International Business Machines Corporation v Total Peripherals Pty Limited

[2000] APO 44

OFFICIAL NOTICE

DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS

Patent:          No. 579156 in the name of INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION.

Title:          Diskette Drive and Media Type Determination

Action:          An application under section 223 for an extension of time to pay a renewal fee and opposition thereto by TOTAL PERIPHERALS PTY LIMITED; hearing.

Decision:          Issued            .

Abstract

The situation arose where a section 223 request had been filed to pay the 11^th year renewal fee and the 12^th anniversary passed after the request had been filed but before the request had been allowed.

The 12^th year renewal fee was not timely paid either by the due date or within the 6 months so-called period of grace. IBM applied under the provisions of section 223(2)(a) for an extension of time to pay the 12^th year fee.

The section 223 application was opposed by Total Peripherals on the ground that the applicant had failed to show that a relevant error or omission had occurred such that there was a causal connection between that error or omission and the non-payment of the renewal fee.

Found on the balance of probabilities that it was more likely than not that it had been IBM's intention to keep the patent in force, that IBM had entrusted responsibility to patent attorney Mr Fraser Old of Spruson & Ferguson for doing whatever was necessary to maintain the patent in force, and that the reason for the failure for the fee to be timely paid was because Mr Old had erroneously assumed that the 12^th year fee would only become due when the section 223 proceedings relating to the 11^th year fee were concluded and if the outcome was favourable to IBM.

Found in the circumstances that neither the public interest nor the interests of Total Peripherals could be seen to prevail over those of the patentee.

The extension of time sought is granted.

PATENTS ACT 1990

DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS

Re:Patent No. 579156 in the name of INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION, an application under section 223 for an extension of time to pay a renewal fee and opposition thereto by TOTAL PERIPHERALS PTY LIMITED.

BACKGROUND

Patent No. 579156 was granted on 26 April 1989 to International Business Machines Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "IBM").

The patent ceased following a failure to pay the 11^th year renewal fee due on 16 May 1996 either by that anniversary date or (upon payment of additional fees) within the grace period of 6 months after that date. On 17 February 1997 IBM filed an application under section 223(2) to extend the time to pay that renewal fee. That application was opposed by Total Peripherals Pty Limited (hereinafter referred to as "Total Peripherals"). Following a hearing in the matter, a decision issued on 17 March 1998 in which a delegate of the Commissioner granted the extension of time sought. The decision of the delegate was subsequently affirmed upon review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) in a decision issued on 30 September 1998.

The patent remained ceased because the 12^th year renewal fee due on 16 May 1997 was not paid either by that date or within the grace period. On 1 May 1998 that fee was paid and on 27 May 1998 IBM filed an application under section 223(2) to extend the time to pay that renewal fee. Material in support of the application for an extension of time was filed on 27 May 1998 and 25 June 1998 and the application was advertised received in the Official Journal on 6 August 1998. Total peripherals filed a notice of opposition under section 223(6) on 4 September 1998 and served a statement of grounds and particulars on IBM on 4 December 1998. An amended statement of grounds and particulars was allowed under regulation 5.9 on 11 March 1999.

The support, answer and reply evidence stages in the opposition were completed on 22 February 2000.

The matter was heard in Sydney on 25 May 2000. IBM was represented by Mr R M Miller, patent attorney of Spruson & Ferguson. Total Peripherals was represented by Mr G R Davidson, patent attorney of Halford & Co.

THE LEGISLATION

The provisions of section 223 relevant to the present request are as follows:

"223. (1) ...

(2) Where, because of:

(a) an error or omission by the person concerned or by his or her agent or attorney; or

(b) circumstances beyond the control of the person concerned;

a relevant act that is required to be done within a certain time is not, or cannot be, done within that time, the Commissioner may, on application made by the person concerned in accordance with the regulations, extend the time for doing the act.

(3) The time allowed for doing a relevant act may be extended, whether before or after that time has expired.

(4) Where an application is made for an extension of time for more than 3 months, the Commissioner must advertise the application in the Official Journal.

(5) ...

(6) A person may, as prescribed, oppose the granting of the application.

(7) Where:

(a) a patent application lapses, or a patent ceases, because of a failure to do one or more relevant acts within the time allowed; and

(b) the time for doing that act or those acts is extended;
the application or patent must be treated as having been restored.

.... ."

THE REQUEST FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME

The application is made by IBM “under section 223(2)(a) for an extension of time from 16 May 1997 to 1 May 1998 within which to pay the 1997 annuity”.

The initial material supplied in support of the application was a statutory declaration dated 27 May 1998 By Fraser P OLD, patent attorney of Spruson & Ferguson, Sydney, expressed in the following terms:

“1. I am a principle of the firm of Spruson & Ferguson and supervise the patent matters of International Business Machines Corporation entrusted to Spruson & Ferguson.

2. I have carriage of the matter of an application for extension of time under section 223 in respect of the above patent regarding an annuity which was not paid before its due date of 16 May 1996 notwithstanding that Spruson & Ferguson was not previously responsible for the payment of annuities in respect of the above patent.

3. On 7 May 1997 I received a letter dated 2 May 1997 from the Commissioner of Patents advising that the extension of time in respect of the renewal fee due 16 May 1996 would be advertised in the Official Journal of Patents dated 22 May 1997.

4. Because Spruson & Ferguson had not been responsible for payment of the 1996 renewal fee, the patent was not during 1997 entered into the computerised patent renewal system of Spruson & Ferguson.

5. At that time, 7 May 1997, I was aware of the commercial importance of the patent to the patentee and was aware that the patentee was attempting to negotiate a licence with Total Peripherals Pty Limited, an Australian company.

6. In view of the commercial importance of the patent to the patentee, it was not necessary for me to seek instructions in relation to whether or not the patent should be maintained in force as it was the wish of the patentee, as expressed verbally to me by officers of the patentee, that every effort should be made to ensure that the patent became, and remained, in force.

7. The section 223 application in respect of the 1996 renewal fee was opposed and the opposition was decided in favour of the patentee by means of a decision dated 17 March 1998.

8. By means of a facsimile dated 24 April 1998 I was advised that the allowance of the section 223 request would be advertised in the Official Journal of Patents dated 14 May 1998 and was very surprised to be told that the patent had now ceased due to failure to pay the 1997 renewal fee.

9. The 1997 renewal fee was paid on 29 April 1998*.

10. I say the failure to pay the 1997 renewal fee by the due date of 16 May 1997 was due to an error on my part in not paying the 1997 renewal fee on receipt of the official letter of 2 May 1997.”

*Patent Office records indicate that this date was actually 1 May 1998 (rather than 29 April 1998).

A letter from the Australian Patent Office dated 4 June 1998 advised that the contents of the above declaration were insufficient to establish who was responsible for the payment of the 1997 renewal fee or what was the nature of the error or omission which lead to the failure for that fee to be timely paid. In response a second statutory declaration by Mr Old dated 25 June 1998 was filed providing further information and expressed in the following terms:

“1. I refer to my statutory declaration of 27 May 1998 in the above matter.

2. Spruson & Ferguson have had the carriage of the matter of the application for an extension of time under section 223 in respect of the above patent regarding the 1996 annuity which was not paid before its due date. Spruson & Ferguson were verbally entrusted with the carriage of the matter on 27 February 1997** by Mr Joseph F Villella, Jnr, Assistant General Counsel, Intellectual Property Law of the patentee, during his visit to Sydney on that date. Annexed hereto and marked FP01 is a copy of Mr Villella’s letter dated 14 April 1997 forwarding the executed affidavits of Miki Aridome and John Holcombe. As a consequence Spruson & Ferguson paid the 1996 annuity and was also responsible for the payment of any annuities which were required to be paid before the section 223 extension was completed.

3. Depending upon the length of time which elapses between the filing of a section 223 application and the due date for payment of the overlooked annuity, there may be none, one or several annuities due to be paid prior to the finalisation of the section 223 proceedings.

4. Since there was an advertisement in the Official Journal of Patents dated 22 May 1997 in relation to the section 223 extension, it follows that on the due date of 16 May 1997 the section 223 proceedings were not completed and therefore Spruson & Ferguson was responsible for the payment of the 1997 annuity.

5. Annexed hereto and marked FP02 is a copy of each of a fax dated 2 July 1997 from Mr Villella enclosing a letter dated 26 June 1997 from IBM Japan, Intellectual Property Department to Spruson & Ferguson and a facsimile dated 26 June 1997 from Davies Collison Cave enclosing an official letter dated 23 June 1997 sent to Davies Collison Cave in error. This correspondence makes it clear that in mid 1997 Spruson & Ferguson had the carriage of the matter, not Davies Collison Cave.

6. On 7 May 1997 following receipt of a letter dated 2 May 1997 from the Commissioner of Patents I made an error in assuming that the 1997 annuity would be due at the conclusion of the section 223 proceedings and for that reason did not take any action to enter the patent into Spruson & Ferguson's renewal system since this action would have been unnecessary had the section 223 proceedings been successfully opposed.

7. I did not become aware that the 1997 annuity was not due at the conclusion of the section 223 proceedings in respect of the 1996 fee until receipt of the Commissioner's facsimile dated 24 April 1998."

** At the hearing Mr Miller pointed out that the Liesegang declaration indicates that the actual date was 17 February 1997 (rather than 27 February 1997).

EVIDENCE

The evidence in support of the opposition consists of a statutory declaration by:

-     Geoffrey R DAVIDSON, patent attorney of Halford & Co., Sydney (the first Davidson declaration with Exhibits GRD-1 to GRD-3).

The evidence in answer consists of statutory declarations by:

-     Gregory M TURNER, patent attorney of Spruson & Ferguson, Sydney (with Exhibits GMT-1 to GMT-5).

-     David J KAPPOS, Assistant General Counsel, Intellectual Property Law of IBM World Trade Asia Corporation, Japan.

-     Robert B LIESEGANG, Director of Licensing of IBM World Trade Asia Corporation from 1993 to June 1999 (with Exhibits RBL-1 to RBL-6).

The evidence in reply consists of a statutory declaration by:

-     Geoffrey R DAVIDSON,  (the second Davidson declaration with Exhibits GRD-4 to GRD-6).

SUBMISSIONS

I summarise  Mr Davidson’s main submissions on behalf of the opponent as follows:

- The practice in relation to renewal fees due whilst a previous section 223 application is pending is set forth in an Official Notice in the Australian Official Journal of Patents (AOJP) on 4 February 1999. The Notice sets out that payment of the subsequent renewal fee is an independent action and its due date is not altered by the fact that a section 223 action is pending. If the section 223 action fails, the subsequent renewal fee will be refunded.

- There is insufficient evidence to sustain the case as set out in the two declarations by Fraser Old, that is that he had standing instructions to keep the patent in force without need for seeking instructions and that the 2 May 1997 official letter should have triggered him to proceed with payment of the 1997 renewal fee. This scenario is contrary to the well documented (in the previous section 223 opposition proceedings) internal procedures of IBM that renewal decisions are made by a Patent Portfolio Manager in the USA and not by IBM Japan nor IBM World Trade Asia Corporation.

- The 2 May 1997 official letter simply advised that that the extension of time application would be advertised, as set out in the Patent Regulations. It had no relevance to payment of the 1997 renewal fee and was not a trigger which should have caused Mr Old to automatically pay the 1997 fee. The timing of that official letter just before the 1997 renewal fee due date is a coincidence.

- It is not probable that Mr Old, without seeking instructions, would have automatically attended to payment of the 1997 renewal fee upon receipt of the 2 May 1997 official letter, even if he did perceive the need to pay the 1997 renewal fee while the previous extension of time was pending.

- There was an unexplained gap of 5 days from the Patent Office fax of 24 April 1998 until the fee was paid on 29 April 1998. Since no section 223 application accompanied the fee, why the delay on such an important matter? Or was that 5 days more than enough time in which to seek instructions as to whether or not to renew the patent?

- Mr Old’s declarations were made after he had found out that a major international corporation had let the patent lapse again in embarrassing circumstances. It would be easy to think “IBM didn’t attend to the renewal, I must have been meant to”, but the questions here are whether, on an objective level, he was the relevant person, did he commit an error and if so did this error cause the failure to pay the fee?

- With reference to the declaration of David Kappos, it is noted that Mr Kappos did not commence his position until mid-1998, well after the events now being considered. He can give no information on when, if at all, there was a decision made that IBM Japan not have an active entry in respect of the patent. This information is vital to the patentee’s case as it proves or disproves Mr Old’s retrospective assumption that he had been instructed by IBM to attend to any renewals without seeking instructions.

- With reference to the declaration of Robert Liesegang, it is noted that Mr Liesegang  was present at the time the relevant events were occurring, but is silent in respect of any decision not to reinstate the patent in IBM Japan renewal records.

- There is no evidence as to whether the patent would have been renewed if IBM had followed its well established patent renewal procedures in respect of this patent.

- With respect to paragraph 10 of the Liesegang declaration. If Mr Liesegang intended to give Mr Old instructions in relation to future renewal of the patent, when Spruson & Ferguson had previously had no involvement in this role, it is reasonable to expect that Mr Liesegang would have given Mr Old more clear and specific instructions on this point.

- With reference to the remainder of the Liesegang declaration, the mere fact that up to 17 February 1997 there had been licensing discussions with the opponent concerning this patent does not in its self amount to instructions to Mr Old to maintain the patent in force without need for further instructions. And again there should be no presumption that an error must have occurred unless this is supported by evidence. In the decision of the U.K. Appeal Tribunal in General Electric Company’s Patents (1973) RPC 707, the fact that the patent was licensed did not in itself mean that an error must be inferred.

- In a fast-moving field such as computer technology a patent can easily be perceived as valuable one day but can quickly become obsolete. A demonstrated eagerness to renew at one point in time cannot necessarily be assumed to carry through to a point in time even shortly thereafter.

- With reference to the Turner declaration, a couple of examples of the Patent Office not following the correct procedure for the payment of renewal fees whilst section 223 proceedings were pending does not establish that approach as systemic.

- The extension of time to pay the 11^th year renewal fee was granted on the basis that the rigid renewals procedures of the patentee had erroneously not been followed. It is stretching the bounds of credibility for an extension of time to now be sought to pay the 12^th year renewal fee on the farfetched basis of those strict procedures ceasing to apply in favour of some other purported undocumented procedure which is also claimed to have been erroneously not followed.

- It does not follow that there must have been an error or omission just because the renewal fee was not timely paid. Also it does not follow that if Mr Old made a mistake relating to the patent that there was a causal connection between that error and the failure for the fee to be timely paid.

- Subsequent payment of  future renewal fees by Spruson & Ferguson is not relevant to establishing the intentions of the patentee in the period of time leading up to the due date for the payment of the 12^th year renewal fee.

I summarise Mr Miller’s main submissions on behalf of the section 223 applicant as follows:

- The interests of the patentee are paramount since the patent “lives or dies “ with the extension.

- The public interest is otherwise provided for by section 223(9) and (10).

- Although the previous section 223 action in relation to the patent was also in relation to the failure for a renewal fee to be timely paid, the circumstances of the present section 223 action are significantly different.

- The evidence shows that:

IBM always intended that the patent be restored. The patentee’s intention is apparent from the earlier opposition and from the evidence of Liesegang.

Spruson & Ferguson had responsibility for attending to renewals over the period of the pendency of the section 223 matters. This stated in the second Old declaration and corroborated by Leisegang and Kappos. The continuance of responsibility is borne out by Spruson & Ferguson paying the subsequent renewal fees.

Due to an error, the fee was not paid within the time prescribed. The error was Mr Old’s in making a false assumption (based on a perceived practice of the Patent office) that the subject renewal fee could be “caught up” when the extension was finally allowed.

- It is not reasonable to expect that the patentee’s usual renewal procedures would cover all eventualities such as might arise in the course of protracted extension of time proceedings.

- It is understood that the Official Notice in the AOJP of 4/2/99, concerning the payment of renewal fees when a section 223 application is pending, resulted from the circumstances of the present action. It is also apparent that there was a need for such a statement to be made not least because a somewhat different practice  had been followed in the past by the Australian Patent Office (see the Turner declaration).

DECISION

In order that the discretionary provisions of section 223(2)(a) be enlivenable in relation to the present matter, it is necessary that I be satisfied that it was always the intention of the patentee that the renewal fee in question be timely paid and that the reason for the failure for that to be done was because of an error or omission by the person concerned or by his or her agent or attorney. The opponent does not concede that either of those prerequisites have been met.

Intent of the patentee

Since the extension of time sought by IBM to pay the 11^th year renewal fee was allowed under section 223(2)(a), both by the delegate of the Commissioner and upon review by the AAT, I consider that it follows that it has been established that it must have been IBM’s intention to pay the 11^th year fee by the due date.

However, as submitted by opponent, the fact that the 12^th year fee was not paid by the due date does beg the question as to whether IBM always intended to pay that fee by the due date or whether they decided to not renew the patent but have now changed their mind after the due date.

The opponent submits that just because the patent may have been considered to be valuable to IBM in the period of time immediately prior to the 11^th year fee due date, it is quite possible, particularly in a rapidly changing field such as computer technology, for the value of the patent to the patentee to have been reassessed as no longer being of significant value over a period of less than a year leading up to the 12^th year fee due date.

I consider that the Liesegang declaration, and Exhibits thereto, shows that from 1994 to February 1997 there was protracted dialog between IBM and Total Peripherals in relation to possible infringement and licensing of 579156. Mr Davidson drew my attention to the decision of the U.K. Appeal Tribunal in General Electric Company’s Patents,(supra) in which the existence of licensing agreements was held to be not conclusive as establishing intention to renew. I note that, but nevertheless consider that in the context of the present surrounding circumstances the intent to licence is at least to some extent indicative that the patent was considered to be of value at the relevant time by the patentee.

Other than the fact that the fee was not timely paid, there is nothing of substance before me to support the opponent’s contention that IBM may have decided not to renew and later changed their mind. On the other hand the fact that IBM intended to timely pay the 11^th year fee, the determination exhibited by the patentee to gain extensions of time to pay the 11^th and 12^th renewal fees, and the licensing negotiations, are circumstances which are supportive of IBM's ongoing intention to timely pay the 12^th year fee. Notwithstanding that it is possible to speculate that IBM may have decided not to renew at the point in time presently under consideration, it is in my view more likely that they did intend to timely renew the patent.

In finding that there is little before me to support speculation that the patentee deliberately allowed the patent to again cease, I distinguish the present case from the circumstances in Reilly v Commissioner (1996) 36 IPR 314 and from those in the case discussed in Paracel Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner [1994] AIPC 91-053, in both of which it was shown that the annuity was not timely paid because as at the due date a deliberate decision had been made to not renew.

So, in the present case, what was the reason for the failure for the 12^th year renewal fee to be paid by the due date?

Error or omission?

The extension of time is sought under the provisions of section 223(2)(a) which refers to “an error or omission by the person concerned or by his or her agent or attorney”. Fraser Old, patent attorney of Spruson & Ferguson, has statutorily declared that he made an error which led to the failure for the renewal fee to be paid by the due date.

The opponent disputes that it has been established that responsibility for timely payment of the fee without seeking further client instructions had been vested in Mr Old and that consequently, in the absence of such instructions being provided to Mr Old, it could not have been because of any error or omission by Mr Old that the fee was not paid by the due date.

The Official Notice in the AOJP of 4 February 1999, in so far as it relates to payment of continuation or renewal fees when a section 223 application is pending, is expressed in the following terms:

“Situations sometimes arise where a request under s.223 has been filed to pay a continuation or renewal fee – and a subsequent anniversary passes after the request has been filed, but before the request is allowed.

If a s.223 request has been filed for the purpose of paying a continuation or renewal fee, applicants intending to maintain their application or patent should ensure that any continuation or renewal fees falling due after the date of the s.223 request, and before the date of allowance of that request, are timely paid – even though the s.223 request has not yet been allowed. If the s.223 request is not allowed, any continuation or renewal fee payments which are of no effect will be refunded.

Applicants should note that allowance of the s.223 request is not dependent on payment of the fee for that later anniversary – that there is no requirement or obligation for the Commissioner to inquire of the applicant whether they wish to pay any such fees. Consequently, failure to timely pay subsequent continuation or renewal fees while a s.223 request is pending may result in the application or patent being restored in respect of an historic period – but remaining lapsed or ceased as of the date of allowance of the request through failure to pay the later anniversary fees.”

The Turner declaration indicates an instance in October 1997 where staff of the Australian Patent Office appear to have assumed that, contrary to the practice later set forth in the above Notice, a subsequent renewal fee did not become due until any s.223 action was resolved. That, and the fact that the Australian Patent Office deemed it necessary to publish an Official Notice clarifying the matter, suggests to me that it is plausible that Mr Old could have made an erroneous assumption as to when the fee was due.

Furthermore, I consider it unreasonable to expect IBM’s standard renewals procedures to cover the unusual eventuality of what should happen in Australia when a renewal fee falls due whilst extension of time proceedings were still pending. In paragraph 6 of his second declaration, Mr Old declares that officers of the patentee made it clear to him that in view of the commercial importance of the patent every effort should be made to ensure that the patent remained in force. Given the unusual circumstances it seems entirely likely to me that IBM would have entrusted the doing of whatever it transpired was necessary, to maintain the patent in force, to an Australian patent attorney without the need for that attorney to seek any further instructions.

Again referring to the second declaration by Mr Old at paragraph 6, he states that the wishes of the patentee concerning Spruson & Ferguson’s role in maintaining the patent in force were “expressed verbally” to him. Notwithstanding that it would be more convincing if there were corroboration of that verbal expression, or if the patentee’s wishes in the matter had been expressed in writing so that a copy could have been provided, I have no reason to doubt the veracity of Mr Old’s statement on this point.

I believe that the balance of probabilities is that there was an error by Mr Old which led to the failure for the renewal fee to be timely paid, and that the nature of that error appears to reside, as declared by Mr Old, in his assuming that the 1997 annuity would only become due at the conclusion of the section 223 proceedings. It follows that I consider it more likely than not that had Mr Old been aware that in order for the patent  to remain in force (if and when subsequently restored) the 12^th year fee had to be paid by 16 May 1997 (regardless of the subsequent outcome of the pending section 223 proceedings), then he would have put a suitable reminder in place and then arranged for the fee to be paid by that date.

Other considerations

In the Federal Court decision Ferocem v Commissioner (1994) AIPC 91-057, Burchet J., in relation to a request for an extension of time under regulation 5.10, said:

"The determination of an application for an extension of time …. involves a balancing exercise, in which competing considerations must be taken into account."

In the present matter I need to take into account the public interest and the respective interests of the parties to the present action.

I consider that the evidence provided by IBM in support of the extension of time sought is sufficiently complete and frank to support the conclusion that there was a relevant error or omission.

Given that Mr Old became aware that the patent had remained ceased on 24 April 1998, the renewal fee was paid on 1 May 1998 and the section 223 application was made on 27 May 1998, there does not appear to have been any significant delay on behalf of IBM in attempting to rectify the standing of the patent.

Davies J in Chalk  v Commissioner for Superannuation (1994) 50 FCR 150 at 155:

"A legislative provision providing for the exercise of a discretion to extend time is beneficial in nature and should be applied beneficially "

This statement was reiterated, apparently with approval, in the context of consideration of the operation of the provisions of section 223(2) of the Patents Act 1990 in the decision of the AAT in Sanyo Electric Co. Ltd. v Commissioner of Patents (1996) AIPC 91-283 at 37844.

In Board of Control of Michigan Technological University v Deputy Commissioner of Patents (1982) 52 AOJP 1992, the AAT, in relation to a request for an extension of time under section 160 of the Patents Act 1952, said:

“In my view, time should be extended in favour of the applicant unless the public interest can be seen to prevail over the applicant’s interest.”

In relation to the respective interests of the parties to the present action, I note that infringement in Australia is a potential issue in relation to Australian patent no. 579156. However, in relation to that, I also note that the public interest in general, and the interests of Total Peripherals in particular, are protected in situations such as the present by the provisions of section 223(10):

"Infringement proceedings cannot be brought in respect of an infringement committed:

(a) …

(b) between the day on which the patent ceases and the day on which it is restored."

None of the material before me is indicative that either the public interest or the interests of Total Peripherals would be unfairly prejudiced by the granting of an extension.

CONCLUSION

In the light of the totality of circumstances, I exercise my discretion in favour of IBM and grant the extension of time sought.

COSTS

I am not aware of any reason why costs should not follow the event.

That being the case, I award costs against Total Peripherals Pty Limited.

A.S. Moore
Delegate of the Commissioner of Patents

Patent attorneys for the applicant  :  Spruson & Ferguson, Sydney

Patent attorneys for the opponent  :  Halford & Co., Sydney