Iskandar; Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations and

[2008] AATA 782

Administrative Appeals Tribunal

DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2008] AATA 782

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL      )

)          No N2006/1421

GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION		)               N2006/1440
Re		SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION EMPLOYMENT AND WORKPLACE RELATIONS

Applicant

And ARIETTA ISKANDAR

Respondent

DECISION

Tribunal

Senior Member M D Allen

Dr J Campbell, Member

Date3 September 2008

PlaceSydney

Decision

The decision under review is set aside. This matter is remitted to the Applicant with the following Directions:

1.    Arietta Iskandar and Naim Iskandar have been at all relevant times and are at present members of a couple.

2.    Arietta Iskandar is entitled to payment of Disability Support Pension as at and from 6 April 2004.

....................[Sgd].......................

M D Allen
  Presiding Member

CATCHWORDS

SOCIAL SECURITY – Whether Respondent was a member of a couple – Retrospective payment of Disability Support Pension – Transfer from one income support pension to another – Original payment must have been a legitimate payment

Social Security Act 1991 – sections 4, 24, 94, 147 and 1068A

Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 – sections 12 and 15

Staunton-Smith v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1991) 32 FCR 164

Lynam v Director-General of Social Security (1983) 52 ALR 128

Re Bourke and Secretary Department of Social Services (1988) 42 SSR 539

Re Tang and Director-General of Social Services (1981) 3 ALN No 49

Cullinane v Secretary Department of Family and Community Services [2004] AATA 789

Pelka v Secretary Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2008] FCAFC 92

R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681

REASONS FOR DECISION

3 September 2008

Senior Member M D Allen

Dr J D Campbell, Member

1.On 19 September 2006, the Social Security Appeals Tribunal determined:

“(1) that Arietta and Naim Iskandar are not members of a couple and have been living separately and apart from 7 July 1999;

(2) that Mrs Iskandar be transferred to parenting payment single from 7 July 1999 to 8 April 2002; and

(3) that Mrs Iskandar be transferred to disability support pension [“DSP”] from 9 April 2002;

(4) that, after the recalculation of her entitlement, monies recovered from Mrs Iskandar in excess of any remaining debts be returned to her; and

(5) that any net arrears payable to her be paid.”

2.      By application made on 19 October 2006, the Secretary to the then Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (now termed the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations) sought review of that determination.

3.      At the conclusion of the hearing of this matter the following issues arose for determination:

(i)Was the Respondent a member of a couple prior to 6 April 2004, and specifically between 7 July 1999 and 6 April 2004;

(ii)If the Respondent was not a member of a couple was she qualified for Parenting Payment Single at any time prior to 6 April 2004;

(iii)If the answer to (ii) is yes, can the Respondent be transferred to Parenting Payment Single (“PPS”) under section 12 of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999;

(iv)If the answer to (iii) is yes, does section 12 of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 permit the transfer to take effect prior to 20 March 2000 (being the date at which the Act commenced); and

(v)Was the Respondent qualified for DSP pursuant to section 94 of the Social Security Act 1991 any time prior to 6 April 2004.

4.The  background to this matter can be summarised as follows:

(i)On 26 September 1991 the Respondent was granted wife pension by reason of her husband Naim Iskandar being granted a DSP.

(ii)By letter dated 30 March 2004 Naim Iskandar was informed that payment of DSP would stop after the payment made on 7 April 2004.  That decision was made as Centrelink discovered by reason of a data matching exercise that Naim Iskandar had been in employment for more than 30 hours a week since 7 July 1999. A debt representing DSP overpaid in a period between 7 July 1999 and 6 April 2004 was raised against him.

(iii)As a result of the cancellation of the DSP paid to her husband the Respondent’s wife pension was also cancelled and an overpayment in the sum of $42,861.39 was raised against her representing the period 7 July 1999 to 6 April 2004.

(iv)On 18 June 2004, both Mr and Mrs Iskandar sought review of the decision to raise the debt with respect to each of them.

(v)Following the cancellation of her husband’s DSP the Respondent claimed an entitlement to DSP in her own right. DSP was granted with the effect from 7 July 2004.

(vi)In March 2006, the Respondent sought further review alleging that she had been living separately and apart from her husband albeit under the same roof from some time in 1992. She also sought that DSP be backdated to 7 July 1999 claiming she qualified for DSP at that time. In the alternative, the Respondent claimed that if she failed to qualify for DSP back to 7 July 1999 she qualified for PPS from that date to 9 April 2002 when the youngest child of her and her husband (Sylvia) turned sixteen.

was the respondent no longer a member of a couple

5.      Whatever might be the relationship between Mr and Mrs Iskandar at present, the question for the Tribunal is whether the Respondent was not a member of a couple in the period 7 July 1999 to 6 April 2004.

6.      In Staunton – Smith v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1991) 32 FCR 164 at 172 O’Loughlin J endorsed the remarks of Fitzgerald J (as he then was) in Lynam v Director-General of Social Security (1983) 52 ALR 128 at 131 namely:

“Financial arrangements cannot be taken in isolation and considered of particular importance in determining the nature of relationship. Their materiality, like each of the other elements of the relationship, stems from the impact which they have as part of an overall situation. Each element of a relationship draws its colour and its significance from the other elements, some of which may point in one direction and some in the other. What must be looked at is the composite picture. Any attempt to isolate individual factors and to attribute to them relative degrees of materiality or importance involves a denial of common experience and will almost inevitably be productive of error. The endless scope for differences in human attitudes and activities means that there will be an almost infinite variety of combinations of circumstances which may fall for consideration. In any particular case, it will be a question of fact and degree, a jury question, whether a relationship between two unrelated persons of the opposite sex meets the statutory test.”

7. Notwithstanding the caution by Fitzgerald J against isolating individual factors, subsection 4(2) and (3) of the Social Security Act 1991 (as amended) now read:

(2) Subject to subsection (3), a person is a member of a couple for the purposes of this Act if:

(a) the person is legally married to another person and is not, in the Secretary’s opinion (formed as mentioned in subsection (3)), living separately and apart from the other person on a permanent or indefinite basis …

(3) In forming an opinion about the relationship between 2 people for the purposes of paragraph (2)(a) or subparagraph (2)(b)(iii), the Secretary is to have regard to all the circumstances of the relationship including, in particular, the following matters:

(a) the financial aspects of the relationship, including:

(i) any joint ownership of real estate or other major assets and any   joint liabilities; and

(ii) any significant pooling of financial resources especially in relation                   to major financial commitments; and

(iii) any legal obligations owed by one person in respect of the other          person; and

(iv) the basis of any sharing of day-to-day household expenses;

(b) the nature of the household, including:

(i) any joint responsibility for providing care or support of children; and

(ii) the living arrangements of the people; and

(iii) the basis on which responsibility for housework is distributed;

(c) the social aspects of the relationship, including:

(i) whether the people hold themselves out as married to each other;                   and

(ii) the assessment of friends and regular associates of the people           about the nature of their relationship; and

(iii) the basis on which the people make plans for, or engage in, joint          social activities;

(d) any sexual relationship between the people

(e) the nature of the people’s commitment to each other, including:

(i) the length of the relationship; and

(ii) the nature of any companionship and emotional support that the           people provide to each other; and

(iii) whether the people consider that the relationship is likely to                 continue indefinitely; and

(iv) whether the people see their relationship as a marriage-like                 relationship.

8.      We agree with the Tribunal in Re Bourke and Secretary Department of Social Services (1988) 42 SSR 539:

“Assessment of the significance of these factors is not a mathematical exercise. One does not count them one weights them. The object is to identify, as far as humanly possible, the presence or absence of the essential characteristics of a marital relationship.”

9.      In approaching this task, the Tribunal pointed out in Re Tang and Director General of Social Services (1981) 3 ALN No 49:

“While the subjective opinion held by the parties of their relationship is important a subjective belief manifests itself in the objective indicia which the relationship exhibits and it is to these the Tribunal should primarily look.”

10.     In her statement the Respondent said that the relationship between her and her husband completely broke down sometime after a trip the family had to Cairo in 1992. In her evidence to the Tribunal she said that after the birth of the couple’s third child she told her husband that the marriage was over. This was in 1986.

11.     The Respondent’s husband said in evidence in chief that he stopped regarding the Respondent as his wife after they had returned from Egypt in 1992. He added that the Respondent’s character completely changed at that time.

12.     This comment stands in contrast to the Respondent’s evidence that there never was any relationship between her and her husband and that they had been fighting since they were married in 1973.  She stated that all that had changed between 1973 and 1986 was that after 1986 there was no longer a sexual relationship.

13.     We have had difficulty in evaluating the evidence of both the Respondent and her husband. There were contradictions in their evidence and we find that both at times tailored their evidence so as to demonstrate a failure of the marital relationship between them. We also consider it significant that the question of whether the Respondent was living separately and apart from her husband was only directly raised with Centrelink after the husband had been discovered in 2003 to be working while the same time receiving the DSP.

14.     In her statement the Respondent says the marriage ended in her mind in 1992. In her evidence she was quite firm that it ended in 1986 after the birth of their third child. The husband maintained the date of change in the relationship as 1992 and stated that in 1986 after the birth of their third child the relationship had in fact been a little bit better.

15.     Cross-examined regarding a Centrelink document completed by him in 2004 (Doc T25) Mr Iskandar was asked “So, when you completed this form, you did not think of yourself as separated?” and gave the unequivocal answer “No”.  

16.     Immediately prior to this passage of evidence, Mr Iskandar had been asked about his mobile telephone. The Respondent in her statement had said that her husband had his own mobile telephone, Mr Iskandar said he did not have a mobile telephone until 2004, whereas their daughter Mrs Girgis said her father had had a mobile telephone since 1998.

17.     The Respondent said that her husband had completed a claim for wife pension in 1991 for her. Asked about that document the husband maintained that the Respondent had completed it herself.

18.     In her evidence, the Respondent stated that she had left the matrimonial home to reside with her daughter and the daughter’s husband but returned to the matrimonial home because her son-in-law hurt her feelings. In her evidence the daughter refuted this, stating it was entirely her mother’s decision to return home.

19.     What can be gleaned from the evidence given is that there is still a great deal of interaction between Mr and Mrs Iskandar in an ongoing relationship.

20.     Financially the couple are still associated. Their dwelling house is still in joint names and they have both decided that this is an asset which will be passed to their children. As we understood the evidence they both attended a solicitor and made wills to that effect.

21.     Mr Iskander gives his wife $250.00 per fortnight. Out of this the Respondent pays the household bills and purchases household necessities although Mr Iskandar buys his own food. Services such as electricity, rates, water, and home insurance are paid by the Respondent from the $250.00 given by her husband although the services are in both names.

22.     Both Mr and Mrs Iskandar’s names, together with two of their children, are on the one Medicare card. Significantly when their eldest daughter married the card was changed but no request has been made for separate Medicare cards.

23.     Although there are no formal legal agreements between Mr and Mrs Iskander, the husband has signed a document lodged at Centrelink dated 21 February 2003 in which he agrees that the recovery of overpayments made to the Respondent be taken out of Centrelink payments due and owing to him.

24.     The nature of the household is such that Mr Iskander still does repairs around the home and maintains the backyard which is devoted to fruit trees. Every fortnight the Respondent goes shopping and Mr Iskandar takes her. When she was ill with breast cancer he accompanied her to various specialist appointments and drove her to appointments for ongoing chemotherapy and radiotherapy after surgery.

25.     There is evidence that for the last three years Mr Iskandar has been sleeping on the lounge. Prior to that he has slept in his car or it seems in the same bed as the Respondent. The evidence as to sleeping arrangements is vague but the Respondent did say that there were many times between 1992 and 2005 that her husband slept in the same bed as her.

26.     In 1997 the residence of the Respondent and her husband was damaged by fire. Not only did the family share the same hotel room for some 12 months while the home was being rebuilt, but the Respondent, who purchased the replacement furniture obtained a queen size bed for the main bedroom, as opposed to two single beds. A large wardrobe was also purchased and Mr Iskandar keeps his clothes in one section of it.

27.     The Respondent does not cook for her husband, but it seems each member of the family cooks their own meals except for the husband who eats at a club. All family members do their own washing. After the Respondent’s breast surgery, Mr Iskandar said he was prepared to assist with housework, but the Respondent would not permit it. Prior to that he had attempted to help with housework, but as he ruefully put it “But she wouldn’t like it, she’d do it again”.  

28.     Mr and Mrs Iskandar remain married and do not intend to divorce. Divorce is not permitted by the Coptic Orthodox Church to which they belong except for adultery and neither regards this as an option. The Respondent said she has told her priests of the marriage breakdown.

29. Documents T84 and T85 prepared for the Tribunal, pursuant to section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, are letters in support of the Respondent from her Parish priests stating the she is separated from her husband under the same roof. Although stating the conclusion that the parties are separated, these letters are in general terms only and basically set out the statement of the Respondent as to separation without descending into particularity. What they do refer to is counselling for unresolved issues and that the parties are united where the welfare of their children has been in jeopardy.

30.     No other evidence was adduced to state how others outside the family regarded the relationship between Mr and Mrs Iskandar.

31.     The Respondent’s eldest daughter was called. Part of her evidence contradicted both the evidence of her mother and her father and her attitude was clearly one of saying what she thought would best support her mother. The two children of the marriage who still live at home were not called. We accept that the son may have difficulties in giving evidence, but that does not apply to the youngest daughter. We therefore draw the inference that any evidence given by her would not have advanced the Respondent’s case. Just because she may have expressed reluctance to give evidence is no reason not to call a witness who can give cogent testimony.

32.     An aspect of family life that was never explained is how the Respondent and her children apparently never commented upon Mr Iskandar’s work as a security guard. Even if Mr Iskandar did not discuss his work over the period from 1998, when he commenced work, it would seem at no time did his wearing the uniform of a security guard attract comments amongst the family. As a security guard it is likely that he would have been required to wear a uniform in the course of his employment.

33.     Any sexual activity between the Respondent and her husband apparently ceased in 1986 after the birth of their youngest child. Although not explained in detail a medical report, being document T27, refers to ten pregnancies and seven miscarriages. In these circumstances a withdrawal from sexual activity is understandable, but an ongoing sexual relationship is not necessary indicia of the existence of a marriage like relationship.

34.     What does become apparent from the evidence is that Mr and Mrs Iskandar have an ongoing commitment to each other. Until 2003, both the Respondent and her husband described themselves in Centrelink documents as married. Mr Iskandar nominated the Respondent as an emergency contact to his employer. The husband attended significant medical appointments with his wife and medical reports by Westmead Hospital and Professor Kefford refer to discussions with the patient and her husband. As said previously, neither party has sough or intends to seek a divorce.

35.     We consider the arrangement whereby the husband gives to the wife a regular sum of money out of which she pays utility bills and other outgoings not to be unusual. These payments have been regularly made for a number of years.

36.     The test of whether a person is a member of a couple is not measured by the happiness of the relationship; see Re Cullinane v Secretary Department  of Family and Community Services [2004] AATA 789 at [16] where Senior Member McCabe said: “…relationships come in many forms. Not all relationships are happy, and they do not always conform to the stereotypes of family life”. As was pointed out by the Full Court in Pelka v Secretary Department of Families Housing Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2008] FCAFC 92 at [31], the test is “…that a commitment that each of [the] persons has to each other is different to the commitment that each person has to any other person.”

37.     Mr Iskandar summed up the relationship by stating:

“We haven’t been serious about separation and divorce. We tried to put up with each other. You know what I mean? We try, maybe tomorrow will be better maybe but we never think about it except that when it come {sic} to an age or something like that we think of it but everything was, today yes tomorrow no, day after yes, whatever, we can get to something.

38.     The following passage then occurs:

Q: And that’s been the state of affairs really since 1992. Is that right?

A: Yes.

Q: Nothing really has changed since 1992?

A: Except her sickness.

Q: Except for that nothing has changed since 1992?

A: 1992 started fighting. As I said today good, tomorrow bad, whatever it is.”

39.     We find that both Mr and Mrs Iskandar have been at all relevant times and still are members of a couple for the purposes of Social Security Law.

entitlement to the disability support pension

40.     The Respondent was granted DSP with effect from 7 July 2004. Significantly in that document she states that her current marital situation is that of married. In these proceedings the Applicant claims that DSP should be backdated to 7 July 1999.

41. The qualifications for DSP are set out in section 94 Social Security Act 1991. Subsection 94(1) reads inter alia:

A person is qualified for disability support pension if:

(a) the person has a physical, intellectual or psychiatric impairment; and

(b) the person’s impairment is of 20 points or more under the Impairment Tables; and

(c) one of the following applies:

(i) the person has a continuing inability to work;

42. In assessing whether a person has a continuing inability to work Ss 94(2) and (3) Social Security Act 1991 state:

(2) A person has a continuing inability to work because of impairment if the Secretary is satisfied that:

(a) the impairment is of itself sufficient to prevent the person from doing any work within the next 2 years; and

(b) either:

(i) the impairment is of itself sufficient to prevent the person from               undertaking educational or vocational training or on-the-job training   during the next 2 years; or

(ii) the impairment does not prevent the person from undertaking               educational or vocational training or on-the-job training – such  training                is unlikely (because of the impairment) to enable the person to do any   work within the next 2 years.

(3) In deciding whether or not a person has a continuing inability to work because of an impairment, the Secretary is not to have regard to:

(a) the availability to the person of educational or vocational training or on-the-job training; or

(b) if subsection (4) does not apply to the person – the availability to the person of work in the person’s locally accessible labour market.

43.     Where as “work” is defined by subsection 94(5) as work that is for at least 30 hours per week at award wages or more and exists in Australia even if not within the person’s locally accessible labour market.

44.     The Respondent obtained two reports from occupational physician Dr Mark Burns. In the first of those reports Dr Burns states that the medical conditions for which the Respondent was granted DSP in 2004 would have existed in 2002.

45.     In a second report dated 4 June 2008, Dr Burns addressed a series of assumptions put to him by the Respondent’s solicitor. He concludes by stating: “I believe that Mrs Iskandar’s medical conditions were in fact the same in April 2002 as they were in April 2004. She would not have been able to work during this period for the same reasons that she was unable to work after the 6^th April 2004. This would have been  due to the problems following her breast cancer surgery  with the lymphoedema in her left arm, with her bilateral knee arthritis and also with her lumbar spine spondyloarthritis”, and further opines that even with vocational or other training Respondent would not have been able to return to work for 30 hours per week.

46.     Dr Burns was not asked to examine the Respondent and his opinions are based upon a review of medical records dating from December 2001. In particular the Respondent’s treating general practitioner’s notes for the period 2002, 2003 are not available. Likewise no medical records appear to exist for the period 1986 to 2001.

47.     An earlier medical report exists being a report by orthopaedic surgeon Dr Guirgis dated 26 June 1986. As Dr Burns acknowledges, the difficulty with this report is that it was prepared for the Respondent’s then solicitors following a motor vehicle accident. Of that report Dr Burns said: “I am not sure how much validity we can take from the functional information he has supplied, because that was, in a certain period of time, it was for a litigated process and it is very difficult.” Dr Burns added in a comment which is quite apparent to any medico-legal assessment “I see many reports for both Workers Compensation Commission and Motor Accident Authority and the reports that are produced by the parties can be widely different on the same person”.

48.     As stated above, Dr Burns did not examine the Respondent and in answer to questions by Tribunal Member Dr Campbell said:

“The answer is, you treat people, you don’t treat investigations. You can actually have people who have significant changes on plain X-rays in their thoracic spine, lumbar spine or cervic spine who have very little symptoms and therefore you tend to ask people about their function capacity about what symptoms they have. You have people who have relatively normal looking X-rays and who have significant pain. So, it is hard to extrapolate from X-ray finding back in the nineteen eighties as to what went on in the late nineteen nineties.”

49.     Further questioned Dr Burns agreed that there was no material that supported any conclusions as to the Respondent’s functional capacity prior to 2001. To go back beyond that date would become speculation. 

50. Notwithstanding that beyond 2001 is speculation the fact remains that in August 2001 the Respondent was diagnosed with breast cancer and had surgery followed by chemotherapy and radiotherapy. As Dr Burns pointed out the Respondent’s carcinoma of the left breast could be said to have been diagnosed and treated by January 2002. This is then the date at which that condition could be said to have been diagnosed, treated and stabilised so as to enable an assessment of impairment to be made pursuant to Schedule 1B of the Social Security Act 1991.

51.     We therefore find that given that the Respondent’s condition was essentially the same in 2002 as in 2004 when DSP was granted, she was qualified for payment of DSP as and from 14 January 2002 when she completed radiotherapy (T55).

is respondent entitled to payment of dsp retrospectively?

52.     The Respondent first applied for DSP on 6 April 2004 and pension was granted from 19 May 2004, the date following cessation of payment of wife pension. At the time of her application for DSP the Respondent had been notified of the cancellation of her wife pension.

53.     The Respondent’s wife pension was cancelled because her husband was no longer entitled to be paid DSP, as he had been working full time for Chubb Security since at least 1998. On 19 July 2004, an Authorised Review Officer affirmed a prior determination of 7 April 2004 to raise an overpayment against the Respondent on the ground that at no time in the period 7 July 1999 to 6 April 2004 had she been entitled to the payment of wife pension.

54.Section 12 of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 reads:

(1) Subject to subsection (3), if:

(a) a person is receiving an income support payment; and

(b) while receiving the payment, the person becomes qualified for another income support payment (the other payment); and

(c) the Secretary determines that the person is to be transferred to the other payment; the person is taken, for the purposes of the social security law, to have made a claim for the other payment on the day on which the person became qualified for the other payment.

(2) Subject to subsection (3), if:

(a) a person who has been receiving an income support payment ceases to receive the payment; and

(b) immediately after ceasing to receive that payment, the person becomes qualified for another income support payment (the other payment); and

(c) the Secretary determines that the person is to be transferred to the other payment; the person is taken, for the purposes of the social security law, to have made a claim for the other payment on the day on which the person became qualified for the other payment.

(3) The Secretary may only make a determination under subsection (1) or (2) if the transfer is one that the Secretary could have determined should occur apart from this section.

55. Although paragraph 12(1)(a) Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 simply states that a person has to be receiving an income support payment (of which wife payment is one, (see section 23 Social Security Act 1991) it seems to us axiomatic that the payment must be being received legitimately.

56.     If we are incorrect on this point the section has the effect that a person could make a totally fraudulent claim for one type of income support benefit yet when the fraud is discovered legitimately claim that they were at some relevant time properly entitled to another type of benefit and ask for the retrospective payment of that benefit to be set off against any debt which occurred by reason of the fraudulent payment.

57.     Although the cannons of modern statutory interpretation are against reading words into legislation (see R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681 at 687) we still consider that section 12 can only apply where the income support payment referred to in paragraph 12(1)(a) is legitimately payable.

58. We are strengthened in this view by the words of subsection 12(2). Paragraph 12(2)(c) Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 refers to the Secretary transferring the person to the “other payment”. If, as in this matter, the persons benefit was cancelled because they were not entitled to it, then the said benefit was not payable and there is no benefit from which the person could be transferred.

59. We do not regard section 15 of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 as applying in this matter. Section 15 allows the backdating of a claim where an “incorrect” claim has been made. The claim by the Respondent for wife pension was not an incorrect claim. She was entitled to payment of wife pension when she made that claim in 1991. She only became disentitled in 1998 when her husband commenced working full time.

parenting payment single

60.     As the Respondent has at all times been a member of a couple she had no entitlement to this benefit.

write off and waiver

61.     As these matters were not before the Social Security Appeals Tribunal they do not arise for decision in these proceedings.

62.     The decision under review is set aside and this matter is remitted to the Applicant with the following directions, namely:

I. Arietta Iskandar and Naim Iskandar have been at all relevant times and are       at present members of a couple.

II. Arietta Iskandar is entitled to payment of Disability Support Pension as and      from 7 April 2004.

I certify that the 62 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member M D Allen and Dr J D Campbell, Member.

Signed:           .............[Sgd]....................
   Ms R Prasad, Associate

Dates of Hearing  7-9 July 2008
Date of Decision  3 September 2008

Counsel for the Applicant         Ms K Eastman

Solicitor for the Applicant          Ms L Combes, Australian Government Solicitor

Counsel for the Respondent     Ms K Sant
Solicitor for the Respondent     Ms J Finlay, Welfare Rights Centre