Ironbridge Holdings Pty Ltd (admin apptd) (rec and mgr apptd) v O'Grady (No 2)
[2020] VSC 638
•30 September 2020
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
PROPERTY LIST
S CI 2016 05210
| IRONBRIDGE HOLDINGS PTY LTD (ACN 009 341 011) (ADMINISTRATORS APPOINTED) (RECEIVERS & MANAGERS APPOINTED) | Plaintiff |
| v | |
| SONJE PATRICIA O'GRADY | Defendant |
(by original proceeding)
AND BETWEEN:
| SONJE PATRICIA O’GRADY | Plaintiff by Counterclaim |
| v | |
| IRONBRIDGE HOLDINGS PTY LTD (ACN 009 341 011) (ADMINISTRATORS APPOINTED) (RECEIVERS AND MANAGERS APPOINTED) | First Defendant |
| IAN WALLACE | Second Defendant by Counterclaim |
| CAROLYN MARGARET DEFREYNE WALLACE | Third Defendant by Counterclaim |
| I WALLACE & ASSOCIATES PTY LTD (ACN 008 936 132) | Fourth Defendant by Counterclaim |
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JUDGE: | Ginnane J |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATE OF HEARING: | 23 June 2020 |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 30 September 2020 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Ironbridge Holdings Pty Ltd (admin apptd) (rec and mgr apptd) v O'Grady (No 2) |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2020] VSC 638 |
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COSTS – Parties’ success on claim and counterclaim issues – Global approach taken to costs – Identification of main issue – Extent of contractual entitlement to indemnification for costs.
JUDGMENT AND ORDERS – Judgments on claims and counterclaim – Set-off – Judgment for the balance – Date for commencement of statutory interest – Supreme Court Act 1986 ss 58, 60; Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 r 10.09.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiff and Defendants by counterclaim | Mr R Hay QC with Ms L Papaelia | Logie-Smith Lanyon |
| For the Defendant and Plaintiff by counterclaim | Mr M Borsky QC with Ms E Murphy | Gilbert + Tobin |
HIS HONOUR:
This judgment deals with the appropriate orders to be made to reflect my conclusions in the principal judgment delivered on 11 June 2020.[1]
[1]Ironbridge Holdings Pty Ltd (admin apptd) (rec and mgr appt) v O’Grady [2020] VSC 344 (‘Principal Judgment’).
Under that judgment, Ironbridge Holdings Pty Ltd (Receivers & Managers Appointed) (Under Administration) (‘Ironbridge’) is entitled to recover instalments of the purchase price paid for the land that Mrs O’Grady retains, less the deposit of $2 million, the sum of $1,812,500, being the purchase price for stages 6 and Lot P, transferred to Ironbridge and an amount of $347,013.70 for counter-restitution for the remediation and rehabilitation of Mrs O’Grady’s Retained Land (as defined in the Principal Judgment).
The parties agreed that the amount that Mrs O’Grady was obliged to pay Ironbridge was $7,433,571.98,[2] plus interest.
[2]The amount of $10,156.005.90 referred to in the Principal Judgment was incorrect.
Mrs O’Grady is entitled to keep the interest Ironbridge paid to her of $2,265,258.80. Under her counterclaim, she is also entitled to receive unpaid interest up to 12 July 2017 or 2 October 2017 or 11 December 2017 under the deeds and letter of variation, being an amount in excess of $11 million and statutory interest thereafter.
The Guarantors Mr Ian Wallace and Ms Carolyn Margaret Defreyne Wallace and I Wallace & Associates Pty Ltd admitted the guarantees on which Mrs O’Grady relied, especially those contained in the Sixth Deed, and did not raise any positive defence. I find that they are liable under the guarantees for the amounts that Ironbridge must pay to Mrs O’Grady under the counterclaim. That liability also arises under the letter of variation of 18 July 2016, to which they were parties.
Date for interest
Differing views were expressed as to whether interest should be awarded under s 58 or s 60 of the Supreme Court Act 1986. I accept that the appropriate section is s 60 because the debts were uncertain and were not payable before the commencement of the proceeding.[3]
[3]Carbone v Melton City Council [2020] VSCA 117 [53], [85].
It is then necessary to determine the interest payable in respect of the amounts recovered under Ironbridge’s claim and Mrs O’Grady’s counterclaim. Section 60 says that in any proceeding for debt or damages, upon application, the Court must unless good cause is shown to the contrary, give damages in the nature of interest not exceeding the prescribed rate as it thinks fit from the commencement of the proceedings to the date of judgment over and above the debt or damages awarded. Neither party suggested that in this proceeding interest should be awarded from the commencement of the proceedings.
Ironbridge commenced the proceeding by filing a generally endorsed writ on 21 December 2016. On 23 February 2017, Ironbridge served a statement of claim. On 23 March 2017, Mrs O’Grady served her defence and counterclaim. Receivers and Managers were appointed to Ironbridge on 7 April 2017 and on 27 May 2017 Ironbridge filed and served a reply to the defence and the four Ironbridge defendants to counterclaim filed and served a defence to counterclaim.
Mrs O’Grady submitted that Ironbridge’s claim for restitution was only made on 11 December 2017, as prior to that date specific performance had been claimed and restitution claimed in the alternative. Interest should run from that date as it was only then that Ironbridge could be said to have been kept out of its money and the adoption of that date was consistent with the purpose of deterring a judgment debtor from delaying proceedings and thereby having the use of the money for a longer period. Mrs O’Grady submitted that, as an alternative, the appropriate date for the commencement of calculating interest was 2 October 2017, being the first occasion on which Ironbridge’s receivers and managers advised that they accepted the validity of Mrs O’Grady’s termination of the contract by the notice she gave on 12 July 2017.[4] Until that date, Ironbridge had contended that the contract was still on foot.
[4]Principal Judgment [75].
I consider that the contract ended when Mrs O’Grady gave notice of termination on 12 July 2017 and that interest commenced to run from that day. The notice of termination took effect immediately and did not depend upon its acceptance by Ironbridge. I consider that to be the appropriate date for the commencement of statutory interest, because thereafter Ironbridge lost any basis for claiming specific performance to enforce transfer of the Retained Land and its claim became one for restitution.
So far as Mrs O’Grady’s claim for unpaid interest is concerned, she claimed statutory interest from 2 October 2017 when Ironbridge withdrew its caveat which claimed an interest as a purchaser under an enforceable contract of sale. Prior to that date she claimed the higher interest rate provided for in the Deeds of Variation. She argued that her claims made under her counterclaim ‘crystallised’ on that date. But I consider that they ‘crystallised’, at the latest, on 12 July 2017 when she served notice of termination of the Contract. That is when the Contract ended and when she ceased to be obliged, or to have a potential obligation, to transfer the Retained Land to Ironbridge.
Success on issues
Ironbridge succeeded on the issues of the identification of the consideration paid under the Contract, the determination of whether it totally failed and whether Mrs O’Grady had a defence to Ironbridge’s claim for restitution. Save for the award of counter-restitution, Ironbridge was successful on the restitution claim. Mrs O’Grady’s defences to the restitution claim were unsuccessful, including the defences of change of position, the issue of whether the value of the retained land had decreased because of Ironbridge’s work, the good consideration defence and the reliance on the principle of restitutio in integrum.
Mrs O’Grady succeeded on the issue of whether Ironbridge had an equitable lien over the Retained Land and in having Ironbridge’s caveat over that land removed. She also succeeded on the significant issue of her right to recover interest under the Deeds because the purchase price was not paid when due.
The trial lasted for seven days and a further part day do deal with the issue of the payment of $109,938.88. After judgment was reserved, the High Court delivered judgment in Mann v Paterson Constructions Pty Ltd[5] and the parties, at the Court’s invitation, made submissions about the significance of that decision for the proceeding.
[5](2019) 373 ALR 1.
Should there be a set-off or judgment for the balance?
The next question was whether the Court should order a set-off of the amounts awarded to Ironbridge under the claim and to Mrs O’Grady under the counterclaim. Mrs O’Grady sought, and Ironbridge did not oppose, an order being made under r 10.09 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules2015 giving judgment for the balance as both parties have had at least some success on their claim or counterclaim. The parties accepted that there was at least a common law set-off available of the amounts recovered.
Senior Counsel for Mrs O’Grady raised the issue of the possible effect of the proposed orders on her if she was ordered to pay any costs to Ironbridge and had to pay such an order before it paid any costs to her or, even if, it and the Guarantors were never likely to be able to pay costs to her. Their solvency was problematic and receivers and managers and administrators had been appointed to Ironbridge. But, I consider that these issues, so far as they are relevant to the making of orders, are counterbalanced by the consideration that subject to the determination of the costs of the proceeding, a Court order for the balance in favour of Mrs O’Grady will not require her to pay any sum to Ironbridge.
Would the set-off apply to the Guarantors?
A further issue was whether that set-off should also apply to the amount of the indebtedness of the Guarantors to Mrs O’Grady.
In my opinion, the reasoning in Krishell Pty Ltd v Nilant[6] establishes that the set-off applies equally to the Guarantors’ liability. In that case Buss JA quoted from S R Derham’s text, The Law of Set-Off, 3rd edition at [12.21]that:
The indebtedness of a truly joint and several debtor, and a debt owing by the creditor to that debtor, constitute mutual debts, and may be set off. The occurrence of the set-off would bring about a pro tanto reduction in the joint and several debt, and would release the other debtors as well.
[6](2006) 32 WAR 540 [84], Buss JA also cited Goodwin v Duggan (1996) 41 NSWLR 158 at 166-167; In re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 8) [1998] AC 214 at 224-225 and Handberg v Smarter Way (Aust) Pty Ltd (2002) 190 ALR 130 at 137-139 [32]-[38].
Costs
The next question concerns costs. Even though there is a claim and counterclaim, the Court can award one amount of costs taking into account the success of both parties as was seen in Nolan v Nolan:
We have already said that there is no doubt that the Court has power to make orders relating to particular questions in or ‘parts’ of a proceeding both by depriving ultimately successful parties of their costs or (additionally) by awarding unsuccessful parties some part of their costs. Moreover it was accepted that an overall order may be made reflecting these matters so as to obviate the need to tax two bills of costs. In making such orders it must be remembered that parties ordered to pay some proportion only of a successful party’s costs do not receive any reimbursement for their own costs except to the extent that the reduction may be seen as a set-off against their own liability.[7]
[7]Nolan v Nolan (No 2) [2004] VSCA 134, [17] (emphasis added). See also Rival Nominees Pty Ltd v Craig Davis ConstructionsPty Ltd (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Starke ACJ, Crockett and McGarvie JJ, 26 June 1981); Kane Constructions Pty Ltd v Sopov (No 2) [2005] VSC 492; BMD Major Projects Pty Ltd v Victorian Urban Development Authority (No 2) [2007] VSC 441.
Ironbridge submitted that the vast majority of time occupied in preparation and at trial related to its claim for restitution and, in particular, addressing Mrs O’Grady’s defences, which themselves added considerably to the length of the trial. She should pay Ironbridge’s costs in respect of those issues or, at least, a substantial part of them. A comparatively small amount of time was occupied in addressing the issues on which Mrs O’Grady succeeded.
Ironbridge relied on an affidavit by Ms T Thomas, who is a solicitor employed by its solicitors Logie-Smith Lanyon, who reviewed the judgment and the transcript of the trial and the written submissions filed by the parties to identify the number of pages of those documents that related to each issue in the proceeding. This review was relied on to support a submission that Mrs O’Grady pay Ironbridge 86% of its costs of the proceeding, including reserved costs, with Ironbridge paying Mrs O’Grady 1% of her costs of the proceeding and the defendants by counterclaim paying Mrs O’Grady 11% of her costs of the proceeding including reserved costs.
In contrast, Mrs O’Grady submitted that a global costs order should be made, allowing her 70% of her costs of the proceeding. She submitted that she was entirely successful on her counterclaim. The ultimate outcome of the litigation, which was ‘the event’ for the usual rule that costs follow the event, was that Ironbridge, which commenced the proceeding by suing her, will be ordered to pay her a substantial sum of money by way of unpaid interest and statutory interest thereon. She described the case as one where she had to defend a multimillion dollar claim, but was substantially the successful party.
Mrs O’Grady submitted that the proceeding arose from a decade of defaults by the Ironbridge parties and the indulgences that she granted them for the payment of interest. Costs follow the event and Mrs O’Grady is owed substantially more by Ironbridge and the Guarantors than she owes Ironbridge. An arithmetical analysis of issues and hearing times is artificial and not appropriate. Her defences to Ironbridge’s restitution claims were not hopeless.
In Rozenblit v Vainer (No 2) Sifris J stated:
The ‘event’ to which the usual rule refers is generally construed to be the ultimate outcome of the case. As such the effect of this rule is that the party who succeeds on the whole of the action is usually entitled to the costs of the action, even if they have been unsuccessful on alternative issues or heads of their claim.[8]
[8][2019] VSC 366 [12] (emphasis in original).
An approach sometimes applied is that:
[W]hile the general rule is that costs should follow the event, where there is a multiplicity of issues and mixed success has been enjoyed by the parties, the court may take a pragmatic approach in relation to costs, taking into consideration the success (or lack of success) of the parties on an issues basis. Such an approach will be primarily a matter of impression and evaluation.[9]
[9]Nom de Plume Nominees Pty Ltd v Fingal Developments Pty Ltd (No 2) [2016] VSCA 233 at [13] applying Chen v Chan [2009] VSCA 233 [10].
The Court has a broad discretion as to costs. In Amcor Ltd v Barnes & Ors (Costs Ruling), Sloss J said:
Section 24(1) of the Supreme Court Act and s 49(3)(k) and Part 4.5 of the Civil Procedure Act dealing with the Court's powers as to costs, and rules 63.02, 63.03 and 63.04 of the Rules, provide that the Court has a broad discretion in determining questions of costs. Further, s 65C(1) of the Civil Procedure Act also now permits the Court to make ‘any order as to costs it considers appropriate to further the overarching purpose’ and such order may ‘make different awards of costs in relation to different parts of a proceeding’ or ‘order that parties bear costs as specified proportions of costs’.
Generally, where a party is successful, costs will follow the event and a successful party will usually obtain all of the costs of the action even though it may have failed in establishing some of the alternative heads of claim. In Oshlack v Richmond River Council, McHugh J conveniently summarised the general position concerning the ‘usual order as to costs’, and the objectives the Court seeks to meet in exercising its discretion as to costs, as follows:
[67] The expression the ‘usual order as to costs’ embodies the important principle that, subject to certain limited exceptions, a successful party in litigation is entitled to an award of costs in its favour. The principle is grounded in reasons of fairness and policy and operates whether the successful party is the plaintiff or the defendant. Costs are not awarded to punish an unsuccessful party. The primary purpose of an award of costs is to indemnify the successful party. If the litigation had not been brought, or defended, by the unsuccessful party the successful party would not have incurred the expense which it did. As between the parties, fairness dictates that the unsuccessful party typically bears the liability for the costs of the unsuccessful litigation. [10]
[10][2020] VSC 585 [35]-[36].
Sloss J also referred to authority that the Court, may in its discretion, make a single order, fixing what proportion of a party’s costs should be paid by another party, thus obviating cross-orders or particular orders as to costs.[11]
[11]Referring to GT Corporation Pty Ltd v Amare Safety Pty Ltd (No 3] [2008} VSC 296. (Robson J).
There is also authority that:
[W]here the successful party made multiple claims and failed in respect of some of them or pursued distinct issues upon which it achieved mixed success, in an appropriate case, the court can award that party only part of its costs or make an order that reflects the measure of success achieved by each party on the issues in dispute.[12]
[12]Marriner v Australian Super Developments Pty Ltd [2016] VSCA 141 [228] referred to by Sloss J [58].
I accept Ms O’Grady’s submission that the proceeding was substantially about money and what sums she and Ironbridge were obliged to pay each other and that she has emerged substantially better off than Ironbridge. In my opinion, it is appropriate to identify the ‘event’ or key issue in the proceeding as the determination of the amount of money that Ironbridge and its Guarantors had to pay to Mrs O’Grady and the amounts that she had to pay them.[13] That issue arose because of Ironbridge’s failure to pay the amounts due under the Contract.
[13]See BMD Major Projects Pty Ltd v Victorian Urban Development Authority (No 2) [2007] VSC 441 [8]-[15] (Pagone J)
Once Mrs O’Grady terminated the Contract and Ironbridge dropped its claim for specific performance, the case became a dispute about the financial liabilities of the parties. Mrs O’Grady won that dispute or ‘event’ substantially on her claim for the interest that Ironbridge agreed to pay under the Deeds of Variation and the letter of variation. The result of the litigation is that Ironbridge and the Guarantors have to pay her an amount in excess of $5 million, in circumstances when she had been sued as defendant for a much larger sum.
I do not consider that an issues based costs order should be made, not least because of the difficulty of assessing the issue to which particular parts of the proceeding related. This is particularly the case with the openings on the first day, including the explanation of the contract documents and the deeds of variation, the view, the evidence of Mr Wallace and Mrs O’Grady and the view, as well as parts of the final submissions, including those concerning Mann v Paterson Constructions Pty Ltd.[14] There was also evidence that went to Mrs O’Grady’s counter-restitution claim and the valuation and related evidence. Nor do I consider that a time based allocation of costs is appropriate based on the estimates that I received.
[14](2019) 373 ALR 1.
Mrs O’Grady is therefore entitled to costs. Ironbridge is also entitled to have its success, principally on the money had and received claim, recognised. This can best be done by a global costs order.
I have taken into account that Mrs O’Grady’s defences to Ironbridge’s claim in restitution failed, although she did recover a sum for counter-restitution. I also accept that the case was extended by her argument of those issues. Questions such as diminution in the value of the land required the calling of witnesses who otherwise would not have been called. However, I consider that the key consideration in the case is that Mrs O’Grady has emerged with a substantial judgment. She won on the ‘dollars’, as her counsel submitted.
I consider that taking a broad approach to the outcome of this proceeding an order that Ironbridge and the Guarantors must pay Mrs O’Grady 40 per cent of her costs of the proceeding. Such an order is an appropriate recognition of her substantial success in the proceeding. Its effect is that she will obtain an order for a minority of her total costs, but will not be ordered to pay any costs to Ironbridge.
There was no separate argument or dispute about the Guarantors’ liability for costs as the terms of their guarantee extended to costs that Ironbridge was liable to pay for its defaults in paying interest.
Indemnity costs
Mrs O’Grady claimed a contractual right to recover costs on an indemnity basis. She relied on provisions of the Sixth Deed. Mrs O’Grady submitted that on a plain reading of cl 12.2, she was entitled to full indemnity costs, including legal fees in connection with enforcement of Ironbridge’s obligation to pay her interest. She argued that the interest that she was owed under the Deeds and the letter of variation was recoverable against Ironbridge, as principal debtor, and against the Guarantors. The Guarantors’ liability to pay full legal costs was bolstered by the plain words of cl 8(b). In the alternative, Mrs O’Grady sought the full measure of her costs on a standard basis.
Relevant provisions of the Sixth Deed
The Sixth Deed provides in clauses 9 and 12:
9. Indemnities
The Purchaser Transaction Parties must within three Business Days of demand, indemnify the Vendor against any expense, loss or liability (including legal fees) incurred by the Vendor as a result of or in connection with:
(a) the occurrence of any breach or default under or in connection with the Transaction Documents;
…
(d) a failure by the Purchaser Transaction Party to pay any amount due under a Transaction Document on its due date; and/or
12. Fees, Costs and Expenses
12.1 Transaction Expenses
The Purchaser Transaction Parties must promptly on demand pay the Vendor the amount of all costs and expenses (including legal fees) incurred by it in connection with the negotiation, preparation, printing and execution of the Transaction Documents.
12.2 Enforcement Costs
The Purchaser Transaction Parties Borrower must, within three Business Days of demand, pay to the Vendor the amount of all costs and expenses (including legal fees) incurred by the Vendor in connection with the enforcement of, or the preservation of any rights under any Transaction Document.
The Contract of Sale and the Sixth Deed were each a ‘Transaction Document’.
Clause 8 is headed ‘Guarantee’ and states:
(a) Each Purchaser Guarantor unconditionally and irrevocably guarantees to the Vendor the due and punctual performance of the Purchaser’s Obligations.
“Purchaser’s Obligations” means all obligations and liabilities which the Purchaser (whether alone or not) is or at any time may become actually or contingently liable to perform for any reason under or in connection with the Transaction Documents.
(b) Each Purchaser Guarantor, as a separate, additional and primary liability, indemnifies the Vendor on demand against any Loss or Claim the Vendor suffers or incurs:
(i) if the Purchaser does not perform the Purchaser’s Obligations;
(ii) if an obligation the Purchaser would otherwise have to perform the Purchaser’s Obligations is found to be void, voidable or unenforceable;
(iii) if an obligation a Purchaser’s Guarantor would otherwise have under paragraph (a) is found to be void, voidable or unenforceable.
‘Claim’ is defined in cl 1.1 as:
includes any claim, proceeding, action, cause of action, demand or suit (including by way of contribution or indemnity) under any document, at law or in equity, including for payment of money (including damages) or for an extension of time, including by statute (to the extent permitted by law), in tort for negligence or otherwise, including negligent misrepresentation or for strict liability, breach or for restitution.
‘Loss’ is defined as:
includes any debt, obligation, cost (including legal costs, deductibles or increased premiums), expense, loss, damage, compensation, charge or liability of any kind, actual, prospective or contingent and whether or not currently ascertainable and whether arising under or for breach of contract, in tort (including negligence), restitution, pursuant to statute or otherwise at law.
Ironbridge submitted that while cl 8 referred to indemnity costs, cl 12.2 referred to all costs and expenses. The indemnity costs could only apply to defaults under the Sixth Deed, which were failures to pay interest.
The effect of these clauses, especially cls 9 and 12.2, is that Ironbridge and the Guarantors agreed to indemnify Mrs O’Grady against any costs or expenses suffered or incurred upon Ironbridge’s default under the Sixth Deed. I do not consider that that liability apply to costs or expenses incurred in defending Ironbridge’s restitution claim or in making the counter-restitution claim. The counter-restitution claim was not a claim connected to the Transaction Documents or the ‘Purchaser’s Obligations’.
I consider that Mr O’Grady is entitled to have the 40 per cent of her costs of the proceeding, that I have ordered the defendants to her counterclaim to pay to her, paid on an indemnity basis. This is because her main success in the proceeding was in connection with the recovery of interest payable, but not paid, under the Contract of Sale, which was a Transaction Document. The costs have been awarded to her primarily because they relate to her counterclaim. She is entitled under the Sixth Deed to be indemnified for those costs. I see no reason to depart from the parties’ agreement, which in plain terms in the Sixth Deed, entitled her to receive and be indemnified for such costs and expenses.[15]
[15]See the consideration of authorities by Sloss J in Amcor Ltd v Barnes (No 2) [2019] VSC 849 [85]–[92].
Other matters
I will adjourn Mrs O’Grady’s foreshadowed application for costs against the receivers and managers to a date to be fixed.
Calculations of amounts payable under the claim and counterclaim:
Subject to any matter of calculation, I will order pursuant to Rule 10.09 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 that:
1.Ironbridge Holdings Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) (Receivers and Managers Appointed), Ian Wallace, Carolyn Margaret Defreyne Wallace and I Wallace & Associates Pty Ltd pay Mrs Sonje Patricia O’Grady the sum of $5,116,526.52.
I will also order that:
2. Ironbridge Holdings Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) (Receivers and Managers Appointed), Ian Wallace, Carolyn Margaret Defreyne Wallace and I Wallace & Associates Pty Ltd must pay Sonje Patricia O’Grady 40 per cent of her costs of the proceeding on an indemnity basis.
3. Save for Sonje Patricia O’Grady’s claim for costs against the receivers and managers, the proceeding is otherwise dismissed.
4. Sonje Patricia O’Grady’s claim for costs against the receivers and managers is adjourned to a date to be fixed.
The amount of $5,116,526.52 referred to in order in in paragraph 44 is the balance of the claim of $9,828,613.58 and the counterclaim of $14,945,140.10, which have been calculated as follows:
O’Grady liability to Ironbridge Net claim in restitution $ 7,433,571.98 PLUS Agreed interest $ 2,193,418.20 PLUS Further interest from 23/06/2020-30/09/2020
(Being 99 days x daily interest rate of $2,036.60)$ 201,623.40 TOTALS $ 9,828,613.58 Ironbridge liability to O’Grady Claim in interest $ 11,303,303.33 PLUS Further interest from 12/07/2017-30/09/2020 $ 3,641,836.80 TOTALS $ 14,945,140.10 Set-Off Ironbridge liability to O’Grady $ 14,945,140.10 LESS O’Grady liability to Ironbridge $ 9,828,613.58 THUS Ironbridge is liable to pay O’Grady $ 5,116,526.52
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