Interchase Co Ltd v Colliers Jardine
[1995] QSC 124
•26 June 1995
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF QUEENSLAND
No. 520 of 1995
Brisbane
[Interchase Co. Ltd v. Colliers Jardine & Ors]
BETWEEN
INTERCHASE CORPORATION LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION)
(A.C.N. 010 663 993)
Plaintiff
AND
COLLIERS JARDINE (QLD) PTY LTD
First Defendant
AND
MICHAEL GEORGE TIDBOLD
Second Defendant
AND
GROSVENOR HILL (QUEENSLAND) PTY LIMITED
(FORMERLY KNOWN AS HILLIER PARKER (QUEENSLAND) PTY LTD)Third Defendant
AND
BRIAN MOFFAT WAGHORNFourth Defendant
JUDGMENT - SHEPHERDSON J.
Judgment delivered 26 June 1995
CATCHWORDS: Corporations Law - application for security for costs by 3rd and 4th defendants - s.1335 Corporations Law - liquidators of plaintiff control $3.116 million in cash funds. Lengthy and complex trial likely - dispute as to likely quantum of applicant defendants costs - dispute as to length of trial. Security for costs ordered.
Counsel:Fraser Q.C. and Quinn for applicants
Morrison Q.C. and McKenna for respondent plaintiff
Solicitors:Ebsworth and Ebsworth for applicants
Feez Ruthning for respondent
Hearing date: 28 April 1995
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF QUEENSLAND
No. 520 of 1995
Brisbane
[Interchase Co. Ltd v. Colliers Jardine & Ors]
BETWEEN
INTERCHASE CORPORATION LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION)
(A.C.N. 010 663 993)
Plaintiff
AND
COLLIERS JARDINE (QLD) PTY LTD
First Defendant
AND
MICHAEL GEORGE TIDBOLD
Second Defendant
AND
GROSVENOR HILL (QUEENSLAND) PTY LIMITED
(FORMERLY KNOWN AS HILLIER PARKER (QUEENSLAND) PTY LTD)
Third Defendant
AND
BRIAN MOFFAT WAGHORNFourth Defendant
JUDGMENT - SHEPHERDSON J.
Judgment Delivered 26 June 1995
The abovenamed third and fourth defendants have sought an order that the abovenamed plaintiff give sufficient security for the costs of the third and fourth defendants in this action and that the plaintiff pay their costs of and incidental to this application to be taxed.
The plaintiff respondent which is in liquidation opposes the application. The application is made under s.1335 of The Corporations Law which reads:-"1335(1) Where a corporation is plaintiff in any action or other legal proceeding, the court having jurisdiction in the matter may, if it appears by credible testimony that there is reason to believe that the corporation will be unable to pay the costs of the defendant if successful in his, her or its defence, require sufficient security to be given for those costs and stay all proceedings until the security is given.
(2) The costs of any proceeding before a court under this law shall be borne by such party to the proceeding as the court in its discretion directs."
The section requires me to answer two questions. In Southern Cross Exploration N.L. v. Fire and All Risks Insurance Co Limited (1985) 1 NSWLR 114 Waddell J. described them thus:-
"The first may be described as a threshold question. It is, whether, having regard to the whole of the evidence before the court, there is credible testimony by which it appears that there is reason to believe that the plaintiffs will be unable to pay the costs of the defendants if successful in their defence. If this question is answered, yes, the second question arises which is whether, in the exercise of the discretion given to the court by the subsection, the relief sought should be granted wholly or in part or should be refused."
Quite a large amount of affidavit evidence has been filed. In addition, some short oral evidence in cross-examination of Alexander John Wilson has been led.
The material before me shows (inter alia) the following facts:-(a)that the liquidators' accounts and statements filed in the Office of the Australian Securities Commission up to 19 October 1994 disclosed that the amount available but not distributed to creditors and shareholders totalled $2,825,323.26 and that proofs of debt had been received and admitted in the sum of $153,783,905.80;
(b)that the applicants' costs of this action to its conclusion (after an estimated 35 day trial) are (on a party and party basis) some $1.8 million;
(c)that as recently as 1 March 1995, the plaintiff's solicitors informed the applicant's solicitors that they had advised their client that it was not appropriate that any security for costs be given "in view of the substantial fund of cash which is held and the priority position which any order for costs your clients obtain (assuming they could obtain any such order) would enjoy out of that fund;"
(d)the parties now before me cannot agree on the likely length of the trial - the respondent plaintiff estimates 15 days and the applicants 35 days. The first and second defendants estimate a 20 day hearing.
The plaintiff's claims against the applicant third and fourth defendants are for damages for breach of contract and negligence in advising the plaintiff the value of the Myer Centre. Similar claims are made against the first and second defendants.
The applicants sought lengthy particulars of the statement of claim. There appears to be a dispute as to whether all particulars and certain documents have been supplied to the present applicants. Nevertheless the present applicants have delivered a defence reserving their right to amend and seek costs.
The applicants have concerns relating to a company described in paragraph 11. of the statement of claim as the Chase Group. This paragraph alleges a retainer of the third defendant as a valuer to provide a certain valuation. The applicant's solicitor has sworn that this group comprises some 281 companies and that considerable investigative work may need to be done in order to detect the basis upon which payments alleged in paragraphs 23 and 30 of the statement claim may have arisen as it is said they may be indirect, for example, by way of payments to builders, subcontractors, banks, financiers, other group companies and third parties.
The estimate of the trial costs of the applicants includes provision for an estimated 50 writs of non party discovery to parties such as the financiers and institutional investors of the plaintiff and its auditors and the services of a forensic accountant investigating the 281 companies in the Chase group.
For their part the respondent says that such procedures evince an attitude by the present applicants to stifle the litigation or alternatively the taking of every possible interlocutory step in an attempt to wear down the liquidators of the plaintiff.
In a letter dated 26 April 1995 addressed to the applicants' solicitors the respondent's solicitors said:-"We have instructions from the liquidators to make, on an open basis, an offer to undertake to all defendants that:-
(i)the liquidators will report every three months commencing in May 1995 as to the current balance of money invested which is available for distribution to unsecured creditors;
(ii)in any event the balance of those funds will not drop below $700,000 until the final completion of this action including the taxation of any costs orders which may be made against Interchase."
In this letter the plaintiffs' solicitors have gone on to say:-
The figure of $700,000 is based upon an estimate of costs of $350,000 each for the first and second, and third and fourth defendants, respectively for the conduct of this action. We believe this offer is reasonable, particularly bearing in mind the estimate provided by the first and second defendants.
The liquidators also advise that they have no present intention to pay a dividend. Should their position change and they believe that they should pay a dividend they will give you 1 month's notice before doing so."
Mr Fraser Q.C. who with Mr Quinn appeared for the applicants submitted that his clients are not bound by any estimate given by the first and second defendants and that his clients are to be free to conduct their defence as they may be advised. It seems that there may well be a substantial difference between the first and second defendants on the one hand and the third and fourth defendants on the other as to the manner in which their respective defences will be conducted. Damages are in issue as well as liability. The damages claimed are estimated to exceed $150 million. The solicitors for the first and second defendants estimate their clients' likely costs of the action to be about $463,000. This estimate comes from James McLellan a legal costs assessor.
The applicants have expressed concern at the frequency and quantum of certain payments which have been made by the liquidators of the plaintiff to the present solicitors for the plaintiff such payments relating to affairs of the plaintiff. Exhibit "DJC5" to the affidavit of Dennis John Cronin filed on 18 April 1995 on behalf of the applicants, lists in two sheets a schedule of payments to Feez Ruthning and a schedule of payments to Price Waterhouse. The payments to Feez Ruthning in the period 18 September 1991 to 7 June 1994 (both dates inclusive) total $1,664,078.16. The respondent's solicitor Alexander John Wilson a partner of Feez Ruthning, in an affidavit sworn on 28 April 1995 has said that "Of this amount only a relatively small amount ($10,000 to $20,000) relates directly to preparation of this case". In that same affidavit he has given broad details of other work his firm has done on behalf of the liquidators, such work being said by Mr Wilson to be "considerable" and "not related to this litigation".
I mention now that in cross-examination on 28 April 1995 Mr Wilson was unable to give with any greater particularity the amount paid to his firm by the liquidators in connection with this present case. He did swear that his firm bills the liquidators monthly for all matters concerning the plaintiff. He said of the present action "This case is the last major event left, so from now on it is the majority of this case and last month I think there was not much else than this case". He thought that in the last month [i.e. March 1995] Feez Ruthning billed about $25,000 which he described as "substantial preparation for this case". He thought that on 28 April 1995, that there might be $50,000 outstanding from the liquidators and certainly no more than two months outstanding.
I should at this stage say that the liquidators were first appointed provisional liquidators of the plaintiff in April 1991. Mr Wilson has deposed to there having been a public examination in the Federal Court - which I assume related to the plaintiff - and that public examination lasted 11 days. He has sworn that during the public examination the second and third defendants in the present action were cross-examined extensively about the manner in which they undertook their valuations and he has particularised three aspects. He has sworn that the statement of claim delivered in the action is based on material obtained during the public examination, that the transcript evidence (presumably from the public examination) will be used in the trial of this action and should substantially assist the defendants to prepare the case they have to answer in this action. He has further sworn that the defendants were represented by counsel at the public examination and that the documents produced at the public examination were reviewed by the solicitors then acting for the defendants (a different firm from the one now acting for the defendants) before production. I infer that the production there referred to is production at the public examination.
In his affidavit sworn on 28 April 1995, Mr Wilson has set out the steps which he considers appropriate for case management of this action. If his views are correct, he estimates the trial will last approximately three weeks, which I interpret as 15 days. Reading the correspondence passing between the solicitors for the parties has led me to conclude that there appears to be some feeling between the respective solicitors. I have already mentioned the offer made on 26 April 1995. That letter asked the applicants' solicitors to advise whether or not the present applicants would discontinue their application for security for costs on the basis of the offer. Obviously the applicants did not accede to that request.
Mr Wilson's affidavit sworn on 28 April 1995, shows also:-(a)at that date the liquidators of the plaintiff and its wholly owned subsidiary Interchase Management Services Pty Ltd held $3,116,000 available for distribution to creditors;
(b)that the above funds were invested earning interest at 7.55% p.a. until 3 May 1995;
(c)that the plaintiff has paid all its admitted unsecured creditors but there is one alleged unsecured creditor for approximately $300,000 whose claim is disputed by the liquidators: this alleged creditor has disputed the liquidators' rejection of the proof of debt but has taken no steps in that action for over a year;
(d)the plaintiff has approximately $132 million of unpaid note holders who it is said "pursuant to relevant trust deed are subordinated to all other unsecured creditors;"
(e)the present litigation is the major aspect left in the administration of the winding up of the plaintiff.
The above offer made by the respondent plaintiff's solicitors has been rejected. Mr Fraser has expressed concern that payments to the plaintiffs' solicitor will continue to be made with the result that if the applicants succeed in the action and gain an order for costs against the plaintiff there will be insufficient funds available to pay these costs. This concern is based on an inference contained in the offer that the present funds totalling $3.116 million could drop below $700,000 when the action is concluded and any costs orders against the plaintiff are taxed. On the material before me Mr Wilson estimates the costs of the four defendants should be $700,000 and he has estimated $350,000 for each of the two lots of defendants.
I note also that in that same letter of 26 April 1995 written to the applicant's solicitors, Mr Wilson referred to the solicitors for the first and second defendants having "only claimed approximately $463,000 for recoverable party and party costs" and having estimated "only a four week trial." I have already mentioned these aspects but the letter of 26 April 1995 apprised the applicants of these facts - if they were previously unaware of them.
I must take account of the plaintiff's costs for prosecuting this action. By 28 April 1995, Mr Wilson had not formed an estimate of the total costs, solicitor and own client and party and party that his firm will be charging the plaintiff for the whole of the litigation. Later in his oral evidence he did say that if the action is case managed in the way he proposes and with a three week only trial, he "would estimate $150,000 for the trial and somewhere between that and double that prior to the trial." He has based that estimate on previous actual cases, but Mr Wilson's estimate of the plaintiff's costs and I assume them to be solicitor and client could be as high as $450,000 for a 15 day trial.
Assuming the costs are $450,000 and that the first and second defendants' costs are $460,000 the total of their costs will come to $910,000 (estimate only). Of course, if the trial runs longer than four weeks and does last as long as 7 weeks (the applicants' estimate) it is not difficult to see that the total costs of the plaintiff and the party and party costs of the first and second defendants could be as high as $1,200,000. I base that estimated increase upon ex."DJC7" to the affidavit of Mr Cronin filed on 18 April 1995 in which the costs assessors Hickey and Garrett have estimated the costs of the applicants (including 2 Counsel) for the second and subsequent days of a 35 day trial at $307,015. This approximates $8,300 per day. If the figures there shown are reasonably accurate one can reasonably forecast that it may well cost each of the plaintiff, the first and second defendants (together) and the third and fourth defendants (together ) some $8,300 for each day the case runs. I assume there will be 2 Counsel for each of the 3 lots of parties. The plaintiff will have these costs for a further 20 days and the first and second defendants for a further 15 days.
For the present funds of $3.116 million to reduce to below $700,000 after allowance is made for the plaintiff's estimated costs and the first and second defendants' estimated costs of a 35 day trial (say $1,200,000) the $3.116 million will need to be reduced by some $1.2 million.
Now there is, as between the applicants and the respondent, a presently insoluble dispute. That is - what is the likely quantum of the applicants' costs of this action including the trial? Incorporated in this dispute is a subsidiary but nevertheless an essential component and it is also in dispute - will the trial last 15 days, 20 days or 35 days? If the applicants are correct in their estimate of $1.8 million for their party and party costs as opposed to the respondent's estimate of $350,000 then, when the above figure of $1.2 million is looked at one can readily see there may be reason to believe that the respondent will be unable to pay the applicant defendants' costs if those defendants succeed in their application. The presence of the disputed proof of debt of $300,000 cannot be overlooked - litigation is en train but dormant.
As to the threshold question raised by s.1335, Mr Morrison Q.C. who with Mr McKenna appeared for the respondent plaintiff, has submitted that this cannot be answered in the applicant's favour. He based this submission upon evidence that all secured creditors of the plaintiff have been paid, that all normal unsecured creditors have been paid (save for the above disputed claim for $300,000), that there is some $3.116 million in the liquidators control and that the only remaining creditors are subordinated as to the entirety of their debts both principal and interest and that the resolution of this present action is the last major step in the liquidation of the plaintiff.
The submission depends heavily upon Mr Wilson's estimate of the applicants' costs being some $350,000 or thereabouts rather than the $1.8 million estimated by the applicant's costs expert.
I am not prepared to act on Mr Wilson's estimates as opposed to the quite detailed estimate given in bill of costs form by Messrs Hickey and Garrett, legal cost assessors (ex."DJC7" to the affidavit of Mr Cronin filed 18 April 1995). Mr Wilson is not privy to the manner in which the present applicants wish to conduct their defence. True it is that there has been the 11 day public examination and that documents tendered there are known to both sides in this case. However, I cannot and do not dispute the right of the applicants to conduct their defence as they see fit. Whether the estimated 50 writs of non party discovery will in fact be issued and proceed and whether the services of forensic accountants will in fact be required is impossible to say. The cost of the latter is estimated at some $250,000 and is part of the $1.8 million estimate.
Further, whether the costs incurred in taking those steps (if they are taken) are necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or maintaining or defending the applicants' rights is not for me to say at this stage of the proceedings. Whether O.91 r.82 will apply to such costs or any of them will be a matter for the taxing officer and if he enters the picture it will be in the future.
There is no doubt that the applicants face a substantial claim from the plaintiff for damages, liability for which is said to be on at least one of two pleaded bases.
In my view, because the applicants and their lawyers are the persons privy to the manner in which their defence is being conducted and will be conducted and because the estimates of the costs assessors (ex."DJC7") are given in reliance on instructions from the applicants' lawyers I see no reason to go behind their estimates totalling some $1.8 million. Those estimates are divided into two parts. The first part is professional costs and estimated disbursements to and including the first day of the trial - $1,304,185.50. The second part is costs in relation to the second and subsequent days for the hearing - the 34 remaining days, these total $307,015.
I should add that these two parts do not contain any figure for the forensic accountants.
The applicants have a letter from a partner of Ernst and Young estimating the accountants costs at $250,000 - this is a broad estimate and is based on a number of uncertainties set out in a letter dated 12 April 1995 from Ernst and Young to the applicants' solicitors.
Because I am unwilling to act on Mr Wilson's estimates of the applicants' costs there is really no evidence to contradict the estimates put before me by the applicants' solicitors.
If I accept as tolerably accurate the combined figures of Hickey and Garrett and Ernst and Young the costs of the applicants will be some $1.8 million for a 35 day trial.
Starting then with the present funds held by the liquidator at $3.116 million, assuming that the defendants succeed in their action the following is an estimate of the financial demands made on those monies:-Estimated costs of the applicants.................................................................................. $1,800,000
Costs of the plaintiff for a 15 day trial ............................................................................... 450,000
Costs of the 1st and 2nd defendants for a 20 day trial........................................................ 463,000
Estimated further costs of the plaintiff for 20 days at $8,300 per day.................................. 166,000
Estimated further costs of the 1st & 2nd defendants for 15 days at $8,300 per day............. 124,500
TOTAL $3,003,500
To that total there must be contingently added the disputed claim in respect of $300,000. The liquidators will probably incur further legal costs for this disputed claim. The total then exceeds the $3.116 million held at 28 April 1995. I recognise that interest will increase this sum.
Thus it may fairly be said that if the applicant defendants obtain an order for costs of this action against the plaintiff there is reason to believe that the plaintiff will be unable to pay those costs.
It may be said that the first question raised by s.1335 is being answered by me in the applicants' favour by a narrow margin. Nevertheless, that margin is such that in my view the justice of this case and the purpose of s.1335 require that answer.
The costs of the plaintiff are but estimates without any detail as opposed to the costs of the applicants which although estimates are detailed in the manner set out in ex."DJC7". There is evidence of some detailed estimate by the first and second defendants' costs given their costs assessor McLellan.
I consider it not unreasonable that I allow as I have done in the above exercise for a likelihood that the estimates of these costs of the plaintiff and the first and second defendants may well move upwards. Also, the charges of the liquidators (as opposed to their costs) have to brought to account and I have no details of these.
I am unable to accept Mr Morrison's submission that on any view of the evidence there are ample funds to meet any costs orders which the applicant defendants might obtain if successful in this action.
I should add that while costs of $1.8 million may at first blush appear very high indeed, I note that in Australian Commercial Research and Development Limited v. Commonwealth of Australia (Appeal No. 98 of 1994) the Court of Appeal had no difficulty in the circumstances of that case in ordering the plaintiff to give security for costs to the defendant in defending the action to the satisfaction of the Registrar in the sum of $4 million. Those were costs for discovery only. Furthermore, the plaintiff in that case was not insolvent.
Having answered the first question in favour of the applicants I turn now to the second question which involved the exercise of the discretion whether or not to order security for costs. It is a discretion to be exercised in all the circumstances of the case and there is no burden one way or the other (see Harpur v. Ariadne Australia Limited (1984) 2 Qd.R. 523 at p.529). That case dealt with the predecessor to s.1335.
In Ariadne Mr Justice Connolly, with whose reasons the other members of the Court agreed said (at p.529):-"... no gloss should be put upon the legislative provision and indeed it needs none. For practical purposes once the legislature has made it legitimate to regard the lack of means of the plaintiff and its likely inability to meet an order for costs, this must always be a consideration of great weight and it will frequently be the determining factor."
I pause to say that in this case, because of the $3.116 million presently held invested, the plaintiff is not entirely without means. The question is the extent to which those means will be available to meet an order for costs in favour of the applicants.
Other relevant principles which I take into account in the exercise of this discretion are:-
Impecuniosity of a plaintiff should not deny him his day in court (Harpur v. Ariadne (supra) at pp.527-8);
As a matter a law any one factor is not to predispose the court to a decision one way or another (Harpur v. Ariadne p.530);
The object of the section is to protect the party who is brought to court against the possibility that the plaintiff, if unsuccessful, will be unable to meet an order for costs.
One circumstance here is that the plaintiff's claim is a substantial one as I have already indicated. Before I consider further the relief claimed, I refer to Mr Morrison's argument that any costs ordered in favour of the present applicants will be part of the costs and expenses of the liquidation and therefore have priority over subordinated creditors. He relies especially on the above decision in Re Pacific Coast Syndicate Limited (supra). That case - a decision of Neville J. in the Chancery division decided that whenever after the commencement of a winding up an action is commenced by the liquidator in the name of the company and judgment is given for costs against the company, whether the order is merely for costs or whether it directs the costs to be paid out of the assets of the company or whether the liquidator is ordered to pay the costs with liberty to recoup himself afterwards out of the assets of the company, the party entitled to the costs is entitled to payment of them before the costs of the liquidator are paid (see p.28).
Mr Morrison has argued that the applicants are in effect secured for their costs if successful in this action. With respect I do not entirely agree. The case means that if the applicants obtained an order for costs against the present plaintiff, they have priority only over the liquidators' costs. The case is still regarded as good law. I have been assisted by counsel and more particularly by an article "Aspects of Official Liquidators' Personal Liability for Costs of Litigation Part 1" by G.J. Hamilton (1989) 7 Companies and Securities Law Journal 262.
At p.273 Mr Hamilton, in discussing In Re Pacific Coast Syndicate Limited said this:-"As a result of the liquidators previous payments the effect of that order was to require the liquidator personally to pay some £213. At the date the applicants obtained judgment the liquidator held £500 out of which he paid some £375 for costs to his own solicitors and some debts of the company, leaving him with £87 which he paid to the applicants in respect of their taxed costs of £300."
I pause to say that in the present case the action has been instituted in the name of the company.
Mr Hamilton went on to say this:-"It is important to note however, that there is no suggestion in Re Pacific Coast Syndicate Limited that the liquidator would have had any personal liability to pay the taxed costs of the applicants had their been no assets in his administration; the liquidator did not conduct the litigation in his own name and consequently the decision is not inconsistent with the general principles expounded in this paper."
The liquidators' costs of this litigation will probably have been paid in full to their solicitors by the time the judgment in this action has been given. A problem will arise if there are then insufficient assets available to meet an order for costs in favour of the present applicants. There is at present no suggestion that the liquidators will be personally liable for any part of those costs. The facts and the decision in In re Pacific Coast Syndicate Limited highlight the present applicants possible future difficulties in obtaining payment of their costs (if successful).
I turn now to the relief claimed by the plaintiff.
It is unnecessary to canvass it in any great detail. The plaintiff alleges retainer on or about 14 April 1988 of the third defendant to provide what was called "a completion date valuation" of the Myer Centre.
Such a valuation was required pursuant to a contract made by the plaintiff and another company ("PEQ") for developing a building known as the Myer Centre. The amount of the valuation could have and did have a bearing on the amount payable under the contract. A similar valuation from the first and second defendants was commissioned.
The third and fourth defendants provided the valuation. The valuations of the defendants led to the plaintiff paying some $17.5 million. Breaches of duty alleged against the present applicants concern capitalisation rate, rental of the Myer Centre, title problems covering support structures and encroachments. A Tenancy Schedule for the Myer Centre at May 1988 shows a very large number of tenants. The plaintiff alleges a sale of the Myer Centre on 18 July 1992 at a price very substantially less than that at which the defendants had valued it in 1988. It appears from the statement of claim that the pleading of this sale may mean that the plaintiff is relying on that sale as evidence of a negligent valuation made some 4 years earlier. It may also be relevant to damages. If the former it suggests a very tenuous connection with the 1988 valuation. The applicants may have a strong case in defence; at this stage I cannot say one way or the other.
It is quite apparent that this will be a complex and lengthy case. A large amount of money is at stake and as I have said, I see no reason why the present applicants should be obliged to defend themselves other than in accordance with the advice given them by their lawyers.
This is a matter where I consider I should exercise my discretion in favour of the applicants. As G.N. Williams J. said in Shannon v. Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (No.2) (1994) 2 QdR 563 at p.569:-"Generally it has not been the practice of the Court to order security for costs on a fully party and party basis, nor on an indemnity basis. Whilst the Court has regard to estimates made of future costs, there are other factors which cannot be ignored; for example, the action may collapse, it may be settled, and the plaintiffs may well be successful. There is a good summary of the discretionary factors relevant in determining quantum in Colbran, Security for Costs, (1993), at 288-289."
I have come to the conclusion that I should order and do order security for costs as follows.
I order the plaintiff to provide security for the costs of the third and fourth defendants in a form satisfactory to the Registrar of this Court up to and including the first day of the trial of this action in the sum of $750,000 and thereafter, again in a form satisfactory to the Registrar in the sum of $7,500 for each succeeding day of the trial of the action. It seems to me that there should be little difficulty in agreeing the form of security. No doubt the Registrar will bear in mind having the moneys set aside for security earn interest at a suitable rate.
I shall hear from the parties on costs.
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