Irvine and Henderson

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

IRVINE & HENDERSON

[2015] FCCA 794

Catchwords:
FAMILY LAW – Parenting – discrete issue involving proposed international travel to (country omitted) – best interests of the child – Rice & Asplund.

Legislation:

Family Law Act 1975, ss.60CA, 60CC

Line v Line (1997) FLC92-729
Rice & Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725

Applicant:

MS IRVINE

Respondent:

MR HENDERSON

File Number:

BRC 2652 of 2010

Judgment of:

Judge Howard

Hearing date:

23 March 2015

Date of Last Submission:

23 March 2015

Delivered at:

Brisbane

Delivered on:

2 April 2015

REPRESENTATION

The Applicant appeared in person

Solicitors for the Respondent:

Stolar Law Pty Ltd

ORDERS

That the Initiating Application filed on 30 July 2014 be dismissed.

IT IS NOTED:

It is noted that the final orders made on 16 November 2012 remain in place.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Irvine & Henderson is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT BRISBANE

BRC 2652 of 2010

MS IRVINE

Applicant

And

MR HENDERSON

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Background

This case relates to one child, X. X was born on (omitted) 2008. He is the son of Ms Irvine (the applicant) and Mr Henderson (the respondent).
The matter has a long history. On 10 May 2010 His Honour Federal Magistrate Slack ordered that the parents be restrained from removing the child from the Commonwealth of Australia without the consent of the other parent or order of the Court. The mother had applied to the Court to have a passport issued for the child to travel to (country omitted).
The mother, Ms Irvine, was born in (country omitted) on (omitted) 1972.
In 2003 the parties commenced a relationship. They married in 2004. In March 2009 the parties separated on a final basis. They were divorced in December 2010.
After the order was made by the Court in May 2010 a further application was then filed – this time by the father. An order was made on 10 November 2011 again restraining the parents from removing the child from the Commonwealth.
The matter went to a final hearing in October 2012. The matter was heard on 29 October 2012 and Judgment was delivered on 16 November 2012. A final order was made on that date in Toowoomba.
The mother was refused permission to take the child on holiday to (country omitted). The Court also ordered that the child live in the (omitted) area. If the mother decided to move back to (omitted) (from (omitted)) then the child would live primarily with the mother and spend time with the father.
The mother has not moved back from (omitted) to (omitted). The mother has chosen to remain living in (omitted). Therefore the child lives primarily with the father during the week and spends time with the mother each weekend from Friday afternoon until Monday morning. The mother drives up to (omitted) to collect the child from school on Friday afternoon and then delivers the child back to school on Monday morning.
For many years the (country omitted) Government refused to sign the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (1980). (country omitted) finally signed the Convention on 24 January 2014. The Convention came into effect in (country omitted) on 1 April 2014. The appropriate central authority is the (omitted) Foreign Ministry.
One of the matters taken into account by the Court in deciding, on the last occasion, that the parents should be restrained by injunction from removing the child from the Commonwealth of Australia – specifically related to the fact that (country omitted) was not a signatory to the Hague Convention. In particular I note paragraph 38 of the reasons for judgment delivered 16 November 2012 where the Court stated as follows:
“38. The mother would dearly love to take the child to (country omitted). I am not willing to make any order allowing the child to travel to (country omitted) unless and until that country both signs and ratifies the Hague Convention. In the event that (country omitted) does eventually sign and ratify the Hague Convention – the mother will be (of course) at liberty to apply to the Court for a passport to enable the child to travel to (country omitted). That will then be a matter for a Court to determine on that occasion. I am concerned that if the mother were able to travel to (country omitted) with the child X prior to (country omitted)’s adoption of the Hague Convention – that there is a real risk that the child would not be returned to Australia. The mother has no assets in Australia (apart from some cash in the bank). The mother has no family members whatsoever in Australia. The mother has no partner in Australia. The mother has expressed a very great desire to return to (country omitted). The mother has said this is only so that she and X (in particular) can visit family members. The mother’s repeated references in the evidence to the fact that she misses her (nationality omitted) lifestyle and (nationality omitted) culture has led me to conclude that – in the event the mother were allowed to travel to (country omitted) with the child – there is a real risk that the child would not be returned by the mother to Australia. To the extent that the mother has given any evidence or assurances to the contrary – I do not believe the mother’s testimony. I had the opportunity to observe the mother in the witness box and I have had regard to the totality of her evidence. In the event that the child is not returned to Australia this would obviously significantly disrupt the relationship between the child and the father. That would not be in the child’s best interests.”
On 30 July 2014 the mother filed a further application seeking an order in relation to, essentially, two discrete issues. The first discrete issue relates to the issuing of a passport for the child. The second discrete issue relates to whether or not the mother should be granted permission to travel with the child to (country omitted) twice per year. It seems that the mother seeks an order for one of those visits to last five weeks and another of those visits to last for 16 days.
The fact that (country omitted) has become a signatory to the Hague Convention does, it seems to me, amount to a significant change in circumstances sufficient for the Court to consider afresh the discrete question of whether or not it is in the child’s best interests to travel to (country omitted) with the mother for a holiday (Note Rice & Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725 especially per Evatt CJ at page 78-905). Indeed, the mother is not seeking (in her application filed in the Court on 30 July 2014) any other parenting order. The Court is only prepared, therefore, to consider the discrete question of the child’s possible travel to (country omitted) with the mother. The accompanying issue connected to such travel is, of course, the question of an order permitting the issuing of a passport in the name of the child.
The matter came on for final hearing on 23 March 2015 in Brisbane. The mother was self represented. The mother specifically informed the Court that she did not require an interpreter. Having listened to the mother give evidence and listened to her submissions – I have no doubt that she has a good command of the English language. The father was represented by Mr Stolar, solicitor.

Best Interests

In deciding whether or not to make a particular parenting order (such as those orders sought by the mother) the Court must regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration (Section 60CA of the Family Law Act 1975 (“the Act”)).
The primary considerations to assist the Court in determining a child’s best interests are stated in s.60CC(2). That section states:
“60CC(2) The primary considerations are:
(a) the benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of the child’s parents; and
(b) the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence.
60CC(2A) In applying the considerations set out in subsection (2), the court is to give greater weight to the consideration set out in paragraph (2)(b).”
There is no doubt whatsoever in the present case that there are benefits to young X in having a meaningful relationship with both his mother and his father. There is no evidence to the contrary. The situation in that regard has not changed since the date of the last hearing in October 2012. It is in the child’s best interests that he remains living primarily in Australia. It is also in the child’s best interests that both parents remain living primarily in Australia in relatively close proximity to the child.
There is no evidence that any aspects referred to in s.60CC(2)(b) are relevant in this case.

Section 60CC(3)(a) – any views expressed by the child and any factors (such as the child’s maturity or level of understanding) that the court thinks are relevant to the weight it should give to the child’s views.

As to the additional considerations set forth in s.60CC(3) of the Act – s.60CC(3)(a) is not relevant. The child is only six years of age and his views, if any, cannot be given any real weight.

Section 60CC(3)(b) – the nature of the relationship of the child with:-

each of the child’s parents; and

other persons (including any grandparent or other relative of the child).

The child has a close and loving relationship with both the mother and the father. Of particular note is the fact that the child has developed a close and loving relationship with his brother, Y. Y is the child of the father (Mr Henderson) and his new wife. Y is four years of age. Y lives with X and I note the evidence of the father (which I accept) that X and Y have a close and loving relationship. I am able to draw that inference from the evidence of the father.

Section 60CC(3)(c) – the extent to which each of the child's parents has taken, or failed to take, the opportunity:

to participate in making decisions about major long-term issues in relation to the child; and

to spend time with the child; and

to communicate with the child.

This particular subsection is worth noting. The final orders made in November 2012 allowed for the child to live primarily with the mother provided the mother was living in the (omitted) area. But the mother has decided to remain living in (omitted). This, of course, is the mother’s own choice. The mother has decided that she prefers to live in (omitted) rather than (omitted). There is no evidence before the Court to suggest that the mother is somehow “prevented” from living in (omitted). Nor is there any evidence to show that the mother is “compelled” to live in (omitted). The mother simply chooses to live in (omitted). The mother’s demeanour when giving evidence indicates to the Court that she has an intense dislike of the father. She considers that her relationship with the father was regrettable.
I infer from the mother’s evidence that she dislikes the father intensely and considers that her relationship with the father was most regrettable. For these reasons the mother seems to prefer to avoid living in (omitted).
The net result of that decision by the mother is that, despite a Court order in her favour, she chooses to live in (omitted) and therefore only gets to spend time with her son on weekends and not during the week.
In that respect, therefore, the mother has failed to take all available opportunities to spend time with the child and communicate with the child.
The father’s very great concern is that the mother will not live in (omitted) with the child because the mother simply will not accept that (omitted) is the child’s home. The father’s concern is that the mother, deep down, wants to live with the child in (country omitted).
As noted, the mother’s evidence and her demeanour when giving evidence (as well as her demeanour when making submissions) does indicate to the Court that she has an intense dislike of the father. The mother appears to have a sense of grievance and injustice concerning the father. There is no evidence before the Court (certainly no evidence which I am prepared to accept) that would persuade the Court that the mother was subjected to any form injustice at the hands of the father. The parties’ marriage broke down irretrievably. There is nothing more that the Court can conclude based on the available evidence.
The Court determined on the last occasion that it is X’s best interests to remain living in the (omitted) area. Nothing has changed in that regard.
As a consequence of the father’s concerns relating to the mother’s attitude towards him and her attitude towards X’s life in (omitted) – the father is extremely worried that if the Court grants the mother permission to take the child on holiday to (country omitted) – that the mother will simply disappear with the child in (country omitted). The mother has changed jobs. The mother had been working in (occupation omitted). She explained to the Court that it was the source of much sadness for her working with (omitted) when she could not spend more time with her own son. There is no reasonable explanation from the mother as to why she has chosen not to spend more time with her son. There is in place a final Court order allowing her to do so. The mother chooses not to live in (omitted).
In any event, the mother explained that she stopped working in the (omitted) industry for the stated reason. She now works on a part-time basis as a (occupation omitted) in a (employer omitted) in (omitted). This allows her flexible hours so that she can travel to (omitted) on a Friday afternoon to collect X and then on each Monday morning drop him back at school in (omitted).
The mother still has no significant assets in Australia. She owns a car which is worth approximately $10,000. The mother still has no family members living in Australia (apart from her son X). There is no evidence that the mother has re-partnered. The mother maintains a very great desire to visit (country omitted). I also find that the mother very much misses her own mother and father and her brother and his family – all of whom live in (country omitted).
I have come to the conclusion that the mother does, indeed, have an intense dislike of the father. The mother very much regrets the relationship with the father. I have also come to the conclusion that the mother does not accept that X’s home is in (omitted). The mother does not accept that X belongs in (omitted). Understandably, the mother has a great love for her own (nationality omitted) culture and lifestyle. She has been teaching young X (nationality omitted) and he can understand the (nationality omitted) language but is not yet fluent in speaking (language omitted).
As a result of the findings that I have made under this subsection of s.60CC(3) I have come to the conclusion that there is still a real risk that the mother would decide to remain in (country omitted) with the child in the event the Court granted her permission to travel to that country. The findings made by the Court in November 2012 (and referred to in paragraph 38 of the reasons for judgment delivered 16 November 2012) are still applicable and valid.
If that occurred the father would be put to the expense of locating the child in (country omitted) and then pursuing the matter through the (country omitted) Courts. In view of the fact that (country omitted) has become a signatory to the Hague Convention the process of the return of the child to his habitual residence in Australia should be faster, quicker, and cheaper. Certainly it should be significantly more efficient than the former processes in the years before (country omitted) became a signatory to the Convention.
The father points out that first of all he would have to be able to locate the child and then there would be the process involved in getting the matter before the appropriate Court. It appears that the matter would be brought before a Family Court in (country omitted). There is also, it seems, a mediation type process provided by the Bar Association of (country omitted). I have taken judicial notice of some of these matters (in particular the location of the two Family Courts and the involvement of the Bar Association of (country omitted)).
Because of the risk that the child will not be returned to Australia by the mother (if permission is granted to the mother to take the child on a holiday to (country omitted)) the father is very concerned that the child remains too young to travel with the mother to (country omitted). The father’s view is that once the child reaches the age of 13 years he should be allowed to travel to (country omitted) (provided the mother pays a $30,000 bond). The father’s reasoning is that the child would, at least be old enough to make independent contact with the father to let him know where he is in the event that the mother decided to remain in (country omitted) with the child. The father is concerned that, at the age of six years, the child is simply too young to take any independent steps to contact his father in Australia in the event the mother decided to remain with the child in (country omitted). Having listened to the mother’s evidence and observed her demeanour I have come to the conclusion that the father’s concerns are valid and understandable.
Having come to the conclusion that there is a real risk that the mother might retain the child in (country omitted) – the Court must closely consider the question of any proposed bond. The mother proposed a $10,000 bond in the case summary filed on 10 February 2015. The Court should have regard to a number of factors when considering an appropriate level of security. I note the decision of the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia in Line v Line (1997) FLC92-729. From page 83-846 the Full Court set out various matters to be considered in relation to the question of security. In particular the Court stated:
“Matters to be considered on security issue
4.47 The fixing of an appropriate level of security in circumstances such as these is always a delicate matter, and one very much for the discretion of the trial Judge. However, in exercising that discretion we consider that a trial Judge should have regard to a number of relevant matters. Some of the matters we will now identify have been already highlighted by Asche SJ in Kuebler and Kuebler (1978) FLC 90-434. We think it timely that we again draw attention to those matters and others we believe to be appropriate.
4.48 The first of those matters to which the trial Judge should have regard is the purpose of such security, in respect of which we adopt, with respect, the two-fold purpose referred to in the submissions of counsel for the husband and set out in paragraph 4.42 above namely:
a) to provide a sum which will realistically entice the person removing the children to return; and
b) to provide a sum to adequately provision the party left in Australia to take action and proceedings in Australia and overseas in an endeavour to obtain the return of the children.
4.49 The next matter is obviously the degree of risk that the departing parent, once permitted to leave Australia, will, despite assurances to the contrary, choose not to return. In assessing that degree of risk, obvious considerations are the existence (or otherwise) of continuing ties between the departing parent and Australia (such as the ownership of real estate, the existence of business interests, or the residence of close family or friends here), the existence and strength of possible motives not to return (including the level of conflict between the parents, particularly over child related issues) and the existence and strength of possible motives to remain in the other nominated country (such as the ownership of real estate, the existence of business interests, or the residence of close family and/or personal friends there).
4.50 We think it will also be relevant, in exercising this discretion, to consider whether the country to which the departing parent intends to travel with the children is or is not a signatory to the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction signed at the Hague on the 25 October, 1980 (“the Convention”). However, in considering and deciding what weight to give to this factor, the Court would have to bear in mind that, even if the designated destination is a convention country, once the departing parent has left Australia there may be little to prevent him or her deviating from that designated destination to another destination in a non-convention country or, after going to the designated destination, from then travelling on to a non-convention country.
4.51 Finally, we think that a relevant consideration in the exercise of this discretion is the financial circumstances of both parties, and in that context the relative hardship which the departing parent would suffer by the imposition of security at a particular level as compared with the hardship which the non-departing parent would suffer if the security were fixed at a lower level. In each case, questions of hardship to the children flowing from any hardship experienced by the relevant parent would also come into consideration.”

The degree of risk that the mother will not return to Australia in this case is high in my opinion. That is for the reasons that I have already stated. The Full Court particularly noted – as a consideration for the Court in such cases – “the level of conflict between the parents, particularly over child related issues”. This is precisely the point in the present case. For this reason and for the other reasons that I have stated already including the distinct lack of continuing ties between the mother and Australia and for all of the other reasons noted herein – I have come to the conclusion that the proposed bond of $10,000 is completely inadequate. The father asks for a bond of at least $30,000 – but that is only provided the child is aged 13 years. But the mother wants to travel to (country omitted) in the very near future.
The mother said during the final hearing that she could sell her car and that she could possibly raise a further $10,000. Taking into account the considerations outlined by the Full Court in Line v Line (supra) I have come to the conclusion that for the Court to be persuaded that the level of security is sufficient – the amount of security in the present case (for the reasons stated) would have to be significantly greater than $10,000. I take judicial notice of the fact that a $10,000 bond is very unlikely to be a sufficient sum in this day and age to fund the necessary international proceedings. That, of course would mean that the mother had absolutely no assets left in Australia. Further, there is no evidence of the value of the car from an appropriately qualified person.

Section 60CC(3)(ca) – the extent to which each of the child's parents has fulfilled, or failed to fulfil, the parent's obligations to maintain the child.

Each parent has maintained the child.

Section 60CC(3)(d) – the likely effect of any changes in the child’s circumstances, including the likely effect on the child of any separation from:

either of his or her parents; or

any other child, or other person (including any grandparent or other relative of the child), with whom he or she has been living.

If the child was to remain in (country omitted) with the mother the child’s close relationship with his father would be severed. Also, the child’s relationship with young Y (his brother) would be severed.

Section 60CC(3)(e) – the practical difficulty and expense of a child spending time with and communicating with a parent and whether that difficulty or expense will substantially affect the child’s right to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis.

I have made reference to these possibilities because of the finding that I have made that there is, at this point in time, a real risk that the mother would remain in (country omitted) with the child contrary to the orders of this Court.

Section 60CC(3)(f) – the capacity of:-

each of the child’s parents; and

any other person (including any grandparent or other relative of the child)

to provide for the needs of the child, including emotional and intellectual needs.

The evidence from the last Court hearing appears to still be applicable. Both parents have the capacity to provide for the child’s needs.

Section 60CC(3)(g) – the maturity, sex, lifestyle and background (including lifestyle, culture and traditions) of the child and of either of the child’s parents, and any other characteristics of the child that the court thinks are relevant.

As to the child’s (nationality omitted) ancestry – clearly it is in his best interests to learn about and become involved in (nationality omitted) language and culture. The father supports this approach. Both parents promote this approach.
Because of the child’s young age it is the case that he would have difficulty in independently contacting the father from (country omitted) in the event that the mother decided to remain in (country omitted) with the child.
Section 60CC(3)(h) is not relevant.

Section 60CC(3)(i) – the attitude to the child, and to the responsibilities of parenthood, demonstrated by each of the child’s parents.

Under this subparagraph I note the father has an excellent attitude towards the child and to the responsibilities of parenthood. The mother also dearly loves the child and has a good attitude towards the child. The mother does not accept that the child really does belong living in the town of (omitted). As to whether or not the mother has fully accepted the responsibilities of parenthood – it must be said that to a large extent she has but I am cautious in making a broad finding in that regard. The mother has not chosen to return to live in the (omitted) area so that the child could live primarily with her.

Section 60CC(3)(j) – any family violence involving the child or a member of the child’s family.

Section 60CC(3)(k) – if a family violence order applies, or has applied, to the child or a member of the child’s family – any relevant inferences that can be drawn from the order, taking into account the following:-

the nature of the order;

the circumstances in which the order was made;

any evidence admitted in proceedings for the order;

any findings made by the court in, or in proceedings for, the order;

any other relevant matter.

In relation to issues of family violence referred to in ss.60CC(j) and (k) there is not, in my view, any or any sufficient evidence that would enable the Court to make any findings under these subsections.

Section 60CC(3)(l) – whether it would be preferable to make the order that would be least likely to lead to the institution of further proceedings in relation to the child.

One possible order to avoid future litigation is for the Court to put in place an order that once the child turns 13 the child should be able to travel to (country omitted) with the mother for holidays provided the mother puts in place a $30,000 bond. This is the order sought by the father – in the event that the Court comes to the conclusion that there should be an order allowing the child to travel to (country omitted). I note, however, that it is not the order sought by the mother. The mother does not agree that the child should wait until he is 13 years of age. Further, there is no evidence to suggest that the mother is in a position to put in place a $30,000 bond and, noting the findings made by the Court in relation to the real risk that the mother will not return with the child – there should, it seems to me, be evidence of the likely cost of legal proceedings and other associated costs connected with the father (left in Australia) taking action and proceedings in Australia and in (country omitted) in an endeavour to obtain the return of the child (note per Murray, Lindenmayer and Kay JJ in Line v Line (supra) at paragraph 4.48).

Section 60CC(3)(m) – any other fact or circumstance that the court thinks is relevant.

I do note that in 2010 the mother told Mr F (the family report writer) that if the Court ordered that the child remained living in (omitted) that she would also live in (omitted). The mother has stated in evidence that she felt quite pressured by Mr F. It seems clear enough that the mother really did not have any intention of living in (omitted).
In a transcript from the Court proceedings from 10 May 2010 the mother told the Court that she was going to keep living in (omitted) with X. There is no adequate explanation from the mother as to why she told the Court that on 10 May 2010 – in circumstances where she clearly had no intention of remaining in (omitted) . I note there is an extract from that transcript included as an annexure to an affidavit of the father filed 21 January 2015.

Conclusion on Best Interests

I have come to the conclusion that if the mother is granted permission to travel to (country omitted) with the child for a holiday then, there is a real risk that the mother will decide to remain in (country omitted) with the child. This will put the father to the expense of finding the child in (country omitted) and then instituting proceedings (in Australia and in (country omitted)) to seek an order for the return of the child to the child’s habitual residence in Australia (pursuant to the Hague Convention).
As noted, there is no evidence of the cost of proceedings in (country omitted) (or Australia) to seek the return of the child under the Convention. As noted, I have taken judicial notice of the fact that a $10,000 bond is very unlikely to be a sufficient sum in this day and age to fund such proceedings. Further, there is no adequate evidence before the Court of the mother’s ability to provide any further significant bond.
I have come to the conclusion that there are very great concerns relating to the mother’s attitude towards the father and the mother’s failure to accept that the child’s home is in (omitted). These are matters which heighten my view that there is a real risk that the mother would remain in (country omitted) with the child if permitted to travel to that country.
For X’s sake it would be much better if the situation were different. If the mother did clearly accept X’s life in (omitted) then the Court would be in a positon to possibly reach a different conclusion. The father has submitted that if the mother were to move to (omitted) and the child were to live primarily with the mother in (omitted) for some years then he would agree to an order for the child to travel to (country omitted) from the age of 10 (with a $30,000 bond). But that application is not before the Court.
The Court has to determine this application having regard to the application as filed, the current evidence and the current situation. I have taken into account all of the matters referred to by the Full Court in Line v Line (supra). I note, of course, that (country omitted) has become a signatory to the Hague Convention. And I do note that it will be difficult for the mother to raise a significant amount of security. But, for the reasons stated already herein, on the mother’s current proposal and noting the risks that the Court has identified and the findings made by the Court – I have come to the conclusion that the mother’s application must be dismissed. No passport should issue for this child and the injunction restraining the parents from removing the child from the Commonwealth of Australia must remain in place.
There is no need for the Court to consider any further sections of the Act having regard to the particular circumstances of this case.
I am not satisfied that there is any sufficient evidence or change in circumstances to convince the Court that there needs to be a variation of the earlier final parenting orders in any other respect. In any event, as was noted earlier herein in these reasons for judgment, the Court has only been prepared to consider the discrete issue relating to the child’s possible travel to (country omitted) with the mother. That is the only application before the Court in any event. The mother indicated in her affidavit filed 13 January 2015 that she wanted to see a change in drop off times. There is no such application currently before the Court. In any event, there is already sufficient scope within the current parenting orders to enable the mother to spend significantly more time with the child (for instance by the mother moving to the (omitted) area) and such an approach by the mother would completely eliminate the need for the child to travel from (omitted) to (omitted) each week. But that approach would require the mother making a decision to move to (omitted). I am not satisfied that it is in the child’s best interests for the Court to make any variation to the final parenting orders that were made on 16 November 2012.
Whilst it is the case that (country omitted)’s adoption of the Hague Convention was a sufficient reason for the Court to consider the discrete issue of possibly allowing the mother to travel to (country omitted) with the child – I have come to the conclusion that, in fact, based on the evidence to which I have referred and the findings that the Court has made, it is not in the child’s best interests to allow the mother to obtain a passport and travel with the child to (country omitted) – and it is certainly not in the child’s best interests for such travel to occur given the inadequate bond proposed by way of security on behalf of the mother.
The mother’s application must be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding fifty-eight (58) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Howard

Date: 2 April 2015

[2015] FCCA 794

2 April 2015

Key Legal Topics

Areas of Law

Family Law

Legal Concepts

Jurisdiction

Natural Justice