Jackson v Ricegrowers Limited
[2016] FWC 2501
•21 April 2016
[2016] FWC 2501
REASONS FOR DECISION
| Fair Work Act 2009 | |
| s.394—Unfair dismissal | |
| Tuki Jackson | |
| v | |
| Ricegrowers Limited T/A Sunrice | |
| (U2016/5904) | |
| SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT DRAKE | SYDNEY, 21 APRIL 2016 |
| Application for relief from unfair dismissal. |
[1] This decision arises from an application for an extension of time for lodgement of an
application for an unfair dismissal remedy pursuant to s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the
Act).
[2] The relationship between Mr Jackson and the respondent ended on 10 March 2016.
Mr Jackson lodged his application at the Fair Work Commission (the Commission) on
1 April 2016. Mr Jackson’s application was lodged 14 days outside the statutory time limit.
[3] When determining this application I had before me the Application for Unfair
Dismissal lodged by Mr Jackson. He did not provide an explanation for his late lodgement in
his application. I wrote to him on 6 April 2016 outlining the matters I was required to
consider by the Act and asked him to provide a statement addressing these matters within 14
days. Mr Jackson provided a statement on 11 April 2016.
[4] I considered his statement. I issued an Order refusing his application for an extension
of time and dismissed this application on 14 April 2016.
[5] The relevant legislative framework for the exercise of the Commission’s discretion in
relation to applications of this kind is set out below:
394 Application for unfair dismissal remedy
...
(3) The FWC may allow a further period for the application to be made by a person
under subsection (1) if the FWC is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances,
taking into account:
(a) the reason for the delay; and
(b) whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect; and
(c) any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal; and
(d) prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); and
[2016] FWC 2501
(e) the merits of the application; and
(f) fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position.
[6] The meaning of “exceptional circumstances” was considered in Nulty v Blue Star
Group Pty Ltd [2011] FWAFB 975 where the Full Bench said:
“[10] It is convenient to deal first with the meaning of the expression “exceptional
circumstances” in s.366(2). In Cheval Properties Pty Ltd v Smithers a Full Bench of
FWA considered the meaning of the expression “exceptional circumstances” in
s.394(3) and held:
“[5] The word “exceptional” is relevantly defined in The Macquarie Dictionary
as “forming an exception or unusual instance; unusual; extraordinary.” We can
apprehend no reason for giving the word a meaning other than its ordinary
meaning for the purposes of s.394(3) of the FW Act.”
[11] Given that s.366(2) is in relevantly identical terms to s.394(3), this statement of
principle is equally applicable to s.366(2).
[12] The ordinary meaning of the expression “exceptional circumstances” was
considered by Rares J in Ho v Professional Services Review Committee No 295 a case
involving in s.106KA of the Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth). His Honour observed:
“23. I am of opinion that the expression ‘exceptional circumstances’ requires
consideration of all the circumstances. In Griffiths v The Queen (1989) 167
CLR 372 at 379 Brennan and Dawson JJ considered a statutory provision
which entitled either a parole board or a court to specify a shorter non-parole
period than that required under another section only if it determined that the
circumstances justified that course. They said of the appellant’s circumstances:
‘Although no one of these factors was exceptional, in combination they
may reasonably be regarded as amounting to exceptional
circumstances.’
24. Brennan and Dawson JJ held that the failure in that case to evaluate the
relevant circumstances in combination was a failure to consider matters which
were relevant to the exercise of the discretion under the section (167 CLR at
379). Deane J, (with whom Gaudron and McHugh JJ expressed their
concurrence on this point, albeit that they were dissenting) explained that the
power under consideration allowed departure from the norm only in the
exceptional or special case where the circumstances justified it (167 CLR at
383, 397).
25. And, in Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513 at 573 [173] Callinan J
referred with approval to what Lord Bingham of Cornhill CJ had said in R v
Kelly (Edward) [2000] QB 198 at 208, namely:
‘We must construe “exceptional” as an ordinary, familiar English
adjective, and not as a term of art. It describes a circumstance which is
such as to form an exception, which is out of the ordinary course, or
[2016] FWC 2501unusual, or special, or uncommon. To be exceptional a circumstance
need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare; but it cannot be one
that is regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered.’
26. Exceptional circumstances within the meaning of s 106KA(2) can include a
single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a
combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular
significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. Thus, the sun and
moon appear in the sky everyday and there is nothing exceptional about seeing
them both simultaneously during day time. But an eclipse, whether lunar or
solar, is exceptional, even though it can be predicted, because it is outside the
usual course of events.
27. It is not correct to construe ‘exceptional circumstances’ as being only some
unexpected occurrence, although frequently it will be. Nor is it correct to
construe the plural ‘circumstances’ as if it were only a singular occurrence,
even though it can be a one off situation. The ordinary and natural meaning of
‘exceptional circumstances’ in s 106KA(2) includes a combination of factors
which, when viewed together, may reasonably be seen as producing a situation
which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon. And, the
section is directed to the circumstances of the actual practitioner, not a
hypothetical being, when he or she initiates or renders the services.”
[13] In summary, the expression “exceptional circumstances” has its ordinary meaning
and requires consideration of all the circumstances. To be exceptional, circumstances
must be out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon but need not
be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare. Circumstances will not be exceptional if
they are regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered. Exceptional circumstances
can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a
combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular
significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. It is not correct to construe
“exceptional circumstances” as being only some unexpected occurrence, although
frequently it will be. Nor is it correct to construe the plural “circumstances” as if it
were only a singular occurrence, even though it can be a one off situation. The
ordinary and natural meaning of “exceptional circumstances” includes a combination
of factors which, when viewed together, may reasonably be seen as producing a
situation which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon.”
[Endnotes not reproduced]
[7] For exceptional circumstances to arise as contemplated by s.394 of the Act, it is not
necessary that the applicant for that extension of time be overtaken by a catastrophic event.
Reasons for delay in the category of extreme events are not necessary to meet the test. All of
the factors outlined in s.394(3) of the Act must be considered and weighed when deciding
whether or not exceptional circumstances, circumstances sufficient to support an exception,
exist.
[8] I considered the various criteria to which my attention is directed by s.394(3) of the
Act.
[2016] FWC 2501
reason for the delay-s.394(3)(a)
[9] The reasons Mr Jackson provided for his delay in lodgement were:
ignorance of his entitlement to file an application pursuant to the Act;
the fact that he was not informed of his entitlements by the respondent; and
his obligation to contact creditors, his landlord, utilities and others to avoid financial
stress.
[10] While sympathetic to these circumstances I was not persuaded that Mr Jackson’s
difficulties were out of the ordinary, unusual or uncommon.
whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect-
s.394(3)(b)
[11] Mr Jackson became aware of the end of his relationship with the respondent on
10 March 2016.
any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal-s.394(3)(c)
[12] Mr Jackson disputed his dismissal by lodging this application.
prejudice to the employer-s.394(3)(d)
[13] I was satisfied that there would be no greater prejudice to the respondent caused by
Mr Jackson’s application being listed now than there would have been had it been lodged in
time. Prejudice to the respondent was a neutral consideration.
the merits of the application-s.394(3)(e)
[14] Merit was a neutral issue in my consideration of this application.
fairness as between Mr Jackson and other persons in a similar position-s.394(3)(f)
[15] There was no issue of fairness in relation to any other person in a similar position.
[2016] FWC 2501
[16] Having considered all of the matters to which my attention is directed by the Act I was
not satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances which would warrant my granting an
extension to the statutory time limit and on that basis dismissed the application. Mr Jackson’s
circumstances were not out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon.
SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT
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