Irving v Pfingst & Anor; Pfingst & Anor v Irving

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[2022] HCATrans 114

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Brisbane  No B3 of 2022

B e t w e e n -

TERRY IRVING

Applicant

and

HELEN MAREE PFINGST

First Respondent

STATE OF QUEENSLAND

Second Respondent

Office of the Registry
  Brisbane  No B5 of 2022

B e t w e e n -

HELEN MAREE PFINGST

First Applicant

STATE OF QUEENSLAND

Second Applicant

and

TERRY IRVING

Respondent

Applications for special leave to appeal

KEANE J
EDELMAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA BY VIDEO CONNECTION TO BRISBANE

ON FRIDAY, 17 JUNE 2022, AT 1.38 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

____________________

KEANE J:   In accordance with the Court’s protocol when sitting remotely, I will announce the appearances for the parties.

MR B.W. WALKER, SC appears with MS E.M. GASS for the applicant in B3/2022 and for the respondent in B5/2022.  (instructed by Maurice Blackburn Lawyers)

MR S.A. McLEOD, QC appears with MR M.R. WILKINSON for the first and second respondents in B3/2022 and for the first and second applicants in B5/2022.  (instructed by Crown Law (Qld))

KEANE J:   Yes, Mr Walker.

MR WALKER:   May it please the Court.  Can I take your Honours to pages 178, 179 of the application book, please, paragraph [119] of Justice McMurdo’s reasons.  It throws us to the middle of things.  His Honour refers to:

The findings which ought to have been made –

That is, the Court of Appeal’s decision…..judge:

concerning Ms Pfingst’s state of mind and purpose in laying the Accessory Charge –

Ms Pfingst was the relevant detective.  Her state of mind and purpose obviously concerned the requisite elements of the tort of malicious prosecution.  The accessory charge, as your Honours know, is a reference to criminal liability, not as the principal offender, for the robbery in question.  Accessory charge and robbery charge were distinguished.  It was common ground, in that fashion.  His Honour in [119] says that:

The findings which ought to have been made –

in relation to the accessory charge:

would reflect poorly upon her credibility in a general way.

We would flesh that out by observing that the conduct of the detective showed a concerted and persistent maintaining of the charge of accessory, notwithstanding what the Court of Appeal held in relation to the lack of any honest or genuine state of mind in her concerning that and, in particular, that combined with what was to be inferred from the lack of an objective basis for the suspicion of the supposed principle of the robbery charge so far as concerned our client and the accessory charge.  But then the tables turn and, as your Honours know, the next sentence in [119]:

It does not follow, however, that those findings –

which have been said to reflect poorly upon her credibility in a general way:

would have significantly affected the credibility of her evidence that she believed that [our client] should be prosecuted on the Robbery Charge, and that she did so for…

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Details
Case
[2022] HCATrans 114
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The proceedings before the High Court of Australia concerned applications for special leave to appeal in two related matters, *Irving v Pfingst & Anor* (B3/2022) and *Pfingst & Anor v Irving* (B5/2022). The dispute centred on claims of malicious prosecution, specifically concerning a charge of accessory after the fact to a robbery and a separate charge of robbery itself. The core of the disagreement involved the state of mind and purpose of Detective Pfingst in laying these charges against Mr Irving, and whether her credibility findings by the Court of Appeal in relation to one charge should have impacted findings regarding the other.

The legal issues before the High Court included whether the Court of Appeal erred in its application of rule 770 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules concerning the ordering of a new trial. Specifically, the court was asked to consider whether the Court of Appeal correctly assessed whether a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice had occurred, particularly in circumstances where credibility findings were made against Detective Pfingst in relation to the accessory charge, but not necessarily to the same extent regarding the robbery charge. A further issue was whether the Court of Appeal correctly determined that a suspicion that Mr Irving might have been the principal offender was incompatible with an honest belief that he was guilty as an accessory after the fact, and whether this constituted an error in the assessment of malice for the purposes of malicious prosecution.

The High Court considered arguments regarding the distinction between questions of fact and law in appellate review, and the considerable burden required to overturn findings of fact. The applicant argued that where credibility is affected in a general way, a retrial may be indicated, even if the appellate court cannot definitively resolve all factual matters. Conversely, the respondents contended that the Court of Appeal correctly applied the principles from *Calin v Greater Union* and rule 770, finding that the findings of fact in relation to the two distinct malicious prosecution claims were separate and that adverse credibility findings against Detective Pfingst concerning the accessory charge did not automatically infect her credibility in relation to the robbery charge. The respondents also argued that the Court of Appeal’s finding that a suspicion of being the principal offender was incompatible with an honest belief of being an accessory was a correct interpretation of the evidence and the law.

Background

Background to the litigation

Terry Irving brought an action against Helen Maree Pfingst, a detective, and the State of Queensland, alleging malicious prosecution in relation to two charges: an accessory charge and a robbery charge. Pfingst had arrested and charged Irving with being an accessory to a bank robbery. Irving claimed that Pfingst maliciously prosecuted him without a reasonable and probable cause. The trial judge found in Irving's favour on both charges. Pfingst and the State appealed, arguing that Pfingst had an honest belief that there was a proper case for Irving's prosecution on the robbery charge. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on the accessory charge, finding that Pfingst did not honestly believe there was a proper case for Irving's prosecution on that charge. However, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the robbery charge, finding that Irving had established malicious prosecution in relation to that charge. Irving and Pfingst both sought special leave to appeal to the High Court. Irving argued that the Court of Appeal should have ordered a retrial on the robbery charge because Pfingst's credibility had been adversely affected in a general way. Pfingst argued that the Court of Appeal erred in overturning the trial judge's findings that Pfingst honestly believed there was a proper case for Irving's prosecution on the accessory charge. The High Court dismissed both applications for special leave, finding that the appeals did not turn on an issue of principle warranting special leave.

The matter before the High Court is an application for special leave to appeal against decisions of the Queensland Court of Appeal in Irving v Pfingst & Anor [2021] QCA 103 and Pfingst & Anor v Irving [2021] QCA 104. The applicants seek to appeal the Court of Appeal's findings on the tort of malicious prosecution in relation to charges brought by Helen Pfingst against Terry Irving. The Court of Appeal allowed Irving's appeal in part and dismissed his appeal in part. The applicants argue that the Court of Appeal erred in overturning the primary judge's findings on Pfingst's state of mind and in not ordering a retrial. The respondents contend that the Court of Appeal's findings were open and that there was no basis for granting special leave to appeal. The High Court dismissed both applications for special leave, finding that the appeals did not turn on an issue of principle warranting special leave. The Court of Appeal's findings were matters of fact which the High Court was not prepared to re-assess.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Did the Court of Appeal err in concluding that the trial judge's findings concerning the detective's credibility did not require a new trial on the robbery charge?
2. Did the Court of Appeal misapply the principles of Calin v Greater Union in not ordering a new trial based on the findings concerning the detective's credibility?
3. Did the Court of Appeal err in overturning the trial judge's findings concerning the detective's state of mind and purpose in laying the accessory charge?
4. Did the Court of Appeal correctly interpret the evidence and findings concerning the basis upon which the detective charged the applicant with the accessory charge?
5. Did the Court of Appeal correctly apply the principles concerning malice in a malicious prosecution when there is an absence of reasonable and probable cause for the charge?

Held
1. The Court of Appeal did not err in concluding that the trial judge's findings concerning the detective's credibility did not require a new trial on the robbery charge. The appeal application was dismissed.
2. The Court of Appeal did not misapply the principles of Calin v Greater Union in not ordering a new trial based on the findings concerning the detective's credibility. The appeal application was dismissed.
3. The Court of Appeal did not err in overturning the trial judge's findings concerning the detective's state of mind and purpose in laying the accessory charge. The appeal application was dismissed.
4. The Court of Appeal correctly interpreted the evidence and findings concerning the basis upon which the detective charged the applicant with the accessory charge. The appeal application was dismissed.
5. The Court of Appeal did not correctly apply the principles concerning malice in a malicious prosecution when there is an absence of reasonable and probable cause for the charge. However, this was not sufficient to warrant the grant of special leave to appeal, and the appeal application was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court of Appeal's decision in Irving v Pfingst & Anor; Pfingst & Anor v Irving involved several complex issues surrounding the credibility of the detective, the principles of malicious prosecution, and the detective's state of mind and purpose in laying the accessory charge. The High Court considered applications for special leave to appeal, examining the Court of Appeal's handling of these issues.

First, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial judge's findings concerning the detective's credibility did not necessitate a new trial on the robbery charge. The Court of Appeal reasoned that while the detective's credibility was affected in a general way, this did not significantly impact her credibility regarding the belief that the defendant should be prosecuted for the robbery charge. The High Court noted that the trial judge had found that the detective had good grounds to suspect the defendant of the robbery charge, which supported the prosecution. The Court of Appeal's approach was consistent with the principle that credibility issues affecting the overall findings do not automatically require a retrial if specific elements of the charge remain unaffected. The Court of Appeal's reasoning aligned with the jurisprudence that emphasizes the distinction between questions of fact and law, particularly in relation to credibility assessments.

Second, the Court of Appeal was accused of misapplying the principles of Calin v Greater Union in not ordering a new trial based on the findings concerning the detective's credibility. The Court of Appeal applied the principle that a retrial should only be ordered if a substantial wrong or miscarriage had occurred, as per UCPR rule 770. The Court of Appeal determined that the detective's credibility issues did not automatically infect her credibility regarding the robbery charge, thus no retrial was warranted. The High Court observed that the Court of Appeal correctly applied the burden of proof on the applicant to demonstrate a substantial wrong or miscarriage, which was not met in this case.

Third, the Court of Appeal was criticized for overturning the trial judge's findings concerning the detective's state of mind and purpose in laying the accessory charge. The trial judge found that the detective honestly believed there was a proper case for the accessory charge against the defendant. The Court of Appeal, however, concluded that the detective could not have held such a belief if she suspected the defendant was the robber. The High Court considered that the trial judge's findings were supported by evidence and that the detective's suspicion of the defendant as the robber did not necessarily conflict with her belief that he was guilty of being an accessory. The Court of Appeal's approach was seen as an error in not recognizing the compatibility of these concurrent beliefs.

Fourth, the Court of Appeal's interpretation of the evidence and findings concerning the basis upon which the detective charged the defendant with the accessory charge was scrutinized. The Court of Appeal's decision that the detective did not have an honest belief in the defendant's guilt of the accessory charge was challenged. The High Court noted that the trial judge had found that there was a proper basis for the accessory charge based on the evidence available to the detective at the time. The High Court observed that the detective's actions and evidence supported her belief that the defendant was liable for the accessory charge.

Finally, the Court of Appeal's application of the principles concerning malice in a malicious prosecution when there is an absence of reasonable and probable cause for the charge was examined. The Court of Appeal found that the detective's honest and reasonable belief based on the evidence justified laying the accessory charge, thus ruling out malice. The High Court supported the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the detective's belief, supported by evidence, precluded a finding of malice. The principles in A v New South Wales were applied to reinforce that an honest belief based on evidence negates the element of malice.

In conclusion, the High Court dismissed the applications for special leave to appeal, finding that the Court of Appeal's decisions were based on sound reasoning and consistent with established legal principles. The ratio decidendi of the High Court's decision is that issues of credibility and state of mind in malicious prosecution cases must be carefully assessed in the context of the specific charges and evidence, and that the Court of Appeal's power to order a retrial is constrained by the need to demonstrate a substantial wrong or miscarriage.