Interleasing (Australia) Limited v Tieman Industries (in liq)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Interleasing (Australia) Limited v Tieman Industries (in liq) [2015] FCA 1120

Citation: Interleasing (Australia) Limited v Tieman Industries (in liq) [2015] FCA 1120
Parties: INTERLEASING (AUSTRALIA) LIMITED ACN 008 589 562 v TIEMAN INDUSTRIES PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) ACN 004 517 953, SEBASTIAN DAVID HAMS, RAHUL GOYAL AND BRYAN WEBSTER IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS THE JOINT AND SEVERAL LIQUIDATORS (FORMERLY THE JOINT AND SEVERAL ADMINISTRATORS) OF TIEMAN INDUSTRIES PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) ACN 004 517 953, WASTECH FIELD SERVICE PTY LTD ACN 607 776 894 AS TRUSTEE FOR THE WASTECH FIELD SERVICE TRUST ABN 81 494 136 790, THIRD ZETON PTY LTD ACN 607 463 972 and THIRD ZETON IP PTY LTD ACN 607 861 227
File number: NSD 1158 of 2015
Judge: GLEESON J
Date of judgment: 22 October 2015
Catchwords:

CORPORATIONS – application for leave to proceed pursuant to Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 500(2) – where case involves proprietary claim – leave granted

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether proceeding should be transferred to Victorian District Registry – where applicant’s primary place of business in New South Wales – where convenience of applicant and respondents point in different directions – circumstances do not warrant a transfer of proceeding  

Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 500(2)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 48
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 2.02
Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth)
Cases cited:

In the matter of Bigdeal Artist Management Pty Ltd (in liquidation) [2015] NSWSC 936
Leda Holdings Pty Ltd v Securcorp Ltd [2013] FCA 1364
Mulhern v Pearce [2013] FCA 1138
National Mutual Holdings Pty Ltd v The Sentry Corporation (1988) 19 FCR 155
Oliveri v PM Sulcs & Associates Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1311
Pozzebon (Trustee) v Australian Gaming and Entertainment Ltd, in the matter of Australian Gaming and Entertainment Ltd (in liq) [2014] FCA 1034; (2014) 225 FCR 305
Re Interwest Hotels Pty Ltd (in liq) (1993) 12 ACSR 78
Richardson v Lo Pilato (liquidator), in the matter of Trojan Hospitality (ACT) Pty Limited (in liq) [2014] FCA 888
Toll (FGCT) Pty Limited v Alphapharm Pty Limited [2004] HCA 52; (2004) 219 CLR 165

Date of hearing: 16 October 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 41
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr AP Lo Surdo SC
Solicitor for the Applicant: HWL Ebsworth Lawyers
Counsel for the First and Second Respondents: Mr DH Mitchell
Solicitor for the First and Second Respondents: Minter Ellison
Counsel for the Third, Fourth and Fifth Respondents: The Third, Fourth and Fifth Respondents did not appear

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1158 of 2015

BETWEEN:

INTERLEASING (AUSTRALIA) LIMITED ACN 008 589 562
Applicant

AND:

TIEMAN INDUSTRIES PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) ACN 004 517 953
First Respondent

SEBASTIAN DAVID HAMS, RAHUL GOYAL AND BRYAN WEBSTER IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS THE JOINT AND SEVERAL LIQUIDATORS (FORMERLY THE JOINT AND SEVERAL ADMINISTRATORS) OF TIEMAN INDUSTRIES PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION)…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 1120
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Interleasing (Australia) Limited v Tieman Industries (in liq), the Federal Court of Australia was tasked with determining whether Interleasing (Australia) Limited, the applicant, should be granted leave to proceed with a proprietary claim against Tieman Industries, the respondent, pursuant to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The central issue revolved around the interpretation of contractual agreements, specifically the Master Agreement and the Related Corporation Nomination Form, to ascertain whether Tieman Industries contracted with Interleasing in its own capacity or in its capacity as trustee of the Tieman Unit Trust. Additionally, the court considered whether the proceeding should be transferred to the Victorian District Registry of the Federal Court given the applicant's primary place of business in New South Wales.

The court examined the relevant provisions of the deed of agreement, particularly clause 3.4, which governs the jurisdiction and applicable law. The liquidators argued that this clause pointed towards the Victorian Registry as the appropriate venue for the litigation. However, the court disagreed, finding that a reasonable person would interpret the clause as referring to the Federal Court of Australia, rather than the Victorian Registry. The court also highlighted that the convenience of the parties did not strongly favour either jurisdiction, and thus, did not warrant a transfer of the proceeding at that stage.

Ultimately, the court granted the applicant leave to proceed with the proprietary claim, finding that the applicant had a case to argue that it held security interests warranting the relief sought. The court also dismissed the interlocutory application and awarded costs to the applicant. The decision underscored the importance of the proper interpretation of jurisdictional clauses and the balance of convenience in determining the appropriate forum for litigation.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant be granted leave nunc pro tunc pursuant to s 500(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) to commence and proceed with this proceeding against the first respondent on condition that no step be taken to enforce any judgment which might be obtained against the first respondent without the prior leave of the Court.

2. The interlocutory application dated 9 October 2015 be dismissed.

3. The costs of the application be the applicant’s costs in the cause.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the following reasons, I have concluded that the applicant should be granted leave to proceed. The matter should not be transferred to the Victorian District Registry.Background to interlocutory applications According to Interleasing’s solicitor, Mr Whatley, the primary and substantive issue to be determined by the Court is whether Tieman Industries contracted with Interleasing in its own capacity or in its capacity as trustee when it entered into various contractual agreements for the vehicles. According to Interleasing’s solicitor, the primary dispute will turn upon the proper construction of a document called the “Master Agreement” dated 14 December 2011 including the “Standard Terms and Conditions for Leases, Commercial Hire Purchase Agreements and Asset Management Services” (“Master Agreement”), and a document called the “Related Corporation Nomination Form” (“RCN Form”) executed on or about 14 December 2011. The liquidators will contend that:(a)The grantor of the security interests was Tieman Industries in its capacity as trustee of the Tieman Unit Trust;(b)Interleasing had registered its security interests on the Personal Property Securities Register against the ACN of Tieman Industries and not the ABN of the Tieman Unit Trust, and registration against the ABN of the Trust was required by s 153 of the PPSA;(c)As Interleasing registered its security interests against the wrong grantor, Interleasing’s security interests were unperfected at the time of the appointment of the administrators; and(d)By s 267 of the PPSA, the unperfected security interests vested in Tieman Industries immediately prior to the appointment of the administrators. There is likely to be a factual question about whether Tieman Industries traded only in its capacity as trustee of the Tieman Unit Trust. There is a deed of agreement dated 3 September 2015 between Tieman Industries, in its own capacity and as trustee of the Tieman Unit Trust, the administrators of Tieman Industries, Wastech, ANZ and Interleasing (“deed of agreement”). The recitals to the deed of agreement provide that the parties agreed to enter into the deed to protect Interleasing’s asserted interest in 40 of the 68 vehicles to the extent that it is found, either by agreement or determination of the Court, to be valid. The deed of agreement contains the following provisions:2.1 Resolution of DisputeThe parties irrevocably and unconditionally agree and acknowledge that:(a)the dispute between Interleasing, the Vendor and the Administrators concerning the Asserted Interest is to be determined either by:(i)written agreement between Interleasing, the Vendor and the Administrators; or(ii)final determination by a Court of competent jurisdiction which:(A) is not subject to an appeal; and/or(B)which does not fall within any period in which that determination can be appealed…And3.4 Governing law and jurisdiction(a) This deed is governed by the laws in force in Victoria.(b)The parties submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Victoria and the Federal Court of Australia and any courts that may hear appeals from those courts about any proceedings in connection with this deed.Legal frameworkLeave to proceed

Decision

Reasons for decision

I do not accept the liquidators’ construction of clause 3.4 of the deed of agreement. Assuming (without deciding) that clause 3.4 applies to the proceeding, a reasonable person would understand that clause to provide for disputes to be determined in the Federal Court of Australia, and not to the Victorian Registry of the Court: cf Toll (FGCT) Pty Limited v Alphapharm Pty Limited [2004] HCA 52; (2004) 219 CLR 165 at [40]. Accordingly, I do not accept that the deed of agreement points towards the Victorian Registry as the appropriate venue for the litigationConclusions I do not agree that the present case has an “intensely strong Victorian flavour”: cf Leda Holdings Pty Ltd v Securcorp Ltd [2013] FCA 1364. The convenience of the applicant and the liquidators points in different directions, but the circumstances do not warrant a transfer of the proceeding, at least not at this stage of the litigation. I do not consider that, having decided that the proceeding should not be transferred, the applicant should not be granted leave to proceed. It plainly has a case to be argued that it has security interests that justify the relief it seeks.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined the statutory provision under section 500(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) for leave to proceed with a proprietary claim. The court found that the applicant had a case to be argued that it had security interests that justify the relief sought. Consequently, the applicant was granted leave nunc pro tunc to proceed with the claim.

Regarding the transfer to the Victorian District Registry, the court balanced the convenience of the parties. While the applicant's primary place of business was in New South Wales, the liquidators' connection to Victoria was significant. The court held that the circumstances did not warrant a transfer at that stage of the litigation, noting that the case did not have an "intensely strong Victorian flavour."

The court also addressed the issue of jurisdiction as stipulated in the deed of agreement. It interpreted clause 3.4 to indicate that disputes should be determined in the Federal Court of Australia, rejecting the liquidators' argument that the Victorian Registry was the appropriate venue. This interpretation was supported by the decision in Toll (FGCT) Pty Limited v Alphapharm Pty Limited. The binding legal principle established is that in cases involving proprietary claims and specific jurisdictional clauses in deeds of agreement, the Federal Court of Australia is the appropriate forum for resolving such disputes.