Ivan Josip Lukatela v John Arthur Birch (No 2)
[2008] ACTSC 142
•11 November 2008
IVAN JOSIP LUKATELA v JOHN ARTHUR BIRCH (NO 2)
[2008] ACTSC 142 (11 November 2008)
EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT
ON APPEAL FROM THE MAGISTRATES COURT
No. SCA 103 of 2007
Judge: Rares J
Supreme Court of the ACT
Date: 11 November 2008
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE )
) No. SCA 103 of 2007
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY )
ON APPEAL FROM THE MAGISTRATES COURT
BETWEEN:IVAN JOSIP LUKATELA
Plaintiff
AND: JOHN ARTHUR BIRCH
Defendant
ORDER
Judge: Rares J
Date: 11 November 2008
Place: Canberra
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
Appeal be allowed in part.
The sentence imposed on each of Counts 1-9 by the ACT Magistrates Court on 7 November 2007 be set aside.
On Counts 1-3 the offender be imprisoned for three months, each such sentence to be served concurrently commencing today.
On Counts 4-6 the offender be imprisoned for three months, each such sentence to be served concurrently commencing on 30 December 2008.
On Counts 7-8 the offender be imprisoned for six months, each such sentence to be served concurrently commencing on 30 March 2009.
On Count 9 the offender be imprisoned for six months, such sentence to be served concurrently commencing on 11 May 2009.
The sentences in orders 3 and 5 be wholly suspended and the offender released immediately on condition that:
(a) the offender sign an undertaking to comply with the conditions of this order;
(b) the offender be of good behaviour for a period of two years from today;
(c) the offender give security for $1,000 for compliance with this order;
(d) the offender comply with the offender’s good behaviour obligations, including the core conditions of the order, under ss 85 and 86 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005;
(e) the offender accept supervision of ACT Corrective Services and obey all reasonable directions of that service for the period of good behaviour;
(f) the offender continue to receive treatment during the term or this order from Dr Eryl Evans, psychologist, or such other psychologist or psychiatrist as is acceptable to the Chief Executive of ACT Corrective Services and until the Chief Executive certifies that such treatment is no longer necessary or appropriate.
The sentences in orders 5 and 6 be wholly suspended and the offender released immediately on condition that:
(a) the offender sign an undertaking to comply with the conditions of this order;
(b) the offender be of good behaviour for a period of two years from today;
(c) the offender give security for $1,000 for compliance with this order;
(d) the offender comply with the offender’s good behaviour obligations, including the core conditions of the order, under ss 85 and 86 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005;
(e) the offender accept supervision of ACT Corrective Services and obey all reasonable directions of that service for the period of good behaviour;
(f) the offender continue to receive treatment during the term of this order from Dr Eryl Evans, psychologist, or such other psychologist or psychiatrist as is acceptable to the Chief Executive of ACT Corrective Services and until the Chief Executive certifies that such treatment is no longer necessary or appropriate;
(g) the offender undertake 500 hours of community service to be completed on or before 10 November 2010, such work to be performed concurrently with the work to be performed in respect of the other sentences imposed today.
On 30 September I published my reasons for concluding that the magistrate erred in imposing concurrent sentences of three months’ imprisonment wholly suspended, and 12 month good behaviour orders in respect of the nine offences, more fully described in those reasons Lukatela v Birch [2008] ACTSC 99. I sought there to set out the circumstances of each offence and the material put forward on Mr Birch’s pleas of guilty before the magistrate and, save for some matters of emphasis, it is not necessary for me to repeat what is set out in those reasons.
FURTHER EVIDENCE ON THE APPEAL
Further evidence has been tendered today which sheds light on Mr Birch’s state of mind prior to and at the time of the offences, and, indeed, as it continues to the present. I was satisfied that under s 214(3)(a)(iii) of the Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) it was in the interests of justice to receive the further evidence in the form of the pre-sentence report and evidence of its author, Les Brien, the report of Dr Eryl Evans, a psychologist, and his oral evidence, in furtherance of the material in his report and the further evidence of Mr Birch’s wife, Leeanne.
With this further material and the material before the magistrate I am now in a position to make additional findings to those that were made by his Honour and the findings that I made in the course of my earlier reasons. Neither party has suggested that there are any factual or, for that matter, legal errors in those reasons. (Earlier today, I raised the point that I had not made dispositive orders and that any such errors were therefore still open to be corrected.)
The objective circumstances of the offences were recorded on the DVD, which was in evidence, and I described in detail the substance of two of the offences in the earlier reasons. It is clear that, objectively, the offending was very grave. It was committed by Mr Birch in circumstances where he was in a position of authority and trust, as the officer in charge of the watch‑house, without any legal justification.
THE NEW PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE
The evidence of Dr Evans has raised an issue about the nature of Mr Birch’s state of mind in making his plea of guilty, in the sense that Dr Evans has recorded that while Mr Birch expressed remorse for his actions, he was unable to understand his own state of mind. During the course of oral evidence, Dr Evans said that Mr Birch had told him he regretted his conduct because he knew somehow that it was wrong but did not understand why Dr Evans opined that, at the time of the offences, his disturbed state of mind had caused Mr Birch to, in effect, withdraw from society. He opined that Mr Birch did not grasp why he had offended, but regretted having acted in the way he did because he saw the ramifications.
As I understand the evidence, this attitude to the offences is indicative of the state of mind diagnosed by Dr Evans, which was significantly different to the psychological material before the magistrate. Dr Evans concluded that Mr Birch had suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder for some period of time prior to his posting to the watch‑house. The aetiology of that condition arose from his exposure to horrific scenes when engaged as an officer of the accident investigation team of the Federal Police. On a number of occasions, in the performance of his duties, he had to deal with incidents in which people, including children, had died and then he had to confront their next of kin with news that was traumatising, not just to them but to him. Subsequently, from time to time, he would have to relive those experiences in giving evidence or preparing for legal proceedings arising from the circumstances of the accident.
Dr Evans concluded that, in effect, by the time Mr Birch came to work at the watch‑house he had reached a critical point where the methods that he had previously used to cope with the horrors to which he had been exposed in the important but difficult work he had with the accident investigation team no longer worked. This meant that, in his mind, Mr Birch was unable to detach himself emotionally from what he was seeing. Dr Evans formed the view that these incidents of Mr Birch’s condition led to an unsettled sleep pattern and a pattern of reliving or reprocessing one or more of the disturbing experiences which had upset him while attending to the consequences of fatal or serious injuries in the accident investigations he attended.
Shortly before he transferred to the watch‑house Mr Birch gave a history of an incident in a high speed car chase in which he had been involved. He appeared to realise that he had acted in the chase in an inappropriate and dangerous way. Dr Evans said that that conduct showed that Mr Birch had begun to engage in high risk behaviour and show poor judgment. Within a matter of weeks after that incident which Mr Birch reported in the history he gave to Dr Evans, he was transferred into the watch‑house and the first of the nine offences occurred.
Dr Evans concluded that the history given to him showed that Mr Birch had displayed behaviours involving errors of judgment, the assumption of inappropriate risks, emotional fragility, inappropriate reactions and an inability to maintain boundaries by personalising the situation of and identifying with the victims of the accidents he had attended. He formed the opinion that Mr Birch was becoming unstable while at the traffic accident team. He noted that Mr Birch had given a history in which there was no counselling provided to him, or offered, in circumstances where he had been exposed to traumas.
If indeed the Australian Federal Police do not have some mechanism to monitor the mental health of its officers who are exposed to traumatic situations that is obviously a matter that requires the attention of the appropriate authorities.
The opinion Dr Evans gave bore directly on Mr Birch’s mental state at the time of the offending. That opinion is significantly different from, and far more informative than, the opinion offered by Professor Stevens which was in evidence before the magistrate. I referred in my earlier judgment to Dr Stevens’ written report which also was referred to by the magistrate. Professor Stevens had diagnosised that depression “may have made him [Mr Birch] more impulsive and would have affected his judgement”: Lukatela v Birch [2008] ACTSC 99 at [49] (emphasis added).
In contrast, Dr Evans said that the disturbed state of mind caused by the post-traumatic stress syndrome he had diagnosed would have affected Mr Birch’s perception, judgement and emotional responsiveness, and that it was highly likely that the events involving the use of the capsicum spray reflected his condition. In oral evidence, Dr Evans said that, when transferred to the watch‑house, Mr Birch had been placed in an extraordinarily difficult post for a person with his then emotional state. He opined that Mr Birch was having difficulty holding his emotions in balance, and that he was hyper‑aroused because of the stresses caused by his condition. There was no release for him or excitement, and he was simply trying to cope, so that he had no outlet for the stresses.
Dr Evans also opined that the behaviour Mr Birch had exhibited in an incident with a superior arising out of the inappropriate high speed car chase was equally appalling with the kind of behaviour he had exhibited as recorded on the DVDs taken in the watch‑house. He said that this was evidence of Mr Birch starting to break down. Dr Evans opined that the behaviour of spraying his victims with capsicum foam without any justification exhibited in the DVDs was not something that Mr Birch perceived as being appalling, as it would be to an ordinary person watching it. Rather, Dr Evans opined that Mr Birch applied a reasoning process, in his disturbed frame of mind, which gave him a justification for the conduct, albeit that to rational persons it would not have been a good justification.
Dr Evans concluded that this situation was caused by the mental struggle Mr Birch had had of dealing with the horrific scenes and grief of those who were affected by the accidents while a member of the traffic accident investigation team. This had caused him to become dissociated. And Dr Evans opined that Mr Birch’s mind was both psychologically and emotionally very strained; the condition had begun to prevent him feeling for others and manifested itself in disturbed thoughts. Dr Evans said that this would affect the values and attitudes of Mr Birch at the time. He thought this provided an explanation of his errors of judgement, because Mr Birch was not seeing the world in the same light as a mentally healthy person who had not suffered from the illness he had.
Dr Evans’ opinion was that there was a very strong possibility that the post-traumatic stress disorder had affected Mr Birch in the way in which he acted in the watch‑house and engaged in the offending conduct.
I asked Dr Evans whether the additional stress of having to face a further sentencing hearing today may have affected the way in which Mr Birch presented to him, or affected his mood at the time of his presentation to Dr Evans. He said that, in effect, it had not because the mechanism that Mr Birch had used to cope with his then state, was an attitude of laughing matters off. That reflected a technique of dissociation; Mr Birch separated himself and his conduct from his feelings. He said that Mr Birch’s resigned attitude towards the offences was encapsulated in these words of explanation he gave to Dr Evans:
“What else can go wrong. I’ve got to the stage where it’s like being told you have 6 months to live and you’re 5½ months into it. My wife doesn’t understand how I’m able to laugh at it”.
Dr Evans said that this attitude was symptomatic of a very troubled state of mind which was manifested, in his opinion, prior to the circumstances of the charges. He considered that Mr Birch was struggling in coping with life, his relationships and his thinking. He thought the charges had compounded the position in Mr Birch’s mind, but had not led to, what he described, as the massive dysfunction and distress that he felt. I accept Dr Evans’ evidence.
SENTENCING CONSIDERATIONS
As a result of the evidence of both Dr Evans and Mr Brien I am satisfied that it would not be appropriate to impose a full‑time custodial sentence in this matter. The circumstances of any such sentence would involve Mr Birch being sent into the New South Wales prison system, most likely to Goulburn Gaol where, on the evidence before me, as a former police officer he would be subjected to treatment that, having regard to the circumstances now before me, his offending would not warrant.
I accept that the plea of guilty is a genuine plea, albeit made with the limitations of comprehension and understanding that Dr Evans opined existed in Mr Birch’s current state of mind. This evidence provides a context for and explanation of the offending conduct that was not before the magistrate. Professor Stevens’ evidence, at its highest, suggested the possibility of a connection between the offending conduct and depression suffered by Mr Birch, in effect, only during the period while he was at the watch‑house and thereafter. This connection never rose higher than being a possibility.
I am satisfied, for the reasons given in the evidence of Dr Evans, that the depression and post-traumatic stress syndrome which he has diagnosed from his recent taking of the history in consultations with Mr Birch had the effects which I have described on Mr Birch’s state of mind at the time of his offending. It is clear that Mr Birch is in need of treatment on an ongoing basis to address the deep psychological scarring that he has received.
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE RE-SENTENCING
The offences took place over a seven month period. The first occurred on 25 February 2006 and the last on 24 September 2006.
In an appeal by the Crown against sentence, a number of important factors arise to palliate what the second sentencer might impose, were he or she first dealing with the matter. On the material before his Honour, for the reasons that I gave in my previous judgment, I am satisfied that the sentences, viewed in their totality, were erroneous and manifestly inadequate. However, the material before me, as I have said, has added a substantial body of explanatory evidence which provides a context for re‑sentencing and for considering the appropriate sentence to impose.
I must take cognisance that this is a plea of guilty to each offence. Objectively each of the nine counts was a very serious offence. Each plea accepted that Mr Birch was guilty of intentionally and unlawfully administering to another person an injurious substance with an intention to injure or cause pain or discomfort to that person. The magistrate found that Mr Birch had the intention to inflict punishment on each of the victims. That finding was accepted as correct during the course of the previous hearing before me. And it may be that in that disturbed state of mind which Dr Evans’ evidence described, Mr Birch may have seen it as his role so to act. Certainly the objective evidence based on my viewing the DVD warranted that finding. But it is now to be viewed through the prism of the evidence most recently given.
I have found this to be an extremely difficult sentencing process in which to formulate a punishment that both recognises the pleas of guilty and the objective seriousness of the offending which I described in my earlier judgment but balancing it against the more recent evidence taken today.
I am mindful that for Mr Birch the process of the criminal law being set in train commenced at least by 23 January 2007 when he participated in a record of interview which was taken in respect of the ninth charge. He declined to be interviewed on the earlier charges, as was his right. Thereafter, there was a joint investigation and then report by the Ombudsman and the Australian Federal Police which occurred between February and June 2007. Mr Birch was charged on 28 June 2007 with the nine counts now before me, as well as the nine counts of assault that were subsequently not proceeded with. He was first sentenced on 7 November 2007 by the magistrate.
The impact of any custodial sentence on Mr Birch as a former police officer cannot be ignored, but I must mark the community’s sense of abhorrence of the objective circumstances of the offending by having regard to a sentence of imprisonment. I have given anxious consideration as to whether I should impose a full‑time custodial sentence or, as I have been urged by both parties to do, to impose a lesser sentence. The Crown has accepted that, having regard to the evidence today, a full‑time sentence of imprisonment would not be an appropriate punishment, and I accept that submission.
I am of the opinion that the disturbed state of Mr Birch’s mind at the time of the offending palliates against any objectively malign or wicked intention in engaging in the conduct that one might otherwise have inferred from viewing the DVDs. As I said in my previous judgment, it is no function of police at any level to inflict punishment on offenders. That is the role of the independent courts. And it must be a role that the courts jealously guard and uphold if our community is to live in the civilised society in which we exist.
Had I sentenced Mr Birch only on the evidence previously before me, I would have imposed a substantially increased term of actual imprisonment to that which the magistrate selected for counts three and following, and I would have accumulated the sentences on those counts to impose a head sentence of not less than two years in total, taking account of all the factors to which I will turn later. I say this because one purpose of this judgment is to correct the error that I have perceived his Honour to have made in the sentence he imposed on the material before him.
Under the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) the objects of the Act, among others, are to promote respect for the law, the maintenance of a just and safe society, and to maximise the opportunity for imposing sentences that are constructively adapted to individual offenders. These are important objects and provide a yardstick by which courts can fashion punishments to fit crimes. Section 7 of the Act gives the court a range of purposes to consider in imposing sentences. One is to ensure that the offender is adequately punished for the offence in a way that is just and appropriate. It is also appropriate to take into account a purpose of preventing crime by deterring both the offender and others from committing the same or similar offences. In a case such as the present, for the reasons I previously gave, the deterrence of crimes by police officers in relation to persons in custody and in their care is a very important social purpose, and an important object of any sentencing exercise for offences of this kind.
In light of the material before me, I do not think that it would be right to take into account the protection of the community from Mr Birch. This is because Dr Evans’ evidence satisfies me that his mental health had been so impaired that he acted in a way that was out of character and contrary to the years of his good service to the community. Another purpose of sentencing is to promote rehabilitation of the offender, and to make him or her accountable for his or her actions.
Those purposes have weighed on me in attempting to assess how appropriately to mark the community’s denunciation of Mr Birch’s objective conduct, and the associated abuse of his position, with the very powerful subjective and mitigating factors that are now before me. The Act imposes a sequential series of steps through which the court must proceed in arriving at an appropriate sentence. I have had regard to all of the material that was both before his Honour and myself and, in particular, to the subjective material, the detailed genuine statements and references provided to his Honour by those who know Mr Birch best in the outside community. I have also had regard to Mrs Birch’s evidence to his Honour and her evidence before me. It was very difficult for her to give that evidence, in the circumstances of seeing her husband have to go through an ordeal of a second sentencing process, with the real possibility, having regard to comments that I had previously made, that he may have had to go to gaol on a full‑time custodial sentence.
I turn now to the factors in s 33 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act which in my view are relevant to the assessment of the sentences to be imposed. First, I must consider the nature and circumstances of each offence which I have described sufficiently in my earlier reasons. In one sense the offences formed part of a course of conduct consisting of a series of criminal acts of the same or similar character, if one looks at nine different offences spread over seven months as a course of conduct. In my opinion the offences occurred in circumstances where Mr Birch’s state of mind clearly affected his judgement, but I do not consider that they occurred as part of a course of conduct. Even though they were similar criminal acts, they were not a series of offending, but occurred in individual instances on distinct occasions.
I am particularly mindful that the last three offences occurred after Mr Birch had been retrained on 6 June 2006 in the use of force, including the use of capsicum foam. Indeed, the seventh and eighth offences occurred five and six days later, respectively. In my opinion each of the offences was discreet. But, even if they were part of a series or course of conduct, I am satisfied that each requires an appropriate individual sentence marking the criminality involved. However, for the reasons which I gave in my previous judgment, to arrive at a final result any such sentence will need to be subject to the application of the totality principle.
Little is before me in terms of the victims, although most of them indicated they had not given consent to their being sprayed. Their state of intoxication may have prevented any real recollection of the incidents. But in any event, it is very doubtful that a person could consent to having such an attack inflicted on him or her: cf: Reg v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212. There was no justification for the conduct. No evidence is before me in respect of any of the victims of a long term injury or victim impact statement.
I am satisfied that Mr Birch, of course, has a considerable degree of responsibility for the commission of the offences but that that must be weighed in light of his mental state. I have had regard to his timely plea of guilty and to its acceptance by his Honour below. As I have indicated in my earlier recitation, the evidence before me from Dr Evans particularly, and from the material in the pre‑sentence report and Mr Brien’s evidence, together with what was before his Honour, I have had regard to Mr Birch’s background, character, antecedents, age and physical and mental condition, and to his financial circumstances, as indicated by Mrs Birch’s evidence today.
There is no doubt on the evidence before me that a custodial sentence of any kind would have a substantial impact on Mrs Birch. She clearly loves her husband. She is devoted to him, and would be distraught were he incarcerated. Had that been, however, the only material before me in addition to what was before his Honour, it would not have been sufficient to dissuade me from imposing a more severe sentence than I propose.
His Honour imposed a conviction for each of the offences and I have not been addressed to suggest that that was not an appropriate course. Indeed, counsel for Mr Birch urged that on the basis of Dr Evans’ evidence I should impose only one sentence, being a suspended sentence of imprisonment with, I assume, as he would have known, an appropriate good behaviour order.
I have had regard to the fact that Mr Birch is now seeking treatment for his mental condition from Dr Evans and I propose to impose an appropriate term in the orders I make that that continue. I also remarked in my earlier judgment on the fact that Mr Birch was in a position of trust or authority when he committed each offence.
The imposition of an appropriate sentence is a matter of the judge arriving at an instinctual synthesis, having regard to all of the elements of the offending and the material adduced at the time of the imposition of the sentence. The fact that there were nine offences spread over a period in the watch‑house, to my mind indicates that the offending was serious and requires an appropriate level of punishment. I am satisfied that a conviction should be recorded and that I should not disturb the magistrate’s order imposing one.
I am also very mindful of what Mrs Birch said, that the man in the DVDs was not the person she knew, and that today a sentence following all the publicity and media attention to which she referred in her evidence, and to which in part his Honour referred on the earlier occasion, have imposed on Mr Birch a significant degree of public shame and humiliation already. In addition, like his Honour, I am conscious that Mr Birch has lost a senior, respected position in the police force as a result of his conduct, together with the salary that attached to that position, and now must earn his living at a much more modest level. I have had regard to the factors which I have listed in my earlier judgment at [94] and [95].
I see no purpose in imposing a deferred sentence in this case. Neither side has addressed me to suggest that such a sentence would be appropriate, and in my view it clearly would not be. What Mr Birch needs is finality.
I have considered whether I should impose a good behaviour order alone. In my opinion, by itself, it would be entirely inadequate to mark the gravity of the offending for each of the offences.
Next I have considered imposing sentences of imprisonment. I have done so in the context that the Act requires consideration of the range of punishments for which it provides. Under s 10(2) the court may order an offender to be imprisoned for all or part of the sentence if it is satisfied, having considered possible alternatives, that no other penalty is appropriate. However, once the Court arrives at that conclusion it is also entitled to consider the form of imprisonment which is available. In addition to full‑time custodial imprisonment s 11 permits the court to order a period of periodic detention, and s 12 permits it to suspend wholly or partly any sentence of imprisonment. As I noted in my earlier judgment a suspended sentence of imprisonment is, in effect, the next most serious penalty the court can impose, short of actual imprisonment.
In my opinion these offences call for sentences of imprisonment. They must mark the community’s sense of concern that police officers act within the law and do not use their position and the weapons they have at their disposal unlawfully and inappropriately. The objective circumstances of the offending, as I have mentioned, caused me in the earlier hearing to express the view that I was horrified when I saw a DVD recording in open court showing two of the offences. I remain of that view, although I now understand, with the benefit of Dr Evans’ evidence, how Mr Birch came to do what he did.
I consider that the sentences for the first six matters which were imposed by the magistrate, viewed as a whole, would not reflect an appropriate degree of criminal punishment. The appropriate sentence for each of those offences is a sentence of three months’ imprisonment, but that the first three offences should have the sentence run concurrently and that, having regard to the additional and cumulative effect of the next three offences, I should add a period of cumulation, so as to make the total effective sentence four and a half months for those six offences. In other words, on each of counts 1-6, I will sentence Mr Birch to imprisonment for three months, but I will make counts 4-6 cumulative on the initial period of three months, to the extent of half of that additional sentence.
The most difficult part of the sentencing exercise on the material now before me is to deal with the fact that Mr Birch was retrained in the use of force, including capsicum foam, but a few days before he committed the seventh and eighth offences. I regard this as a serious matter. While I accept that his judgement was impaired, I cannot accept that this factor alone sufficiently explains why he did not have some real appreciation that he ought stop his conduct. In my opinion those counts require a more significant sentence and I will impose a sentence of six months’ imprisonment for each of those offences. I will cumulate the six months for the seventh and eighth offences on top of the four and a half months of the previous ones, and also cumulate a further one and a half months of the six months for the ninth offence, to make a total period of imprisonment of one year. However, I find that, having regard to all the circumstances, each of those terms should be suspended.
I have given anxious consideration as to whether I should impose a periodic detention period, particularly in regard to the last three of the offences. I have formed the view that, having regard to Dr Evans’ evidence, to do so would not reflect the degree of mercy to which I think the evidence shows Mr Birch is entitled because of his impaired, but not completely absent, ability to understand and appreciate the nature of his wrongdoing, and the inappropriateness of his conduct. While I accept that he was detached from and, to an extent, he dissociated himself from what he was doing, I do not accept that he was entirely unable to appreciate after the retraining that using capsicum foam on defenceless individuals, however irritating and obstreperous they were, was wrong.
In my view, it is necessary to impose community service orders to reflect the important functions and the purposes of sentencing. This will make Mr Birch accountable for his actions. It will give him a means in which he can contribute back to the community in a useful and purposeful way, which nonetheless, interferes with his liberty to a degree that I regard as appropriate. I have had regard to the choices in the Act for the appropriate punishment. In respect of each of the last three charges I have concluded that I should impose a substantial and cumulative period of community service. This will enable Mr Birch to demonstrate his accountability and promote his rehabilitation into the community as a useful member as, I think, he is now trying to be. But such a sentence will also provide what I regard to be as the most humane and appropriate form of punishment I can impose consistently with the evidence that I have heard, in circumstances where, but for that evidence, I would have had no hesitation in sending Mr Birch to prison on a full‑time custodial sentence for the period that I have indicated.
For these reasons I am of opinion that I should impose concurrent community service orders for a period of 500 hours each on the three last sentences.
SENTENCE
Now, Mr Birch, could you please stand up. Mr Birch: I make the following orders:
1. Appeal be allowed in part.
2. The sentence imposed on each of Counts 1-9 by the ACT Magistrates Court on 7 November 2007 be set aside.
3. On Counts 1-3 the offender be imprisoned for three months, each such sentence to be served concurrently commencing today.
4. On Counts 4-6 the offender be imprisoned for three months, each such sentence to be served concurrently commencing on 30 December 2008.
5. On Counts 7-8 the offender be imprisoned for six months, each such sentence to be served concurrently commencing on 30 March 2009.
6. On Count 9 the offender be imprisoned for six months, such sentence to be served concurrently commencing on 11 May 2009.
7. The sentences in orders 3 and 5 be wholly suspended and the offender released immediately on condition that:
(h) the offender sign an undertaking to comply with the conditions of this order;
(i) the offender be of good behaviour for a period of two years from today;
(j) the offender give security for $1,000 for compliance with this order;
(k) the offender comply with the offender’s good behaviour obligations, including the core conditions of the order, under ss 85 and 86 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005;
(l) the offender accept supervision of ACT Corrective Services and obey all reasonable directions of that service for the period of good behaviour;
(m) the offender continue to receive treatment during the term or this order from Dr Eryl Evans, psychologist, or such other psychologist or psychiatrist as is acceptable to the Chief Executive of ACT Corrective Services and until the Chief Executive certifies that such treatment is no longer necessary or appropriate.
8. The sentences in orders 5 and 6 be wholly suspended and the offender released immediately on condition that:
(a) the offender sign an undertaking to comply with the conditions of this order;
(b) the offender be of good behaviour for a period of two years from today;
(c) the offender give security for $1,000 for compliance with this order;
(d) the offender comply with the offender’s good behaviour obligations, including the core conditions of the order, under ss 85 and 86 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005;
(e) the offender accept supervision of ACT Corrective Services and obey all reasonable directions of that service for the period of good behaviour;
(f) the offender continue to receive treatment during the term of this order from Dr Eryl Evans, psychologist, or such other psychologist or psychiatrist as is acceptable to the Chief Executive of ACT Corrective Services and until the Chief Executive certifies that such treatment is no longer necessary or appropriate;
(g) the offender undertake 500 hours of community service to be completed on or before 10 November 2010, such work to be performed concurrently with the work to be performed in respect of the other sentences imposed today.
I certify that the preceding fifty (50) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of his Honour, Justice Rares
Associate:
Date: 16 December 2008
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A Doig
Solicitor for the Appellant: The Director of Public Prosecutions for the ACT
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr FJ Purnell SC
Solicitor for the Respondent: Porters Lawyers
Date of hearing: 11 November 2008
Date of judgment: 11 November 2008
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