JA
[2025] WASAT 115
•21 OCTOBER 2025
JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
ACT: GUARDIANSHIP AND ADMINISTRATION ACT 1990 (WA)
CITATION: JA [2025] WASAT 115
MEMBER: MS F CHILD, MEMBER
HEARD: 26 AUGUST 2025
DELIVERED : 21 OCTOBER 2025
FILE NO/S: GAA 2144 of 2025
JA
Represented Person
Catchwords:
Guardianship and administration - Periodic review of administration and guardianship orders - Represented person with intellectual disability - Need for administrator and guardian - Refusal of father/carer of the represented person to restore funds withdrawn from represented person's bank account to the estate - Loss of interest income to the estate - Father proposing self as administrator - Father not suitable for appointment - Former bankrupt - Failure to cooperate with the appointed administrator to restore funds to a secure interest earning account - Use of represented person's funds to contribute to the purchase of a vehicle used primarily for the father's business - Other potential conflicts of interest - Need for an independent administrator - Allegation by represented person that he had been hit by father - Denial by father of the incident - Need for independent oversight of accommodation and services decisions - Public Advocate reappointed as limited guardian - Public Trustee reappointed as plenary administrator
Legislation:
Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA), s 4, s 4(3), s 4(4), s 4(5), s 4(6), s 43(1)(b), s 43(1)(c), s 44(5), s 64, s 68(3), s 84, s 84(b), s 85(1)(e), s 107(1)(d), s 110ZD, s 110ZD(4)(c)
Public Trustee Act 1941 (WA), s 51
Result:
Public Trustee appointed as the administrator of the estate
Public Advocate appointed as limited guardian
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Represented Person | : | In Person |
Solicitors:
| Represented Person | : | N/A |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
FY [2019] WASAT 118
JA [2018] WASAT 68
JA [2020] WASAT 73
SAL and JGL [2016] WASAT 63
REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:
Introduction
These are the reasons for the decision made on review of orders pursuant to s 84 of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) (the GA Act) which appoint the Public Trustee as plenary administrator of JA's estate and the Public Advocate as JA's limited guardian.
The hearing of the reviews was conducted on 26 August 2025. JA, his mother D, father B and stepfather T, together with the delegated guardian of the Public Advocate (guardian) all attended the hearing in person. The decisions on the reviews were reserved and these are the reasons for the decisions made.
Background and history of orders
JA is a 34-year-old man who lives with an intellectual disability. Guardianship and administration orders were first made for JA in 2018. Prior to that time his financial and personal decisions were managed informally with support from his family.
An administration order was first made for JA on 26 June 2018 when his sister, S, was appointed the plenary administrator of his estate. That order followed an application by a clinical neuropsychologist (the original applicant) because of conflict which had arisen between JA's parents about the management of his financial affairs. Reasons for that decision were published as JA [2018] WASAT 68 (JA 2018).
The administration order was revoked on 3 July 2018 on the urgent application of the Public Advocate and a new order made appointing the Public Trustee as the plenary administrator of JA's estate. The review was sought and the appointment of the Public Trustee proposed as $55,000 of JA's savings had been withdrawn from his bank account on the day the original administration order was made.
B later advised that following the appointment of S as the administrator of JA's estate that he, B had been 'disappointed' and 'angry'[1] and he had driven JA to his bank 'straight from the hearing'.[2] B acknowledged that in the hearing JA had supported S's appointment as the administrator of his estate.[3] The Public Trustee reported that $57,239.09 was transferred from one of JA's accounts to another account and then $55,000 was then withdrawn in cash.
[1] ts 33 - 34, 9 January 2020.
[2] ts 55, 9 January 2020.
[3] ts 17, 9 January 2020.
On appointment the Public Trustee was directed to take immediate steps to secure the estate of JA including the recovery of the withdrawn funds (funds). There was delay in the Public Trustee taking action for reasons explained in JA [2020] WASAT 73 (JA 2020). Despite later efforts by the Public Trustee,[4] JA's funds have not been restored to his estate as B has not cooperated with the Public Trustee.
[4] Report of the Senior Legal Officer of the Public Trustee dated 31 August 2023.
In a letter to the Tribunal dated 31 August 2023, the Senior Legal Officer of the Public Trustee advised that Counsel's opinion had been sought by the Public Trustee and the view expressed that as there was no certainty how much of the funds remained, it was difficult to ascertain what further steps could meaningfully be undertaken to recover the funds. Following this the Public Trustee determined that no further recovery action could be taken.
An application for the appointment of a guardian for JA was made by the original applicant in August 2018 following a further deterioration in communication between family members and withdrawal of JA from his long-term employment.[5] The Public Advocate was appointed JA's limited guardian with the following functions:
(a)to decide where the represented person is to live, whether permanently or temporarily;
(b)to decide with whom the represented person is to live;
(c)to decide whether the represented person should work and, if so, the nature or type of work, for whom he is to work and matters related thereto;
(d)to determine what contact, if any, the represented person should have with others and the extent of that contact;
(e)to determine the services to which the represented person should have access; and
(f)to determine whether the represented person travels outside of Western Australia or Australia .
[5] As noted in JA 2020 the Public Advocate's investigator reported that JA had ceased working in his longterm paid supported employment the day after the original administration hearing, supported by B who was (and is) his carer, without any consultation with D and was working as an unpaid intern in B's homebased small business. A holiday which had been planned for JA by his service provider had been cancelled by B.
The guardianship and administration orders were reviewed in July 2020 and the order appointing the Public Trustee was confirmed.
The guardianship order was amended and the Public Advocate now exercises the functions:
(a)to decide where the represented person is to live, whether permanently or temporarily;
(b)to decide with whom the represented person is to live; and
(c)to determine the services to which the represented person should have access.
The orders made on 3 July 2020 are the orders now under review.
The s 84 Review
All guardianship and administration orders made under the GA Act must be reviewed.[6]
Legislation and principles to be observed
[6] GA Act, s 84(b).
To appoint an administrator of his estate either initially or on review of an order, I must be satisfied that JA is unable by reason of a mental disability to make reasonable judgments about all or any part of his estate and that he is in need of an administrator of his estate.[7]
[7] GA Act, s 64.
To appoint a guardian either initially or on review I must be satisfied that JA is:
(a)incapable of looking after his own health and safety;
(b)unable to make reasonable judgments about his person; or
(c)is in need of oversight care or control in the interests of his own health and safety or for the protection of others and is in need of a guardian.[8]
[8] GA Act, s 43(1)(b) and s 43(1)(c).
If satisfied that JA is a person for whom orders can and should be made, I must then consider who should be appointed, the scope of the authority and the duration of any orders made.
In all proceedings under the GA Act the Tribunal must observe the principles as set out in s 4 of the GA Act.
The principles provide that the primary concern of the Tribunal is the best interests of JA.
The principles also provide that JA is presumed to be capable of looking after his own health and safety; making reasonable judgments in respect of matters relating to his person; managing his own affairs; and making reasonable judgments in respect of matters relating to his estate, until the contrary is proved to the satisfaction of the Tribunal.[9]
[9] GA Act, s 4(3).
The principles also say that orders should not be made unless they are needed; if the needs of the person concerned can be met by less restrictive means, then orders should not be made.[10] If an order is made it should be in the least restrictive terms possible.[11] A plenary guardian should not be appointed if a limited order will meet the needs of the represented person.[12]
[10] GA Act, s 4(4).
[11] GA Act, s 4(6).
[12] GA Act, s 4(5).
In considering any matter relating to JA, I should seek to ascertain his wishes as expressed at the time or gathered from his previous actions.[13]
Evidence and material before the Tribunal on Review
[13] GA Act, s 4(7).
In addition to hearing from JA, D, B and an oral report from the guardian at the review hearing, the following documents have been filed for the review:
(a)a report of Dr JR dated 18 May 2025;
(b)a service provider report from the Specialist Support Coordinator dated 12 June 2025;
(c)a Functional Capacity Assessment of JA completed on 16 January 2024 by RL an Occupational Therapist; and
(d)report of trust manager of the Public Trustee dated 14 August 2025.
I have also had regard to material filed by the parties in the previous proceedings to which I have referred including submissions by B and a report from the Senior Legal Officer of the Public Trustee dated 31 August 2023 and also to transcripts of previous hearings.
Reports of historical assessments[14] filed in the original proceedings report JA as having an intellectual disability and this was confirmed by the applicant neuropsychologist.
[14] By the Disability Services Commission.
In the original proceeding JA's need for support in financial and personal decision-making was supported by the applicant, JA's mother D and his sister S and the Public Advocate's investigator who had interviewed JA prior to the hearing. I was satisfied that JA was reliant on others to manage his finances. I was also satisfied despite B's challenge to the professional and other evidence that JA's reliance on others for financial decision-making was consistent with B's past conduct in assisting and intervening on JA's behalf in respect of a range of financial matters. B's own submission to the original hearing was that he supervised JA's financial management.[15]
[15] In the hearing on 9 January 2020, B said the funds were accessible to the represented person 'as and when he needs it'; ts 45, 9 January 2020. B also said that 'and I try and provide [the represented person] direction into not spending savings but to accrue savings'; ts 19, 9 January 2020.
Although B initially argued JA could make his own financial (and other) decisions, in his submissions filed for the review proceeding in 2020, B conceded that '[JA] will always require oversight, it is the nature of his disability'.[16]
[16] Submission from B filed 12 May 2020 (Folio 38), GAA 2666/2019.
The recent medical report of Dr JR dated 7 August 2025 refers to JA having an unclear diagnosis: 'query birth trauma'. JA's condition is described by Dr JR as static one and his opinion is that JA is incapable in all spheres of financial and personal decision-making. The report notes that JA usually asks his father to make decisions on his behalf.
A functional capacity assessment dated 16 January 2024 submitted for the review confirms JA's intellectual disability and reports on the impacts it has on his cognitive function and the barriers it creates to his performance of financial management. The report notes that JA has difficulty with learning new skills, with memory, attention, organisation and planning which are noted to be all essential components of financial management.
The report notes that JA has reported difficulty with planning, organisation, initiation, memory, budgeting and problem-solving associated with grocery shopping due to his intellectual disability.
It is reported that he is informally supported by his father B to complete grocery shopping. The cognitive components of planning meals, writing a list and ensuring items are' ticked off are managed by [B]'.
The Functional Capacity assessment also confirms the impact of JA's intellectual disability on the management of personal tasks noting that the intellectual disability impacts on JA's cognition make sequencing tasks, organisation, timeliness and learning new skills difficult. It notes that JA would benefit from capacity building in a number of personal areas including shaving, cooking, identifying the need for cleaning. Specific challenges experienced by JA in the areas of short-term and working memory, concentration and problem solving were identified. The report notes that JA has limited insight into his difficulties.
The report of the support coordinator states that JA lives with his father and visits his mum, stepdad and sister frequently and goes on holidays with his mum. He is reported to have good and close relationships with his family. JA and B are reported to get along but B 'can appear to be controlling at times as he is naturally protective of [JA]'. D is described as 'very supportive and involved in all aspects of [JA's] care'. JA is described as having 'some issues' in the sphere of simple financial decision-making such as putting his debit card details online and sharing his banking details with people. He is described as vulnerable to financial exploitation.
The support coordinator reports JA is currently living with his father and this arrangement suits them both well. She notes that JA is on a community housing list in the event that living with his father is no longer suitable. JA is said to have been exploring independent living options but does not feel ready to live independently from his family at this time.
Presumption of capacity displaced
Based on the evidence filed for this review to which I have referred and the clear reliance of JA on others and the history I am satisfied that the presumption that JA is capable of making reasonable judgments about his person and his estate is displaced.
I am satisfied and I find that JA has an intellectual disability which is a mental disability as defined in the GA Act.[17]
[17] 'Mental disability' is defined in s 3(1) of the GA Act which includes an intellectual disability, a psychiatric condition, an acquired brain injury and dementia.
Section 64 of the GA Act for the appointment of an administrator of an estate requires that the person concerned be unable by reason of their mental disability of making reasonable judgments about their estate.[18]
[18] An estate is a reference to the aggregate of a person's property, their assets and liabilities and in practice encompasses the entirety of their real and personal property and all of their financial affairs' (SAL and JGL [2016] WASAT 63 at [22]).
As found in FY [2019] WASAT 118:[19]
… a person's ability to make reasonable judgments about their estate requires that they have the intellectual ability necessary to make decisions of that kind. An individual's ability to make reasonable judgments in respect of their estate requires that they have, amongst other things, the ability: to understand the need for, and sources of, income available to them; to understand the value of any income received relative to items of expenditure; to identify and calculate necessary expenditure for day to day living, together with expenditure for longer term financial objectives and discretionary items; to devise a budget so as to be able to live within their means; to identify and to assess the financial implications of particular items of expenditure or of financial decisions (for example whether to enter into contracts such as those for the purchase of a phone, household items, a car, or a house); to organise their affairs so as to be able to meet debts as they fall due; and to identify and implement problem solving strategies for resolving any unexpected financial issues.
[19] FY [53].
Having regard to the medical opinion and other professional evidence of his memory and problem-solving deficits and the acknowledged history JA's reliance on others to support, oversee and manage his financial affairs I am satisfied that he is unable by reason of his intellectual disability to make reasonable judgments about any or all of his estate.
Having regard to the medical and other health professional's reports I am also satisfied that JA is unable to make reasonable judgments about his person and is unable, on his own, to look after his own health and safety and is in need of oversight and care in the interests of his own health and safety.
I am satisfied that the presumption of capacity is displaced and JA remains a person for whom both an administration and guardianship order may be made.
Wishes of JA
JA's previously expressed wishes were that all his family members were involved in decision-making for him.[20]
[20] Both in the original hearing and on review in 2020.
In the original hearing JA supported the appointment of his sister S as the administrator of his estate.
When asked in the review hearing how things were going for him JA said, '[r]eally good'.[21] JA had previously asked whether the trust manager of the Public Trustee would attend the hearing using her first name. JA said he did not have questions for her but just wanted to know if she was coming. I infer from this that JA has a working relationship with the trust manager who notes in her report dated 14 August 2025 that JA emails or calls on occasion to discuss the provision of funds.
[21] ts 3, 26 August 2025.
JA also appears to have a working and trusting relationship with the delegated guardian of the Public Advocate and I will return to this later in these reasons.
Administration
The report of the Public Trustee's trust manager notes that JA's income is a disability support pension and a fortnightly wage of $204 paid from B's business. Superannuation contributions are made to JA's superannuation account from the business. The report notes that Public Trustee tax officers oversee JA's tax obligations if any. Payments are made on JA's behalf by the Public Trustee including a third of the rent in a tenancy he shares with B. The trust manager notes that as B operates his home business from the premises, the business pays one-third and B pays the other third of the rent. JA's third share applies to the utility costs as well. JA's expenses include the payment of his health insurance and gym membership. The trust manager reports that D was reimbursed on the provision of receipts for expenditure on JA's behalf for flights accommodation and expenses for a holiday to Melbourne.
The trust manager advises that the Public Trustee became aware of a motor vehicle registered in JA's name when the licence renewal was received. The report states that B advised the Public Trustee that he had been the owner of the vehicle and had transferred it to JA to protect the asset 'in the event of [B's] demise'. B is reported to have said he intended to transfer the vehicle back to himself as he would use the vehicle as a work vehicle. B was asked to provide details of the prior ownership of the vehicle, but the trust manager reports this had not been provided. In the hearing B said he had no recollection of the request.[22] The trust manager notes in her report that no funds had been advanced from funds held by the Public Trustee for JA for the purchase of the vehicle. The Public Trustee reports that the insurance and registration costs for the vehicle are being paid from JA's funds by the Public Trustee.
[22] ts 5, 26 August 2025.
In the hearing B said he and JA had bought the car together.[23] He said that each contributed half to the purchase of the vehicle which cost $4,500. B said JA gave him his share of the money which he used together with his share to pay for the vehicle.[24] B said he did not know where JA had obtained the money.
[23] ts 5, 26 August 2025.
[24] ts 5, 26 August 2025.
Although as reported in the Functional Capacity Assessment JA had previously been very keen to obtain one, he does not have a motor vehicle driver's licence. D confirmed in the hearing that JA had decided that he did not really want to get a driver's licence.[25] B said that JA 'can rely on public transport quite well, Uber, taxis and we don't see the necessity for him to have a driver's licence'.[26]
[25] ts 6, 26 August 2025.
[26] ts 6, 26 August 2025.
B said he was paying for the vehicle insurance monthly and said he did not know how the Public Trustee had got involved.[27] The obligation on an administrator to insure an asset of a represented person and pay the required vehicle registration was explained to him. B said that to his knowledge he had never received any communication about the matter from the Public Trustee but said if he saw the email sent he would retract that comment 'quite happily.[28] B confirmed that the vehicle was used '90 - 95 percent of the time' for B's business and that he maintained records associated with its use for tax purposes.[29]
[27] ts 7, 26 August 2025.
[28] ts 13, 26 August 2025.
[29] ts 13, 26 August 2025.
In the previous decision regarding the funds withdrawn from JA's bank account in 2018 (reported as JA 2020) I was satisfied that B had instigated and facilitated the withdrawal of JA's funds from JA's bank because of B's opposition to the appointment of an administrator of JA's estate. I did not and do not accept that JA was able to or did act independently of B regarding the process to transfer and withdraw the funds. I came to this conclusion based on B's own statements and the assessment of the original applicant that JA experienced global cognitive impairment including particular weaknesses in reasoning and executive functioning skills.
In the hearing in 2020 B confirmed he knew the whereabouts of the withdrawn funds and said they would not be returned (to JA's estate) unless the administration order was rescinded.[30] B said '[t]hey're [the Public Trustee] never going to get the money. I'm never going to tell them where the money is'.
[30] ts 55, 9 January 2020.
This statement and others[31] in my view confirmed that B and not JA had ultimate control of JA's funds.
[31] For example, in the hearing on 9 January 2020, B said the funds were accessible to the represented person 'as and when he needs it'; ts 45, 9 January 2020. B also said that 'I try to provide [JA] direction into not spending savings but to accrue savings'; ts 19, 9 January 2020.
In the recent review hearing on questioning B denied knowledge of the whereabouts of the funds but said they were in a 'safe secure place' and 'must be'[32] in cash and were not in a bank account or other investment.
[32] ts 10, 26 August 2025.
B's evidence that he does not know the whereabouts of JA's funds is inconsistent with his statement that the funds are in a 'safe and secure place' and his prior statements made in the previous proceeding. I am satisfied that B knows the whereabouts of JA's funds and continues to exercise control over the expenditure of those funds. JA's financial contribution to the purchase of the vehicle used in B's business, is I find more likely than not to have come from those funds since no funds were advanced from JA's savings held by the Public Trustee for this purpose and JA's weekly income is very limited.
In 2020 B offered to provide D 'full banking transparency of all of [JA's] bank accounts and assets'.[33] Despite this assurance D advised in the review hearing that she does not know the whereabouts of JA's funds.
[33] Submission of B filed for the review January 2020.
That no one other than B and perhaps JA[34] know of the whereabouts of JA's funds is of considerable concern and I raised this with B in the review hearing. To illustrate the difficulty, I referred B to his comments to the Public Trustee that the purported transfer of the vehicle to JA was to protect JA's interest in the vehicle on B's demise. B did not accept that the same applies to JA's withdrawn funds. JA's position in respect of the identification and assertion of his ownership of the funds is highly vulnerable if B dies before JA. JA has always relied on his parents in respect of dealing with third parties and with his banking. B acknowledged this when explaining in the review hearing that JA's bank account had been hacked into three times but that JA had been fully compensated by the bank under B's 'direction'.[35] JA's reliance on his parents in relation to banking and financial arrangements was also made clear from the circumstances in the lead up to the original application being made when each parent made changes to JA's banking arrangements. If no one other than B knows that the withdrawn funds, which are understood to be held in cash somewhere are JA's, then it is possible that they could be lost to his estate permanently.
[34] The report of the Senior Legal Officer of the Public Trustee reported in August 2023 that when the Public Trustee served summons pursuant to s 51 of the Public Trustee Act 1941 (WA) on B and JA and they were questioned about the funds B said the funds were in a 'safe secure place' and that the funds had been moved from one location to another to protect JA . When asked about the location of his funds, JA said the funds were in 'a safe and secure location'. When asked how much of the funds remained stored JA said, 'I don't know'.
[35] ts 26, 26 August 2025.
In the original proceeding B said that he experienced significant health problems and was experiencing carer stress. He said he had to close his previous business due to a deterioration in his health with significant impact on him personally and financially. Given B's health history and his age it is possible, even probable that he will die before JA. It is in my view imperative that the funds, or whatever is left of them, are restored in some way to JA to prevent their permanent loss to his estate and to provide for his future benefit.
That the funds are not to be in any form of interest-bearing account, or any other form of investment represents an ongoing loss to JA's estate which B himself has acknowledged.[36]
[36] ts 16, 9 January 2020: B said that the situation was ridiculous and agreed JA's funds belonged in a bank account.
In the review hearing B said he had made enquiries about a deposit of funds into JA's superannuation fund. He said '[h]opefully, I could put it into a superannuation scheme, which would be fantastic'.[37] I advised him to seek advice about JA's superannuation arrangements.
JA is in need of an administrator of his estate
[37] ts 33, 26 August 2025.
As noted, I am satisfied that JA is and has always been reliant on others for the overall management of his financial affairs. This was acknowledged by B in the review hearing when referring to the appointment of an administrator made in the first proceeding. B said, 'I've been doing that all the time'.[38]
[38] ts 32, 26 August 2025.
D finds the requirement to seek reimbursement from the Public Trustee for expenditure on JA's travel costs (or as she described to seek permission for JA to travel), as unnecessary and would prefer that family made these decisions. However, the process to obtain funds was said by D to be 'quite smooth, that [the trust manager] was very good, she set things up, we just said where we were going'. However, D said 'it's just easier if we can just make the decisions ourselves'.[39] It is acknowledged that this level of scrutiny may be experienced as intrusive. However, I am satisfied that it is in JA's best interests that there be independent oversight of JA's financial affairs to ensure his interests are protected to the extent possible.
[39] ts 30, 26 August 2025.
The informal arrangements to manage JA's finances prior to the original proceedings broke down due to conflict between JA's parents. Although that conflict is reported to have reduced, I am satisfied that there is a continuing need for independent oversight of JA's finances. JA is employed in B's business, shares accommodation and costs with him. I consider that B has at times demonstrated an inability to differentiate his own needs and interests from those of JA's. This can be illustrated when B was experiencing housing stress[40] and B proposed to use JA's savings as a deposit for a property to be held as tenants in common between B and JA (each having a half share despite the disparate contributions with B's contribution to the purchase price being a contribution to the mortgage payment) in a location of B's choosing without consultation with D or apparent consideration of JA's overall housing needs.[41] More recently there was the example of the purchase of a vehicle using funds of JA's[42] which is used for the majority of the time in B's business when JA does not have a driver's licence and, according to B's evidence, uses public transport. JA is through the Public Trustee meeting the costs of vehicle licencing and insurance. B did not appear to have considered the implications for the use of JA's funds in this way prior to the review hearing.
[40] B said, he had lost his home, declared bankruptcy and had lived with his brother for three months and described that he had been destitute. JA 2018, [77].
[41] See JA 2018, [74] - [82].
[42] Or the transfer of a previously owned vehicle from B to JA, whichever is correct.
I am satisfied that the Public Trustee has sought information from B and his failure to provide information about the vehicle transfer requested is a continuation of his lack of cooperation with the Public Trustee and the Tribunal since the original proceeding.[43]
[43] See JA 2020, [97] for the review hearing B again refused to accept the service of the notice of the review hearing saying that the Sherriff's officer had described the notice as a summons. This will be the third time that B has interfered with a notice of hearing of a Tribunal hearing being given to JA. Whether the notice was described as a summons is unclear to me. JA's own version of this was that '[a] Sherriff came around and kicked the car's fog lights in'; ts 19, 26 August 2025.
I am satisfied that there are no less restrictive alternatives to the appointment of an administrator of JA's estate. I accept the evidence of the original applicant that JA lacks capacity to make an enduring power of attorney.[44]
[44] JA 2018, [83].
Although B proposes his appointment as administrator at the review, I am not satisfied that he is suitable for appointment.
In JA 2020 at [89] - [107] when B also proposed his appointment, I considered this in reference to requirements of s 68(3) of the GA Act in determining the suitability of a proposed administrator of the estate of a represented person. I then found that B was not suitable for appointment. In summary I found that B had not acted in the best interests of JA in facilitating the removal and the refusal to return the withdrawn funds to a secure and an interest accruing account which had and continued to diminish JA's estate. B had not cooperated with the Public Trustee (or with S the original administrator) and there could be no confidence that he would comply with the obligation on an administrator to account if required by the Public Trustee [at [98] - [99]. B's financial circumstances were more limited than JA and B had been bankrupt [at 106].
In the review hearing B again proposed his appointment as administrator. I referred to the need to consider the suitability of any appointment and referred to B's refusal to disclose the whereabouts of JA's funds, B's financial position and his past bankruptcy. B said he had been bankrupt[45] 'twice' and that he was, '[v]ery proud of them as well'.
[45] Section 85(1)(e) of the GA Act requires that there be a mandatory review of an administration or guardianship order if a guardian or administrator is a bankrupt. Section 107(1)(d) requires a bankrupt donee of an enduring power of attorney to report that bankruptcy to the Tribunal. Implicit in these provisions is the need to give consideration to whether a bankrupt person should manage the finances of another.
Having regard to the history and the current circumstances of JA, I am not satisfied that B is suitable for appointment as the administrator of JA's estate and will confirm the appointment of the Public Trustee as the plenary administrator of JA's estate.
Guardianship
The guardian reported that JA is supported by his mum, his sister and his father. JA and B have been living together and have good support services around them. JA is reported to be very close to his family and often spends time with them. JA also works with B and the guardian said that the arrangement has been working quite well. When the guardian had visited JA, he was very proud of his workspace and his work and his home. The guardian said that JA and his dad seem to work really well, although there had been incidents in March 2024 where JA had reported to the guardian that there have been some 'physical altercations'. The guardian reported that JA had advised the guardian that he was physically hit (by B) and following this the guardian had organised a welfare check, and the police were involved but that JA chose not to pursue any charges. After the incident JA had gone to D's (and T's) house but then decided to return to live with B. The guardian reported that there had been no reports since. The guardian confirmed that JA receives support services three times a week and there had been no reports of any incidents from the support workers either.
The guardian reported that existing services were working well for JA and the specialist support coordinator maintained contact with the support services and the guardian regarding any changes needed.
Although JA did not want to move out of home yet, the guardian noted that there was an option available for JA if he wished to be independent in the future and decided to have his own house and supports. This was available if JA decided to leave or if the current arrangement broke down or if there are any further incidents between JA and B this alternative could be arranged.
The guardian submitted that there was an ongoing need for a guardian with the existing functions of accommodation and services decision-making for JA. The need in respect of the services function was to participate in the NDIS assessment meetings, and make sure JA's NDIS plan is adequate and meets his needs. The guardian recommended a two year order be made until JA's finances were sorted.[46]
[46] ts 16, 26 August 2025.
In response to the incidents reported by the guardian, B said he had been surprised[47] about the situation. B said the guardian had called him and advised him of the welfare check but B said he did not take it seriously. B said that two police officers had visited their home for a welfare check and had spoken to JA and to him separately and 'there was no issue.'[48] B said that JA 'might have heightened the situation, what was perhaps mistaken for a 'tap on the shoulder or something else'. B said that JA 'does tend to embellish situations for attention'.[49] B said that he asked JA on the way to the hearing what JA 'remembered about that day and JA 'couldn't make a comment on it because there was nothing. JA said he couldn't remember'.[50]
[47] ts 16, 26 August 2025.
[48] ts 17, 26 August 2025.
[49] ts 17, 26 August 2025.
[50] ts 17, 26 August 2025.
While not making any finding as to whether the incident was a 'tap on the shoulder' as described by B or a 'physical altercation' as described by the guardian following JA's disclosure to him, I accept the guardian's evidence that JA reported the incidents to the guardian who was sufficiently concerned about that report to arrange the police welfare check. I am satisfied that JA initiated the contact with the guardian to raise this matter. Although B says that JA said he cannot remember the incident when he questioned JA on the way to the review hearing, I consider it necessary that JA continue to have access to the guardian to raise any issues of concern to him.
B opposes the guardianship order describing it as 'a hindrance'.[51] He said that '[JA] recently had to have a kidney operation. The doctors couldn't proceed. Same day or day before'.[52] D stated that there was uncertainty about whether consent was required for the surgery from the Public Advocate's office but that she had telephoned the office and someone had explained that it was not needed'.[53] D said that the surgery was not delayed.[54]
[51] ts 27, 26 August 2025.
[52] ts 27, 26 August 2025.
[53] ts 27, 26 August 2025.
[54] ts 28, 26 August 2025.
At the review hearing there was no proposal for the appointment of a guardian other than by the guardian who proposed the reappointment of the Public Advocate.
Although both D and B support the revocation of the orders, I am satisfied that JA remains in need of a guardian to make decisions which may be required in respect of his accommodation should there be a change needed for any reason in his current accommodation. The services to which he should have access are closely aligned with his accommodation and it is appropriate that the guardian exercise those functions. No other needs for decision-making by a guardian have been identified. JA's medical treatment decisions continue to be made pursuant to s 110ZD of the GA Act which allows treatment decisions to be made by the person responsible, which in JA's case are his parents.[55] I am satisfied that a limited order in those terms meets the current needs of JA such that a plenary order is not required.
[55] GA Act, s 110ZD(4)(c).
Section 44(5) of the GA Act provides that except where appointed to act jointly with another person or other persons, the Tribunal shall not appoint the Public Advocate as a guardian unless there is no other individual who is suitable and willing to act.
No one proposed their appointment as guardian. However, even if B had proposed his appointment in this role I am not satisfied he could be appointed because of the operation of s 44(1)(a) and (b) of the GA Act which requires that any proposed appointee act in the best interests of the represented person and not be in a position of conflict or potential conflict with the interests of the represented person. As I have previously found, B is responsible for the withdrawal of JA funds and the refusal to return them to a secure interest accruing environment. This decision continues to be to the detriment of JA and his immediate and long-term financial interests. Such conduct is clearly not in JA's best interests. I am also satisfied that there are potential conflicts which arise in the use of JA's funds for the purchase of the vehicle used in B's business and in the context that JA lives with B in a shared rental property and B is likely reliant on JA's contribution to meet the rent and other outgoings. B is also JA's employer. In these circumstances an independent guardian is required to make accommodation and services decisions for JA with a focus only on the interests of JA.
I am satisfied that it is in the best interests of JA that he has an independent guardian to have oversight of and to make decisions in the best interests of JA in respect of his accommodation and the services to which he has access.
Given the history and the current housing arrangements of JA, I am not satisfied that any member of his family is able to provide the independent oversight of JA's circumstances and could act if necessary to change those housing arrangements without reigniting family conflict.
Although the recommendation of the guardian is for a two year order, I will make the orders for five years. If the financial issues of JA can be resolved prior to this and both the administration and guardianship orders require review, an application for review can be brought. In the absence of a change in the current circumstances of JA I see no need or benefit to JA to bring the orders back for early review. JA has a lifelong intellectual disability and in the current circumstances and in light of the history outlined he is likely to need independent substitute decision-makers in the longer-term.
For these reasons I make the following declarations and orders:
Orders
1.The Tribunal declares that the represented person, [JA] is:
(a)unable, by reason of a mental disability, to make reasonable judgments in respect of matters relating to all of his estate; and
(b)in need of an administrator of his estate.
The Tribunal orders:
Administration
2.The administration order dated 3 July 2020 is amended so that it now reads:
3.The Public Trustee of 553 Hay Street, Perth, Western Australia is appointed plenary administrator of the represented person's estate with all the powers and duties conferred by the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA).
4.The administrator is authorised to expend up to a total amount of $300 per annum on gifts on behalf of the represented person.
5.The administration order is to be reviewed by 20 October 2030.
Guardianship
6.The Tribunal declares that the represented person, [JA] is:
(a)incapable of looking after his own health and safety;
(b)unable to make reasonable judgments in respect of matters relating to his person;
(c)in need of oversight, care or control in the interests of his own health and safety; and
(d)in need of a guardian.
The Tribunal orders:
7.The guardianship order dated 3 July 2020 is confirmed as follows:
8.The Public Advocate of David Malcolm Justice Centre, Level 23, 28 Barrack Street, Perth, Western Australia is appointed limited guardian of the represented person with the following functions:
(a)to decide where the represented person is to live, whether permanently or temporarily;
(b)to decide with whom the represented person is to live; and
(c)to determine the services to which the represented person should have access.
9.The Tribunal approves delegation by the Public Advocate of her functions as guardian of the represented person to an officer or employee employed in the Office of the Public Advocate.
10.The guardianship order is to be reviewed by 20 October 2030.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
MS F CHILD, MEMBER
21 OCTOBER 2025
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