Jacobs and Jacobs

[2007] FamCA 1266

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

JACOBS & JACOBS [2007] FamCA 1266

FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY - Settlement in relation to marriage

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

Hickey & Hickey (2003) FLC 93-143; 30 Fam LR 355
Coghlan & Coghlan (2005) FLC 93-220; 32 Fam LR 414

APPLICANT: Mrs Jacobs

RESPONDENT: Mr Jacobs

FILE NUMBER: NCF 708 of 2005

DATE DELIVERED: 26 October 2007

PLACE DELIVERED: Sydney

PLACE HEARD: Newcastle

JUDGMENT OF: Johnston JR

HEARING DATE: 26 & 27 July 2007

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Ms S Christie

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Mark Evans, Solicitor

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: Mr J Hamilton

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: Braye Cragg, Solicitors

Orders

1. That within 60 days the husband shall pay to the wife the sum of $184 503.

2. That simultaneously with the payment referred to in order 1 hereof the husband and the wife do all things and sign all documents necessary to transfer to the husband all the wife’s right title and interest in the real estate at B in the State of New South Wales being the whole of the land described in folio identifier … (“the home”).

3. That pending the payment referred to in Order 1 hereof and the transfer in order 2 hereof the husband shall indemnify the wife against all payments and liability for all rates, taxes and outgoings including household insurance premiums of or with respect to the home of whatsoever nature and kind.

4. That in default of compliance with order 1 hereof the home be sold and the husband and the wife do all things and sign all necessary documents to effect a sale of the home and by way of consequential arrangement that shall be made for the purposes of effecting the sale:

   (a)The listing price for the sale be as agreed between the parties and failing agreement as advised by a valuer as agreed but failing agreement as nominated by the President of the Australian Property Institute Inc.

   (b)The home shall be listed for sale by private treaty with such real estate agent as the parties shall agree and failing agreement with T Real Estate (“the agent”).

   (c)The listing contract shall be prepared by such solicitor or conveyancer as the parties shall agree and failing agreement by N Solicitors, and thereafter the agreed or nominated solicitor or conveyancer shall conduct the sale conveyancing procedure on the sale of the home whether by way of private treaty or auction as herein after provided.

5. That in the event that the home fails to sell by private treaty within three months of it being so listed for sale by private treaty then, unless otherwise agreed in writing, the parties shall do all things and sign all documents necessary to cause the home to be successively submitted for sale by auction through the agreed or nominated listing agent appointed pursuant to these Orders until sold at a reserve price of not less than $445 000 save that each successive auction shall be conducted upon the date recommended by the agent but not being less than two months and not more than three months after the preceding auction and on each occasion the reserve price shall decrease by five percent.

6. That the proceeds of sale be paid as follows:

   (a)In payment of agent’s commission, auction fees, and advertising expenses in relation to the sale;

   (b)In payment of the legal costs on sale;

   (c)In repayment to each of the husband and the wife of any amounts paid by either of them prior to the completion of the sale as may represent reasonable advertising expenses or auction fees or disbursements that were required to be prepaid.

   (d)In payment to the husband of 58.408 percent of the balance and to the wife of 41.592 percent thereof.

7. That pursuant to s 79 of the Act both the husband and the wife are declared the owners respectively of all other property in their possession and/or control including superannuation.

8. That in the event that either party should fail, neglect or refuse to execute any deed or instrument required to be executed to give validity and effect to these orders then upon the other party filing an affidavit setting out such failure, neglect or refusal a Registrar of this Court is hereby appointed pursuant to s 106A of the Act to execute such deed or instrument in the name of the party who defaults and to do all things necessary to give validity to the operation of the deed or instrument.

9. That all exhibits be released.

10. That the above orders not commence operation until 16 November 2007.

11. That both parties have leave to re-list these proceedings for further submissions in relation to the form of the orders only, at any time not later than 15 November 2007.

12. That both parties have leave to re-list these proceedings on 7 days notice in relation to the implementation of these orders.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Jacobs & Jacobs is approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY

FILE NUMBER: NCF 708 of 2005

MRS JACOBS  

Applicant

And

MR JACOBS  

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction and Applications

1. These are property proceedings. The parties are Mrs Jacobs and Mr Jacobs.  For convenience I shall refer to them as “the wife” and “the husband” respectively.

2. The wife seeks orders to the effect that the husband pay to her the sum of $365 000 upon which payment she will transfer to him her interest in the former matrimonial home at B. The wife also seeks some consequential orders and an order in relation to the parties’ personalty.

3. On the other hand, the husband seeks an order to the effect that the wife transfer her interest in the home to him upon payment by him to her of the sum of $60 000.  The husband seeks similar consequential orders to those sought by the wife.

Background

1. The wife was born in March 1956 and she is therefore 51 years of age. The husband was born in May 1960 and he is therefore 47 years of age. The parties married in December 1990 and they separated in August 2005. 

2. There are two children of the marriage, M born in November 1991 who is therefore 15 years of age and N born in April 1993 who is therefore 14 years of age.

3. At the time of the marriage the husband’s property consisted of a small amount of equity in a property at K which he had purchased approximately 12 months previously for $30 000, a boat and trailer, a Holden Commodore, a Land Rover, savings of between $5000 and $10 000 and some furniture. The husband was employed as a miner earning approximately $80 000 per annum.

4. At that time the wife’s property consisted of an F100 truck, an Arab horse and horse riding equipment. The wife also had a benefit in the First State Super fund. The wife was working in Nursing at the K Hospital.

5. In February 1990 the parties purchased the property at B for $135 000. The funding of this is in issue and I shall refer to it further below.  The wife said she applied $34 000 from her property settlement with her former husband. The husband said he applied $34 000 net proceeds of sale of his property at K. The parties borrowed $80 000 from the Newcastle Permanent Building Society to fund the purchase.

6. The interior of the home was painted. There is an issue about who painted this and I shall refer to this again below. Shortly after the parties moved into their new home they purchased a number of beef cattle. The wife continued to work until shortly before the birth of the parties’ elder child. From this time until 1997 she remained out of the paid work force, devoting herself to the full time care of the family.

7. Unfortunately the husband sustained a number of injuries during his employment at the mine. These were of differing severity. In April 1991 the husband injured his right elbow at work. A few months later the husband injured his left knee at work. In November 1992 the husband injured his back at work. A few months later the husband injured his right leg at work. In November 1993 the husband injured his back and took a couple of weeks sick leave.

8. In September 1996 the parties obtained a further loan of $30 000 to use towards additions and alterations of their home.

9. In 1997 the wife resumed paid work on a casual basis working at H Hospital.

10. In March 1997 the parties obtained a further loan this being for $98 000 to put towards funding renovations. Extensive work was undertaken.

11. In August 1997 the husband suffered a very serious injury to his back while working at the mine. The husband was unable to continue working at the mine.  He suffered from pain. He became depressed. For the next two years the husband continued to receive his full salary but then went onto worker’s compensation upon termination of his employment in March 1999.

12. In 1998 the husband commenced building a two-storey building at the back of the property assisted by Mr G. 

13. In 1998 the wife commenced working a second job, this being at D Hospital.  From about this time the wife employed a housekeeper to assist particularly with cleaning the wet areas of the home.

14. In February 1999 the wife commenced working full time work at D Hospital. 

15. In August 1999 the husband was paid $133 000 from his superannuation fund.  This money was used to reduce the mortgage balance. 

16. In 2001 the wife enrolled for study at the University of Technology, Sydney for a Masters degree. She commuted to Sydney two evenings per week during semesters.  This continued until 2004 when the wife successfully completed the course.

17. In 2003 the husband established a business. He registered the business name “W Pty Ltd”. The parties borrowed $35 000 and the husband purchased equipment.

18. The parties purchased a Holden Astra for $10 000, a boat for $35 000 a Toyota Landcruiser for $25 000. They had also spent approximately $20 000 on the construction of their separate dwelling.

19. In October 2004 the husband settled his personal injury claim.

20. In April 2005 the husband received a District Court judgment in his favour of $100 000 against his former employer. He also redeemed his worker’s compensation rights in the amount of $350 000.

21. By this time the parties’ mortgage was in the vicinity of $100 000 and this was repaid.

22. In early August 2005 the husband withdrew $200 000 from the parties’ joint account with Newcastle Permanent Building Society without the wife’s knowledge. The husband deposited the money into an investment account with Newcastle Permanent Building Society.

23. In late August the husband withdrew a further $12 000 from the joint account.

24. As indicated above, the parties separated on 29 August 2005. The wife left the former matrimonial home.

25. In early September 2005 the wife rented a home at S. The wife had formed a relationship with Mr K. 

26. The children remained living with their father.

27. In November 2005 Mr K moved into the wife’s home.

28. On 27 October 2005 the wife commenced paying $1600 per month child support to the husband pursuant to a child support assessment. The wife has also been paying half the costs of the children’s attendance at their private schools.

29. In January 2007 the husband purchased further equipment for his business.

Issues

1. A hallmark of this litigation is that there are many matters about which the parties disagree. I shall confine myself to the major issues and deal with some of these here and others below.

2. There was an issue about the quantum of initial contributions to the purchase of the former matrimonial home.

3. As indicated above, the purchase price was $135 000 and there were legal costs and stamp duty. One would expect all up costs to have been in the vicinity of $140 000. It is clear that the parties borrowed $80 000 from Newcastle Permanent Building Society.  It is also clear that the wife had received $34 000 from her property settlement with her former husband. The wife said that she applied this $34 000 to the purchase. The husband said that she did not have $34 000.

4. The husband said that when he sold his property at K for $64 000 in 1990 the proceeds of sale were approximately $34 000. He said that he paid these funds to pay out bridging finance for the B property. He also said that he used approximately $5000 from the sale of his boat and trailer.

5. With the wife’s alleged $34 000, this would be a total of $73 000 in addition to the borrowed $80 000. This would be a total of $153 000. Yet approximately $140 000 was all that was required.

6. The husband was unable to provide any document to support his version of events.

7. I prefer the wife’s evidence in relation to this matter. I find that it is more probable than not that there was an imbalance in initial contributions to the B property and that the imbalance was in favour of the wife. But it is more probable than not that the imbalance was modest in any event.

8. This matter is of little relevance in the overall context of all the contributions which have been made by the parties over the more than 17 years since they purchased this property.

9. There was another issue about who repainted the former matrimonial home when the parties purchased it prior to their moving in. The wife said that she and her parents painted the interior of the home. The husband said that he painted the interior, assisted by the wife’s father and that the wife did not participate in the painting.

10. I am not able to make any finding about this matter one way or the other. But again, in my view, it would have very little significance in the overall result.

The Applicable Law

1. The Court must be satisfied that in all the circumstances it is just and equitable to make an order. This is provided by s.79(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

2. The Full Court of this Court in its decision in the case of Hickey & Hickey (2003) FLC 93-143; 30 Fam LR 355 said as follows:

   “The case law reveals that there is a preferred approach to the determination of an application brought pursuant to the provisions of s.79.  That approach involves four inter-related steps.  Firstly, the Court should make findings as to the identity and value of the property, liabilities and financial resources of the parties at the date of the hearing.  Secondly, the Court should identify and assess the contributions of the parties within the meaning of ss.79(4)(a), (b) and (c) and determine the contribution based entitlements of the parties expressed as a percentage of the net value of the property of the parties.  Thirdly, the Court should identify and assess the relevant matters referred to ss.79(4)(d), (e), (f) and (g), (“the other factors”) including, because of s.79(4)(e), the matters referred to in s.75(2) so far as they are relevant and determine the adjustment (if any) that should be made to the contribution based entitlements of the parties established at step two.  Fourthly, the Court should consider the effect of those findings and determination and resolve what order is just and equitable in all the circumstances of the case:  Lee Steere and Lee Steere (1985) FLC 91-626; Ferraro and Ferraro (1993) FLC 92-335 (and various other well known authorities).”

3. Despite some criticism of this decision by the majority of the Full Court in Coghlan & Coghlan (2005) FLC 93-220; 32 Fam LR 414, see for example paragraphs 36 and 37 at page 79,641 and paragraph 63 at page 79,646, in my view it is not incorrect to take the approach to the hearing of property proceedings as described in Hickey above.

Property available for division

1. There were some issues concerning what the pool of available property comprises. There was a difficulty with valuation of the husband’s business equipment. It was conceded on behalf of the husband that his recently purchased equipment either had not been valued or, if valued, the valuation had not been included in the valuer’s report. In these circumstances it was conceded that this item of property should be included at its purchase price which was $26 000.

2. It was submitted on behalf of the wife that the husband’s legal costs paid of approximately $40 000 should be included. I accept that the source of these payments was the monies received by the husband for his worker’s compensation redemption. These were funds which were available to the parties at the time of separation. I accept the submission on behalf of the wife that these funds should be added back to the pool.

3. It was also submitted on behalf of the wife that the husband has had the sole use of an additional $90 000 from the funds available at the time of separation.  It was submitted that these should be brought back into the pool on the basis that the husband has not explained how he spent such funds. 

4. In my view, there are a number of difficulties with this submission. The first is that the first payment from the litigation was made prior to the parties separating and it was paid to the parties’ joint account.

5. It is common ground that there was approximately $215 776 in the joint account at the time the husband withdrew the $200 000 and put it on term deposit and out of the wife’s control approximately three weeks before the parties separated. He then withdrew $12 000 from the account and paid $3000 to the wife keeping $9000 for himself. So that is $209 000. The husband has paid $40 000 to his solicitors which leaves a balance of $169 000.  The account balance is currently $112 500. So there is a difference of $56 500 which the husband has had the use of between 8 August 2005 and the present time.

6. It is submitted on behalf of the wife that in light of the fact that she has paid child support to the husband since October 2005 and the husband has had the benefit of the money he has earned from his business the expenditure at the rate of an additional $56 500 over the period is unreasonable and should be taken into account by the Court. 

7. I propose to accept this submission in part. But the husband required funds to live on beyond what he was able to earn from his business and the money paid by the wife for child support. I propose to take this matter into account below.

8. The property available for division between the parties is as follows:-

$
1.         Former matrimonial home at B	$445,000
2.         Wife’s Newcastle Permanent Building Society (“NPBS”) account …	133
3.         Wife’s Holden Astra	18,000
4.         Wife’s personal property	1,350
5.         Wife’s pottery equipment	550
6.         Wife’s IAG shares	7,650
7.         Wife’s superannuation	65,000
8.         Husband’s boat, equipment, personal property	48,080
9.         Husband’s NPBS account …	112,500
10.      Husband’s NPBS account …	1,597
11.      Husband’s business	14,500
12.      Husband’s business equipment	26,000
13.      Husband’s legal costs (add back)	40,000
14.      Joint NPBS account …	1
15.      Husband’s superannuation	68,000
_____________
$848,361

1. The liabilities are as follows:-

$
1.         Husband’s outstanding loan for equipment	55,000
2.         Joint mortgage	1,400
_____________
$56,400
Surplus	$791,961

Contributions

1. This is the area of greatest disagreement between the parties.  Each appears to have the perception that they have done much more in terms of their overall contributions than the other.

2. My view is that certainly up to the time of the husband’s very serious accident in 1997 they both worked very hard. As I have said, the wife worked in her profession until shortly before the birth of M. From this time, as I have also said, she concentrated her energies on caring for the husband, the children and the home. The husband endeavoured to present a picture of the wife as a housewife who did not live up to his expectations so that he had to do some of the domestic work at a time when he was working very hard and for long hours at the mine.

3. For her part, the wife endeavoured to present the husband as not providing her with sufficient support with the children and the domestic work. A husband who went out too much and spent too much of the family budget on alcohol.

1. The view that I have is that both parties worked hard, certainly up to 1997. 

2. The husband was busy with his employment and at times he did double shifts.  In addition he helped the builder with the initial extension and renovation of the home. He also did considerable improvements around the property including the construction, with assistance, of a large double garage and later a free standing additional building which provided storage area and an area for the use of the wife as a studio. He also made other improvements to the property. 

3. But the wife was very busy with the children and the domestic work.

4. After 1997, things became more difficult for the family.  The husband suffered a very serious change in his life as a consequence of his accident at work.  He could not lead the same active life which he had enjoyed before his accident.  He became frustrated and depressed. This flowed onto the other family members to some extent.

5. But in terms of the financial implications of the accident, the husband continued to receive full pay (although not overtime) from the time of the accident for almost two years until his employment was terminated in March 1999. Then he only received approximately $15 000 - $16 000 per year worker’s compensation payments.

6. The husband said that from the time of the accident he was the parent primarily involved with the children. The wife denies this. Yet she was in full time employment from early 1999. In addition, as indicated above, between the years 2001 and 2004 the wife was travelling to Sydney twice a week to attend to the requirements of her Master’s degree course and, of necessity, some additional time was required for study and assignments.

7. As against this, the husband did not have the same capacity for physical work around the home and the property as he had prior to the accident.  He gave the impression during his cross-examination that he undertook much of what he had been able to achieve previously, only that he had to do things more slowly and carefully. I can accept this to a point. But account must be taken of a report on his condition prepared for the purposes of his personal injury and worker’s compensation litigation by Ms C following a home visit to the husband in March 2002.  Amongst other things, the report observes that:

   ·the wife and children now perform more of the heavier gardening and housework;

   ·he was unable to pick up the children;

   ·he was capable of performing light work;

   ·he was only performing 20 percent of the housework;

   ·often he could not help with preparing the evening meal and that the wife was preparing most meals;

   ·that he can only wash up for one or two minutes;

   ·he does not usually do the ironing;

   ·he could perform some outside tasks but enlisted his wife and son to assist.

8. On the other hand the report also observed that:

   ·he could do approximately 20 percent of the laundry tasks and all the shopping which he does in small purchases almost each day;

   ·he could also do the lawn mowing using the ride-on mower but only for approximately 30 minutes.

9. In my view, the clear picture from this report is that, certainly up to March 2002, the husband’s physical capacity to contribute was considerably more limited than before his accident. It was also an acknowledgement that the burden on the wife to undertake more of the physical work around the home and the property had increased.

10. As I have said, the wife took on a second job then returned to full time paid employment. She was very busy.

11. It was submitted on behalf of the husband that in the final analysis of the parties’ contributions, the finding should be that the husband has made greater contributions overall than the wife.  It was submitted that this is because the husband has made greater financial contributions than the wife. It was submitted that this was particularly as a consequence of receiving $133 000 from his superannuation fund in August 1999, part of which was attributable to several years of membership prior to the parties’ marriage, to the fact that he continued to be paid a full salary for approximately two years after his accident and because he received approximately $375 000 net upon settling his litigation. It was also submitted that he made significant contributions to the improvement of the property by the work he undertook thereto, particularly his participation in construction of the sheds and extra dwelling on the property.  It was submitted that the husband made the major contributions to the care of the children in the almost two years since separation. In all the circumstances it was submitted that the husband’s contributions overall should be assessed as having been 70 percent.

12. On the other hand it was submitted on behalf of the wife that the parties’ contributions should be assessed as having been equal. It was submitted that the wife made a greater initial contribution to acquisition of the home, that she made the major contributions as homemaker and parent throughout the entirety of the marriage until separation, that she worked in two jobs at one point and that, in any event, her financial contributions over all the years would have been similar in quantum to those of the husband. In any event, it was submitted on behalf of the wife that the husband has had the benefit of at least $90 000, in addition to the $40 000 used to pay his legal costs, out of the $375 000 net proceeds of the litigation.

13. In my view, the husband is ahead of the wife in terms of their contributions overall. But this is not by a large margin. In my view, his financial contributions have been greater than those of the wife because of the receipt by him of the $133 000 superannuation and net $375 000 from the workers compensation litigation. I accept to some extent the submission on behalf of the wife that the husband has had the benefit of part of the payout.  But he had to meet his living costs and to provide for his share of the financial responsibility for the children after separation.

14. As I have said, the difference is not significant. In my view, the husband’s contributions overall have exceeded those of the wife by 5 percent.  I assess the parties’ contributions therefore, as having been 55 percent by the husband and 45 percent by the wife.

s 75(2) matters

1. The wife is 51 years of age and in reasonable health.  Her income from her employment in Nursing at R Hospital is $1573 per week. The wife also contributes to the FSS superannuation scheme. On present indications the wife would appear to have the capacity to continue employment in this or some similar capacity for the foreseeable future.

2. The wife lives in a de facto relationship with Mr K. They share their living costs.  Mr K is also employed earning approximately $572 per week.

3. On the other hand the husband is 47 years of age.  There are serious limitations in terms of his physical ability. As indicated above, those managing his superannuation fund were satisfied in 1999 that he was eligible for the permanent disability benefit.  He has been unable to return to his work at the mine since 1997.  In 2002 he was considered only to be able to perform light duties.

4. He has been working in his business since 2004 but this returns a very modest income. His taxable income for the financial year ending 30 June 2006 was $28 326.

5. In these circumstances, in my view his capacity for earning income is considerably less than that of the wife.

6. In addition, the husband has almost the entire responsibility for the physical care of the children. Orders were made in July 2006 for the children to spend time with their mother each alternate weekend, half school holidays and other specified occasions.

7. For a period the children spent time on weekends with their mother.  Unfortunately, the relationship between M and her mother has become fractured.  It is hoped that with the resolution of these proceedings and perhaps the passage of some time their close relationship will be restored.  N continues to enjoy a good relationship with his mother.  He has spent numerous occasions overnight at his mother’s home.

8. But, in any event, it seems clear that, on the history of events since separation, it is more probable than not that the major physical care of the children until they reach adulthood will be provided by the husband.

9. The wife is assessed to pay child support and she has been paying this in a significant amount since October 2005. In addition, the wife pays one half of the children’s private school fees as well as the premiums for their health insurance.

10. The husband has had the benefit of occupying the home since separation.

11. Upon consideration of the relevant s 75(2) matters, these favour a set-off of available property in favour of the husband.  In my view, there is a significant disparity in the parties’ capacities for earning income, the wife having a much stronger capacity than the husband. Account must also be taken of the greater responsibility the husband is likely to have for the care of the children.  But, as submitted by learned counsel for the wife, given the ages of the children, this will continue only for a few years.  Account must also be taken of the fact that the assessment of contributions has been in favour of the husband.

12. In all the circumstances, in my view, the appropriate set-off of property on account of relevant s 75(2) matters is 10 percent in favour of the husband.

The fourth step

1. This was a marriage of substantial duration in the course of which two children have been born. Contributions have been assessed 5 percent in favour of the husband and he is to enjoy a further 10 percent pursuant to s 75(2) adjustment.  This is a division of available property 65 percent to the husband and 35 percent to the wife.

2. The husband will have property with a value of $514 775.  This will enable him to retain the former matrimonial home although he will have to rearrange his affairs and perhaps borrow a modest amount to pay the wife.

3. The wife will have property with a value of $277 186.  This is considerably less than the husband. The wife might not have the capacity to borrow sufficient funds to assist her to purchase accommodation for herself and Mr K. As indicated above, Mr K assists by sharing living costs.  So, they might have to continue renting a home for some years.  This situation should be expected to change once the children reach adulthood and the wife no longer has to pay support for them. 

4. The orders I propose will not affect the income earning capacity of either party.

Conclusion

1. The husband is to have property with a value of $514 775.  The husband has the following property:

$
1.        Boat, equipment, personal property	48,080
2.        NPBS account …	112,500
3.        NPBS account …	1,597
4.        Business	14,500
5.        Business Equipment	26,000
6.        Legal costs (add back)	40,000
7.        NPBS account …	1
8.        Superannuation	68,000
_____________
$310,678

1. But the husband also has a liability on the loan to purchase equipment of $55 000.  Accordingly, the husband has net property with a value of $255 678 ($310 678 - $55 000 = $255 678).

2. To achieve property with a value of $514 775 the husband will require additional property with a value of $259 097 ($514 775 - $255 678 = $259 097).  This can only come from the former matrimonial home.

3. This home has an agreed value of $445 000 and is subject to a mortgage of $1400.  The equity is therefore $443 600 ($445 000 - $1400 = $443 600).  If the husband wishes to keep the home he will be required to pay the wife the sum of $184 503 ($443 600 - $259 097 = $184 503).

4. On the other hand, the wife is to have property with a value of $277 186.  The wife has the following property:

$
1.        NPBS account …	133
2.        Holden Astra	18,000
3.        Personal property	1,350
4.        Equipment	550
5.        IAG shares	7,650
6.        Superannuation	65,000
_____________
$92,683

1. The wife has no liabilities.

2. For the wife to achieve property with a value of $277 186 the wife will require additional property with a value of $184 503 ($277 186 - $92 683 = $184 503).

3. If the husband does not wish to retain the home it will have to be sold and the net proceeds of sale paid in the following proportions:

   -58.408 percent to the husband ($259 097 is 58.408 percent of $443 600)

   -41.592 percent to the wife ($184 503 is 41.592 percent of $443 600).

I certify that the preceding ninety-five (95) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judicial Registrar W P Johnston.

Associate

Date:              26 October 2007