ISHMAL & KARAJA
[2020] FamCA 791
•21 September 2020
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| ISHMAL & KARAJA | [2020] FamCA 791 |
| FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – where the Father has not seen the child for over six years – where the Father seeks a relationship with the child – where orders for family therapy have been frustrated by the Mother’s resistance – consideration of benefits of meaningful relationship with – where there are scarce prospects of a successful reintroduction – where attempts to reintroduce the child are likely to destabilise his family unit – where orders for no time and sole parental responsibility are in the child’s best interests – where the Mother seeks injunction to prevent the Father attending her home, work or child’s school or contacting the Mother – where such orders are not warranted – where declining to make such an injunction leaves open the opportunity for child to seek out Father when he is older – where Mother seeks that the name of child be changed – where the Mother seeks orders permitting international travel. |
| Births Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW) s 28 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 60B, 60CA, 60CC, 65DAA, 65M, 68B |
| Dua [2020] FamCA 299 |
| APPLICANT: | Mr Ishmal |
| RESPONDENT: | Ms Karaja |
| INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Ms Hernandez |
| FILE NUMBER: | SYC | 3586 | of | 2015 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 21 September 2020 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Canberra |
| PLACE HEARD: | Canberra |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Gill J |
| HEARING DATE: | 9 & 10 September 2020 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: | Mr Sperling |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: | David H Cohen & Co |
| COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Mr White |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Phillip A Wilkins & Associates |
| COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Mr Fermanis |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Claremont Legal |
Orders
The Mother shall have sole parental responsibility for the child X, born … 2013.
The child shall live with the Mother.
The Mother has sole parental responsibility in relation to signing all necessary documentation, organising and obtaining an Australian Passport for the child.
Pursuant to section 11(1) and (2) of the Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth), these orders provide authority to the Minister for Foreign Affairs or a delegate of the Minister to issue an Australian Passport for the child X, born … 2013.
The Australian Passport issued to the child shall be provided to the Mother to hold on behalf of the child.
The child be permitted to travel outside the Commonwealth of Australia with the Mother without prior notice to or permission of the Father.
The child's name X shall be removed from the Airport Watch List.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Ishmal & Karaja has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).
| FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT CANBERRA |
FILE NUMBER: SYC 3586 of 2015
| Mr Ishmal |
Applicant
And
| Ms Karaja |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
introduction
These proceedings concern X, who is now seven years old. X is the child of the parties. Although the parties are both from Country D, they are Australian citizens now. The dispute between the parties is as to whether X will have a relationship with the Father. At present he does not, and has not spent time with the Father since he was about ten months old.
The proceedings were commenced by the Father on 4 June 2015.
On 20 December 2018, Tree J listed the matter for trial commencing 29 July 2019, to be conducted by videolink to Cairns. The trial was however conducted in person in the Sydney Registry before me.
On that occasion, after hearing the matter, I declined to make final orders in relation to X, delivering judgment adjourning the proceedings part heard for further determination following the parties and X engaging in family therapy with Dr B. This judgment should be read in conjunction with the judgment of 1 August 2019.
At that stage it was anticipated that the family therapy, which was directed to facilitating and supporting X spending time with the Father, would enable directions to be made on 20 January 2020 to prepare for the finalisation of the trial. However, by that time there had been significant delays in the family therapy, causing the further adjournment of the proceedings until trial directions were given on 22 May 2020 listing the matter for finalisation of the trial commencing on 9 September 2020. By that stage, although the Mother and child had attended Dr B face to face on 21 October 2019, and by telephone on 5 December 2019, with the Father attending face to face on 3 December 2019, it had become apparent that the Mother had become non-compliant with the therapeutic process, communicating to Dr B in May 2020 that she would not comply with the orders for therapy.
The proceedings came on for trial by videolink on 9 September 2020, given issues arising from the COVID-19 pandemic, out of the Canberra Registry.
Orders sought
The orders sought by the parties appear at Annexure A of the judgment.
Documents relied upon
The Applicant Father relied upon[1]:
a)Affidavit of the Father filed 10 July 2020;
b)Tender bundle to the Affidavit filed 10 July 2020; and
c)Parenting questionnaire completed by the Father filed 24 October 2016.
[1] Father’s Outline of Case filed 7 September 2020
The Respondent Mother relied upon[2]:
a)Amended Response of 15 July 2020;
b)Affidavit of Ms Karaja and exhibits made 15 July 2020;
c)Affidavit of Mr F made 16 July 2020;
d)Family report by Ms C, dated 19 June 2019;
e)Affidavit of Dr B made 22 June 2020; and
f)Case outline for the mother prepared 22 July 2019.
[2] Outline of Case (updated) filed 8 September 2020
Principles
The paramount consideration in determining what order should be made is, pursuant to s 60CA, the best interests of the child. That is to be determined on consideration of the matters set out at s 60CC of the Act, and in accordance with the objects and principles set out in s 60B and the reasoning process set out at s 65DAA.
While a number of the considerations are touched upon in this case, those that may be determinative in this case are limited. Key to the Father’s case is the consideration of the benefits of meaningful relationship for X with the Father. In consideration of this aspect the Father emphasised the Principles of Part VII of the Act, s 60B(2)((a), which provides (amongst other principles) that:
Children have the right to know and be cared for by both their parents, regardless of whether their parents are married, separated, have never married or have never lived together.
In considering the Principles, it must be recognised that they are in aid of the Objects which are contained at s 60B(1) which are all directed to ensuring that the best interests of children are met. That is, neither the Objects nor the Principles are ends in their own right, but rather receive their life from the consideration of the paramount consideration, being the best interests of the child.
The other considerations that loomed large related to X’s personal characteristics, the nature of his relationships with his Mother and Father, and each parent’s capacity to provide, particularly in an emotional sense, for X’s needs. A particular area of focus in relation to parental capacity is the Mother’s refusal to support X’s relationship with the Father. Significant emphasis was also placed upon the likely effect of changes to X’s circumstances that would be caused by commencing to spend time with his Father.
Although the Mother maintained that the Father presents a risk of harm, in the judgment delivered on 1 August 2019, I determined that he does not present a risk of any significance, including of exposing X to family violence.
The facts of this case
The facts of this case are narrow, and in many respects, uncontentious.
The Father has not spent time with X since X was about ten months old.
X has no relationship with his Father, or knowledge of him, or understanding that he has a father.
The Father has pursued a relationship with X through the court processes since 2015.
Dr B described, particularly in the previous hearing of the matter, the possible benefits of relationship with the Father for X, particularly in the realm of X’s self-identity. She also identified the benefits of X having future options to pursue relationship with the Father.
The Father anticipates that his reintroduction to X will be successful. Under cross-examination, he said that X should be compelled to spend time with him in accordance with his proposal (a 48 week ramping up of time) but that if, at the end of this time, X did not wish to spend time with him, then he should not. The Father also asserted that X would love him within four weeks of the commencement of time (two visits which may or may not be under supervision), although he also accepted that X may be uncomfortable and may not remember the Father.
Dr B was less than optimistic then the Father about the efficacy of the Father’s proposed regime. She considered that a therapeutic process was essential to reintroduction occurring, although a therapeutic process did not guarantee a successful reintroduction. She however did not see how any further therapy could occur, given the history of the matter and the attitudes of the parties being so “worlds apart.” She further regarded that cooperation between the parties in respect of reintroduction was a necessity. There is, however, no prospect of cooperation occurring.
The parents have a poor relationship with each other. The Father regards the Mother as crazy, and says that he does not like her. The Mother’s dislike or contempt for the Father is even more palpable. The parties have not had communication for years. Despite the Fathers’ assertions that they could communicate via email to sort out issues in respect of X, any hopes for productive interaction of any sort between the parties are utterly misplaced.
The Mother is opposed to the Father spending any time with X. She has not, and indicates that she will not, comply with orders that have an effect of X being exposed to the Father. She says that if the Father is to spend any time with X, then she will have nothing to do with X and he should be with the Father full time. She will not “share” X with the Father.
Although a process of family therapy was ordered to facilitate X spending time with the Father, the Mother was non-compliant with the orders in relation to such. As was observed by Dr B who was appointed to conduct the therapy, therapy is only as good as the parents taking part in it.
Dr B was unable to conceptualise how a reintroduction could now take place, assessing that the parties are unable to do the necessary work to support a reintroduction themselves.
Further, Dr B observed that X’s family unit, comprised of himself, the Mother and his sister (who has special needs) formed a “tight, closed system” that was fragile rather than robust. She assessed that the Mother, as the only parent that X has known, required that there be minimal stress to that fragile family unit.
X’s only parental relationship is with the Mother. The Father is not critical of the Mother’s parenting other than in respect of her exclusion of the Father. It is not in dispute that X should continue to live with the Mother.
Assessing the Mother’s threat to walk away from X, she observed that should such occur it would be enormously destabilising for X, but that even if it did not, the Mother’s position illustrates the anxiety and intensity of her opposition to the Father, and the potential for adverse impact on the family unit should it be placed under such strain.
I doubt that the Mother would carry through her threat, given her strident opposition to X having any time with the Father. While Dr B thought that it represented the Mother’s response to being overwhelmed by the prospect of the Father’s involvement, it appears more likely to be an attempt to manipulate the court process. Even so, illustrative as it is of the extremity of the Mother’s opposition to the Father, it points to significant impact and stress being placed upon X’s family unit should there be time ordered with the Father. Such stress upon the family unit is likely to impact adversely on X. As Dr B observed, anxious parents produce anxious children.
The Father’s manner of giving evidence was the subject of submissions for the Mother. It may be observed that he was intense in his manner, loud in his responses (to the extent that he had to be directed to cease shouting at counsel for the Mother), and unresponsive to the questions that he was asked. He presented as angry and ill-controlled. It was submitted that his manner in court raised the prospect of uncontrolled responses to X should they be reintroduced. While this is a matter of some concern, full weight should not be given to such an assessment, when the submissions on behalf of the Father are also taken into account. Firstly, it should be recognised that the Father has suffered severe frustration in his legitimate pursuit of time with X. He has faced delays in the court processes and non-compliance by the Mother. He faces the prospect of having no time with X, despite my previous findings that he does not present a risk to X. It is unsurprising that he might approach the proceedings in an emotionally heightened state. Secondly, English is the Father’s second language, and he comes from a different set of social expectations as to behaviour, such that caution should be exercised before drawing inferences as to his behaviour in court. Thirdly, the Father was giving evidence via videolink, which is a very different set of circumstances to giving evidence in the courtroom. On balance, the Father’s presentation was suggestive that he may experience difficulties in emotional regulation should he spend time with X. An inference flowing from the Father’s conduct in court should not be drawn any stronger than this.
Discussion
As identified above, this case falls to be determined by what is in X’s best interests. Although it may readily be seen that the case involves, and has been impacted by, the Mother’s non-compliance with orders, and her position that she will not comply with orders, her non-compliance, while relevant to assessing X’s best interests, is not the focus of the case. This case is not concerned with punishing for non-compliance, but is concerned with what is best for X.
As noted, the Mother is the uncontested primary carer for X. It is the position of both of the parents and the Independent Children’s Lawyer (ICL) that she should remain so.
The pivotal issues revolve around relationship between X and the Father. There are advantages for X in knowing his Father, as identified in the previous hearing for this matter. Those advantages are however predicated on there being able to be a relationship between X and the Father. At present there is no relationship, and effectively no knowledge on X’s part of his Father. That is a gulf that requires crossing before X might be in a position to have benefits from a relationship with the Father. In order to cross that gulf, orders were previously made for therapeutic intervention. That process has failed, and sadly the current circumstances, particularly those of the Mother’s strident opposition to the Father and stated resistance to orders, leave no scope for recovery of the relationship between X and the Father.
The proposal by the Father cannot be seen as carrying sufficient prospects for success to warrant it, in the face of the risks of destabilisation for X’s circumstances that it carries. Any hope for success is undermined by the Mother’s resistance to such arrangements, with that same resistance, whether fed by anxiety or merely animosity, being indicative of the threat to the stability of the fragile family unit that X is currently a part of.
Destabilisation of that family unit is a significant threat to X’s wellbeing.
Hence, although the Mother’s resistance to X’s relationship with his Father points strongly to deficiencies in her capacity to provide emotional care for X, in removing the benefits that he might receive from knowing his father, X’s best interests mean that, in her primary care, orders should not be made for him to spend time with his Father. Under those circumstances, and particularly in the light of the observations as to the nature of the relationship between the parties, an order for sole parental responsibility in favour of the Mother should also be made. It could not be thought that any interaction between the parties in determining long term issues for X could either occur, or would be of benefit to X.
That conclusion leaves a number of other issues to be determined, which will be dealt with separately below.
Injunctive relief
The Mother seeks injunctions to prevent the Father from attending her home, work or X’s school, and preventing the Father from contacting her.
She pointed to the Father’s assertion that he wanted to know where she lived, and also X’s school, and that he intended to contact X’s school.
These assertions need to be considered in the light of the findings made at the first part of the hearing last year, but also in the context of there being no evidence to show that the Father has taken any steps to locate the Mother or to attend her address or X’s school. Further, the Mother concedes that the Father does not know either her address or the identity of X’s school. She does not seek that these be identified in the injunctive orders that she seeks, leaving open the spectre of the Father potentially approaching the address, work or school without knowing that he is doing so.
The injunctions are sought pursuant to s 68B. I am unable to be satisfied that the injunctions sought are appropriate for the personal protection of X or the Mother. Firstly, I am unable to be satisfied that there is an issue of personal protection that would justify the making of the order. Secondly, I am not satisfied that, even if there were, the circumstance of the Father not knowing where he is not to attend renders them a proper means of protection. The injunctive relief should not be given.
An order that the Father spend no time and not communicate with, as opposed to no orders for time or communication.
The ICL and the Mother sought orders that positively oblige the Father to not spend time with or communicate with X, rather than that there be no orders that provide for spending time or communicating.
This was suggested to secure in a better fashion stability in X’s circumstances.
The Father opposed such an order, in case X should, in the future, pursue the Father for relationship. This was a matter identified by Dr B as beneficial for X. Although premature at present, as X enters adolescence, Dr B considered that knowing his Father would be advantageous for X, enhancing his opportunity to develop a sense of self derived from knowing where he has come from. She noted the possibility of X becoming resentful toward the Mother for failing to facilitate knowledge of the Father.
The general obligations flowing from an order that X live with the Mother are set out at s 65M of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth):
General obligations created by parenting order that deals with whom a child lives with
(1)This section applies to a parenting order that is in force in relation to a child to the extent to which the order deals with whom the child is to live with.
(2)A person must not, contrary to the order:
(a) Remove the child from the care of the person; or
(b) Refuse or fail to deliver or return the child to the person; or
(c)Interfere with the exercise of performance of any of the powers, duties or responsibilities that a person has under the order.
Such obligations would not prevent X from contacting the Father in the future, although they would prohibit the Father from removing X from the Mother’s care. The obligations mean that the Father would not be at liberty to, for example, remove X from his school or home.
The orders sought by the Mother and the ICL would prevent any contact between X and the Father, even if instigated by X as an adolescent.
Given the potential benefits identified by Dr B of X being able to make contact with the Father should he choose to, the orders should not be made prohibiting contact with X. The protections created by s 65M appear sufficient in the circumstances of this case, and the order that will be made will grant no right to the Father to have contact with X.
As noted by counsel for the Father, should the Father attend at X’s school in the circumstances of this case, he may then be the subject of other remedies.
Provision of information
The Father sought orders that would require the Mother to notify him if particular medical events occur in relation to X. Given that no orders will be made for time in his favour, nor for parental responsibility, such orders do not advance X’s welfare, but rather impose an obligation on the Mother that is both unlikely to be met or, if met, creates stress within the Mother’s household that is not beneficial to X. Such orders will not be made.
Name change
The Mother sought orders to allow name change for X. Although it might be considered that the name of a child is a matter for the exercise of parental responsibility as it relates to long term decision making and hence, where there is an order for sole parental responsibility, would be a matter for the exercise of that sole parental responsibility, the matter is not so straightforward.
X is resident in New South Wales. In Re Dua,[3] Foster J noted the content of NSW State law as it deals with the change of a child’s name and registration of that name:
[3] [2020] FamCA 299
[28] Notwithstanding that the mother has sole parental responsibility for the child pursuant to consent orders made on 3 October 2019, ss 28(3) and (5) of the Births Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW) relevantly provides:
(3) An application for registration of a change of a child’s name may be made by one parent if:
(a) the applicant is the sole parent named in the registration of the child’s birth under this Act or any other law (including a corresponding law), or
(b)there is no other surviving parent of the child, or
(c)a court approves the proposed change of name.
…
(5)If any court (including any court of another State or the Commonwealth) approves a proposed name for a child, the court may order the Registrar to register the child’s name in a form specified in the order.
Hence, for a change to X’s name to take effect it is necessary for the court to give specific approval of such.
In Re Dua,[4] Foster J identified frequently applied considerations to the issue of name change noting that the issue of name change is one to be determined on the best interests of the child:
[39] The factors frequently considered in determining whether there should be any change to a child’s name include:
Any embarrassment likely to be experienced by the child if his or her name is different from the parent with residence or care and control;
Any confusion of identity which may arise for the child if his or her name is changed or is not changed;
The effect any change in surname may have on the relationship between the child and the parent whose name the child bore during the relationship;
The effect of frequent or random changes of name;
The contact that the non-custodial parent has had and is likely to have in the future with the child;
The degree of identification that the child or children have with their non-custodial parent; and
The degree of identification which the child or children have with the parent with whom they live.
[4] [2020] FamCA 299
Exhibit F2 is a copy of X’s birth certificate. It shows X’s name to be X Hafiz Mirza, the Father’s name to be Mr Ishmal, the Mother’s name as Ms Karaja.
The Mother sought orders that she be permitted to change X’s name from ‘X Hafiz Mirza’ to ‘X Hafiz’.
The Father was opposed to such a change.
No party led evidence as to the significance of the names, including as to the cultural significance.
The Mother deposed in [66] of her affidavit that "X finds it difficult having two surnames and difficulty spelling and pronouncing Mirza. X prefers by going by just Hafiz. I understand that none of the applicant's other children use the surname Mirza."[5]
[5] Mother’s affidavit filed 16 July 2020 [66]
Other than by mere assertion, the Mother gave no description of the degree of preference or difficulties said to be experience by X. No hint was given as to why X might have such a preference, nor how he has expressed such.
The evidence put forward by the Mother lacks cogency to establish that the change is in X’s best interests. No order for change of the name has been justified.
International travel
The Mother sought that she be permitted to travel with X as she desires the opportunity to take him overseas in the future.[6] Both she and the Father were born in Country D. She wants X to know his heritage.[7] She also said that she would like the “opportunity to take him on a cruise or on a holiday”.[8]
[6] Mother’s affidavit filed 16 July 2020 [67]
[7] Mother’s affidavit filed 16 July 2020 [67]
[8] Mother’s affidavit filed 16 July 2020 [67]
In circumstances where the Mother will have sole parental responsibility, and the Father will spend no time with X, there should be no impediment to the Mother exercising her decision making role in terms of overseas travel. The unfettered ability of the Mother to expose X to different experiences, places, and to his parents’ country and culture of origin is in X’s best interests, particularly where it carries no practical implications in relation to his relationship with the Father.
Corresponding to this, X’s name should be removed from the Watch List.
The orders should be made as sought by the Mother.
I certify that the preceding sixty-five (65) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Gill delivered on 21 September 2020.
Associate:
Date: 21 September 2020
Annexure A
Orders sought
The Applicant Father seeks[9]:
[9] Minutes of Proposed Orders of the Father dated 9 September 2020
That the parties Ms Karaja (hereinafter referred to as “the Mother”) and Mr Ishmal (hereinafter referred to as “the Father”) have equal shared parental responsibility for the child of the relationship namely X Hafiz Mirza (hereinafter referred to as (“X”) born … 2013.
Each party shall have sole parental responsibility for the short-term issues of care welfare and development of X whilst X is living with or spending time with them.
That X live with the Mother.
That X spend time with the Father except as otherwise specified in these orders
i.for six periods of two hours a fortnight at such times and dates as directed by G Contact Centre, PROVIDED THAT if there are no such appointments then available or the Centre is unable to assist in providing services for the parties then such time be from 10am until 12 noon each second Sunday commencing on the second Sunday after the making of these orders with changeover to take place outside G Contact Centre at the commencement and the conclusion of such time.
ii.thereafter for six periods of four hours from 10am Sunday until 2pm Sunday every second week with changeover to take place outside G Contact Centre at the commencement and the conclusion of such time.
iii.thereafter for six periods of six hours from 10am Sunday until 4pm Sunday every second week with changeover to take place outside G Contact Centre at the commencement and the conclusion of such time.
iii.thereafter for six periods of eight hours from 9am Sunday until 5pm Sunday every second week with changeover to take place outside G Contact Centre at the commencement and the conclusion of such time.
iv.thereafter for six periods from 5pm Saturday until 5pm Sunday every second week with changeover to take place outside G Contact Centre at the commencement and the conclusion of such time.
v.thereafter each alternative weekend from 5pm Friday evening until 5pm Sunday evening every second week with changeover to take place outside G Contact Centre at the commencement and the conclusion of such time.
vi.When X commences spending time with Father each alternative weekend from 5pm Friday evening until 5pm Sunday evening every second week Order 4 v. above) that X spend time with his father for half the school holidays as agreed, and in the absence of agreement as follows:
a.each short school holidays thereafter from 10am on the first Saturday of such short school holiday until 5pm the second Sunday of such school holiday period 8 days later).
b.For the second half of the school holiday in December /January with the Father
vii. Any other times as agreed between the parents.
Additional arrangements for special occasions:
i. X shall live with the Mother between 10am and 5pm on Mother’s Day and should Mother’s Day fall on a day when X is living with the Father, then X’s time with the Father shall be suspended for those hours.
ii. That X shall spend time with the Father between 10am and 5pm on Father’s Day and should that day fall on a day when X is living with the Mother, the X’s time with the Mother shall be suspended for those hours.
iii. That X shall live with the Mother between 10am and 5pm on the Saturday following the Mothers birthday and should that day fall on a day that X is spending time with the Father then his time with the Father shall be suspended for those hours.
iv. That X shall spend time with the Father between 10am and 5pm on the Saturday following the Father’s birthday and should that day fall on a day that X is living with the Mother then his time with the Mother shall be suspended for those hours.
Whilst X is in the parties respective care, both parties shall facilitate reasonable internet and telephone contact between X and the other party.
Collection and deliver of X shall be as agreed but in the event that there is no agreement the changeover shall be at or outside G Contact Centre.
Both parties shall as soon as possible keep the other informed of any serious or long –term illness or injury affecting X whilst he in their care. In this paragraph, the term “serious shall refer to a medical condition that requires a visit to a hospital or specialist or more than 2 visits to a general practitioner for the same ailment.
The Respondent Mother seeks[10]:
[10] Outline of Case (update) filed 8 September 2020
The mother shall have sole parental responsibility for the child X Hafiz Mirza born … 2013.
The child shall live with the mother.
The child shall spend no time with the father.
Pursuant to section 68B of the Family Law Act 1975, Mr Ishmal is hereby restrained from:
a. Approaching within 100 meters of the mother's residence or place of work;
b. Approaching within 100 meters of any school the child may attend;
c. Contacting the mother by any means.
The mother has sole parental responsibility in relation to signing all necessary documentation, organising and obtaining an Australian Passport for the child.
Pursuant to section 11(1) and (2) of the Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth), these orders provide authority to the Minister for Foreign Affairs or a delegate of the Minister to issue an Australian Passport for the child X Hafiz Mirza born … 2013.
The Australian Passport issued to the child shall be provided to the mother to hold on behalf of the child.
The child be permitted to travel outside the Commonwealth of Australia with the mother without prior notice to or permission of the father.
The mother shall be permitted to change the child's name with Births, Deaths and Marriages to X Hafiz and the mother shall have sole parental responsibility enabling her to sign all documents necessary to cause this to occur.
The child's name X Hafiz Mirza shall be removed from the Airport Watch List.
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