Jackson v Lithgow City Council

The appeal before the Court of Appeal of New South Wales concerned a dispute between the appellant, Jackson, and the respondent, Lithgow City Council. The matter had been remitted from the High Court for a rehearing of the appeal after the first hearing proceeded on an inaccurate record of evidence, specifically due to a missing question mark symbol. The central issue revolved around the probative force of evidence, particularly notes made by ambulance officers.

The court was required to determine several legal issues. These included the admissibility and relevancy of the ambulance officers' notes as business records under section 69(1) of the *Evidence Act 1995* (NSW), considering whether the hearsay rule applied and if the representation within the document was based on information from someone with personal knowledge. Additionally, the court had to consider the admissibility of opinion evidence under section 78 of the *Evidence Act 1995* (NSW), specifically whether the opinion related to the aftermath of an incident and the meaning of "necessary" in that section, which does not require absolute necessity. Finally, the court needed to assess whether, on the balance of probabilities, the appellant suffered his injuries as described in the ambulance officers' notes, addressing the issue of causation in negligence.

The court reasoned that the ambulance officers' notes were admissible as business records, as the hearsay rule did not apply because the maker of the document was providing information based on the direct observations of the ambulance officers, who could reasonably be supposed to have had personal knowledge of the asserted facts. The court also found that the opinion evidence was admissible, as the term "necessary" in section 78(b) did not connote absolute necessity and the section encompassed perceptions of the aftermath of an incident. Ultimately, the court concluded that the appellant had established causation on the balance of probabilities. The appeal was allowed, the District Court's orders were set aside, and judgment was entered for the plaintiff with costs.