Ioannou v Hellenic Community Aged Care

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Ioannou v Hellenic Community Aged Care [2012] FCA 1227

Citation: Ioannou v Hellenic Community Aged Care [2012] FCA 1227
Parties: TOMMY GEORGE IOANNOU v HELLENIC COMMUNITY AGED CARE
File number: WAD 71 of 2012
Judge: MCKERRACHER J
Date of judgment: 7 November 2012
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for summary judgment – no reasonable prospect of success – no jurisdiction for the respondent to be joined as a party because it was not a respondent to the original complaint to the Australian Human Rights Commission – abuse of process – applicant seeking similar relief in a State Court

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – consideration of relevant factors in deciding whether it was in the interests of justice to grant a request for the adjournment of the proceeding – whether a further adjournment would have any utility – whether the applicant had conducted proceeding in a manner consistent with ss 37M and 37N of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – repeated attempts to have inappropriate ex parte communication with chambers – whether the respondent would be prejudiced by a further adjournment

Legislation: Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) s 46PO
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37M, 37(N)
Federal Court Rules 2011 r 26.01
Cases cited: Australian Associated Motor Insurers Ltd v NRMA Insurance Ltd (2002) 124 FCR 518
John Holland Rail Pty Ltd v Comcar (2011) 276 ALR 221
Date of hearing: Determined on the papers
Date of last submissions: 22 October 2012
Place: Perth
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 30
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: BG Grubb
Solicitor for the Respondent: Metaxas & Hager

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

WAD 71 of 2012

BETWEEN:

TOMMY GEORGE IOANNOU
Applicant

AND:

HELLENIC COMMUNITY AGED CARE
Respondent

JUDGE:

MCKERRACHER J

DATE OF ORDER:

7 NOVEMBER 2012

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The proceeding is dismissed.

2.        The applicant pay the costs of the respondent, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

WAD 71 of 2012

BETWEEN:

TOMMY GEORGE IOANNOU
Applicant

AND:

HELLENIC COMMUNITY AGED CARE
Respondent

JUDGE:

MCKERRACHER J

DATE:

7 NOVEMBER

PLACE:

PERTH

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. On 26 July 2012, pursuant to programming orders made from chambers on 12 July 2012, Hellenic Community Aged Care (the respondent) filed an interlocutory application for summary judgment pursuant to rule 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.  Essentially, the respondent claims that it was wrongly joined to this proceeding.  Alternatively, it claims that the application filed by Mr Ioannou (the applicant):

    (a)has no reasonable prospect of success;

    (b)is vexatious;

    (c)is an abuse of process; and/or

    (d)that no reasonable cause of action is disclosed.

  2. For the reasons that follow, the respondent’s interlocutory…

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Details
Case
[2012] FCA 1227
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Ioannou v Hellenic Community Aged Care involves an applicant who sought to bring a proceeding against a respondent that was not a respondent to the original complaint to the Australian Human Rights Commission. The dispute was heard by the Federal Court of Australia. The primary legal issues the court had to address were whether there was any reasonable prospect of success for the applicant's proceeding, whether it was in the interests of justice to grant the applicant's request for a further adjournment, and if the applicant had conducted the proceeding in a manner consistent with the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). The court also had to consider whether the applicant's conduct amounted to an abuse of process given that he was seeking similar relief in a State Court.

The court found that the proceeding was fatally flawed as the respondent was not a respondent to the original complaint to the AHRC and therefore had no jurisdiction to be joined in the proceeding. Despite the applicant's submission that he was unfit to attend court, the court concluded that this did not provide a reasonable prospect of success for the proceeding. The court further found that the applicant's conduct throughout the proceeding, including numerous inappropriate ex parte communications and threats, was inconsistent with the principles of just resolution of disputes and amounted to vexatious conduct. Given these findings, the court dismissed the proceeding and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs.

In reaching its decision, the court considered the overarching purpose of the civil practice and procedure provisions, which is to facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively, and efficiently as possible. The court held that a further adjournment would not have any utility and would not be in the interests of justice due to the fundamental deficiencies in the applicant's originating application and the respondent's submissions. The court also found that the respondent would be prejudiced by a further adjournment.

The orders made by the court were that the proceeding be dismissed and that the applicant pay the respondent's costs, to be taxed if not agreed. The dismissal of the proceeding was based on the lack of jurisdiction to join the respondent and the applicant's vexatious conduct.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The proceeding is dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the costs of the respondent, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Even if the reference in the medical certificate as to the applicant’s unfitness to ‘attend court’ is understood to relate to his capacity to properly and effectively prosecute proceedings, an interpretation I can well appreciate, further delay will not solve the problem. There is and always has been, from the moment of filing this proceeding, a fatal and incurable flaw in that there was no power to join the respondent to the proceeding. No amount of timing can overcome that threshold deficiency. CONCLUSION Notwithstanding the authenticity of the applicant’s medical certificate which covers the period 22 June 2012 until 1 December 2012, for the reasons canvassed above it is not in the interests of justice to grant the applicant a third adjournment of this proceeding until December or to otherwise amend the programming orders I made on 12 July 2012. I accept the respondent’s submission that it was wrongly joined as a respondent to this proceeding; its summary judgment application must succeed with costs. Accordingly the following orders are made:1.The proceeding is dismissed.2.The applicant pay the costs of the respondent, to be taxed if not agreed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Chambers received similar facsimiles from the applicant directly (and out of time) on 13 August 2012 (8 pages), 18 August 2012 (7 pages), 3 October 2012 (10 pages), 19 October 2012 (5 pages) and 22 October 2012 (7 pages). It is unnecessary to reiterate their contents. CONSIDERATION OF THE APPLICANT’S ADJOURNMENT APPLICATION The fundamental deficiencies in the applicant’s originating application cannot be remedied with an extension of time. At the first directions hearing on 11 April 2012, I ordered the applicant to file an amended originating application that set out the grounds of his claim and the particulars of his claim for damages by no later than 9 May 2012. No amended application was filed. On 12 June 2012, the respondent filed an affidavit sworn by its solicitor in support of its application for summary judgment. Annexed to the affidavit is correspondence between the solicitor and the AHRC showing that the respondent in this proceeding was never a respondent to complaint 2029377FC and that the only respondent to the original complaint was the ‘Commonwealth of Australia (Department of Human Service – Centrelink)’. Also annexed to the solicitor’s affidavit is a letter addressed to the Western Australian District Registrar of the Federal Court from the President of the AHRC annexing the original termination notice for complaint 2029377FC which again shows that Hellenic Community Aged Care was never a respondent to the original complaint. Fatal and incurable error As the respondent correctly submits, s 46PO(1)(b) of the AHRC Act provides that an application may only be made to this Court by an affected person ‘alleging unlawful discrimination by one or more of the respondents to the terminated complaint’. It is quite clear that that Hellenic Community Aged Care was not a respondent to the complaint to the AHRC and therefore there is no jurisdiction for it to be joined as a respondent to this proceeding. This alone is sufficient reason for not granting a further adjournment and dismissing the proceeding summarily. However, it is necessary to comment on a few further matters because the granting of an extended adjournment is discretionary. Applicant’s conduct The nature of the applicant’s conduct throughout the course of this proceeding is one factor weighing heavily against granting a further adjournment. Section 37(M) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) relevantly provides that the ‘overarching purpose of the civil practice and procedure provisions is to facilitate the just resolution of disputes (a) according to law and (b) as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible’. Section 37(N) of the FCA Act provides that the ‘parties to a civil proceeding before the Court must conduct the proceeding … in a way that is consistent with the overarching purpose’. Even taking into account the fact that the applicant is self-represented, his conduct has been directly at odds with these provisions and falls well within the realm of vexatious conduct. On 1 June 2012, my associate wrote to the applicant reminding him that all of his correspondence with the Court should be copied to the respondent’s solicitor and that it was not appropriate for him to telephone chambers to discuss substantive issues. He was also informed orally by my chambers numerous times, for example, on 1 May 2012 and 3 May 2012, that all of his correspondence with the Court should be in writing and copied to the respondent’s solicitor. Notwithstanding these requests, the applicant has attempted to telephone my associate directly on over thirty (30) documented occasions and left numerous voicemail messages making scandalous allegations about the respondents, the respondent’s solicitors, registry staff and various government officials as well as threatening to report my associate to the Australian Federal Police. Not only does this conduct serve to undermine the impartiality of the Court (John Holland Rail Pty Ltd v Comcare (2011) 276 ALR 221) but it also stretches the Court’s limited resources when it is already under considerable pressure to resolve disputes of a seriously arguable nature.