. (instructed by Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions)
KEANE J: Yes, Mr McDonald.
MR McDONALD: Thank you, your Honour. The first matter I need to raise is that an extension of time is required for special leave. There is an affidavit of Mr Patsouris in support of that application at page 69 of the application book.
KEANE J: Is the application opposed, Mr Power?
MR POWER: Only in the sense that the ultimate submission of the Director is that leave would be futile if the grant of special leave is refused but no other basis is put forward.
KEANE J: Thanks, Mr Power. Mr McDonald, you can proceed on that footing.
MR McDONALD: Thank you very much, your Honour. I propose to commence by addressing what we have identified as special leave question 2, which relates to proposed ground of appeal 1(b). Then I propose to move to question 1 and then question 3. So, the first issue, question 2, relates to what the Court of Appeal described as a “signposts approach”, which was adopted by the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions and was accepted and acted upon by the Court of Appeal. What is meant by the signpost approach is explained clearly at paragraphs 2 and 29 of the judgment of the Court of Appeal, so if I can perhaps take your Honours first to paragraph 2 at page 38 of the application book. You will see that their Honours said:
the Director further identifies several matters relating to the basis upon which the sentence was imposed.
That is the sentence of the primary judge:
The Director does not go so far as to submit that these constitute process errors in their own right, but rather that they tend to explain or demonstrate the manifest inadequacy of the overall sentence.
I interpolate that the language of “process error” is a shorthand that is commonly used – in South Australia, at least – to refer to the first category of House v The King error, what we might call specific or identifiable errors of principle. In paragraph 29, if I can take the court there, on page 43 of the application book – paragraph 29 starts with the proposition, which we respectfully submit is wrong, that:
The determination of…
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- Case
- [2022] HCATrans 83
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the High Court included whether the Court of Appeal erred in its application of the "signposts approach" to assess manifest inadequacy of a sentence, and whether the Court of Appeal incorrectly determined the non-parole period by reference to an "a priori" range rather than by applying sentencing principles. A further issue was whether the Court of Appeal failed to address the residual discretion to dismiss a prosecution appeal.
The applicant contended that the Court of Appeal's "signposts approach," which involved accumulating disagreements with the primary judge's discretionary judgments without finding specific errors of principle, did not demonstrate manifest inadequacy. Instead, it was argued that this method effectively allowed the appellate court to substitute its own discretionary judgments for those of the trial judge, contrary to established principles. Regarding the non-parole period, the applicant argued that the Court of Appeal erred by fixing it by reference to a recognised range (50-75% of the head sentence) rather than by applying sentencing principles to the facts, which was said to be contrary to decisions such as *Hili v The Queen*. Finally, the applicant submitted that the Court of Appeal failed to address its residual discretion to dismiss the prosecution appeal, despite this being raised in submissions.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the High Court of Australia as an application for special leave to appeal. The applicant, Steven Joseph Jacques, sought special leave to appeal against the decision of the South Australian Court of Appeal, which had affirmed the sentence imposed by the primary judge. The Director of Public Prosecutions opposed the application, arguing that the grant of special leave would be futile. The key procedural steps leading up to this application included the original sentencing hearing in the trial court, an appeal to the South Australian Court of Appeal, and the subsequent application for special leave to appeal to the High Court. The High Court, after hearing arguments from both parties, ultimately dismissed the application for special leave to appeal, finding that the appeal did not have sufficient prospects of success to warrant the grant of special leave.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the Court of Appeal correctly applied the "signposts approach" in assessing the manifest inadequacy of the sentence.
2. Whether the Court of Appeal erred in principle by beginning with an a priori range for the non-parole period instead of applying sentencing principles to the facts.
3. Whether the Court of Appeal correctly exercised its residual discretion to dismiss the prosecution appeal.
Held
1. Whether the Court of Appeal correctly applied the "signposts approach" in assessing the manifest inadequacy of the sentence.
The Court did not endorse the "signposts approach" but considered that the appeal did not have sufficient prospects of success to warrant the grant of special leave to appeal. The application was dismissed.
2. Whether the Court of Appeal erred in principle by beginning with an a priori range for the non-parole period instead of applying sentencing principles to the facts.
The Court did not find that the Court of Appeal erred in principle by beginning with an a priori range for the non-parole period, as the appeal did not have sufficient prospects of success to warrant the grant of special leave to appeal. The application was dismissed.
3. Whether the Court of Appeal correctly exercised its residual discretion to dismiss the prosecution appeal.
The Court did not find that the Court of Appeal failed to exercise its residual discretion to dismiss the prosecution appeal, as the appeal did not have sufficient prospects of success to warrant the grant of special leave to appeal. The application was dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In assessing the manifest inadequacy of the sentence, the High Court considered whether the Court of Appeal correctly applied the "signposts approach" in evaluating the sentence. The Court of Appeal had adopted a technique of advocacy where the Crown Prosecutor identified several factors that contributed to the explanation for the asserted manifest inadequacy of the sentence. The High Court noted that the Court of Appeal was not adopting this approach as a legal principle but rather as a technique of advocacy to assist the court in its task. The High Court concluded that the Court of Appeal did not err in its approach, as it was not substituting its view for the sentencing judge's findings but rather considering whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Regarding the second issue, the High Court assessed whether the Court of Appeal erred in principle by beginning with an a priori range for the non-parole period instead of applying sentencing principles to the facts. The High Court found that the Court of Appeal did not err in principle, as it had applied the principles in Hili v The Queen and Barbaro v The Queen. The Court of Appeal had not assumed a norm from which one subtracted or added but rather had considered the application of principles and the circumstances of the offending and the respondent's offending history. The High Court concluded that the Court of Appeal's approach was consistent with the proper application of sentencing principles.
Lastly, the High Court examined whether the Court of Appeal correctly exercised its residual discretion to dismiss the prosecution appeal. The High Court found that the Court of Appeal had considered the factors relevant to the residual discretion during the permission phase, and therefore, the residual discretion had been properly exercised. The High Court held that it was not necessary for the Court of Appeal to separately address the residual discretion as long as all relevant factors had been considered.
In conclusion, the ratio decidendi of this case is that the Court of Appeal did not err in its application of the "signposts approach" in evaluating the manifest inadequacy of the sentence, nor did it err in principle by beginning with an a priori range for the non-parole period instead of applying sentencing principles to the facts. Additionally, the Court of Appeal correctly exercised its residual discretion to dismiss the prosecution appeal by considering the relevant factors during the permission phase.