SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
International Cat Manufacturing (in liq) & Anor v Rodrick & Ors [2013] QCA 372
PARTIES:
INTERNATIONAL CAT MANUFACTURING PTY LTD (in liquidation)
ACN 099 908 942
(first appellant)
DAVID HAMBLETON & ROBERT MURPHY AS LIQUIDATORS OF INTERNATIONAL CAT MANUFACTURING PTY LTD
(in liquidation)
(second appellant)
v
RAYMOND JOHN RODRICK
(first respondent)
NU-LOG PTY LTD
ACN 001 420 515
(second respondent)
SUSAN RUTH CARTER
JASON WALTER BETTLES
(third respondents)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 4074 of 2013
SC No 9739 of 2006DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
General Civil Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at BrisbaneDELIVERED ON:
10 December 2013
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
13 September 2013
JUDGES:
Holmes, Gotterson and Morrison JJA
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the order madeORDER:
Appeal dismissed with costs.
CATCHWORDS:
CORPORATIONS – CHARGES, DEBENTURES AND OTHER BORROWINGS – VALIDITY – OTHER CASES – where the appellants were the plaintiffs in proceedings against (relevantly) the first and second respondent – where the proceedings sought relief arising out of the insolvency of the first appellant in relation to the granting of a charge by the first appellant to the second respondent – where the appellant contends that the Company was insolvent at the time it granted the charge, on 25 November 2003, to the second respondent and therefore the charge should be set aside as void under s 267 of the Corporations Act 2001 – where there was evidence of an arrangement between the first appellant and the first and second respondents for the latter to finance the former in exchange for the charge – where the learned primary judge concluded that the arrangement was such that it would cover all debts as and when they fell due – whether the learned primary judge erred in finding that the arrangement was sufficiently certain to result in a finding of solvency – whether the learned primary judge erred in finding that, having regard to the terms of the arrangement, the first appellant was solvent as at 25 November 2003 and the charge was valid
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 267, s 588FE
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 52Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Edwards (2005) 220 ALR 148; (2005) 54 ACSR 583; [2005] NSWSC 831, cited
Coates Hire Operations Pty Ltd v D-Link Homes Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1279, considered
Crema (Vic) Pty Ltd v Land Mark Property Developments (Vic) Pty Ltd (2006) 58 ACSR 631; [2006] VSC 338, cited
In re A Company (No 006794 of 1983) [1986] BCLC 261, considered
International Cat Manufacturing Pty Ltd (in liq) & Anor v Rodrick & Ors [2013] QSC 91, upheld
Lewis v Doran (2004) 208 ALR 38; [2004] NSWSC 608, considered
Lewis (as liquidator of Doran Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) & Anor v Doran & Ors (2005) 219 ALR 555; [2005] NSWCA 243, considered
Mulherin v Bank of Western…
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- Case
- [2013] QCA 372
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge erred in finding that the arrangement was sufficiently certain to result in a finding of solvency and whether the primary judge erred in finding that, considering the terms of the arrangement, the first appellant was solvent as at 25 November 2003, and thus, the charge was valid. The court considered the nature of the arrangement, the evidence of solvency at the time of the charge, and the application of s 267 of the Corporations Act 2001. The court found that the primary judge's assessment of the arrangement's certainty and the company's solvency was correct. The court determined that the primary judge did not err in finding that the arrangement was sufficiently certain and that the first appellant was solvent at the time of the charge.
The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the costs of the appeal be paid by the appellants. The reasoning was based on the primary judge's findings that the arrangement was comprehensive and that the company was solvent at the time of the charge. The court upheld the primary judge's conclusions, finding that the charge was valid and that the company was not insolvent at the relevant time. The court did not find any errors in the primary judge's assessment and thus upheld the decision of the lower court. The appeal was dismissed, and the costs of the appeal were ordered to be paid by the appellants.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter was initially heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, where the primary judge found in favour of the respondents. The primary judge concluded that the arrangement between the first appellant and the respondents was such that it would cover all debts as and when they fell due, thereby ensuring the first appellant's solvency. The primary judge's decision was appealed to the Court of Appeal, where the appellants argued that the primary judge had erred in finding that the arrangement was sufficiently certain to result in a finding of solvency and that the first appellant was solvent on 25 November 2003.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the learned primary judge erred in finding that the arrangement was sufficiently certain to result in a finding of solvency.
2. Whether the learned primary judge erred in finding that, having regard to the terms of the arrangement, the first appellant was solvent as at 25 November 2003 and the charge was valid.
Held
1. The court held that the learned primary judge did not err in finding that the arrangement was sufficiently certain to result in a finding of solvency.
2. The court also held that the learned primary judge did not err in finding that, having regard to the terms of the arrangement, the first appellant was solvent as at 25 November 2003 and the charge was valid.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In addressing the first issue, the court considered the nature and terms of the arrangement between the first appellant and the first and second respondents. The learned primary judge concluded that the arrangement was sufficiently certain as it would cover all debts as and when they fell due. The court found that the primary judge's conclusion was based on a proper consideration of the evidence and did not involve any error in law. Therefore, the appeal against the primary judge's finding on the certainty of the arrangement was dismissed.
Turning to the second issue, the court examined the solvency of the first appellant at the time the charge was granted to the second respondent on 25 November 2003. The learned primary judge found that, considering the terms of the arrangement, the first appellant was solvent at that time and that the charge was valid. The court agreed with the primary judge's assessment and held that there was no error in the judge's finding. The court emphasised that the solvency of a company at the time of granting a charge is determined by assessing its ability to meet its debts as and when they fall due, taking into account any arrangements in place to ensure this.
In reaching these conclusions, the court applied the principles of corporate insolvency law, particularly under sections 95A and 267 of the Corporations Act 2001. The court noted that the validity of a charge granted by an insolvent company is subject to the solvency of the company at the time of the charge. The court also considered relevant authorities that support the test for solvency and the nature of insolvency proceedings. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that where an arrangement is in place to ensure a company's ability to meet its debts as and when they fall due, this arrangement can be considered in determining the company's solvency at a particular point in time. The court did not depart from or distinguish any prior authority on this point.